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I  N T  R 0  D U C T  I  0  N 
The  Mines  Safety Commission,  which  was  set up  in virtue of  a  decision  (1) 
taken  by  the  governments  represented in the  Council  of Ministers  in the Council 
meeting of  9th and  lOth  May  1957,  has  so far  issued two  Reports  on its activities. 
The  first Report  covered  the  period 1957  and  1958  and  the second covered 
the  years  1959  and  1960. 
This,  the Third Report,  sets out  the activities of  the  Commission  during 
the  period  1961  to  1965. 
All  the  recommendations,  reports,  expert reports  and  guiding principles 
prepared by  the Working Parties and their sub-committees  and reported on  in detail 
hereafter,  were  presented,  in accordance with  the  terms  of reference of  the Mines 
Safety Commission,  to  the Community  Governments  and  to the interested authorities 
for  further  action or for  information;  this was  done  immediately  following  upon 
their acceptance  by  the Safety Commission. 
(1)  The  text of the  terms  of reference  and rules of procedure of  the Commission 
Annexes  XIV  and  XV,  pp.  155  and  159. PART  ONE 
ACTIVITIES  OF  THE  COMMISSION 13 
With  the  exception of  the examination of  a  new  programme  of work,  all the 
tasks of  the Working  Parties set up right at the beginning of  the Commission's 
activities were  carried out;  the Working Parties set up sub-committees  to examine 
various special  problems. 
The  following Working Parties dealt with  the technical  problems  of 
- "Fires  and Underground Combustion", 
- "Rescue  Arrangements", 
- "Winding Ropes  and Shaft Guides", 
- "Electrification". 
The  working  group  for  "Combustible Dusts"  was  set up  to establish a  new 
programme  of work,  but  this body  was  able  to start work  only at the  beginning of 
1966. 
Problems  associated with  human  factors were  dealt with  by  the  following 
Working  Parties  : 
"Psychological  and Sociological  Problems  of Safety in Mines", 
- "The  Effects of Working  Hours  on  Safety", 
- "The  Effects of  Systems  of  Payment  on Safety", 
- "Medical  Problems  of  a  Mine  Safety Policy". 
In each Working  Party  (1)  the chair was  occupied by  a  Government  repre-
sentative. 
(1)  The  membership of  the various Working Parties and their sub-committees is given 
in Annex  XVI,  together with  a  table of the meetings held. 15 
C  H A P  T  E  R  0  N E 
TECHNICAL  PROBLEMS 17 
A.- FIRES  AND  UNDERGROUND  COMBUSTION 
I.- Explosion-proof  fire stoppings 
1.  Plaster stoppings 
When  promulgating its Recommendation  regarding  the sealing-off of  open 
fires  and  beatings underground,  the  Mines  Safety Commission  declared,  in its 
plenary session of  20.12.60,  in favour  of  looking  for  new  designs  and mate-
rials to  be  used in the  erection of fire stoppings.  It was  unanimously  agreed 
that quite  a  considerable  number  of practical  tests.would have  to  be  carried 
out  to  provide  a  basis  for  developing  the  best  possible  design  of stopping 
to be  used against  fires where  there was  also  a  risk of explosion. 
At  the  request  of  the Safety Commission,  the  High  Authority  approved 
financial  support  for  a  programme  of  experiments  drawn  up  by  the Working 
Parties for  "Fires  and  Underground  Combustion"  and  "Rescue  Arrangements";  the 
practical execution of  this  programme  of trials was  entrusted to the Exper-
imental  Roadway  Association  in Dortmund with  the  cooperation of specialists 
from  the  Main  Mine  Rescue  Station at  Essen-Kray. 
The  main  question was  to  discover  the  extent  to which it was  possible  to 
replace  the hitherto conventional  sandbag  stoppings  - used in firefighting 
operations where  there  was  a  risk of  explosion' - by  stoppings made  of other 
materials,  which  might  make  erection of  the  stoppings  quicker,  easier  and 
less  dangerou~,  and which  m~ght also offer better resistance  to an  explosion. 
This  point  was  to  be  investigated by  means  of experimental  explosions against 
stoppings made  of  sandbags,  stonedust,  cement  and water,  plaster and water, 
water  bags  etc.  The  experimental  programme  was  commenced  in October  1961  and 
terminated in May  1963.  Out  of  a  total of  27  experimental  explosions,  11 
were  carried out using  plaster-and-water-bag stoppings. 
It was  clear  from  tqe  te~t results obtained that  the erection of  plaster 
stoppings  to seal  Off  qpen  Of  concealed fires underground offers considerable 
advantages,  this type  Ot  sto~ping having  given  the pest results with regard 
to rapidity of  ereGtio~ and  r,esistance  to explosion. 
The  principle of  the  aonst~uction of plaster stoppings  i~ that the plaster-
of-paris is pumped  in  pneymati~ally,  in a  di'y  state,  by  mea.n~ of compressed-
air reservoirs,  through hoses  so that it fills the  space  between  two  light 
lagging screens;  once  in  p~ace where  the  dam  is to  be  built,  the plaster is 
wetted.  Material  consumption is 75%  less than with  sandbag stoppings.  The 
~maller quantity of material required and  the use  of  pneumati~ transport 
reduce  the construction  time  and  the  number  of manshifts  to be  worked  to less 
tban half the  requirement  for  sandbag  stoppings.  Moreove~,  the  fact  that 
transport is by  hose  means  that  the material  can  be  carried over fairly  long 
distances,  and  the  task of  transporting it is lightened. 
One·major  advantage  from  the safety point·of view is that,  out of  the 
teams  involved in the work,  only  a  small  observer  group of  about  two  men  need 
remain  in the  direct  danger .area at the stopping construction site,  while all 
the  other men  can  be  much  f~rther away  (up  to 300m),  at  the  point where  the 
compressed-air reservoir is set up;  this means  that in most  instances  they 
are in a  flow  of fresh air. 
On  the basis of  these results,  together with the.fact that plaster stop-
pings  have  already been used  by  the  Main  Mine  Rescue  Station at Essen-Kray 
in fighting various mine  fires or in sealing-off abandoned workings  success-
fully,  the Working Parties prepared an expert report regarding the  construc-
tion of plaster stoppings  as  a  means  of combatting mine  fires,.and 18 
established guiding principles which  are  to be  borne  in mind  in erecting 
such stoppings. 
These  guiding principles indicate  : 
- the choice  and  deployment  of  the materials  (plaster,  building materials) 
and 
deployment  of  the  equipment  (air reservoir,  pneumatic  transport  pipes, 
water  nozzles,  flowmeter,  distribution units,  hoses  and snuffle pipes). 
They  give  descriptions of  the  preparatory work 
- at the site where  the  dam  is to be built, 
- at  the  point where  the  compressed-air reservoir is set up. 
The  guiding principles finally contain suggestions  for  the  finishing-off 
work  and  for efficient protection of  the men  against  the clouds  of  dust 
produced during  the  pneumatic  transport  operation. 
At  its plenary session of  27th  and  28th April  1964  the  Mines  Safety 
Commission  examined  the report  presented by  the Working Parties,  together 
with  the  final  report  by  the  Experimental  Roadway  Association.  The  Commis-
sion accepted the  report  as well  as  the statement of  policy,  together with 
the guiding principles,  and  advocated  the erection of  plaster stoppings  for 
sealing-off open  and  hidden  underground fires  in all cases  in which  this 
method  can  be  used  and  shows  advantages  over  sandbag stoppings.  The  following 
advantages  guided the  Commission  in this action. : 
increased resistance of  the  dams  to explosion, 
- shorter  time  required for  construction  and 
- increased safety for  the  teams  of  men  building the  stoppings. 
The  text of  the  Report  together with  the  statement  of  policy  and  guiding 
principles,  as well  as  the Final Report  of  the  Experimental  Roadway  Associa-
tion were  sent out  on  the  20th  May  1964  to all the  governments  represented on 
the  Mines  Safety Commission  and  to all bodies  interested in this  problem 
(research institutes,  main  mine  rescue stations,  employers  and workers' 
associations etc.). 
It is included in  the present Report  as  Annex  I  (1)  and in the  Appendix  to 
the Report  as  Annex  Ia  (2). 
2.  Foamed  urethane seals 
In  1963  the Mines  Safety Commission  instructed the Working  Parties to give 
increased attention.to the application of urethane  foam,  after one  of  the 
member  countries had successfully sealed the  stopping~. in a  fire  area with 
foamed urethane,  and after urethane  foam  stoppings  ha~ been used in  two 
further serious cases  - the Mines  Inspectorate  having  issued an  exemption  in 
view of  the urgency  of  the case. 
The  Working Parties are fully aware  that underground use  of  a  plastic must, 
in the first instance,  be  made  dependent  upon it having  high resistance to 
flamability  and  no  associated health risk. 
The  Working Parties are currently studying experience gained in practical 
underground employment  of  foamed  urethane  in the Community  countries and in 
the United Kingdom.  They  are also examining  findings  obtained from  a  series 
of experiments  into the  propagation of  fires,  carried out  in the  experimental 
(1)  Present  Report,  Annex  I. 
(2)  Appendix  to Report,  Annex  Ia. 19 
roadways  of  the Safety Co-ordination Centre in Hasselt with materials  from 
various manufacturers. 
In view of  the very differing nature of  the materials available,  the  point 
to be settled is whether  a  product  can  be  used in individual cases without 
previous practical testing.  To  date it is necessary  to carry out  full-sized 
trials of every  product  before it can  be  used in practice. 
The  comparability of  these  products  in respect of quality and  the  degree 
to which  the test results are generally recognised as authoritative present 
further difficulties.  The  Working Parties are  therefore studying whether it 
it advisable  - to prepare  a  comparative  survey indicating the test results 
and  the  properties - for all those materials which  have  been  tested regarding 
resistance to flamability  and  freedom  from  health risks in the Community 
countries  and in the  United Kingdom.  If maintained constantly up  to date,  a 
survey of  this kind could facilitate  and  encourage  the practical application 
of  these materials. 
In order  to substitute a  simpler  process  for  the  expensive  and  time-con-
suming  full-sized fire trials,  the  Safety Co-ordination Centre  in Hasselt is 
examining  the suitability of  a  reduced-scale test procedure,  using  70-cm 
diameter  tubes. 
Test  methods  for  such substances  are  also being  developed  in North  Rhine/ 
Westphalia.  Appropriate  guiding principles are  being prepared. 
II.- Opening-up of fire zones 
The  study of  this problem was  decided upon  by  the Safety Commission  in its 
session of  20.12.60,  at which  the  Recommendations  regarding fire stoppings re-
ferred  to above  were  accepted  (1). 
The  Safety Commission  was  then of  the  opinion that  the  recovery of sealed-
off fire areas  must  be  dealt with,  because  none  of  the  Inspectorates of  the 
countries represented in the Mines  Safety Commission  had  issued 'guiding princi-
ples regarding the most  suitable procedures  to follow.· Only  reports  on  work 
carried out  in individual cases  had been  published hitherto. 
The  Working Parties for  Fires and  Underground  Combustion  and  for  Rescue 
Arrangements  began  to study this question after the Belgian,  German,  French  and 
British delegations  had reported on  the methods  of  opening-up fire areas in the 
coal-mining industries of their countries  and had described typical practical 
opening-up operations of such sealed-off fire  zones  and  the preparatory work 
required.  Taking the  documents  tabled. as  a  basis,  coupled with  a  study of  a 
body  of relevant source material,  an expert  (2)  produced,  at the request of the 
Working Parties  and with  the  agreement  of  the Safety Commission,  a  study of  this 
problem which  took  the  form  of  a  synoptic  table. 
This  investigation made  it possible to examine  the  problem in detail,  to 
work  out generally-applicable proposals  for  the  opening-up of fire  zones  in the 
form  of guiding principles capable of very wide  application and  to give  to man-
agements  as  yet  inexperienced in work  of  this kind  a  clear idea of  the  factors 
to be  borne  in mind  and  the measures  required in preparing  and  executing such 
work. 
Precisely as  in the  case of  the  guiding principles for  sealing-off mine 
fires  (1),  the Working  Parties distinguished between  zones  where  there was  the 
risk of explosion  and  zones  where  there was  not,  in working out  these guidelines. 
(1)  Second Report  of  the Mines  Safety Commission,  page  51. 
(2)  Bergassessor a.D.  Lehmann,  Gelsenkirchen. 20 
The  detailed principles for  the  opening-up of sealed-off fire  areas were 
classified  ~s  follows  : 
general  remarks  regarding the  factors  governing  the  decision to open-up  a  fire 
zone  and  regarding the  dangers  which  arise;  these  are  followed  by  basic rules 
to be  borne  in mind  when  opening-up operations  are·begun. 
There  follow  chapters  on  : 
- opening-up fire  zones  containing non-explosive  gas  mixtures, 
- opening-up fire  zones  containing  gas  mix~ures which  can  become  explosive  when 
diluted with air and 
- opening-up fire  zones  containing explosive  gas mixtures. 
In  each  case  a  difference was  drawn  between  opening-up operations  from 
one  side only  and  on  two  sides  (to provide  through ventilation of  the  fire 
zone). 
The  guiding principles finally deal with 
- opening  of  flooded fire  zones  and 
- renewed manning  of old fire  areas. 
In its Plenary Session of  i6th October  1964  the  Safety Commission  accepted 
these  guiding principles  and  expressed its satisfaction that it was  now  possible 
to refer  to  a  guide  to  the  opening-up of fire  zones,  with details of  the  measures 
and working  operations  required,  although this guide  was  primarily intended only 
to indicate the  possibility of  the  undertaking,  since  the  decision  in .each  in-
dividual  case  must  be  left to  the  responsible  authorities. 
The  Safety Commission  expressed its wish  that  these  guiding principles 
and  the  text of  the studies should be  distributed to all interested circles. 
The  gu'iding principles,  together with Bergassessor  a.D.  Lehmann's  synopsis 
the study of which  the Safety Commission  particularly recommended,  was  made 
available  to the  Mines  Inspectorate of  the  Community  countries,  as well  as  all 
other  interested parties,  on  the  20th  May  1964. 
The  text of  these  guiding principles is attached to this Report  as  Annex 
II  (1),  the  text of  the  synopsis  corresponds  to  Annex  IIa  (2)  of  the  Appendix 
to the  Report. 
III.- Fighting fires  in deep shafts 
On  the  8th April  1960  the  Safety Commission  finally  approved guiding 
principles for  fighting  fires  in  deep  shafts by  sending  down  water  (3). 
The  establishment  of  these  guiding principles goes  ~ac~ to  ~  Re~om~endation 
of .the Conference  on  Safety in Coal  Mine~, which  wa~ baseq on  the  inve,stigatians 
into the  shaft fire at Marcinelle  in 1956  (4). 
Among  other things,  these  guiding  principles  fprmulate  the  requirement 
that 
(1)  Present  Report,  Annex  II,  page  14. 
(2)  Appendix  to Report,  Annex  IIa. 
(3)  Second Report  of  the  Safety Commission, ·page  26. 
(4)  Report  of  the Conference,  page  54,  decision 2- b). 21 
"a  device  must  be  installed at the  head of  each shaft going  to  the surface, 
which  can  provide  a  flow  of water  of at least  50  1/min  and  m2  of shaft 
cross-section". 
At  the  same  time  the Working  Parties pointed out _that  P?tting in excessive 
quantities of water would  cause  disturbances  in the ventilation and  could thus 
cause  additional  danger  to  the  men  underground. 
The  Experimental  Roadway  Association  in Dortmund  carried out  tests even 
before  the  approval  of  these  guiding principles,  and  their experiments  showed 
that  the  quantity of water  indicated is sufficient  to extinguish shaft fires 
at shallow depth. 
However,  this left open  the  question  as  to whether  this quantity of water 
was  also sufficient to extinguish  a  shaft fire at  a  greater  depth.  This  type 
of  fire is one  which creates difficult problems,  especially for collieries with 
deep pits,  which  are_becoming  more  and  more  numerous. 
The  Working  Parties therefore worked  out,  with  the  close collaboration of 
the  Heads  of  the  experimental stations of  the  Community  countries  and  the  United 
Kingdom,  proposals supported by  the  Safety Commission,  to carry out  full-scale 
experiments  : 
- to examine  the  extinguishing effect of water  fed  i~to downcast  shafts of  some 
depth,  taking into account  the  duration  of  supply  and  the  quantity of water, 
and 
- to study  the  ventilation disturbances,  caused  by  the  thermal  lift due  to the 
fire itself or  to fire-fighting measures. 
The  Safety Commission  was  of  the  opinion that  the  test results gave  a  deal 
of  information  regarding the  execution of  the mine  rescue  operations,  thus contrib-
uting to  the safety of  the  men.  It was  not-possible at this  time  to carry out 
full-scale  tests,  since  the  research institutes of  the  Community  countries did 
not  have  at their disposal  suitable shafts of  the  required depth. 
The  Safety Commission  asked  the High  Authority for  a  financial  grant  for 
carrying out  a  practical research  programme  in  a  suitable pit,  to  be  selected 
from  the list of  closed· pits,  and  instructed the Working  Party to work  out ·a 
suitable experimental  programme. 
The  Working Parties set up  two  committees  of experts,  one  of which  dealt 
with  the  examination of  the  practical problems,  such as  the  requirements  in the 
pit to be  chosen,  requirements  in men  and materials,  cost estimates etc.,  while 
the other examined  the  problems  of ventilation conditions,  airflow conditions, 
thermal lift,  and  the  measuring procedures  to be  used  from  a  scientific point 
of view.  These  committees  were  strengthened by  the  co-option of experts  from 
the  research stations,  in particular ventilation specialists. 
The  programme  worked  out  by  the  two  committees  of experts could,  in the 
first instance,  be  no  more  than  a  skeleton programme,  which  would,  in any  event, 
have  to be  adapted  to the actual conditions  of  the shaft to be  used  for  the 
experiment  once  the  name  of  the  selected pit had been made  known. 
When  the  closure  of  the Dorstfeld Colliery near  Dortmund  made  available  a 
suitable shaft  for  the experimental  programme  to be  carried out,  the  committees 
of experts referred to  above  studied the shaft available  and  adapted the  pro-
gramme  which  they  had worked out,  and which  had  been  approved by  the Safety 
Commission,  to  the conditions actually obtaining at Do_r_stfeld Colliery.  It soon 
became  clear,  that one  could not  expect  to provide  full explanations of all the 
problems encountered,  but it would  be  possible to obtain adequate  information 
regarding the  question of  the water  supply. 
The  modified  programme  provided that the fire test should  determine  : 
- whether it is possible to extinguish a  well-developed fire  in a  shaft over  800 m 
deep with  a  water  flow  of  50 litres per minute  and  m2  of shaft cross-section, 22 
- whether  sending  down  water  produced changes  in the ventilation and 
- whether  a  ventilation reversal  could occur  as  a  result of  the  thermal lift 
due  to  the  fire itself. 
Even  before  the  beginning of  the  experiment it was  known  that one  could 
hardly expect  to obtain an explanation of  the  last question - air reversal  in 
this shaft - as  the existing ventilation conditions were  exceedingly stable 
because  of  the existing simple ventilation system,  using  one  downcast  and  one 
upcast shaft,  and  because of  various changes  in the mine  layout  made  for  safety 
reasons. 
Experiments  showed  that  an artificially-raised fire of great intensity -
such  as would  probably hardly occur in practice - could be  extinguished.  On  the 
basis of this result,  the experts consider it probable  that  a  quantity of water 
corresponding  to that  named  in the guiding principles is sufficient to extinguish 
any  fire in a  shaft. 
During  the  test it was  possible to observe  the  formation  of  pulsating 
combustion  fumes  and  a  forced  expulsion  of  the  fumes,  and it was  also possible 
to analyse  the composition of  the  combustion  fumes  and measure  their tempera-
ture. 
No  decisive  information could be  obtained  from  the  test with regard to 
ventilation. 
The  members  of  the Working  Parties simultaneously  came  to the  same  conclu-
sion as  the  committee  of experts,  that  this fire  test was  capable of  answering 
only  some  of  the existing questions,  and  that  in order  to solve the  problems 
still unresolved (if it were  possible to carry out  a  second  large-scale test) 
close attention must  be  paid to the  following  points  on  the  programme  : 
- a  non-stable ventilation system, 
- the centre of  the  fire should be  at medium  or shallow depth  in  a  deep shaft 
with  an  increased aeromotor  counter-action, 
- the fire should be  extended vertically along  the shaft walls, 
- the  initiating fire  should be  small etc. 
Views  expressed on  the  judgment  of  the  committees  of experts  and  their 
conclusions with regard to continuation of  the research were  not  unanimous, 
either in the Working Parties or  in the  sub-committees. 
The  Report  of  the Working  Parties  and  the Final Report  of  the  Experimental 
Roadway  Association were  placed on  the  agenda  of  the Plenary session of  the 
Safety Commission of  the  19th and  20th July 1965. 
A lively discussion arose with regard to  the  continuation of  the experi-
ments,  in particular regarding  the  question as  to whether  the  remaining unsolved 
questions  should be  resolved by  carrying out  a  second large-scale test or by 
model  tests,  or whether it was  necessary  to have  a  large-scale test with supple-
men.ta:ry  model  tests. 
Those  in favour  of  a  large-scale test hoped  that it would  provide  an 
answer  to the  question as. to whether  a  fire extended vertically could be  ex-
tinguished as  quickly  (as  had  been  the  case at Dorstfeld)  as  a  fire - governed 
by  the  arrangement  of  the burning material - which  developed  primarily in the 
horizontal direction. 
On  the other hand,  some  members  held the  view that  a  single large-scale 
test would not  be sufficient to clear up  outstanding questions or  to establish 
generally-applicable rules,  by  reason of  the basically different ventilation 
conditions at each  individual colliery and  the very varied conditions within 
any  given pit. 23 
As  against  this,  the  model  tests should be  able  to provide  an  explanation 
of  the  flow conditions  and  of  the  pulsating ejection of  fume~,  such  as  were 
observed during  the  Dor~tfeld trial,  and  thus  provided information - before 
carrying out  any  full-scale  test which might  be  decided upon  - regarding the 
importance of  thermal lift, which  can affect  the  amount  of water sent  down.  More-
over,  suitable measurement  methods  would  have  to be  made  ready. 
The  possible use  of  model  tests was  objected to on  the  ground that results 
of trials carried out in two  countries in a  model  roadway  had  as  yet  not  provided 
any  information  as  to  the extent  to which  they  could be  applied to  practi~al 
conditions. 
Recognizing the  diversity of  views,  the  Safety Commission  supported the 
proposals  formulated  by  the  committee  of experts regarding further  investiga-
tion of  this question with certain reservations. 
These  proposals  envisage  that  the  problem of  fire  fighting  in fairly  deep 
shafts  by  sending  down  water  should be  dealt with as  follows  : 
a)  Before  any  new  large-scale test which might  be  decided upon is carried out, 
existing results of  research regarding  : 
- pulsating counterflow near  the  source  of  the  fire  and 
- the  danger  of pulsating emission of  combustion  fumes 
should be  collated and critically analysed. 
b)  If the results of  this analysis were  to make  it appear  advisable  to continue 
the  investigations,  by  means  of  model  tests,  such model  tests should be 
directed  towards  : 
- examining  the  flow  phenomena  in the vicinity of  the seat of the fire with 
various  arrangements  of  the  burning material 
- the  determination of  the maximum  intensity of  a  shaft fire where  air supply 
is limited and 
- the  development  ot measurement  methods  for  such  large-scale tests as  might 
be  decided upon. 
c)  Independently of this,  should  a  favourable  occasion present itself for  carry-
ing out  a  large-scale test at  low cost,  this should be  done  with  due  consid-
eration of the conditions listed under  point  2  of the conclusions  (1)  of the 
Committee of Experts,  but with  the restriction  : 
- that before  proceeding to  a  further  large-scale test,  an  inventory should 
be  taken of  those pits in Community  countries which  possess  the desired 
characteristics for  the experimental shaft,  to guarantee  that - bearing 
in mind  the  expenditure necessary  for  carrying out  this test - the results 
to be  expected should be  applicable  to the  largest possible  number  of 
shafts in practice. 
Only  once  this inventory has  been  tabled will  the Safety Commission  examine 
the desirability of carrying out  a  further  large-scaie test and what  new  results 
might  be  expected  from  it. 
The  Safety Commission  expressed the wish  that  the  investigations  named 
under  Point  1  of  paragraph  1  of  the conclusions  (1)  should be  put  in hand  as 
soon  as  possible,  i.e.  the  questions  as  to  : 
- what  results it has  been  possible to obtain to date  in the  Community  countries 
and  elsewhere with model  tests, 
; 
- whether,  in  the  light of  these results,  it is in  the  present  instance worth-
while  carrying out model  tests or not. 
(1}  Appendix  to  the  Report,  Annex  III b. 24 
The  Committee  of  Experts  dealing with "Theoretical Problems  of Shaft Fires 
at fairly  G~~at Depth'',  assisted by  experts  in  flow  phenomena,  has  meanwhile 
begun  the  study of this  field. 
The  experimental  programme,  the  course  of  the  experiment  and  the results 
are  given  in detail  in  the  Report  (1)  of  the Experimental  Roadway  Association in 
Dortmund.  Tt~ Committee  of  Experts  had  worked  out  a  special  document  (2)  on  this 
Report;  this  ~ucument was  unanimously  accepted.  The  Working  Parties,  on  the 
other hand,  considered clarifications  (2)  were  called for -to  give  a  clearer 
understanding  of  this  Report. 
IV.- SRecifications  and Tests  for  Fire-resistant Fluids used  for  Power  Transmission 
and Control  Purposes 
As  set out  in the  Second Report  of  the Safety Commission,  the  Committee  of 
Experts  entrusted with  the  preparation of criteria and testing methods  for  fire-
resistant fluids  has  produced  a  Report  (3)  on  these  problems;  in accordance  with 
a  decision of  the Safety Commission  this Report  has  been distributed to all 
responsible authorities  in  the  petroleum,  chemical  and mechanical  industries 
and  in the  coal-mining  industry,  to keep  them  informed of  developments  in this 
field  and with  regard to  the  lines being  followed  by  the  work  so  begun.  This 
information report  was  accepted  on  20/12/60 and  published on  24/2/61. 
In  the meanwhile,  further  detailed investigations have  been  carried out 
with regard to the  formulation  of  fire-fighting  and  technical criteria. 
It was  necessary  to carry out  many  comparative tests in the  laboratories 
of  :  Technischer Ueberwachungsverein e.v.  in Essen,  Versuchsgrubengesellschaft 
m.b.H.  in Dortmund,  Houilleres  du  Nord/Pas-de-Calais  in Douai·and also at  the 
Institut National  des  Mines,  Pftturages,  in order  to check  the criteria worked 
out  by  the  Committee  of  Experts,  to  develop  new  experimental  devices  and  to lay 
down  further test methods. 
Progress  in the criteria affecting mine  health  and safety and  the  devel-
opment  of  test methods  in this field received particular attention,  as  a  result 
of  the  cooperation given  by highly-qualified medical  experts. 
The  Committee  of Experts  presented in 1964 its "Second Report  on Specifi-
cations  and Testing Conditions  Relating to Fire-Resistant Fluids  used  for  Power 
Transmission  and Control";  this Report  takes  into account  the most  recent 
knowledge  in this field.  The  investigations are  being continued. 
The  purpose  of  this Report  was  to provide standardized criteria and 
testing methods  for  all the  Community  countries  and  thus  to ensure  that  a 
hydraulic  fluid  intended for  use  underground  should be  judged by  the  same cri-
teria,  and not  approved  for  use  in one  country and  refused certification in 
another. 
To  be  sure  that work  towards  this objective proceeded on  a  sure  founda-
tion,  the Directors of  Research  Institutes represented in the  Committee  of 
Experts  agreed to exchange  information on  the results of tests of  the  individual 
products  available  and,  moreover,  to keep  informed  those institutes in the 
Community  countries which  do  not  at the  moment  possess  practical test experience 
in this field. 
It is worth  noting the  proposals  put  forward  by  the  Committee  of  Experts 
with regard to  the  conditions of  approval  (Article  1  of  the  second part of  this 
Report)  : 
(1)  Appendix  to  the Report,  Annex  III a). 
(2)  Appendix  to the  Report,  Annex  III b). 
(3)  Second  Report  of  the Mines  Safety Commission,  page  59. 25 
"1.  Fire-resistant fluids  for  hydraulic  powered  transmission  and control must, 
before being used in mine  workings,  be  given  a  certificate of  approval 
indicating that  they  have  passed  the  following series ot'  tests  : 
a)  Laboratory tests corresponding  to  the methods  described in the Report  for 
the  determination of  technical criteria of  flamability,  health criteria 
and  technical criteria, 
b)  Long-duration  tests in normal  use. 
2.  The  series of  tests must  be  placed under  the  control of  a  specialist 
institute. 
'  3.  Approval  of  the use  of  these  fluids  in mine  workings  is  depen~ant on  produc-
tion of  the certificate mentioned  above". 
The  Safety Commission  formally  approved  this Second Report  in its plenary 
session of  16th October  1964,  noting with satisfaction that  the completion  ~f 
this Report  had  attracted interest which  went  beyond  the  boundaries  of  the  Com-
munity  countries. 
The  text of this Second Report  is annexed  to this present Report  in the 
form  of  a  brochure  (Annex  IV  a)  (1).  It was  despatched,  with  a  preface  by  the 
Chairman of  the Mines  Safety Commission  in the  four  Community  languages,  as well 
as  in English,  on  18.11.1964,  to Mines  Inspectorates of  the  Community  countries 
for  further  action  and  to all the  other  interested parties  named  above  for 
purpose  of  information. 
V.- Ventilation Measures  (Prof.  Budryk's  theory) 
In its plenary session of  20.12.1960,  the Mines  Safety Commission  declared 
its agreement  to  a  suggestion put  forward  by  the  Working Parties  for  "Under-
ground Fires  and  Combustion"  and  "Rescue Organisation"  to set up  a  sub--committee 
of ventilation experts  to  examine  Prof.  Budryk's  theory  on ventilation measures 
as  a  part  of  fire  fighting,  and  their application in the Polish mining industry, 
so  that  they could if appropriate  present  the  appropriate conclusions  for  the 
coal-mining industries of  the Community  countries. 
This  sub-committee  has  in the meanwhile  prepared  a  first provisional  report 
of its work.  A series of  new  facts  has  been established and  provisional  conclu-
sions reached,  and  the  sub-committee  has  reported its views  regarding  the fol-
lowing  points  in the  theory worked out  by Prof.  Budryk  : 
- the required information regarding  the ventilation conditions of  a  pit; 
- the  importance  of  the  idea of  the  "main  flow current"  introduced by  Budryk; 
~ basic  formula  for  the  determination of ventilation direction in a  mine 
working;  and 
-practical steps to stabilize ventilation·direction. 
In this First Report  the  sub-committee  of experts  accepted the  theory of 
Prof.  Budryk  in principle  and  drew  attention to  numerous  questions,  especially 
those relating gassy mines,  to which. answers  had not  yet  been  found. 
This  report  was  laid before  the  two  Working  Parties.  After  examining it, 
the Working Parties did not,  however,  consider it appropriate  to submit it to 
the Safety Commission  in its provisional  form.  The  Committee  of Experts  made 
every effort to clear up  the  questions  remaining  open  by  correspond~nce with  the 
responsible Polish authorities.  The  great complexity of  the overall  problem  and 
its very difficult technical content made it impossible  to reach  a  clear under-
standing,  satisfactory to all parties,  on  every occasion;  moreover;  there were 
unexpected  differences of  opinion regarding  the  practical application of this 
theory. 
(1)  Appendix  to Report,  Annex  IV  a. 26 
For  this reason,  the Polish authorities responsible  proposed to the experts 
that  they should visit the Polish coal-mining industry to clear up  the outstand-
ing questions  on  the spot.  The  Mines  Safety Commission  agreed  that  a  study visit 
should be  made  by  a  few  qualified representatives of the Committee  of Experts, 
in view of  the  importance of  the  Budryk  theory  and its possible  future  applica-
tion. 
The  questions to  be  dealt with were  primarily  : 
1)  to what  extent application was  made  of  the measures  derived from  Prof.  Budryk's 
theory  to achieve stabilization of  the ventilation in the  event  of  the  mine 
fire,  in particular in gassy mines  or  those with  a  high  firedamp  risk  and  at 
descensionally-ventilated working-points  in the  Polish mines; 
2)  how  the  special representations of ventilation conditions used in Poland were 
prepared and what  use  was  made  of  them  in the fire fighting operations. 
In addition information was  to be  obtained regarding  : 
3)  the  determination of  the  tendency  of. coal  to  spontaneous  ignition and  the 
estimation of  the risk of  spontaneous  ignition in faces; 
4)  timely recognition of spontaneous  ignition and 
5)  supervision of sealed-off fire  zones  and  the  opening-up of  sealed-off workings. 
The  experts'  report  on  their study visit,  which  took  place  from  the  5th to 
13.12.1964,  showed  that  they  obtained the  desired clarifications and  explanations 
and  that  they  were  now  in a  position to issue very soon  their final  report with 
regard to Prof.  Budryk's  theory  and its practical application. 
VI.- Discussion of  Mine  Accidents 
It is not  necessary  to emphasize  that mine  accidents which  can give useful 
information  and  ~hose causes  and conditions  are directly related to topical 
problems  being dealt with by Working Parties are  the subject of special  discus-
sion. 
In most  instances  the  accidents in question are  those which  are  listed in 
chapter Three  of  this Report. 
B.- MINE  RESCUE 
I.- Organization of Rescue  Operations 
1.  Supra-national aid - Expert  advice  in the  event  of  a  major  accident 
Following  on  the  approval  of  the  Report  on  the visit to the Main  Rescue 
Stations of  the  Community  countries  and  of  the United Kingdom  (1),  the 
Working  Party on  "Mine  Rescue  Operations"  first of all devoted its attention 
to the  problems  left open  in that Report,  the  above  problem being one  of 
these;  this was  done  on  the basis of  the conclusions  drawn  by  the  Permanent 
Commission. 
After  the Working  Party had  finished  examining this question  and  had reported 
to the  Permanent  Commission  on  the results of  this study,  the Permanent  Com-
mission  decided on  12.12.61  that  - after detailed examination of  the results 
recorded in the  Report  on  the visits to  the Main  Rescue  Stations in the 
(1)  Second  Report  of  the  Mines  Safety Commission,  Annex  B. 27 
Community  countries and in the United Kingdom,  as also on  the basis of  prac-
tical experience available up  to that  time with regard to the close relations 
already existing between  the  Main  Rescue  Stations of neighbouring countries -
it did not  in general  seem  necessary  to recommend  preparations for organizing 
supra-national  ai~ ~n the  event  of  a  major  accident. 
On  the other hand,  the Safety Commission  did consider it advisable to 
formulate  a  Recomme·ndation  regarding  the  provision of expert  advice with 
regard to measures  to be  taken  in respect  of major  accidents  by experts 
from  other countries. 
This  Recommendation,  the  text of which  is attached as  Annex  III  (1),  was 
approved on  12.12.1961  and  transmitted for  further  action to the Mines 
Inspectorates  and  to the  Main  Rescue  Stations of  the  Community  countries on 
15.2.1962. 
2.  Communication  links  between  standby base  and rescue  team 
The  discussion of  a  fatal  accident which  occurred while  a  rescue  team was 
in action led to  an  exchange  of experience  regarding communication  links 
between the standby base  and  the  rescue  team. 
In the light of  this discussion the Working  Party considered it advisable 
to examine  the question  of  the provision of  a  communication  link between  the 
rescue  team  in action and  the  standby base  and  also between  the standby base 
and  the  leader of  the rescue operation,  with  a  view  to making  available infor-
mation regarding the  technical  design  of  the  apparatus used  and of  the methods 
employed,  as well  as  to compare  the various  views  held in this field in the 
Community  co~ntries and,  if this  seemed  appropriate,  to table general  pro-
posals. 
The  provision of this communication  link is of special  importance,  not 
only  for  the  team  in action,  but  also for  the standby base  and  for  the  leader 
of  the rescue  operation in respect of  the  decisions  to  be  taken  and  their 
rapid communication  during  the  period when  the  team is operating. 
Questionnaires were  used  to record the  method~ e~pl~yed in the  different 
countries  and  to list the existing instructions in this respect,  and  to 
compare  these records. 
The  results of this investigation can  be  summarized essentially in the 
following  proposals,  which  are  formulated  by  the Working  Party for  the 
further  development  of  telephone  apparatus  and  equipment  : 
"a)  Masks 
Since only breathing masks will be  used for  telephoning,  attempts  should 
be  made  to  improve  them with regard to the  following  features  : 
- air-space  and gas-tightness,  field'of view,  weight,  means  of attachment. 
b)  Connection with  the  telephone wire 
Needle  plug units  (prickers)  already exist for  thin telephone cables.  The 
development  of other plug-in devices  for  other  types  of cable would  be 
welcome. 
c)  Weight  and size of  the  apparatus,  of cable  drums,  of cables etc. 
Should be  adapted to the conditions in which  the  rescue  team will have 
to use  them  when  operating. 
(1)  Present Report,  Annex  III,  page  343. 28 
d)  Amplifiers 
Flameproof  amplifiers  of small  and  lightweight  design should be  developed, 
to ensure better understanding where  the connection is bad. 
e)  Wireless  radio 
Development  of·an effective wireless-telephone system". 
The  execution of  this investigation and  the results obtained are  described 
in detail  and  summary  ~orm in  a  tabulation  (Annex  IV)  (1},  which was  approved 
by  the Safety Commission  in its plenary session of  14th and  15th.2.1966 with 
the  instruction that  the  rescue stations and manufacturers  of  telephone 
equipment  should be  apprised of this information;  if necessary,  the advisabil-
ity of  holding  a  competition should be  examined. 
3.  Annual  report  on  the organization of  the Mine  Rescue  System 
The  Report,  referred to  above,  on  the visit to the Main  Rescue  Stations 
is at the  same  time  the first Report  of  the Working  Party regarding  the 
organization of mine  rescue  operations  and  deals with  the state of affairs 
from  the  end of  1959.  The  Working  Party was  charged by  the Safety Commission 
to continue  the  exchange  of  experience  in order  to be  in a  position to pre-
sent  to the Commission  an  annual  report  on  the  developments  in mine  rescue 
organizations. 
The  first Report  for  the  year  1959  contained  a  detailed survey of  the 
organization of mine  rescue  systems  and consequently paid particular attention 
to  the  instruction and  training of  the rescue  team  personnel,  the organization 
of  a  rescue  operation,  the reciprocal  aid in the event  of major  accidents,  the 
use  of oxygen-recycling breathing apparatus  and other available equipment,  the 
provision of breathing apparatus  for  gassy  atmospheres  always  in  a  state of 
readiness,  the preparatory measures  for major  accidents etc.  As  against  this, 
future  annual  reports will  be  prepared only  in  a  summary  form  and will  follow 
a  standard list of headings  dealing with  the  following  groups  of  problems  : 
- Structure of mine  rescue  organizations 
Rescue  stations and  personnel, 
Equipment  with recycling  apparatus~ 
- Measures  in serious accidents 
To  protect men, 
To  protect  equipment. 
- Accidents  in breathing apparatus  for  gassy  atmospheres. 
- Results  from  research  and  development. 
To  give  the report  a  clearer  form,  details will be  given only  regarding 
the most  important  districts in each country,  it being realized that for  this 
reason  and  because  of  the  varying conditions within  the different districts, 
comparison  between  the statistical data given  in  the  reports will be  limited. 
The  members  of  the Working  Party will  furthermore  be  able  to study indi-
vidual  problems  in greater detail  by  a  systematic  exchange  of  the  annual 
reports of each  of  the  Mines  Rescue  Stations. 
In  each case,  when  the  annual  report  has  been finished,  there will be  a 
discussion  in the Working  Party regarding  the notable cases of accidents 
reported on  therein as well  as  on  various  questions arising from  the report. 
Experience has  already·shown  that this will provide valuable  pointers with 
regard  to the  further  development  of  the organization of mine  rescue opera-
tions. 
(1)  Present  Report,  Annex  IV,  p. 34~ 29 
Up  to  the  present,  this layout  has  been  adopted  for  the reports  for  the 
years  1960,  1961,  1962,  1963/1964;  the  text of  these reports is attached to 
the  present Report  (Annex  V a- VIII  a)  (1).  In  accordance with  a  decision 
of  the  Permanent  Commission,  a  two-yearly report will be  issued for  the  years 
1963  and  1964  for  t.he  first  time. 
II.- Selection and  training of  mine  rescue workers 
1.  Development  of  a  simple method  to test the  heat resistance of  actual  or would-
be  mine  rescue workers 
When  the  rescue  operation was  being carried out after  a  mine  accident,  a 
mine  rescue worker  of  the  Main  Rescue  Station at Frftmeries  (Belgium)  was 
overcome  by  heatstroke.  At  the  same  time,  several  other rescue workers  who 
showed signs of excessive exposure  to heat,  were  able  to be  carried out in 
good  time  and revived. 
These  accidents  led the  Main  Rescue  Station at Frftmeries  to make  a  special 
study,  (with the cooperation of specialist doctors)  of  the  problem  of  the 
selection,  training  and aiclimatisation of  rescue  teams  for  wor~ in high  · 
temperatures  and at high humidities. 
Within  the  framework  of .these  investigations mine  rescue workers  were 
subjected to  a  series of acclimatisation  exercices '  the  degree of  diffic~lty 
of  which  was  increased  from  one  exercise  to  another,  to  improve  the resist-
ance  of  the  men  in respect  of  their capacity to stand heat  in moist  and  hot 
surroundings,  if possible.  Since  this capacity of resistance varies  from  one 
individual  to another,  there  are  considerable differences in this respect 
between  the  individual mine  rescue workers  who  make  up  a  rescue  team. 
During  these suitability exercises,  and  in spite of  the greatest care  taken 
in  the Main  Rescue  Station of  Frftmeries,  various  troubles  arose - fainting, 
giddiness etc.  - which  could not  simply  be  attributed to insufficient acclima-
tisation. 
To  reduce  the risks which.had arisen  during rescue operations in  ve~y hot 
and moist  conditions,  the  development  of  precise but  simple criteria could 
be  very useful;  these criteria could be  used to select m1ne  rescue workers 
who  from  the  beginning were  suitable  for  rescue operations  in high  tempera-
tures without it being necessary - as hitherto - to carry out  expensive  and 
time-consuming acclimatisation exercjses  to establish their capacity to 
resist heat.  The  Belgian experts held the  view  that  these criteria could be 
formulated  by  means  of  a  suitable research  programme.  The  Working  Party for 
Mine  Rescue  Operations  approyed  ~f this view. 
In its plenary session of  12th December  1961  the Safety Commission  declared 
its agreement  that  the Centre National Belge  de  Coordination des Centrales  de 
Sauvetage  in  Cha~leroi should carry on  the  proposed research,  approve~ by  the 
Working  Party. 
This  research project was  entrusted to the Main  Rescue  Station at Frftmeries 
by  reason of  their experience in this field.· Together ~ith the  doctor  respon-
sible for  this research  and  in cooperation with  ~edical experts  from  various 
Community  countries  and  from  the  United Kingdom,  the Working  Party prepared 
the  research  programme.  In accordance with  the  agreement  reached between  the 
High Authority  and  the  Main  Rescue  Station at Frftmeries,  the research work 
was  scheduled to begin in August  1962.  The  Main  Rescue  Station at Frftmeries 
carried out  the tests laid down  in the experimental  programme  as  had  been 
agreed,  using  a  specially selected test personnel. 
In September  1965  the Working  Party examined  for  the first time  the  final 
report  on  the work  carried out  at Frftmeries  and  reached  the conclusion that 
(1)  Appendix  to this Report,  Annexes  V a,  VI  a,  VII  a  and VIII  a. 30 
the results obtained  gave  the  Main  Rescue  Stations criteria which might 
possibly be suitable to select  a  restricted number  of mine  rescue workers 
for  operations,  in respect  of their tolerance of heat.  The  Working  Party 
were  unable  to reach  a  final  judgement  on  this point,  since the  principal 
yardstick employed  was  the  change  in cardiac  frequency,  in respect of which 
a  sufficient  body  of  practical experience is not  yet  available.  The  Safety 
Commission  considered the results in its plenary session of  14th and  15th 2. 
1966  and  agreed with the Working  Party's proposal  to wait  for  data  to become 
available  from  the practical use  of  these criteria and 
- to commission  the  Main  Rescue  Station in Frftmeries  to select mine  rescue 
workers  and would-be  rescue workers  in  the  future  on  the basis of  the 
criteria laid down  and  to make  a  report  on  the  practical experience  gained 
by  the centre  as  soon  as  possible,  and  also 
- instructed the centre to distribute  the research report  reference  (1)  in the 
form  presented to all the Main  Rescue  Stations of  the  Community  countries 
and of  the United Kingdom  for  information,  and  to  encourage  them  to apply 
the test described therein even before  the  Main  Rescue  Station of  Frftmeries 
published its own  results,  asking  the other  rescue stations also to prepare 
reports  on  their results,  in order  to obtain  a  broad basis of  experience. 
2.  Training  teams  responsible  for  erecting plaster stoppings 
Some  of  the  members  of  the Safety Commission expressed the  wish  that  the 
guiding principles for  the  construction of plaster stoppings,  already re-
ferred to  (2),
1 should be  supplemented by  suitable diagrams  to make  it possible 
to understand the  individual stages of  the  process clearly.  The  majority of 
members  were,  however,  of  the  opinion that it would  be  better to examine all 
the  questions with regard to the  trainin·g of  the men  entrusted with  the 
construction of  plaster stoppings  and  to bring all the  points  together  in an 
instruction leaflet. 
Since it is primarily the mine  rescue  personnel  who  are concerned with 
building plaster stoppings,  the Working  Party  "Mine  Rescue  Operations"  was 
entrusted with studying  these  problems  in collaboration with  the  Main  Rescue 
Stations  and with  preparing  a  training programme  for  the  training of  the 
personnel  involved. 
To  help  them  in studying this question,  the Working  Party had available 
documents  from  the Main  Mine  Rescue  Station at Essen-Kray  and  from  the 
National  Coal  Board.  The  Working Party  recommended  the  acceptance  of  an 
expanded text prepared by  the Main  Mine  Rescue  Station at  Essen-Kray  under 
the title·of "Instructions for  the construction of Plaster Stoppings",  since 
this document,  based on  practical experience  in  the  Ruhr  where  the construc-
tion of  plaster stoppings  is increasingly favoured,  is assuming  particular 
importance. 
The  guiding principles set out  above  were  incorporated in the  instruction 
leaflet and  the  principles to be  observed during  training were  described 
under  the  following  headings 
- Availability and transport  of  plaster 
- Requirements  of material 
- Preparation of  proposals 
- Preparation and execution of  the filling operations 
- Testing for air- and  gas-tightness 
- Sealing·off the stopping. 
(1)  Appendix  to this Report,  Annex  IX  a. 
(2)  Present  Report,  p.17. 31 
The  Working  Party presented this introduction to the Safety Commission  as 
the fruit of its investigations into this  problem.  In  th~ plenary session of 
14  and  15.2.1966,  the  Mines  Safety Commission  examined this instruction,  which 
they  accepted with  the  recommendation  that  the  responsible services in the 
Community.countries·should be  encouraged to carry out  the  training of  the 
personnel  responsible  for  building plaster stoppings  in accordance with this 
instruction. 
The  text of this instruction for  the building of plaster stoppings is 
reproduced in Appendix  X  a  (1). 
3.  Use  of  smoke  powders  to simulate  smoke  in practice galleries 
In the light of  a  comparison of  the  smoke-producing substances  and methods 
used in  the  Community  countries and of  the  regulations applying thereto,  the 
Working  Party formed  the  intention to find  a  suitable smoke  powder  which  could, 
if this seemed appropriate,  be  recommended  as  a  standard powder  for  general 
use  by  Mine  Rescue  Stations. 
After  discussion,  it was  however  agreed that the study of  this problem 
should be  taken  up  again at  an  appropriate  time  in connection with investi-
gation of  the entire group of  problems  of training rescue  teams ,in practice 
roadways;  at this  time it would  be  possible to work  out  the specification to 
be  met  by  such  a  powder  and  a  suitable method  for  exercises in smoke-charged 
atmospheres,  these  texts  to be  given  to  the Mine  Rescue  Stations in the  form 
of  guiding principles. 
III.- Mine  Rescue  apparatus  and  equipment 
1.  Improving breathing apparatus  for  rescue workers 
As  regard to the  question of  improving breathing apparatus,  the  Working 
Party's initial idea was  to suggest  a  prize competition for  the  development 
of  a  portable closed-circuit breathing apparatus,  the required specification 
for  this apparatus  having  already been  laid down  in the Second Report  (2) 
(simplicity of use,  re~iability of operation,  extension of the  period of use, 
improvement  of  the breathing attachment  and  of  the possibilities of  communi-
cation,  optimum  adaptation to respiratory-physiological conditions). 
After  a  further detailed examination of  this question,  the Working Party 
suggested to the Safety Commission  that,  before  any  prize competition were 
announced,  the possibility should be  examined of  improving  the respiratory-
physiological conditions  by  means  of  a  research contract. 
The  purpose of  this research project is to further  the  development  of more 
suitable devices,  which might  make  the work  of  the men  in the rescue  teams 
less arduous  - especially when  they have  to cover  long distances. 
To  achieve this end,  the extra physical strain.imposed on  the man  wearing 
the breathing apparatus  must  be  an  absolute minimum.  This extra strain is 
governed  by  various  factors which must  be  investigated  : 
- the resistance  to breathing offered by  the device  and  the energy  expended 
on breathing, 
- the  temperature  and humidity of  the  inspired air, 
the C02  content of  the inspired and expired air, 
- the oxygen  consumption  and 
(1)  Appendix  to Report,  Annex  X a. 
(2)  Second Report  of  the Mines  Safety Commission,  pp.  62/63. 32 
- the weight  of  the  device. 
Ideally,  the  device  should ensure  that  the man  wearing it would  have  the 
least possible  extra physical strain at  the  same  time  as  maximum  reliability 
of  functioning  of  the apparatus. 
The  Working  Party  for  "Mine  Rescue  Organization",  in collaboration with 
experts  and specialist doctors,  worked  out  a  research  programme  which was· 
approved  for  execution  by  the Safety Commission  in its Plenary Session of 
.27.11.1962,  financial  aid for  the work  being  given  by  the  High Authority. 
Within  the  framework  of  this research work,  the  protective breathing 
devices  used in the  Community  countries  and  in the United Kingdom  having  a 
service period of  at least  two  hours  were  tested by selected persons  per-
forming  various activities,  each activity remaining unchanged,  to study  the 
devices  in the  light of  the criteria set out  above. 
The  values ascertained were  compared with  the reference values  obtained 
from  tests of  the  same  devices  carried out  in the  laboratory with "respira-
tion"  from  an artificial lung.  The  purpose  of making  this comparison  between 
the results obtained  from  tests with  the  two  methods  was  to obtain values  for 
the  technical  examination of  the  new  designs  in the  laboratory. 
Furthermore,  to be  in a  position to propose  improvements,  it is necessary 
to determine  the effect on  the wearer  of  the  apparatus  of  factors  stemming 
from  the  design characteristics. 
Finally,  the  question arises in this connection of  the effect of unfa-
vourable external  (climatic)  conditions  on  the  rescue-team man  wearing  the 
breathing apparatus. 
The  Safety Commission  therefore stressed the  need  to  examine  the  following 
questions  - of  importance  in connection with  the use  of  these  devices  - at 
the  same  time  as  the  tests envisaged were  carried out  : 
- comparison of all devices  under  test in exercises under  worsened climatic 
conditions, 
- possible duration of service under  worsened climatic conditions  and 
- effect of  heat  storage  on  the mental  and physical capacities of  the wearer. 
The  result of  these tests should be  to determine  what  improvements  are 
required in the anti-gas breathing apparatus  in use  at  the moment;  in addi-
tion  not~s should be  prepared which could be  of use  in preparing  new  designs. 
Moreover,  the regulations covering the manufacture  and testing of anti-gas 
breathing apparatus  in force  at  the moment  could be modified as  soon  as  the 
expected results of  the research were  available. 
Three institutes were  entrusted with carrying out  this research project, 
because  they  seemed particularly suitable for  the work  by  reason of  their 
p~actical experience  and  of  the  test apparatus  available to  them  for  the 
purpose  : 
- The  Physiological  Institute of Liege University 
- C8ordinatie-Centrum Reddingswezen  (the Coordination Centre  for  Mine  Rescue) 
of  the  Campine  coalfield at Hasselt 
- The  Main  Mine  Rescue  Centre at Essen-Kray. 
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2.  Perfecting the CO-filter self-rescuer 
Without  losing sight of  the main  purpose,  which is to develop  a  fully-
protective self-rescuer (1),  the Working  Party considered it appropriate  to 
give more  attention'to perfecting the CO-filter. self-rescuer as  an  interim 
solution. 
CO-filter self-rescuers are successfully used in Community  countries  and 
in the United Kingdom. 
After  an  exchange  of views  regarding the  development  and use  of  these 
devices  in the various countries it was  agreed,  on  the  basis of  a  synoptic 
survey of regulations  already existing in this field to investigate those 
questions  the  answer  to which  could lay the  foundation  for  formulating  the 
requirements  to be  fulfilled by co-filter self-rescuers,  in particular with 
regard to design  and  physiological  ~actors. 
These  questions  include  : 
- technical requirements  (design regulations) 
- organization of use 
- training in use 
- maintenance  and  testing. 
Work  on  these points is not  yet completed. 
3.  Preparing  a  catalogue of  equipment  for  special rescue  operations 
The  examination of  this  problem was  initiated in the  light of  experience 
obtained in two  major  incidents which  took  place outside the coal-mining in-
dustry. 
Although  the  Annual  Reports  of  the Working  Party on  "Mine  Rescue  Organi-
zation"  do  already contain  a  survey over  a  great deal  of  the  equipment 
available in the  Main  Mine  Rescue  Stations,  and  althoug~ every member  of 
this Working  Party is kept  continually informed of  the fields of responsab-· 
ility of experts  and of  the available  equipment  in other Main  Rescue  Stations 
- all this by  reason of  the  Recommendation  regarding reciprocal assistance 
in rescue operations  - the members  of the Working Party nevertheless consid-
ered it necessary  to study this questiop as  a  supplement  to the  Recommenda-
tion referred to  above.  Preparation of  such  a  catalogue would  provide infor-
mation  in the  event of major  incidents as  to where  to apply for  a  certain 
device,  and which  experts  and operating  teams  could be  called upon  for  spe-
cial rescue operations. 
This  suggestion particularly concerns  large apparatus,  e.g.  : 
- for working  through falls,  the removal  of fallen material  and obstacles, 
- large  diameter  boring apparatus with accessories  and supporting material, 
- slurry/water  pumps, 
- rescue cradles, 
- ancillary apparatus e.g. 
Listening apparatus, 
location apparatus, 
high-sensitivity microphones, 
borehole television devices, 
film cameras  etc. 
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Examination of  this question is in progress. 
4.  Frontier formalities  and  customs  duties  for  mine  safety equipment  in the 
event  of  a  major  accident 
With  regard to the  question of  frontier  formalities  and customs  duties 
for  rescue  equipment  in the  case of major  incidents,  the  Mines  Safety Com-
mission  agreed that it should not  formulate  a  Recommendation,  particularly 
as  no  difficulties had arisen hitherto when  mine  rescue  equipment  has  been 
.taken across frontiers,  as  far  as  present  experience  goes. 
The  Safety Commission would  only consider this question  again if a  solu-
tion at ministerial level  seemed to be called for. 
C.- WINDING  ROPES  AND  SHAFT  GUIDES 
I.- Use  of  accelerometers  to test winding  installations 
With regard to  the  above  question,  on which  the Safety Commission  had 
already declared itself in  the  Second Report  (1),  an  improved  Report,  the 
purpose  of which is to set out  in synoptic  documentary  form  : 
- the various  accelerometers  used in the  Community  countries  and 
- the  advantages  which  can be  expected from  the use  of  these  devices. 
Investigation of  the  accelerometers in use  in different countries has 
shown  that  these  devices  can  give useful  information,  not  only  for  checking 
shaft guides,  but  also  in general  for  checking  the operation of winding instal-
lations. 
Moreover,  some  of  the  accelerometers listed in the  Report  have  characteris-
tics which make  their use  by  the  operators responsible for  checking shafts much 
easier,  e.g. 
- robustness  and rapidity of setting-up, 
- diagrams  which  can  be  read off  immediately, 
- purely mechanical  functioning,  or at most  the use  of small current supplies. 
In  the· light of  the state of  development  of  these  devices  at that time, 
the Safety Commission  abstained from  formulating  a  Recommendation  for  use  to 
be  given to the officials responsible  for  routine checking of shafts but rec-
ommended  continuation of  the  tests wi"th  accelerometers  over  a  wide  range. 
The  text of  this Report  appears  as  Annex  V  (2)  and  was  issued to the Mines 
Inspectorate on  15.2.1962. 
II.- Electromagnetic testing of winding ropes  in use 
With  regard to the  question of electromagnetic testing of winding  ropes 
in use,  the Second Report  (3)  states that the  High  Authority was  giving finan-
cial support  i~ this field to an  experimental  programme  supported by  the Safety 
Commission. 
(1)  Second Report:of  the Mines  Safety Commission,  p.  67. 
(2)  Present  Report,  Annex  V,  p.  35~ 
(3)  Second Report  of  the Mines  Safety Commission,  p.  64. 35 
The  Working Party had in the first place given close attention to examining 
the existing literature on  this problem  and  had  taken note  of  the  comparative 
tests carried out  in the United Kingdom. 
Following this,  the Working  Party had itself carried out  tests in France, 
Belgium and Germany  on  winding  ropes  of various  lays,  using the test apparatus 
employed in those countries,  and had carried out  a  comparative analysis of  the 
results indicated in the  diagrams  so obtained. 
It was  only when  the results were  found  to be unsatisfactory that the test 
programme  already described in the  Second Report  was  worked out  and entrusted to 
the  Rope-Testing Station of  the Westfalische Berggewerkschaftskasse in Bochum. 
In addition to this,  the members  of  the  Working Party  and  the  experts 
associated with  them  had  prepared a  series of scientific studies on  this prob-
lem  and  had placed  them  at  the  disposal of  the  Working_Party., 
In addition,  the  alternating  current test device  employed in South Africa 
and  the  United Kingdom  had  been tried out  in practice in three Community  coun-
tries and  a  special study had  been made  of  the results ·of  this trial. 
The  progress of  this  programme  had  been  slowed  down  by  reason of difficul-
ties which  arose in the selection of  sample  pieces of winding rope.  The  tests 
had,  nevertheless  been carried out  in due  and  proper order,  so that the final 
report was  available  for  discussion by  the  Working  Party for  the first  time  in 
December  1964.  -~ 
This  final  report makes  it clear,  inter alia,  that for  the first  time  new 
methods  must  be  applied to  assess  the actual state of  a  rope  - as  revealed by 
later unravelling - since  no  reliable criteria were  available  for certain 
factors. 
The  Working  Party had  prepared  a  special statement with regard to the 
results obtained,  containing broadly  the  following  points  :· 
a)  The  investigation of  numerous  diagrams  recorded with  th~ various  electro~ 
magnetic  test devices  and  the  comparison  of these results with  the  informa-
tion obtained on unravelling the  rope  which  had  ~een tested makes it possible 
to conclude  that  the  use  of  these  devices  allows  of 
- rapidly locating major  faults  in the rope, 
- determining  the  presence  of  broken wires  in many  cases  and 
- checking  the  changes  in the  condition of  a  rope. 
b)  On  the basis of the results of  the research carried out under its guidance 
the Working  Party noted that 
- it is not  possible at  the present  time  to identify the individual  para-
meters  of wear  recorded on  the  diagram,  such  as  corrosion,  mechanical 
wear,  crush points etc., 
it is not  possible to give precise  assessment  o1  the  loss  loadbearing 
capacity of  a  rope  by  means  of  the  diagrams  recorded. 
c)  Consequentiy  the  Working  Party expressed the·view that electromagnetic test-
ing is a  useful auxiliary aid in assessing winding ropes,  but that the in-
terpretation of the  diagrams  is difficult in many·cases. 
d)  From  this it follows  that  : 
- the testing devices  should be  used only by experts,  who  must  be  aware  of 
the limits and  shortcomings of  the method  and also of  the  type  and behaviour 
of  the  different  designs  of rope,  so as  to eliminate faulty assessments; 36 
- electromagnetic  testing cannot  replace  the  normal  conventional  test processes 
such  as  external  inspection,  tapping with  a  hammer,  twisting the rope  open 
(when  possible)  or  removal  of  a  wire,  but  can  only supplement  the~. 
e)  To  sum  up,  the Working  Party is of  the  opinion that the  electromagnetic test 
method  can make  a  contribution to increasing safety in man-riding when  suit-
ably usea  and  in association with the conventional  test methods. 
The  Mines  Safety Commission  accepted the  Report  (1)  of  the Working  Party 
with  the  final  report  (2)  of  the Rope-Testing Station in its Plenary session of 
20.7.1965  and  decided  not  only  to  send it- as  provided in the  terms  of ref-
erence  - to representatives of  the  Governments  and  to the representatives of 
employers  and  workers  ori  the  Permanent  Commission  for  further  act'ion,  but  also 
to distribute it widely ·to all bodies  interested in this question  (manufacturers, 
institutes,  laboratories,  scientific centres,  technical universities,  rope-
testing stations etc.). 
The  Safety Commission  hopes  in this way  to  have  stimulated further study 
of  this problem. 
The  Reports  were  distributed on  15.10.65,  together with  a  letter signed 
by  the  Chairman of  the  Safety Commission.  The  first edition,  consisting of  350 
copies  in each of  two  languages,  French  and German,  was  rapidly exhausted,  so 
that  a·second,  even  larger edition became  necessary before  the  preparation of 
the  Italian,  Dutch  and English versions. 
The  Working  Party agreed to take  a  detailed interest in the  further  de-
velopment  of  electromagnetic  testing of winding ropes.  The  three  testing in-
stitutes of  the Association des  Industriels  de  Belgique,  Association  des  In-
dustriels  de  France  and  the Westfalische Berggewerkschaftskasse  in Bocum  were 
invited to report  to the Working  Party within  one  year  on  special  advances  in 
the field of  electromagnetic  testing of winding  ropes  in their countries.  Only 
after this will the Working  Party  decide  to what  extent  the  study of this 
problem should be  continued. 
III.- Outstanding questions 
The  experts  proposed interim discussion of various  problems  from  daily 
practical operations,  e.g. 
- the utilization of various  types  of material  for  the manufacture  of  convey-
·ances,  suspension  gear  and cage safety devices,  and  also 
- the  preservation  and maintenance  of winding  ropes  by  the  use  of special 
greases. 
The  Safety Commission has  not  yet  decided whether  the  study of  these 
problems  should be  accepted. 
(1)  Present  Report,  Annex  VI,  p. 3~~ 
(2)  Appendix  to this Report,  Annex  XI  a. 37 
De- ELECTRIFICATION 
Ie- Underground  electrical  networks 
lo  Protecting underground electrical networks  against  fire  and  firedamp-explo-
sion risks 
Approval  was  given  to  the  proposal  to protect  underground electrical net-
works  to eliminate  the  danger  of  an electric shock,  the wish  was  expressed 
in  the  Mines  Safety  Commission  that  the  protection of electrical networks 
against  the risk of  fires  or  firedamp  explosions  should  be  included in  the 
same  investigation.  At  the  time,  this request  had  been  met  by  the  attached 
Report  (1),  to which  there were  also  attached Recommendations  and  a  commen-
tary setting out  the  reasons  for  the  various measures. 
The  Report  was  approved at  the  tenth session of  the  Mines  Safety Commis-
sion  on  27th  and  28th April  1964  and  was  distributed on  20th  May  1964  to  the 
responsible organizations  for  further  action. 
_The  Report  consists  of  the  following  three sections,  which  deal with  the 
protection of  underground electrical  networks 
- against  fire risk 
- against  the  risk of  ignition of  firedamp 
- in pits subject  to  sudden  outbursts  of  gas. 
All  the  Recommendations  deal  with alternating currento  If direct-current 
circuits were  introduced  on  a  larger scale in the  future,  a  similar Report 
on  the measures  to  be  recommended  for  direct current  would  be  prepared. 
A.  In  the  first part,  dealing with  fire risk,  three  different  groups  of 
measures  are  recommended 
As  preventive measures  elimination of  fire risk by  excessive  heating 
or  by  short-circuitinge 
- As  protective measures  :  selection of  the risk installation,  use  of 
fire-resistant material  or material which  does  not  burn easily,  removal 
of easily-ignited or  combustible materials. 
- As  active measures  :  automatic  protection of  the  networks  against  abnor-
mal  overloads,  short-circuits  and  dangerous  heatings. 
Naturally,  it is only  by  the  simultaneous use  of all three categories of 
protective measures  that  an  adequate  degree  of  protection of  the under-
ground electrical networks  can  be  ensured. 
Be  In  the  second section,  which  deals with  the  risk of ignition of  firedamp, 
simultaneous  application of  the  three  groups  of measures  is also recom-
mended  as  follows  : 
- As  preventive measures  :  avoidance  of  concentrations of  firedamp at 
points where  electrical equipment  is located;  investigation of  the 
ventilation conditions whenever  a  new  piece of  equipment  is being 
installed and  before  any  installation is added  to; ·investigation of  any 
consequences  of  changes  in operating conditions  (in the  working  system) 
which  may  effect ventilation or  gas  emission; 
- As  protective measures  :  exclusive use  of  equipment  certified by  the 
responsible  Inspectorate,  inspection and  maintenance  of  the  apparatus 
and cables,  clear instructions  to  the  operators; 
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- Active measures  :  elimination of  the  risk of  ignition where  an  explosive 
or combustible  gas  mixture  is present.  On  this point,  the  Working  Party 
expressed the  view  that  robust  and  reliable devices  were  to  be  preferred 
to those  which  acted more  quickly,  but  whose  action was  weak  and  whose 
construction was  not  robust  enough. 
B.  In  the  third section,  dealing with  dangers  connected with electrical net-
works  in pits liable to  sudden  outbursts of  gas,  there  is  a  series of  ad-
ditional measures  which  should be  taken  by  reason of  the  greater scale of 
gas  outbursts  and  of  the difficulty of  predicting  them  : 
These  additional  measures  are  Primarily  directed  towards  three  objectives 
- Restriction of  the risk that electrical  apparatus  or current-carrying 
cables  and  leads  may  be  hit by  flying  debris; 
- elimination of  the  possibility that bodies of  gas  with  a  dangerous 
content  of  firedamp  should be  able  to  pass  around current-bearing 
electrical equipment  without  the  fact  being  known; 
- strengthening of  the  normal  electrical precautions  in gassy pits not 
liable  to sudden  outbursts of  gas. 
2.  Safety measures  during actual  operations  to  prevent  accidents  due  to elec-
trical  shock,  fire  and  firedamp  explosions 
The  Safety Commission  had  declared its agreement  that  the Working  Party 
on  "Electrification"  should begin to study  the  normal  precautions  employed 
in practical operations  to  ensure  the  safety  and  to eliminate  accidents 
- from  electric shock 
- from  fire 
- from  firedamp  explosions. 
The  main  objective here  is to  examine  the  constructional  features  of 
electrical cables  for  underground use  as  well  as  the  electrical  and mechanical 
protection with which  they  are  provided,  the  arrangement  and  composition of  the 
earthing leads,  the  composition  of  the external  sheathing,  the  mechanical 
reinforcement  etc. 
This  work  is considered complimentary  to  the  work  which  has  already  led 
to  proposals  to  the  Safety Commission  (compare  point 1). 
The  great  importance  of  the  problem of electric cables is very clear,  in 
view of  the  increasing electrification of  modern  mine  workings. 
3.  Heat  transmission  through  the  core  of  an  insulated and  heat-shielded cable 
The  Working  Party  had  to turn its attention to  the  transmission of  heat 
through  the  core  of  an  insulated,  heat-shielded cable. 
Among  the  Annexes  (1)  to this  Report  there is a  note,  with calculations, 
which  shows  that  the  heating of  the  conductors  of  an electric cable is 
virtually free  from  any  fire risk,  as  long  as  the  source  of heat lies out-
side the cable.  However, .the  problem is very  different if the  conductor it-
self is raised to  a  higher  temperature  as  a  result  of  the Joule effect, 
i.e.  the heating of  a  conductor  occurring when  a  conductor  passes  through it. 
To  give more  force  to  the  result~ of  these calculations it should be  point-
ed out  that Silec  (2)  have carried out  a  test in which  a  cable was  heated  by 
(1)  Present  Report,  Annex  IX,  p.  1~4. 
(2)  Societe Industrielle  de  Liaisons Electriques,  Paris. 39 
means  of  a  soldering  iron  to  800° c.  It was  observed  that  the  speed of spread 
of  the  heat  was  in fact  only  one-quarter  of  the  calculated speed. 
4.  Effects  of  damp  and  the  salt-paste method  on  the electrical networks  under-
ground 
The  Working  Party  on  "Electrification" will  in future  have  to  consider all 
the  problems  which,  as it were,  form  the  logical  consequence  of  or supplement 
to investigations carried out  previously. 
With  regard  to underground electrical networks,  the  study of  which  led to 
a  Recommendation  and  to  a  supplementary  study,  further  topical  problems  will 
arise.  For  instance,  the  Working  Party is  now  obliged  to  examine  those  prob-
lems  caused  in  underground  electrical networks  in wet  pits or  in pits where 
the  salt-paste process  is used  to  fix  dust. 
In  its Plenary Session  of  14th  and  15th•  2.66  the  Mines  Safety Commission 
charged  the  Working  Party with  an  investigation  into these  problems 
II.- Flameproof  switchgear  for  nominal  voltages  over  llOOV 
The  Working  Party  on  "Electrification"  had  presented  a  Report  on  these 
devices  to  the  Safety Commission  at its meeting  of  16th October  1964  (1). 
This  fulfills  the  responsibility laid on  the  Working  Party  by  the  Safety 
Commission  on  9th  December  1958  to prepare  a  Recommendation  to eliminate oil 
from  underground  transformers,  condensers  and  other electrical equipment  (2). 
This  responsability  led to  the  decision  to continue  the "research into  the 
development  of  low-oil  or oil-less high-tension switchgear  and high-tension 
relays  having  the characteristics necessary  to  ensure  safe use  in  gassy  pits". 
The  Working  Party  on  "Electrification"  had  established - after detailed 
investigations of  the  problem  and  after  journeys  to Germany,  Belgium,  France, 
Italy,  Netherlands  and  the  United  Kingdom  to study  the  construction of  these 
devices  - that  research  into  the  development  of  low-oil  or non-oil  high-tension 
switchgear  and  relays with  the characteristics required  to  provide safe  use  in 
gassy pits should be  energetically pursued  in  the  Community  countries. 
To  provide  a  better survey  of  the  matter  the Working  Party considered it 
advisable  to  prepare  a  list of  the  available  apparatus  ensuring reliable cut-off 
of electric current  and  to make  a  distinction between  switches  and  relays. 
A  method  of  operation of  these  devices  led  the  Working  Party  to classify 
them  according  to  the  type  of  cut-off  (quenching  of  arc)  : 
- Quenching  in oil  (single-vessel oil-switch,  low-oil  power  switch with 
separate chambers); 
- quenching  in water; 
- quenching  in  a  current  of  gas  (switches  with gas-jets,  sulphur-hexa-
fluoride  switches); 
- quencQing  in air.  A  distinction was  made  between  two  sub-groups  of 
devices  in this category  of  cut-off operation; 
- switches which  ensure cut-off with  a  low  arc  resistance  :  these  types 
of  switch  cover  pressure-gas switches,  auto-compression  switches  and 
isolation switches with  fusible-plug  protection; 
- switches which  ensure  cut-off with  high  arc  resistance  (air circuit-
breakers  in  the  normal  sense). 
(1)  Present  Report,  Annex  VIII,  p.385. 
(2)  First Report  of  the  Mines  Safety.Commission,  p.  4. 40 
In all cases  in which  a  suitable  type  of cut-off  device exists  for  gassy 
pits,  an  indication has  been  given  of  the special  features  of  the  type  of  pro-
tection  ("o",  "d"  or "e"),  together with details of  the  practical behaviour  and, 
if appropriate,  of  the  field of  application of  the  group of  devices  in question. 
Following  this,  current  trends  in respect  of  the  use  of  these  devices  in 
the  mines  of  Community  countries were  discussed. 
Finally,  it was  noted,  in  accordance with  the wishes  expressed by  the 
Safety Commission,  that  there  now  exists  a  general  trend in  the case  of  switches 
for  voltag~s above  1000 volts  to reduce  the  quantity of oil used  or  to  ~liminate 
oil altogether. 
It is,  however,  true  that trials with  the  single-vessel oil switch  (30 to 
40 litres of  oil)  have  also  shown  that  this  type  of  device  has  an  exceptionally 
high  degree  of  safety  against  firedamp  and  that  the  danger  of  ignition of  the 
oil is low,  if the  right  type  of  switch  is chosen  and  correctly installed,  i.e. 
in  accordance  with regulations. 
In  the  case of  relays  for  voltages  above  1000 volts,  which  are  frequently 
tripped,  it is not  possible  to avoid  the  use  of oil  in the  flameproof  models. 
Quenching  of  the  arc  in air  in  fact  produces  ionisation and  oxidation which 
reduce  the effective reliability of  the  cut-off  and  in consequence  also affect 
the  functioning  of  the  relay.  These  difficulties increase  even  more  if the 
relay is called upon  to  function  in gassy  atmospheres. 
Investigations  into the  functioning  of  switches  and  relays  in gassy  pits 
must  therefore  be  continued,  since oil is still used  throughout  in such  condi-
tions.  The  Safety  Commission  had,  moreover,  requested that  this  important 
question  should be  discussed again  at  regular  intervals in view  of  the  rapid 
development  of  switching  technique.  The  above  Report  was  issued  to  the  responsible 
organizatio~s on  17.11.1964. 
III.- Investigation of  accidents 
1.  Investigation of  an  accident  caused  by  an  electric shock 
The  Working  Party  was  informed of  the  investigation of  an  accident  due  to 
electric shock  which  had  involved  a  pit electrician in  a  colliery in the 
Dutch  coalfield. 
The  network  data were  as  follows  :  500 volt  DC,  earthed neutral  lead, 
limitation of  fault  current of  some  30  amperes  by  a  99  ohm  impedence;  core-
balance relay. 
An  electrician was  instructed to reconnect  a  protective device  against 
belt slip situated in the control  switch-box of  the  conveyor.  Half  an  hour 
previously  the  apparatus  had  been  switched off to  allow of repairs  to the 
conveyor  belt.  The  electrician was  found  dead,  bent  over  the  switch-box.  The 
lid of  the  swi~ch-box had  fallen  back  on  to  the  housing  and  had  caused  an 
earth connection.  The  core-balance relay had  functioned  and  the circuit had 
been  isolated. 
The  switch-box  for  the  working  comprised  - in addition to  the  cable inlets 
and outlets on  the  supply side - an  isolating and  throwover  switch with 
mechanical  interlock,  which  should prevent  removal  of  the  lid of  the  main 
housing  (containing the  fusible  plugs,  a  relay,  terminals etc.)  when  the 
isolating switch  was  not  ~n the  "voltage cut-off"  position. 
Directly after the  accident it was  established that  the  isolating switch 
was  found  in the "operating"  position;  it must  therefore  be  assumed  that  the 
electrician had  forgotten  to cut off  the current. 41 
However,  on  the  other hand  the  interlocking had also failed,  and in taking 
off  the  lid the electrician had  also  touched  one  of  the  terminals  of  the  relay 
which  was still under  voltage  (traces of  bead  formation).  Since  the  lid was 
no  longer  in contact with  the housing of  the switch-box which  was,  in accord-
ance  with  the regulations,  connected  to  the earthing lead,  but  was still in 
the  hands  of  the  electrician,  he  was  in direct contact with  one  phase  of  the 
system  and  was  killed by  an electric shock. 
Repeated tests after the  accident  have  shown  that  the  interlock was  no 
longer operating sufficiently reliably,  perhaps  as  a  result of wear  .•  It is 
very clear  from  the  investigation of  this accident  that interlocks  do  not 
provide  one  hundred  per cent safety.  In  the  case under  discussion  there  was 
the  complicating factor  that  the  switch-box was  installed in a  very  narrow 
niche. 
The  Working  Party examined  the  question as  to whether it was  appropriate 
to  provide  pit electricians with  checking  apparatus,  so  that  they could check 
whether  the  equipment  was  under voltage.  Some  members  of  the  Working  Party 
held  the  view  that this measure  would  be  a  disadvantage,  since  there would 
then  be  a  risk that  the  current  would  not.  be  cut off before  the housing was 
opened. 
2.  A heavy  firedamp  explosion  occurred in the  Aachen  district by  reason of  a 
concentration of  firedamp  in  a  roadway  where  trolley locomotives were  run-
ning.  Sparks  from  the  trolley wire  had  caused  the  ignition. 
In connection with  this accident  the Mines  Safety Commission  had  charged 
the  Working  Party on  "Electrification" to investigat.e _the  safety measures 
applicable to trolley locomotives.  The  Safety Commission  desired that  these 
investigations should in particular cover  the  problem of  how  the electric 
sparks occurring during  the  movement  of  the  locomotives  could be  reduced. 
Naturally,  increased safety can  be  achieved  by  other means  from  simply 
reducing  the  formation  of sparks.  However,  as  in other fields  of mining  opera-
tions,  the  principle was  to be  maintained that  different  types  of safety 
measures  should be  taken simultaneously. 
3.  A pit accident  in the United Kingdom  gave  rise to the  charge  laid upon  the 
Working  Party by  the  Safety Commission  to investigate over-voltages  produced 
in underground workings  by  lightning.  It is a  fact  that  lightning produces 
a  steep voltage wave,  which  can  produce  very high over-voltages on  the high-
tension side.  The  low-tension current is then increased in the  same  proportion 
and  this can  lead to breaking  dow~ of  the  insulation.  If such failure of  the 
installation occurs  in a  gassy  atmosphere,  then it goes  without  saying that 
there is a  risk of  ignition. 
This  instruction to  the Working  Party was  supplemented by  the  requirement 
to investigate the  problem  of scatter currents  in mine  workings.  This  old 
question has  recently  become  acute  again,  by reason of  the  phenomena  observed, 
particularly in the  United Kingdom,  in the electrification of  railways  on 
colliery sites. 
4.  I~ connection with  a  major  pit accident  in France in which  the  probable cause 
of  the ignition was  electrical,  the Safety Commission  gave  the  Working  Party 
the  following  charge  : 
"investigation of safety measures  to be  taken in the  case of necessary work 
on  equipment still under  voltage". 
The  first· investigations of this accident  had  shown  that  a  switch-box had 
been handled without  the current  being cut off  previously,  as  the  regulations· 
provided. 42 
5.  In general,  the Working  Party is in the  habit of  examining  the  conditio~s in 
which  the  accidents  or  incidents of which  they  are  informed had  taken  place, 
and  to note  where  the  causes were  due  to electrical installations. 
While  this Report  was  being  prepared,  the Working  Party was  studying the 
detailed circumstances of  an  accident  in Belgium in which  damage  to  a  power 
cable was  given  as  the  cause  of  the  ignition of  a  concentration of  firedamp. 
The  Working  Party also  intends  to discuss  a  major  accident which  had oc-
curred in Wales.  Here  firedamp  was  ignited,  because  the  face  conveyor  drive 
was  under electric control  precisely at  the moment  when,  by  chance,  a  con-
centration had been  formed. 
E.- COMBUSTIBLE  DUSTS 
1.  As  can  be  seen  from  Chapter  III  B,  one  of  the  conclusions  drawn  by  the Mines 
Safety Commission  on  the basis of  the various expert discussions of  the pit 
catastrophe at Luisenthal  was  to  prepare  for  and carry out  the  study of  those 
problems  which  arise in consequence  of  the risks of explosions of  firedamp  and 
coal-dust. 
2.  After  examining  and  approving  a  first draft  programme  of work,  drawn  up  on  the 
basis of  suggestions  from  the various  members,  the Restricted Committee  and  the 
Mines  Safety Commission  expressed  the wish  th~t the  problems set out  in this 
draft  should in the  first place  - before  the establishment  of  a  Working  Party  -
be  clearly defined in preliminary studies with regard to their scope,  so  as  to 
make  it possible  to carry out  a  systematic  investigation.  During  a  meeting  of 
experts,  which  emphasized the  necessity  for  a  study of  this whole  problem,  it 
was  insisted that  this preliminary examination should be carried out with  the 
proviso that in the  first  instance attention would  be  concentrated on  a  certain 
number  of  questions  of direct  and major  practical importance,  e.g.  neutralizing 
coal-dust,  the use  of  stone-dust barriers  and  the  removal  of  coal-dust. 
At  this meeting  the  experts expressed  the wish  that after listing the 
problems  at  present  being investigated in the  various research institutes,  and 
the  results  - or  part results - attained  from  these studies,  that there should 
also be  prepared  documents  showing  : 
comparison of  the  legislation existing in the  various  Community  countries  and 
in the  United Kingdom; 
a  list of  the various  causes  which  have  given rise to ignition of  firedamp  or 
of  coal-dust  - from  a  given  moment  of  time  onwards; 
a  precise  summary  of  the whole  of  present knowledge  in this field. 
3.  On  the basis of  these suggestions  the Safety Commission  decided to set up  a 
Working  Party with  the  following  terms  of  reference  : 
"The  Working  Party shall investigate the  problems  arising in the coal-mining 
industry in connection with combustible  dusts. 
In  the  first  instance,  the Working  Party shall investigate 
- the mechanism  of  the  ignition of  dust  and  the  propagation of  the  flame,  and 
- the  factors  which  can affect  the  ignition of  dust  and  the  propagation of  a 
coal-dust explosion,  e.g. 
- the  type  of coal  and/or  the volatile content 
- the  fineness  of  the  coal 43 
- the  dust  concentration 
- the  firedamp  concentration 
- the  cause  of  ignition 
- the effect of  the  manner  of  deposition 
- the effect of  humidity 
- the  local "geometry"  in the  roadway 
- etc. 
The  Working  Party is further  responsible  for  studying  the  protective meas-
ures  to  be  taken  against  ignition of  dusts,  in particular  : 
- the neutralization of  dust  (dust-suppression measures  at  the  point of  dust 
production,  stone-dusting,  spraying with water,  binding of  the  dust  by  coatings 
of salts and  coagulating pastes etc.), 
-barriers (all  the  various  types  of barrier,  their construction,  their.location 
etc.). 
The  Working  Party shall be  free  to  propose  any  research project which 
might,  in its view,  seem  necessary  to provide  further  information regarding  the 
phenomena  to  be  investigated and  to  increase safety in this connection. 
The  Restricted Committee  is of  the  view  that it is advisable  from  the 
practical point  of  view  to begin this investigation by  studying the neutraliza-
tion of coal-dust  and  the use  of  stone-dust barriers. 
The  Working  Party shall also have  among  its members  representatives of 
mine  managements,  representatives of specialist research institutes in this 
field,  practising engineers  and miners'  representatives. 
In  accordance with  the  normal  practice,  other experts may  be  co-opted for 
special  technical  problems,  e.g.  in connection with general  chemistry or  the 
combustion of  coal. 
4.  In order  to provide  the  members  of this Working  Party with  precise  and  comparable 
information regarding present practice,  a  questionnaire  was  sent  to  the national 
mines  inspectorates. 
This  questionnaire called for  the essential information which would  give 
the Working  Party  a  clear picture of  the manner  in which  the  problems  of neutral-
izing the coal-dust  and  of  employing stone-dust barriers are  dealt with at  this 
moment. 
The  answers  received were  examined  and  compared,  and in this way  a  very 
extensive compilation of information was  available  to the  Working Party at its 
first session. 
5.  After  a  detailed exchange  of  views,  representatives of  three countries with  the 
greatest experience  in this field were  entrusted with preparing  a  study of  the 
coal-dust explosions which  had  occurred since  1950. 
Without  going into the  question of  blame,  this study sets out  to provide 
the  maximum  useful  information  from  the records of  the various pit accidents; 
an  attempt is made  to pick out  the typical  cases,  and  to extend research into 
these  beyond  the  three selected countries. 
6.  A further,  smaller group  - made  up  of Directors of Research Stations - was 
requested to compile  the  following  information  : 
- the  proven results obtained  from  tests carried out  up  to  the  present, 44 
- experiments at  present being carried out, 
- proposals  for  research projects to fill existing gaps  in our knowledge. 
This  prQgramme  would  be  restricted to the most  important  points,  so that 
first conclusions  could be  reached at  the earliest possible moment. 
7.  This  work  is now  under  way.  The  lessons obtained therefrom will make  it possible 
to continue  the experts'  discussion. 
X 
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While  this Working  Party  for  "Combustible  dusts"  was  in process  of  formation,  the 
secretariat - at  the request  of  the Safety Commission  - was  occupied in collecting 
information which  would make  it possible to define more  precisely the  problems  which 
arise in connection with  firedamp. 
The  Safety Commission  had expressed the wish  that this work  should begin with  the 
compilation of  a  list giving details of all firedamp-measuring  and  firedamp-indica-
ting apparatus,  to provide  a  starting-point  for  investigation of  the  problems  of 
measurement  of  firedamp  and  the  conclusions  to be  drawn  therefrom. 
In  accordance with this wish,  work  has  begun  on  the  compilation of  documents  regard-
ing the various  types  of  portable or  fixed  apparatus,  remote-indicating methanometers 
and measuring  apparatus  for  high  gas  concentrations,  including all types  at present 
in use  as  well  as  prototypes or  proposed  designs. 
This  preparatory work  requires  to be  continued. 
F.- HIGH  AUTHORITY  COMPETITION  FOR  IMPROVED  MINE  SAFETY  EQUIPMENT 
I.- First competition 
The  First Report  (1)  of  the  Mines  Safety Commission  indicated the  reasons 
for  organizing this competition. 
On  9.2.1962,  the  competition was  formally  closed by  the  presentation of 
the  prizes. 
The  five  classes of  apparatus  covered by  this competition were  as  follows 
1.  Portable methanometer 
This  device was  to replace  the miner's  flame  lamp  as  a  means  of measuring 
firedamp  concentration,  and would,  in particular,  be  issued to  a  large  number 
of  persons  authorized to fire shots,  for  the measurement  of  firedamp  concentra-
tion before shotfiring. 
2.  Portable  firedamp-warning  apparatus 
This is a  device  for  installation at  the  head of  the  face,  in airways,  in 
roadways  being dismantled etc.  It must  give either an optical or  an  accous-
tic signal. 
(~)  First Report  of  the Mines  Safety Commission,  p.  28. 45 
3.  Portable  device  giving warning of  oxygen  shortage 
This  device is intended to replace  the miner's  flame  lamp  as  a  means  of 
giving warning of  oxygen  shortage,  and  for use,  in particular by officials 
responsible  for ventilation.  If possible it should give  an  accoustic signal. 
4.  Carbon monoxide  recording apparatus 
The  requirements  to be  met  by  this device  are  : 
to  give  timely warning  of  an  incipient mine  fire  in pits with  a  high fire 
risk,  and 
- in the  case  of  a  fire  already having  a  hold,  to record the  progress  and 
extinction of  the fire  and  to give  the men  in the pit warning  of  a  dangerous 
concentration of  carbon monoxide. 
5.  Fully-protective self-rescuer 
This  self-rescuer must  provide  complete  protection against  poisonous  gases 
anq  against  shortage  of  oxygen  and  thus make  it possible for  men  to save 
themselves  in the  event  of mine  fires  or explosions of  firedamp  or  combustible 
dusts.  This  device,  which completely eliminates  the  need for  breathing the 
surrounding  atmosphere,  should be  able  to protect men  against  asphyxiation in 
cases where  the CO-filter self-rescuer at present in use  can offer  no  pro-
tection. 
In each of  the  five  groups  of apparatus,  the  requirement  was  that  the 
new  devices  should represent either completely  new  designs  or considerable 
improvements  over  types  already in service;  in particular,  the most  impor~ 
tant  features  called for  were  : 
- the  device  should be  as  light as  possible, 
- should be  simple  to use, 
- should be  robust  (proof  against  blows)  and 
should be  reasonable  in price  • 
. In view of  the  importance  of  this competition for  the  furtherance  of safety 
in mines,  participation was  not restricted to Community  countries. 
The  High  Authority established a  jury to examine  the entries,  consisting 
of  experts  from  the coal-producing countries of the Community. 
- All  the  devices  entered for  the competition  (from  the Federal  Republic  of 
Germany,  France,  the Netherlands  and  the United Kingdom)  were  tested for 
a  period of six months  in  the  laboratory as well  as  in underground service 
tests in  two  different countries - ind~pendently of  one  another. 
On  the basis of  these trials the jury awarded  the  following  prizes 
1.  Portable methanometer 
Two  second prizes  each  of  10,000 European Monetary  Agreement  units of 
account  for 
a)  Device  submitted by  the Ministry of  Power,  Safety in Mines  Research 
Establishment,  Sheffield, 
- This  apparatus is characterized by  a  highly-developed measuring method, 
and  the results of  the trials justify it being considered a  reliable 
apparatus  for  underground use.  · 46 
b)  The  "Kuhbier  59"  device,  (Federal Republic  of  Germany). 
- This  device  is based on  a  well-known measuring  principle,  which  is very 
suitable for  underground use.  The  small  dimensions  and  low weight  of 
the  apparatus  characterize its advance  over  other models  in this field. 
2.  Portable  firedamp-warning  apparatus 
One  first prize of  35,000 European Monetary  ~greement units of  account  for 
the  device  entered by  Mines  Safety Appliances,  Glasgow. 
- The  modern  design,  the simple operation of  the setting element  and  the 
measurement  accuracy  of this  device  justified this prize  award. 
3.  Carbon monoxide  recording apparatus 
4. 
a)  A first prize of  35,000  EMA  units of  account  for  the  device  entered  by  the 
Bergbauforschung G.m.b.H.,  Essen. 
- This  apparatus  fulfilled all the  requirements  laid, down  in the  competi-
tion  regulations;  it is particularly suitable for  use  because  of its 
lightweight  design,  coupled with either continuous  long-term monitoring 
of  a  ventilation current  from  a  fixed station,  or  for  short-term use 
at different  points  in firefighting operations  - in both  instances it 
is used in the  same  way.  One  particular advantage  is that it gives 
quantitative'indication of  CO  for  concentrations as  low  as  0,005%  by 
volume. 
b)  Two  second prizes each of  10,000  EMA  units of  account  for 
- the  device  entered by  the  Dragerwerk  Company,  LUbeck  and 
- the  device  entered by  the National  Coal  Board,  North Western Division, 
Central Laboratory,  ~anchester; 
- both  pieces of  apparatus  in general  fulfilled almost all the competition 
requirements.  Whereas  the first apparatus is very suitable for  use  at 
fixed stations,  the  second is of  lightweight construction and  is better 
for  short-term use  at different positions. 
Fully-protective self-rescuer 
Two  awards  each of  10,000 EMA  units of  account  for 
a)  the  device entered by  the  firm  Fenzy  &  Co.,  Montreuil  (Seine)  and 
b)  the  device entered by  the Auer-A.G.,  Berlin. 
It was  noted that  the  design of  these  pieces of  apparatus  had achieved 
further  progress in the  development  of  fully protective self-rescuers.  The 
designers  have  come  near  to the  solution required and  have  achieved very 
promising results with  the principles  they applied. 
To  sum  up,  the results obtained by  the  jury  from  the  laboratory trials 
and  the underground service trials with the  prizewinning apparatus  led to  a 
satisfactory overall  conclusion  : 
- the  portable methanometer,  the  portable  firedamp-warning  apparatus,  and 
the  carbon monoxide  recording apparatus  are  already capable of entering 
into service  immediately after the  end  of  the  competition; 
- the  fully-protective self-rescuer devices  only  approximated  to  the  condi-
tions laid down;  the experience  gained during the tests will make  it 
possible  for  them  to be  used successfully after some  lapse of  time. 47 
II.- Second Competition 
In  the  group  covering  the  oxygen-shortage  indicating devices  the  jury 
decided  not  to  give  a  prize.  However,  bearing in mind  the great  importance  for 
mine  safety of  the  development  of  such  an  appara~us,  they  proposed.to  the  High 
Authority  to  extend  the  competition for  this group of  apparatus  and  to offer 
the  70,000  EMA  units of  account  not  awarded  as  prizes in the first competition. 
For  the  purposes  of  this second competition  the  jury drew  up  less rigorous 
conditions. 
In  addition,  having regard to  the difficulties encountered in developing 
a  flameless  oxygen-shortage  indicator,  they  have  left open  the opportunity,  if 
appropriate  as  a  stop-gap solution,  to  award  a  prize to  a  flame  apparatus,  if 
the  new  apparatus offers essential  advantages  over  the conventional  flame  lamps 
- although  the ultimate objective is the  development  of  a  f~ameless apparatus 
as early as  possible. 
The  conditions of  this competition were  published on  27.8.1962,  after the 
High  Authority had  accepted the  proposal  (1). 
The  period for  entry of  these  devices  closed on  8.10.1964.  At  its first 
meeting  on  the 8th and  9th October  1964  the jury was  able  to  examine  the  proto-
types  entered for  the  first  time  when  they were  personally demonstrated by  the 
makers. 
The  jury's work  is still under  way. 
The  Mines  Safety Commission  has  taken  a  very special  interest in these 
activities which  are  so  important  for  mine  safety,  and will  be  kept  continuously 
informed of  progress. 
(1)  Bulletin of  the European  Community  No.  77,  27.8.1962,  p.  2160. 49 
C  H A P  T  E  R  T  W 0 
HUMAN  FACTORS 51 
The  Mines  Safety Commission  had decided that  the  following  four  groups of 
problems  should be  studied  (1)  : 
The  effects of working  hours  on safety,  in particular under  heavy  working  condi-
tions  or at unhealthy working  points. 
- Medical  problems  of safety policy. 
- Psychological  and sociological factors  affecting safety. 
- Effects of method of  payment  on safety. 
Further details of  the  work  undertaken  in these  fields is contained in 
the  following survey. 
Party  : 
A.- EFFECTS  OF  WORKING  HOURS  ON  SAFETY,  ESPECIALLY  UNDER  DIFFICULT 
OR  UNHEALTHY  CONDITIONS 
The  Safety Commission  had  issued the  following mandate  to the Working 
"Preliminary Remarks 
a)  The  question here is what  are  the effects of  the working  time  on safety,  not  the 
problems  of  the working  time  itself as  such. 
b)  In studying this problem,  the Working Party must  take  as its starting-point  the 
basic principles laid down  by  the members  of the Conference  and subsequently  by 
the  Government.  These  principles should need  no  further  amplification. 
I.- Working  time  in the special cases which  cause  increased fatigue  or  danger 
The  Conference  approved  a  general  Recommendation  on  this subject.  A 
suitable formulation must  be  found;  in such.cases  the  increased fatigue  must  be 
taken  into account  in laying  down  the  length of  the working  period. 
Starting from  this basis,  the Working  Party responsible  for  these  problems 
was  able  to vote  to devote its attention to discussion of  the  following  points  : 
1.  In which  cases must  special measures  be  taken  : 
- hot working-points, 
- wet  working-points, 
- thin seams. 
(1)  Second  Report  of  the  Mines  Safety Commission,  p. 52 
2.  Hot  working  points 
a)  How  is the effective temperature  to be  measured  and  to what  degree must, 
e.g.  the  following  factors  be  taken into account?  : 
the  temperature, 
- the  air velocity, 
- the effects of radiation. 
b)  What  limits should be  laid down?  i.e. 
- what  is the  threshold of effective temperature at which special measures 
should be  put  into force? 
- should only  one  limit be  laid down  or should there  be  several stages, 
calling for  different measures? 
c)  What  measures  to be  taken?  : 
- shortening of  the  daily working  period, 
shortening of  the working  time  at  the working-points  in question or 
granting  a  rest  day  after  a  fixed interval. 
3.  Thin  seams 
a)  In what  instances is  a  seam  to  be  considered as  thin,  and  therefore calling 
for  special measures? 
b)  What  special measures  should be  taken  in such  instances? 
4.  Wet  working-points 
a)  When  is  a  working-point  to  be  considered as wet  or moist,  and  when  are 
special measures  justified? 
b)  What  measures  should be  taken in such  a  case? 
II.- Effective Working  time  (includinR overtime) 
The  Conference  approved of  a  Recommendation  to restrict overtime  to  a 
minimum. 
III.- Pauses  during  the shift,  and other  guiding principles for  fixing working  time 
(e.g.  the  time  of  day  at which  the shift starts,  delayed working  periods). 
The  Conference  accepted  a  Recommendation  regarding pauses  during the 
working shift. 
It might  therefore be  useful  to see whether it was  possible to lay down, 
inter alia,  the  length of  these  pauses,  the  number  of  pauses  to be  made  and  the 
time  at which  they  would be  taken  during  the  wo.rking  day. 
It would  also be·advisable  to investigate the effects of  these  pauses  on 
safety,  according to whether  they were  taken collectively by  the  men  or  individ-
ually. 
It is not envisaged up  to the  present that further  guiding principles 
for  fixing working  time  should 'be  issued.  A  particular subject for  investigation 
would  be  the  problem of  adjusting work  to the biological rhythm". 
X 
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As  stated in the  last Report  (1),  it was  decided to study  the subjects 
named  in the  working  programme  as  appropriate  for  i~vestigation; first in time  and 
in  importance  was  the subject of hot  working-points~ 
Repeated discussions  eventually led to complete  agreement  on  the wording 
of  the  Recommendation  regarding  the  laying  down  of  climatic limit values,  and of 
the  explanatory notes  to this Recommendation.  The  Recommendation refers only  to 
underground working-points. 
Medical  experts collaborating in the  appropriate  investigations,  subsidized 
by  the  High  Authority,  took  part in these  discussions. 
The  draft of  the  Recommendation  and  of  the explanatory notes  were  referred 
to  the  Mines  Safety Commission  in its meeting of  18th July  1963  for  assessment. 
After  a  detailed discussion both  documents  were  approved of  (2). 
Using  as  a  basis  a  physiological  index of  climatic conditions,  there  was 
laid down  a  maximum  climatic value  above  which it is forbidden  (except  in special 
cases)  to work  or  remain  at working-points  • 
. Furthermore,  there  was  laid down  a  range  of climatic conditions within 
which  working  operations or  mere  presence  there were  allowed  only with special 
precautions. 
Finally,  attention was  drawn  to  the necessity of  improving knowledge  in 
this field so  that  the  Recommendation  could  be  improved  accordingly. 
The  maximum  climatic value  was  set at  320 eff A  (basic scale),  and  the 
prescribed precautions must  be  taken  in the  range  of climatic conditions  between 
320  eff A  and  28° eff A  (basic scale). 
These  precautionary measures  include,  inter alia,  : 
- special medical  checks  of  the  persons  employed  on  this work  appropriate  to  the 
special working  conditions, 
- selection of  those  persons  who  can,  on  medical  grounds,  be  considered for  work 
under  these climatic conditions, 
- restriction of  the  total  time  spent  in such climatic conditions, 
- application of  a  suitable method  of  payment  to  take  account  of  the working  condi-
tions  in such climatic circumstances. 
The  wording  of  this last point  was  agreed,  after it had  been  decided to 
investigate in greater detail  the  problem of  the method  of  payment  for  the  climatic 
conditions ranging  from  28° eff A to  320 eff A  (basic scale),  so  as  to obtain  a 
clearer picture of  the situation. 
The  measures  listed in the  Recommendation  with regard to the  protection of 
the  men  subjected to conditions  falling within this climatic range  represent  the 
present state of  knowledge  regarding  the medically-permissible work  under  such cli-
matic conditions.  Advances  in medical  knowledge  in this field could therefore  lead 
to changing or expanding  the  precautionary measures  at  some  subsequent  time. 
It should be mentioned in this connection that the  Mines  Safety Commission 
has  made  it its business  to  recommend  certain investigations,  in an effort to contrib-
ute to extending present  knowledge. 
During  the discussion of  the  "Recommendation  on  fix~ng climatic limits" 
attention was  drawn  to  the  problems  of modifying  the climate  in the underground 
workings,  especially in relation to the  limits laid down  in the  Recommendation. 
(1)  Second  Report  of  the  Mines  Safety Commission,  p.  87. 
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An  application made  by  the  "Gezamenlijke Steenkolenmijnen"  in Limburg 
(Netherlands)  for  financial  support  of  investigations into "the measurement  of 
factors which  affect  the climate in underground workings"  is intended to examine 
the  problems  of  the  factors  which effect underground climate  and if possible to 
find  a  solution. 
The  investigation had already  progressed so  far  that  the results were 
being  put  to practical use  in Limburg  (Netherlands). 
However,  there were still two  elements  of  this problem which  had  to be 
examined  in particular detail 
a)  the  oxidation of  coal  as  an  exothermic  process  underground 
b)  the mechanics  of  climatic conditions in workings  with auxiliary ventilation. 
Modification of  the climate underground is undoubtedly  of  great  importance 
to  the  safety and health of  the  men  occupied there. 
In  addition,  the  investigation has  economic  and  technical  importance, 
particularly for  managements  who  are  faced with  having  to  purchase  air-cooling plant 
within  the  foreseeable  future. 
The  Mines  Safety Commission  had  unanimously  approved  these  investigations 
and  had supported the  grant  of  financial  aid by  the  High  Authority  in its meeting 
of  27th  and  28th April,  1964. 
Once  the consultants of  the  High  Authority had  approved  this application, 
the  request  for  financial  aid would  be  placed before  the Consultative Committee, 
shortly before  the  end of  the  period of  time  covered by  this Report. 
B.- MEDICAL  PROBLEMS  OF  A SAFETY  POLICY 
The  terms  of  reference  issued to  the Working  Party  by  the  Mines  Safety 
Commission  run  as  follows 
"Preliminary remarks 
a)  The  purpose  is to examine  the medical  problems within  the  framework  of  a  policy 
of safety in mines,  i.e,  fundamentally  the  following  questions  : 
- selection of  the  workmen  on  the basis of  their state of  health; 
- guiding the workmen  into particular fields  of  work  for  which  they  are fitted 
on  health grounds; 
- regular medical  examinations  to ensure  that  the workers  are capable of carrying 
out  the work  on which  they  are  employed; 
- conclusions  drawn  from  the observations made  by  the medical  service regarding 
the suitability or otherwise  of  a  gtven workman  for  the work  on which  he  is 
employed. 
b)  The  principles  accepted in this connection by  the Conference  and later by  the 
Governments  should be  considered as  final  and  do  not  therefore call for  any 
further  discussion. 
I.- Description of medical  services 
- Number  of  doctors  and assistants in relation to the  number  of workers; 
- available medical  equipment; 
- working conditions; 55 
measures .taken  to create  good  relations  between  the medical  service,  the 
various operational  departments,  the  workmen  and  their representatives; 
- the contractual poFition of  the  doctors  and  the members  of  the medical  service 
within the enterprise. 
The  practical success  and  the efforts made  in this field,  on  the  one  hand 
by  the  whole  branch of industrial medicine  and  on  the  other side by  the colliery 
medical  services is to  a  considerable extent  dependent  on particular details of 
practical execution which  can  only  be  worked  out  by  a  detailed,  descriptive 
investigation. 
This  investigation would  have  to be  extended to cover  a  limited number  of 
colliery medical  services,  considered as  those best able  to provide usable  in-
formation  for  the various  Community  countries.  The  Working  Party could,  if ap-
propriate,  prepare  the skeleton for  this descriptive investigation after having 
visited and  inspected various medical  services,  and  then after receiving the 
information,  decide  what  conclusions should be  drawn. 
II.- Measures  to ensure specialization of  the  doctors wishing  to serve or already 
serving as  industrial doctors  in the mining  industry 
- Specialization during university studies; 
- specialization after university studies; 
- laws  or regulations  applicable in this  field; 
- measures  taken  in the coal-mining industry regardless of  any  legal provisions. 
The  specialization of doctors wishing  to  devote  their activities to in-
dustrial medicine  draws  its special significance  from  the  developments  in this 
field and  from  the particuiar conditions  under  which  industrial medicine  is· 
applied in the  coal-mining industry,  as well  as  by  the essential knowledge  of 
the surroundings  and conditions  of work. 
III.- a)  The  adaptation of  the workers  who  are  no  longer  able  to carry out their 
previous  work  for  health reasons; 
b)  re-employment  of  these workers  and  those  who  have  been  shown  by  medical 
inspection to be  no  longer  able  to perform their previous  work. 
The measures  in this field are of  great  importance,  not  only  because it 
is essential  for  the  worker  to recognize  the  doctor's  decision,  but also because 
it is equally essential  that he  should willingly agree  to be  examined. 
The  Conference  approved  ·of  the  following  Recommendation  : 
"Should it be  found  that  there are  grounds  for  not  employing  a  man  underground, 
he  must  be  transferred to  a  suitable occupation,  as  far  as  possible within the 
framework  of  the  same  enterprise". 
1.  Description of  some  of  the measures  already  taken in the  field of rehabili-
tation of workers  who  can  no  longer perform their previous  tasks 
This description could be carried out  in the  same  way  as  was  proposed in 
the  case of  the  industrial medical  services. 
2.  Comparison of  laws,  regulations  and contracts regarding the  re-employment  of 
workers  who  are unable  - or no  longer  able  - to  perform their previous  work 
and  comparison  of  the measures  to be  taken  to  give  force  to these provisions 
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As  stated in the  previous  Report  (1),  the  Mines  Safety  Commission  has  ap-
proved  of  a  firs~  Re~ommendation in conformity with  the  terms  of reference.  This 
Recommendation  covers  : 
- pre-entry medical  examinations, 
- special medical  examinations, 
- routine medical  check-ups  during work. 
Investigations of  the  following  problems  have  been  begun 
- the  type  of  organization for  the  industrial medical  service, 
- the operation of  such  a  service  and 
- its composition". 
In cooperation with  the Department  for  "Industrial Medicine  and Workers' 
Health"  of  the  High  Authority,  inspection visits were  paid  to  the  following medical 
centres during  the  period covered by  this Report 
"Centre  de  !'Association des  Instituts  de  Medicine  du  Travail,  de  Traumatologie et 
de  Readaptation  Professionnelle  de  l'Industrie et  du  Commerce"  in Loverval; 
"Centre  de  Traumatologie et  de  Readaptation  Fonctionnelle"  of  the  "Caisse Commune  de 
l'Industrie Charbonniere  de  Charleroi et  de  la Basse  Sambre"  in Montigny,  and  the 
Health  and  Social  Service of  the  "Houilleres  du  Bassin  de  Lorraine"  in Merlebach 
and  Forbach. 
C.- PSYCHOLOGICAL  AND  SOCIOLOGICAL  FACTORS  IN  SAFETY 
The  terms  of.reference laid down  for  the  Working  Party  by  the Safety Com-
mission  cover  the  following  points  : 
"I.- Measures  required to enable  the workers 
- to recognize  dangers 
- to  do  their work  in such  a  way  that  these  dangers  are  avoided. 
Various  means  of  carrying out  these measures  to ensure  that  they  have 
maximum  effect. 
For  example,  the  following  are  emphasized in this connection  : 
a)  specialization during industrial training of  the worker  in accordance with 
the  job he  is destined
1for:  utilization of  the  worker  at  the working-point 
for  which  he  was  trained and maintaining him  there; 
b)  steps to correct wrong  or  dangerous  methods  of working which  have  been 
observed in the  case  of  certain workers  or certain groups  of workers  : 
assistance in self-protection; 
c)  special  instruction for  the workers  before beginning  a  job involving excep-
tional risks. 
II.- Training officials with  regard to safety 
a)  Encouraging attention to safety as  a  counterbalance to the desire to achieve 
production. 
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b)  Training with  regard to practical questions raised by efforts to increase 
safety  : 
The  training covers  : 
- correct preparation of  accident  reports 
- assessment  of  information contained in these  reports 
- the  search  to establish causes  of accidents 
- the  search for  means  to eliminate  them 
- familiarity with safety equipment. 
III.- Measures  necessary  to ensure  that all interested persons  (workers,  officials, 
management  staff)  are  involved in the efforts to achieve  maximum  safety. 
a)  Suitable measures  to encourage  the  competitive spirit between  the different 
districts of  the _colliery or  between pits  (presentation of statistics or 
trends  in  the  num'ber  of  accidents  per district,  per working-point,  per col-
liery,  per  group  of  workers  with  the  same  officials etc.). 
b)  Publicity campaigns  in respect  of mine  safety  : 
- preparation 
- measures  to ensure  their success 
- assessment. 
c)  Activity of  the Safety Committees  and other similar bodies. 
d)  Activity of  other bodies within  the enterprise". 
Terms  of  reference  issued to  the Working  Party clearly lay  down  that it 
is necessary  not  only  to work  out  proposals  but  also to study  the most  suitable 
means  of  putting  these  proposals into practice. 
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The  continuing discussion of  the  group of  problems  referred to in the 
previous  Report  (1)  led to  the  approval  of  two  documents  on  these  points by  the 
Mines  Safety Commission  at its meeting of  14th and  15th February  1966. 
These  two  documents  are entitled ''Report  on  the Psychological  and Soci-
ological Factors affecting Safety"  (2')  and  "Recommendation  on  the Psychological  and 
Sociological Factors affecting Safety"  (3). 
The  consultations which  led to the  preparation of  the  documents  referred 
to had hitherto been concentrated in practice on  three'points which  had  formed  the 
chapter headings  in the Report  (2),  dealing in fact with points  I  and  II in the 
terms  of reference  previously mentioned. 
These  are  : 
I.  Measures  to enable  personnel  to recognize  dangers  and  work  in such  a  way  as  to 
avoid  them. 
(1)  Second Report,  p.  81. 
(2)  Present  Report,  Annex  XII,  p. 415. 
(3)  Present  Report,  Annex  XIII,  p.  425. 58 
II.  Training of safety supervisors  arid  officials in safety problems;  selection of 
such officials. 
III.  The  effectiveness of  psychotechnical  tests. 
Ad  I.  Measures  to enable  personnel  to recognize  dangers  and  work  in such  a  way  as  to 
avoid  them 
In  the first  place  attention must  be  drawn  to  : 
A.  Recognizing  the  dangers,  it being  necessary  to distinguish three stages 
1.  Before beginning activity all measures  which  can  avoid any  possible 
dangers  should be  carefully checked. 
2.  Safety conditions  should be  continually checked  during working  opera-
tions.  In addition,  certain specified reports must  be  prepared and  data 
collected. 
3.  After  the  end of  work,  it is necessary  to  prepare  a  report which  records 
a  series of specifically-indicated items  of  information. 
In connection with  the  recognition of  the  dangers,  attention must  also 
be  paid to 
B.  Informing all those  involved of  the  dangers 
Here  a  distinction is drawn  between  two  phases  in  time  which call for 
certain measures  to be  taken  : 
1.  Before work  is begun,  it is advisable to have  a  discussion between 
representatives of  the works  management,  the officials,  members  of the 
safety branch  and  the  workmen  themselves,  to keep  everybody  informed, 
to discuss  the working  operations  in detail  and  to settle upon  the  most 
suitable method of work;  this method of work is to be  made  known  to  the 
workers  involved by  the most  suitable means  available. 
2.  While  the work  is being carried out,  the  management  or  the supervisory 
officials should emphasize  the  regulations  and  instructions which 
should be  observed as  often as  necessary. 
Any  other  announcements with regard to safety should be  systematically 
brought  to  the  notice of  each  person  involved. 
In addition,  steps should be  taken to ensure  that  information  from  any 
of  the wprkers.involved regarding  dangerous  situations arising in the 
course  of  work  should be  brought  to  the  notice of  the  management  of-
ficials. 
C.  Instruction  on  how  to keep  the work  safe 
This  is primarily  a  question of occupational  training. 
In this connection,  the reader is referred to  a  series of Recommendations 
which were  formulated  by  the Conference  on  Safety in Coal  Mines. 
It is further  emphasized that every  underground must  receive  : 
- a  general  training as  an  underground worker; 
- a  special training for  the work  assigned to  him; 
- any  supplementary  training in respect of special conditions at  the 
working-point  where  he  is employed. 
Instruction regarding safety measures  must  be considered as  an essential 
part of occupational  training;  consequently,  this  instr~ction must  deal  in 
particular with  the safety problems  which arise in connection with each 
of  the methods. 59 
There  must  be  sufficient training staff to provide  this instruction ef-
ficiently,  and  they must  be  provided with suitable means  and  have  sufficient 
time  to perform their task properly. 
D.  Supervision of working  operations with regard to safety 
The  under-officials  and supervisory officials are responsible  for  super-
vising not  only production but  also the  observation of safety regulations. 
Their full responsibility in this respect  must  be  clearly emphasized. 
Apart  from  this supervision  by  under-officials and supervisory officials, 
it also seemed  advisable  to have  recourse  to further measures with  the 
particular intention of ensuring  that  the  work  is carried out  in  a  way  which 
meets  the safety regulations. 
Ad  II.  Training of under-officials  and  supervisory officials in safety problems; 
selection of  these officials 
Genera~ 
This  chapter deals  in particular with  the  following  problems  : 
A.  The  basic principles for  the  occupational  training of  under-officials  and 
.supervisory officials. 
B.  Training the staff responsible  for  preparing the  accident returns;  the 
printed forms  used for  the  purpose. 
c.  Appointment  and  promotion of  the under-officials  and supervisory officials. 
To  be  able  to get  the best results witp regard  to safety factors  in the 
occupational  training of  the under-officials  and  supervisory officials, it is of 
the  utmost  importance  that  continuity in the  execution of  their functions  should 
be  ensured. 
Several stages must  be  distinguished in the hierarchy of  these officials 
and  the  training programme  must  be  adapted to the requirements  of  each  of  these 
separate stages. 
Ad  A.  Basic principles of  the  occupational  training of  the under-officials  and 
supervisory officials 
1.  The  under-officials  and supervisor-y officials must  have  a  general  training 
which  corresponds  to their tasks  and responsibilities. 
2.  They  must  have  an  adequate  knowledge  of  the special instructions for  the 
various working  teams  whose  operations  they will have  to superyise. 
3.  They  must  be  able  to  draw  the  attention of  the workers  under  their charge 
to the risks arising in their work,  and  to do  this in  a  suitable manner, 
and instruct  them  how  best  they  should  do  this work  to avoid these risks. 
4.  They  should further  be  trained in how  to issue  instructions in practice. 
5.  Special attention should be  paid to  the  further  training of all under-of-
ficials  and supervisory officials. 
6.  They  must  prepare reports not  only  on  the  performance  of their work,  but 
also regarding accidents  and  any  other incidents which call for  mention. 
The  following  points arise in this connection  : 
- the correct preparation of  accident returns, 
- the  assessment  of  information given  in these returns, 60 
- the  establishment  of  the  cause  of  an  accident, 
- the  senrch  for  means  to avoid similar accidents. 
Ad  B.  Training the staff responsible  for  preparing the  accident  returns;  the  printed 
forms  used  for  the  purpose 
1.  The  accident  returns must  - taking into account  all the  human  and  technical 
factors  involved - provide all necessary  information,  in particular in 
respect  of  : 
- the  circumstances, 
- the  consequences  of  the  accident, 
- the  causes, 
- the  measures  proposed  to  avoid similar accidents. 
2.  Each  of  these  items  of  information must  be  capable  of  formulation  as  the 
answer  to  a  clear  and  precise  question. 
3.  The  text  of  the  form  used  for  the return must  make  it clear what  questions 
must  be  answered by  the  individual officials who  have  to collaborate in 
preparing  the return. 
4.  Each  of  these  persons  should be  informed regarding  the meaning  of  the  in-
dividual  questions  and  on  how  to  answer  them  correctly. 
5.  A systematic watch  should be  kept  to ensure  that  the  answers  are complete, 
careful  and  accurate. 
6.  The  accident returns should serve  as  the basis  for  the  routine  preparation 
of reports  on  experience  in each district,  each section or  each working-
point. 
Ad  C.  Appointment  and  promotion of  the under-officials  and  supervisory officials 
It is a  prerequisite condition for  safety of work  that  there should be 
a  sufficient  number  of officials having  an  adequate  knowledge  of  the  technical 
questions  and  of  the  problems  of working safety,  and who  are also fully  aware 
of  their responsibility in these  two  fields.  It is impossible  to guarantee 
safe working underground if this is not  the  case. 
In order  to select persons  who  are most  likely to fulfil  these  require-
ments,  it is necessary  to lay  down-beforehand the minimum  requirements  for 
appointment  to one  of  these  posts or  for  promotion within one  of these fields 
of responsibility;  moreover,  such appointments  or  promotions  should be  made 
subject·to assessment  and reports  on  the efficiency of  these  persons. 
The  regulations  governing  the methods  of selection or promotion of 
candidates  for .such  posts for under-officials  and supervisory officials differ 
from  one  member  country to another. 
Ad  III.  The  effectiveness of  psychotechnical  tests 
These  tests fall  into three  groups  : 
A.  Tests  on  appointment. 
B.  Before  beginning particular categories of working activity. 
c.  Tests before  promotion of  a  workman  to  the  post  of official. 
Ad  A.,  Tests  on  appointment 
In this inatance  a  relatively simple  psychotechnical examination is suf-
ficient  to determine  the general  level of  intelligence of  the candidate,  so 
that all ·those who  do  not  reach  a  minimum  level in this respect  are  excluded. 61 
Ad  B.  Tests  before beginning particular categories  of working  activity 
In  the  case  of  workmen  who  are  intended to  be  put  on  particular tasks 
which  are  associated with special responsibilities in regard to the safety 
of  a  group  of  men  or which make  particular requirements  in respect of intel-
ligence or character,  it is advisable  in every case  to subject  the candidate 
to  a  special  psychotechnical  examination which  can  determine  whether  he  meets 
the  requirements  for  this  post. 
The  responsible  Inspectorate  - together with  the  representatives of  the 
employers  and of  the  workm~n - should  as  soon  as  possible  lay  down  precisely 
the categories of  work  for  which  these special examinations  apply. 
Ad  c.  Tests  before  promotion  of  a  workman  to  the  post  of official 
Workmen  proposed for  promotion  to official should be  subjected to  a 
suitable psychotechnical  examination. 
D.  Principles  for  carrying out  the various  examinations cited above 
This  section contains  further  details  about  the  following  points 
1.  Determination of  the criteria to  be  met  by  the  candidates  on  appointment 
or,  on  subsequent. 
2.  Matters  of  which  the  psychologist must  have  full  knowledge. 
3.  The  period for  which  the  psychologist's report  is valid. 
4.  Comparison  of  the  assessment  by his  immediate  superior of  the  workman  sub-
.iected to  the  psychotechnical  examination with  the report  made  by  the 
psychologist. 
5.  The  presentation of  the assessments  in  a  particular way  which  ensures  a 
sufficiently high  degree  of objectivity. 
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The  Working  Party will continue its activities on  the basis of  the 
terms  of reference  issued to it;  the Working  Party has  been charged  by  the  Mines 
Safety Commission with studying the  following  problems  in detail  : 
a)  The  employment  of  foreign  or  young workers; 
b)  the  general  application of .psychotechnical  examinations,  in particular to workmen 
engaged in activities which  involve safety risks or which  imply  special respon-
sibility. 
D.- EFFECTS  OF  METHODS  OF  PAYMENT  ON  SAFETY 
The  Mines  Safety Commission  issued the  following  terms  of reference  to 
this Working  Party  : 
"Introductory remarks 
a)  Only  the effects of methods  of  payment  on safety should be  investigated,  and not 
the methods  of  payment  themselves. 
b)  The  principles laid down  by  the Conference  in this respect  and subsequently ap-
proved  by  the Governments  should be  regarded as  final  a~d are not  therefore  to 
be  discussed further. 62 
I.- Various  forms  of application of methods  of  payment  to  piecework 
(One-man,  group  or contract wage  arrangements),  which eliminate- or at 
least reduce  - the risk that  the  worker  may  become  neglectful  as  a  result of 
these methods  of  payment. 
Example  :  Separate calculation of  piecework  for  working  operations connec-
ted with safety in such  a  manner  that  the  payment  for  this work  is calculated 
and,  if appropriate,  paid to  the worker  independently of  payment  for  production 
work. 
II.- Effects of  the  payment  on  work  in  one-man  piecework  arrangements 
a)  Direct effect of  this  type  of  piecework  payment  on  the  payment  of  each miner; 
b)  effect of  this method of  payment  on  the  team spirit. 
III.- Effects  on  safety in piecework 
a)  in small  groups; 
b)  in large groups. 
IV.- Special measures with  payment  on  a  piecework basis 
(In this connection it should be  indicated,  if appropriate,  whether  this 
is a  one-man  contract,  a  group or contract  payment  in large or small  groups)  : 
a)  with respect  to  the  men  working  on  piecework e.g.  : 
- exclusive  employment  of men  with  a  specified level of  training 
- particular psychological effects  on  these men; 
b)  with respect  to  the officials responsible  for  these  tasks  :  special training 
or information,  in particular with  regard to relations  to  the  workmen". 
To  obtain  a  clear picture of  the  problems  which  arise in this field of 
work,  a  special questionnaire was  prepared. 
Several  discussions  took  place after the replies  to this questionnaire 
had  been  received.  Representatives of  the specialists departments  of  the  High 
Authority were  also invited to these discussions. 
These  discussions  provide  the  opportunity to collect more  detailed infor-
mation  about  the methods  of  payment  applied in the various  Community  countries 
and  the  problems  associated therewith. 
The  discussions  made  it possible to achieve better comparability of  the 
answers  to  the  questionnaires,  so that it was  possible to prepare  a  comparative 
survey of  the  various  answers  received. 
This  comparative  survey made  it possible to prepare  a  report covering the 
points which were  considered important  having regard to the  purpose  of  the work. 
The  Recommendations  were  then brought  together  in draft in a  document. 
The  two  documents  formed  the basis of  further  discussions.  By  the  end of 
the  time  covered by  the  presen~ Report  the  discussions within  the  Working  Party 
had  terminated in the  acceptance of  the  two  documents. 
Although  the  approval  of  the Mines  Safety Commission  has  not  yet  been 
issued,  it seems  appropriate  to give  here  a  survey of  the  points made  in the 
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I.  Factors  affecting the  idea of  the  productivity wage  and  trends in this 
connection 
a)  Reference  is made  to  the  formulation of  the  problem worked  out  during  the 
Conference  on  Safety in Coal  Mines. 
b)  Attention is drawn  to the  trends  brought  about  by  mechanisation. 
c)  Trends  in respect  of social matters  are  examined.  Two  Community  countries 
have  already  introduced  a  new  system of  payment  as  a  result of  these 
trends. 
II.  Basic  principles 
This section deals successfully with  : 
a)  Determination of  productivity standards; 
b)  Factors  in the  assessment  of  productivity wages; 
c)  The  productivity wage; 
d)  Unforeseen difficulties; 
e)  Results  of working with  a  productivity wage; 
f)  Minimum  and maximum  ages  for working  on  a  productivity wage  basis; 
g)  Transition  from  productivity wage  to  time-based wage; 
h)  The  management  and  the officials appointed by  them; 
i)  Determination of  the salary scales for  management  and officials; 
j)  Arbitration. 
It should be  pointed out  for  completeness'  sake  that in the meantime  a 
beginning has  been made  with  investigations into the  problem of  the  method of 
payment  in the  range  of climatic conditions between  28° eff A and  32° eff A 
(basic scale);  this investigation is based on  the  discussions  already held  on 
the effects of working  time  on safety work,  in particular in.respect of  heavy 
work  or work  at unhealthy working  points. 65 
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The  system of reporting on  accidents  capable  of giving valuable  lessons 
continued - both in the  Working Parties as also in the Safety Commission itself -
in accordance with  the  agreement  made  at  the  Plenary session of  17.3.1958. 
In accordance with this  agreement,  the Secretariat of  the Mines  Safety 
Commission  is informed by  telephone  immediately after the  occurrence  in question 
regarding  the circumstances which  had  led to  the  accident  and  the  number  of  persons 
involved  :  thereafter the Secretariate is kept  continually informed. 
After this the first provisional report is tabled and  discussed at  the 
next  meeting in date  of  the Safety Commission. 
The  written Final  Report  is then  tabled after the official investigations 
have  been  completed;  this report is also discussed at  the  next  Plenary session in 
date,  the safety Commission  paying particular attention to the measures  taken  on  a 
national  level  and  the conclusions  to be  drawn  therefrom. 
Conclusions of  this kind have  already several  times  led the Safety Com-
mission  to charge its Working  Parties with  the  investigation of particular problems 
arising in connection with  a  given  accident. 
The  following  survey clearly shows  how  much  of  the  work  of  the  Safety 
Commission  is constituted by  discussion of  the most  notable accidents  and  what 
importance  is attached to this vital activity. 
A.- SURVEY  OF  THE  ACCIDENTS  DISCUSSED  IN  THE  REPORTING  PERIOD 
I.- Firedamp  and coaldust  explosions 
1.  Luisenthal Colliery  (Saar),  7.2.1962  - 299  dead 
2.  Sachsen Colliery in Heessen  (Ruhr),  9.3.1962  - 31  dead 
3.  Tower  Colliery  (Great Britain),  12.4.1962  - 9  dead 
4.  Adolf Colliery in Merkstein  (Aachen),  14.12.1962  - 8  dead 
5.  Fenton Colliery  (Great Britain),  13.6.1963- 3  dead 
6.  No.  7  Colliery Lievin  (France)",  2.2.1965  - 21  dead 
7.  Cambrian Colliery  (Great Britain),  17.5.1965- 31  dead  . 
8.  Mont  Cenis Colliery in Herne-Sodingen  (Ruhr),  22.7.1965- 9  dead 
9.  La  Tronquie Colliery  (France),  24.11.1965- 12  dead 
II.- Rock  bursts 
Sachsen Colliery  in Heessen  (Ruhr),  13.12.1962- 6  dead 
III.- Collapse of  Mine  Workings 
1.  Ste.  Fontaine Colliery  (France),  1.8.1961  - 7  dead 
2.  Ste.  Marie  in Lambusart Colliery  (Belgium),  11.5.1962  - 6  dead 
3.  Colliery 13 of  the Lens  Group  (France),  21.6.1962  - 6  dead 68 
IV.- Man-winding  accidents 
1.  Sachsen Pit in Heessen  (Ruhr),  27.3.1964- 10 dead 
2.  Pit 5-ter at  Auchel  (France),  17.6.1964- 5  dead 
V.- Inrushes  of  water 
·Bure-aux-Femmes  Colliery  (Belgium),  11.2.1961- 11  dead 
The  catastrophe at Luisenthal  led the  Mines  Safety Commission  to call a 
special meeting  to  discuss its causes. 
B.- CONCLUSIONS  WITH  REGARD  TO  MINE  ACCIDENTS 
I.- Conclusions  from  the  disaster at Luisenthal 
1.  The  Mines  Inspectorate  of  the  Saar  drew  from  this disaster  a  series of conclu-
sions  the ·most  important  of which  are  reproduced below  : 
"1.- The  method of ventilation air distribution and  the  way  in which  ventila-
tion districts were  delineated was  newly  laid down 
a)  The  main  intake airstream should be split into as  many  independent 
parallel ventilation flows  as  possible,  these  being  fed separately 
into the main  return airstream.  The  term main  airstreams covers  those 
airstreams which  pass  through  horizon roads  in stone or  through 
staple pits with at least one  landing directly  leading to  a  horizon, 
on  the  intake side up  to the  last split and  on  the  return side  from 
the  first junction onwards.  Airstreams  flowing  through  a  horizon road 
running  in the  seam  and  acting as  a  collecting airway  are also consid-
ered as  main  airstreams,  as  long  as  this seam  road is not  at  the  same 
time  serving  as  a  gateroad. 
b)  Parallel airstreams ventilating one  or more  workings  are  considered 
as ventilation district airstreams  and all the working-points venti-
lated by  the  same  district airstream form  together  a  ventilation dis-
trict. Ventilation districts begin at the split or splits where  the 
ventilation.district airstream leaves  the main  intake airstream  and 
terminate  at  the  junction or  junctions with  the main  return airstream. 
In  one ventilation district there may  be  several splits on  the  intake 
side  and  several  junctions on  the return side,  according to whether 
separate airstreams unite or  a  single airstream is split. 
c)  Ventilation district airstreams must  be  reliably separated from  one 
another.  They  must  not  be  arranged in series - not  even after regen-
eration of  the air - nor  connected by  diagonal  airways  (diagonal air-
streams).  Each ventilation district airstream must  be  shut.  off  from 
neighbouring  airstreams  by  its own  separate barrier,  in accordance 
with regulations  regarding protection against  explo~~ons  •. This is 
particularly true in the case  of  the extraction of  adjacent  seams  or 
in  dou~le-panel workings.  If these conditions are  not  fulfilled,  the 
workings  constitute  a  single ventilation district. 
d)  Not  more  than  100 men  can work  in one ventilation district at the 
same  time. 69 
2.- Increased supervision of  the ventilation conditions  and  of  gas  emission 
are  imposed  for  all roadways  within  the  zone  of  influence of workings. 
The  term  zone  of  influence  is defined as  a  body  of  rock  delineated in 
the  roof  and  floor  of  the working  by  surfaces  50 m apart  running parallel 
to  the  planned working  and  also  by surfaces at rightangles  to  the strati-
fication  and  parallel to the  working,  also  50 m apart. 
3.- Minimum  air-speeds  are  laid down  for  particular roads 
Gate-roads 
Other  roads  within  the  zone  of  influence 
of  the  working 
Roadways  in  a  working  in preparation 
Stonedrifts with auxiliary ventilation 
Rise  drifts 
Other  seam  roads  with auxiliary ventilation 
0.5 m/s 
0.2 m/s 
0.3 m/s 
0.2 m/s 
0.4 m/s 
0.3 m/s 
4.- A ventilation overman must  be  present  for  supervision of  the ventilation 
for  each shift.  In addition,  there must  be  available  a  special ventila-
tion-measuring  team,  consisting of  a  ventilation overman  and  two  venti-
lation men;  they must  examine  the  workings  daily,  especially within  the 
zone  of  influence  of  the  workings,  with  regard to  the  formation  of 
layers  of  methane  and  they must,  if appropriate,  see  that  they  are'elim-
inated  (by  installing turbulence  ducts,  baffle plates or baffle cloths). 
In  addition,  a  firedamp  overman  must  be  provided  for  pits with methane 
drainage  systems. 
5.- The  stonedusting method is refined beyond its present state. Hitherto 
only  one  stonedust barrier was  cal~ed for  in each gate-road.  Now  a 
second stonedust barrier is required if the  face  is more  than  175  m from 
the  stonedust barrier.  If gate-roads  exceed  a  length  of  500 m,  new  stone-
dust  barriers must  be  installed every  500  m.  It may  be  considered that 
this operation is facilitated by  the fact  that plastic troughs  can  be 
used in the construction of  the stonedust barriers instead of  planks, 
provided that these  plastic troughs  have  been  tested  and  given special 
permission. 
6.- A new  possibility is to replace stonedust barriers with water-trough 
barriers.  The  utilization of  these barriers is left to the  free choice 
of  the pits.  The  only  proviso is that only  one  of  the  two  types  of bar-
rier should be  used in  the  same  pit.  Only  translucent plastic troughs 
of  permitted design may  be  used  for  water-trough barriers.  Water-supply 
lines must  be  provided in roadways  where water-trough barriers are in-
stalled.  Each  main water-trough barrier must  contain  200  1  of water  per 
sq.m of  roadway  cross-section,  while  secondary barriers must  have  100  1 
of water  per  sq.m  of  roadway  cross-section.  In contrast  to  the regula-
tions  for  stonedust barriers in gate-roads,  water-trough barriers must 
be  installed every  200 m.  This  decision was  reached after tests at  the 
Tremonia  experimental gallery had  shown  that water-trough barriers in 
workings  containing moist air can  be  more  easily maintained in an ef-
fective condition than stonedust barriers. 
7.- Finally,  tests that  have  been made  in the last three years  at several 
pits with  the salt-paste process  to bind deposited coal  dust.  These  tests 
were  begun because  dusting  the workings  with stonedust  has  been  proved  to 
be  ineffective in eliminating the risks  involved by  the  deposition of 
coal  dust.  The  tests have  shown  that salt-paste binds  the  coal  dust ef-
ficiently.  However,  the application of  the  paste  in the  gate-roads must 
be  carried out  over  larger areas  than had been  envisaged in the  prelim-
inary tests.  At  the  present  moment  preparations are  being made  in the 
Saar  to introduce  the salt-paste process  as  a  fundamental  measure.  It is 70 
intended  to  apply  the  paste  over  the entire length of return gate-roads, 
while  zones  150 m  long will  be  coated with paste  on  the  intake side of 
the workings,  since  the  degree  of  dust  deposition is considerably  lower 
on  the  intake side,  and  in no  case is it possible to bind the  fine  coal 
formed  on  the  conveyors,  not  even if long  zones  are  coated with paste." 
2.  rhe  Safety  Commission is to establish a  new  Working  Party consisting of qual-
ified experts  (representatives of specialized research institutes,  repre-
sentatives of  the  Inspectorates,  mining  engineers,  experts in chemistry  and 
coal  combustion);  the  Commission  has  charged the Working  Party to investigate 
- the whole  group  of  problems  associated with  combustible  dusts  in coal mines 
and  to  deal  in particular with  the  following  problems  : 
- mechanism  of  ignition of  the  dust  and  of  the  propagation of  the  flame,  and 
- factors  which  can affect  the  ignition of  the  dust  and  the  propagation of 
coal  dust  explosions,  such  as 
the  type  of coal  and/or  the volatile content 
the  degree  of  fineness  of  the  coal 
the concentration of  dust 
the methane  content 
the  source  of ignition 
the effect of  the  type  of  deposition of  the  dust 
the effect of moisture 
the  geometry  of  the  roadway etc. 
- and  protective measures  against  dust  ignition,  in particular  : 
- neutralization of  the  dust  (suppression of  the  dust  at  the  point of  pro-
duction)  stonedusting,  spraying,  binding  the  dust  by  the application of 
salt and  coagulating paste etc.) 
barriers  (barriers of various  types  - design- situation etc.). 
The  Working  Party will  be  able  to suggest  any  research project which it may 
consider  appropriate  to  increase knowledge  with regard to the  phenomena  to 
be  investigated and  to further safety in this field. 
Work  to this end is in progress. 
II.- Noteworthy  conclusions  from  other mine  accidents 
1.  Measures  to be  taken  to avoid explosions  of  firedamp  and coal  dust  (accidents 
of  9.3.1962 at  the  Sachsen Colliery and of  14.12.1964 at the  Adolf Colliery 
in Merkstein) 
The  mining regulations  issued by  the Chief  Mines  Inspectorates in Dortmund 
and Bonn  on  18.12.1964 contain the  following  provisions  : 
- Airspeeds  (paragraph  151) 
"a)  The  average  airspeed may  not  fall below  the values  indicated hereunder 
in  the  largest  free  cross-section of  the mine  workings  listed hereunder: 
workings  ventilated by  through-flowing  airstreams 
trolley-loco roads 
gate-roads  (top or bottom) 
auxiliary roads  including escape 
roads  along  the  goaf 
roadways  ahead of  the  face 
1  m/s 
0.5 m/s 
0.5 m/s 
0.3 m/s 71 
workings  with auxiliary ventilation 
advanced  gate-roads 
seam  roads 
rise drifts  and staple pits 
headed  upwards 
dripping drifts  and staple pits· 
driven  downwards 
stonedrifts 
large mining cavities 
0.5 m/s 
0.5 m/s 
0.5 m/s 
0.3 m/s 
0.2 m/s 
0.1 m/s 
(to be  calculated) 
b)  The  airspeed may  not  exceed  6  m/s.  This  does  not  hold for  shafts reaching 
the surface,  air channels  and  roadways  not  used  for  regular  transport  or 
travelling." 
- Operation of ventilation installations  (paragraph 143,  section  3) 
"Auxiliary ventilation installations can only  be  switched on  again  once it 
has  been  determined that  this can  be  done  without  danger  and  that  no  risk 
is involved by  the  air being  drawn  off." 
- Conducting waste  air (paragraph  144,  section 6) 
"Waste  air from  workings with auxiliary ventilation must  not  be  fed  into 
trolley-loco roads." 
2.  Measures  to  be  taken  when  installing new  winding  ropes  (accident of  27.3.1964 
at Sachsen Colliery) 
Travelling and working  in shafts 
"The  only winding  to be  done  in shafts·when work  is going  on  is that  ~eces­
sary for  carrying out  the  work.  Exceptions  can  be  approved by  the  Inspec-
torate." 
- Making  clamp  connections  on  winding  ropes 
"When  ropes  under  load are  being clamped,  the  clamp screws  must  be  tightened 
several  times  so as  to achieve  the  clamping force,  because wire  ropes  tend 
by  reason of  their yield to undergo  gradual  deformation under  the effects 
of  a  clamping  force maintained for  a  longish time,  and as  a  result the  clamp-
ing  force  applied at  the  beginning is reduced." 
3.  Conditions  to be  observed when  working  in seams  liable to  rock bursts  (ac-
cident of  13.12.1962 at Sachsen Colliery) 
Further working  in seam  24  of  the  Sachsen Colliery in Heessen  - a  seam 
subject  to rock bursts  - has  been subjected by  the  Mines  Inspectorate to  the 
following  conditions  : 
- "The  working  must  be  carried out  in such  a  way  that concentrations  of stress 
are  avoided; 
-winning should be  carried out  over  as  broad  a  front  as  possible;~short faces 
should be  avoided; 
- whenever  possible caving should be  practised instead of  pneumatic  stowing; 
- a  low rate of  advance  should be  maintained; 
- the  coal  face  should be  loosened up  by  intensive relaxation shotfiring; 
- observations  and measurements  for  the  timely detection of  the  threat of  a 
rock  burst should be  continued on  a  large scale." 72 
In this connection the  government  of  Land North-Rhine Westphalia  have 
instituted a  research project  to  determine  the  causes  of  rock bursts  and 
possibilities of  avoiding  them,  and  they  are  contributing to  the  expense  of 
this project. 
4.  Conclusions  drawn  on  the  basis of roof-falls in  faces  (accident at Colliery 
13  of  the  Lens  Group  21.6.1962) 
- In winning operations  in shortwall  faces  in the Nord  and  Pas~de-Calais 
Coalfield the  following  requirements  must  be  met 
"1.  The  length of  the  face  in  a  shortwall working  must  not  exceed  20  m;  dif-
fusion ventilation is permissible  only  to  a  maximum  length of  10 m. 
2.  The  entry to  the shortwall  face  must  be  in the  main ventilation stream. 
3.  If  the shortwall  face  is worked simultaneously with  an  adjoining main 
face  from  which it is independent,  steps must  be  taken to avoid  the 
shortwall  face  lying within  the  zone  of  influence of  the  advance  abut-
ment  pressure  brought  about  by  the  main  face. 
4.  The  supports must  be  set with  particular care,  especially at  the entry to 
the  face,  at  the  buttock leading to  the  roadway  and,  where  appropriate, 
along  the  line of  a  fault  or at  places where  the roof  is bulging. 
If the  face  is caved,  the supports must  be  reinforced,  to enable  them  to 
stand up  to  any  overloading  and  to resist being  overthrown  :  increased 
support  density,  additional  rows  of  props  or chocks  along  the  breaking-
off edge,  stiffening with roof  bars or  lagging.  One,  or if necessary, 
several  of  these methods  can  be  applied. 
5.  If the shortwall is a  sub-level working  and  a  pump  has  to  be  installed 
to  remove  the water which collects on  the  downside,  the  pump  must  be 
installed outside  the shortwall  face  and  the water  drawn  up via  a  rigid 
pipe  fastened to  the  conveyor  in the shortwall  face. 
6.  Shotfiring in the coal  face  in the shortwall is forbidden;  the  only 
exception is for  pulsed-infusion shotfiring which  must  however  be  pre-
viously  approved  by  the  Inspectorate. 
7.  In gassy  seams  : 
a)  Shortwalls worked  above  a  road must  first  be  approved  by  the  Inspec-
torate. 
b)  The  regulations require auxiliary ventilation with correctly-aligned 
ducting  for  all shortwall  faces  over  5  m  in  length~  The  air quantity 
measured at the  extreme  end of  the shortwall must  be  roughly  1  m3. 
c)  The  methane  content of  the air - measured  twice  per shift at the 
highest  point  in the  face  and recorded - must  never  exceed  1%. 
d)  If this limit methane  value  is exceeded or if the auxiliary venti-
lation system stops,  the shortwall  face  must  be  evacuated." PART  TWO 
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1.  In  the mee CJ_ng  of  the  Council  of  Ministers  of  6th January  1964  the President  of 
the High  Authority  proposed to the Governments·to extend the field of activities 
of  the  Mines  Safety  Commission to those  problems  which  have arisen on  the  one  hand 
in the coal-mining  industry  in respect to the prevention of  the diseases  associated 
with  mining work  and  on  the other  hand  in the iron-ore mining  industry  in respect 
to accident  risks  and  the diseases associated with mining work, 
2.  In  actual fact  the diseases associated with mining work  represent  a  risk which  is 
not  less great  than  the risk of  accidents. 
3,  In  addition to this,  the proposal to extend the activities of  the Safety  Commission 
was  aimed  at  obtaining a  proper  proportion of  the means  at  the disposal of  the 
Community  - these  means  not  having  been  properly distributed hitherto - as  a  result 
of  the restriction of  the Safety  Commission's activities to eliminating risks of 
danger  in coal  mines. 
Whereas  in its efforts to eliminate accidents the  Community  has  at  its disposal -
in addition to the means  assigned to the High  Authority to further  research and 
investigations  - the possibility of  exchanges  of practical experience in the Mines 
Safety  ·~ommission,  in contrast to this,  only the means  of  action of  the High 
Authority  were  available  in respect  of  the prevention of  industrial diseases. 
4,  Although it was  not  the  intention to modify  the nature of  the terms  of  reference 
of the  Mines  Safety  Commission as defined  by  the Governments  in  1957,  the aim  was 
at  least  to achieve  an  extension of  its interests to a  second risk.  This  could be 
done  only  by  an  unanimous  decision  of  the Governments. 
In  the meeting  of  the  Council  of  Ministers  of  11.3,1965 the representatives of  the 
Governments  modified the terms  of  reference  (1)  of  the  Mines  Safety  Commission 
with the declaration that  henceforth  the  Commission  was  charged with "studying the 
trends  in mine  safety  and the measures  to avoid risks to health at  the working 
place in coal mines". 
The  other provisions of  the  terms  of  reference were  modified accordingly. 
5.  As  a  preliminary to the entry  into force  of  the decision taken  by  the Governments 
with  regard to the extension  of  the responsibilities of the Mines  Safety  Commission 
to the preservation of  health in coal mines,  the responsible services of  the High 
Authority are preparing proposals  based  on  the experience  gained  in furthering 
research  in this field and  on  the results obtained up  to the time  of writing. 
(1)  Present  Report,  Annex  XV,  p.  437 79 
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1.  The  European  Parliament  had  requested the  Chairman  of  the Mines  Safety  Commission 
to participate in the negotiations  - which  it had  instituted in the  Community 
decision of  22.2.1962 with  each  of  the  Member  Governments  - to guarantee  certain 
supervisory responsibilities to the  Mines  Safety  Commission. 
2.  After these discussions at  the political level,  the representatives  of  the Govern-
ments  in the  Mines  Safety  Commission  together  examined  the possible  forms  for  the 
answerto be  given to the negotiations  instituted by  the European  Parliament. 
3.  The  supervision of  the application of  the  Mines  Inspectorate regulations  issued  in 
the form  of  laws  or  regulations,  and  the  investigation of  blame  in cases  of 
offence  or accident,  are  and  remain  the exclusive responsibility of  the national 
authorities. 
The  Governments will however  continue to  inform the High  Authority  in respect  of 
the  implementation  of  the tasks falling to them  in virtue of  the Treaty and to 
inform the  Mines  Safety. Commission with  respect  to the  implementation  of  its terms 
of  reference. 
4.  A  new  system of  passing  information to the Safety  Commission  was  envisaged. 
5.  With  respect  to information regarding mine  accidents,  the messages  envisaged  are 
intended to widen  the method  applying at  present  (1). 
At  the request  of  the  Chairman  or  the Secretary of  the  Mines  Safety  Commission to 
the responsible national authority or to the Government  members  of  the Restricted 
Committee  of  the country  in which  the accident  has  occurred,  official arrangements 
are to be  made  for  members  of  the Secretariat to make  the necessary visits to the 
colliery where  the accident  took place,  in the presence  of  a  representative of  the 
appropriate national authority,  to obtain  information regarding the  circumstances 
and  effects of  the accident. 
However,  in order to allow for the  time-dependent  requirements  posed  by  the mine 
accident,  the time  and  form  of  the visit to the colliery in question must  be  fixed 
jointly by  the appropriate national authority  and the Secretariat or its represent-
ativ~s. 
Members  of  the Secretariat will then,  by  contact  with the appropriate national 
services,  inform themselves  with  regard to the collecting of  information regarding 
the  cause  and  effect  of  this accident,  as well as the  lessons to be  drawn  and  the 
work  carried out  to check these reports. 
6.  At  the request  of  the Chairman  or the Secretary,  members  of the Secretariat are 
allowed  - in the presence  of  a  representative of  the appropriate national author-
ity - to visit mining  companies  and their underground  installations in order to 
collect the  information necessary  for  the Safety  Commission  to perform its task 
and  in particular to inform themselves, 
a)  How  the Recommendations  of  the Conference  and  of  the Mines  Safety  Commission 
- on  the basis of  the discussions  of the Special  Council  of  Ministers  or  in 
accordance with Section  4  of  the terms  of  reference of  the Mines  Safety  Commis-
sion- have  been  implemented,  what  problems  have arisen as  a  result of·this 
implementation  and  what  effect they  have  had, 
b)  How  particular problems  of  safety arise in practice and  how  they  have  been 
solved. 
These are purely  information operations;  they  shall not  give rise to instructions 
nor to remarks  to the representatives of  the mining  company  nor to the  local 
authorities. 
(1)  First Report  of  the Mines  Safety  Commission  p.  45. 82 
7.  Since  there is therefore  no  intention of  changing the terms  of  reference nor the 
constitution of  th~ Mines  Safety  Commission,  but  only that  of  reinforcing its 
means  of  action to execute its task,  the decisions to be  taken  do  not  require 
unanimity. 
Five Governments  have  already  answered the European  Parliament  on the basis of  the 
principles  worl~ed out  jointly,  while the sixth Government  was  of  the opinion that 
it could  not  accept  any  obligations of  general  scope  in this field. P A  R  T T  H  R  E  E 
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-In the First Report  of  the Safety  Commission  (1)  it was  stated that  Italy 
has  issued  a  new,  enlarged set  of  mining regulations  by  decree  of  the President  of 
the Republic  dated 9.4.1959.  This  set  of  regulations was  distributed at that  time to 
all members  of  the Mines  Safety  Commission  - additionally  in French  and  German  trans-
lation - for  information. 
Two  further sets of  regulations for  coal mines  have  been  issued  in the 
period covered  by  the  present  Report. 
A.- REGULATIONS  REGARDING  COAL  MINES  18.12.1964 
ISSUED  BY  LAND  NORTH  RHINE/WESTPHALIA 
The  Mines  Inspectorate of  the  Land  North  Rhine/Westphalia  issued a  series 
of  new  mining regulations at  the  end  of  1964,  the most  important  of  these being the 
mining  regulations for  coal mines  issued  on  18.12.1964. 
The  promulgatiori of  a  new  set  of  mining regulations for  coal mines  had  be-
come  necessary  since the  previous set  of  regulations,  dating  from  1935,  was  no  longer 
suitable for use  - in spite of  having  been  revised  in  1953  - because  of  the safety 
requirements  resulting  from  the rapid  advance  in techniques  and  the concentration of 
workings,  and  moreover  it did  not  take account  of  knowledge  gained  in recent  years. 
The  new  regulations differ  from the old set  even  in their structure.  They 
contain  in the first part  requirements  applying to both surface and  underground  opera-
tions and  are therefore  of  a  general nature.  The  second  part  comprises additional 
regulations for  underground  mining operations  and  the third section contains similar 
regulations for surface operations.  The  fourth  section contains the final  provisions, 
e.g.  regulations  regarding the approval  of  exceptions,  transitional decisions,  prose-
cutions. 
In  applying this grouping,  the regulations  contained  in the first section 
are of  general  application to other fields  of  mining,  e.g.  ore mining,  quarrying of 
rock and  earth,  browncoal mining,  and  they therefore contain the appropriate regula-
tions  - also newly-issued - applicable to browncoal  mining  and  mining  of  products 
other than coal.  This  was  done  in an effort to achieve  some  degree  of  unification of 
the presentation of  the regulations. 
It should be  emphasized that  the mining regulations  for  coal mines  have  for 
the first  time  been  issued for  the entire coal  mining  industry  of  Land  North Rhine/ 
Westphalia  in the  same  terms. 
The  new  regulations contain - in particular with respect  to underground 
operations  - a  series of  important  provisions which  are either new  or which differ 
from the previous regulations.  The  emphasis  of  the enlarged provisions for  safety 
measures  falls especially  on  the fields  of  protection of  health,  ventilation and  the 
prevention or  containment  of  explosions. 
The  Recommendations  issued hitherto by  the  Conference  on  Safety  in Coal 
Mines  and  by  the  Mines  Safety  Commission  have  been very  largely taken  into account  in 
issuing this set  of  regulations. 
These regulations were  also made  available to members  of  the  Mines  Safety 
Commission  for  information at  the moment  of  publication. 
(1)  First  Report,  p.  115. 88 
B.- REGULATIONS  FOR  MINES  IN  THE  NETHERLANDS,  1964 
The  mining  regulations  of  1964  were  issued by  Royal  Decree  of  21.12.1964 
and  published  in the "Staatsblad"  on 30.12.1964.  They  came  into force  on  1.1.1965. 
The  "Committee  for the Revision of  the  Mine  Regulations"  was  entrusted with 
the  preparatory work;  this committee  had  been  constituted by  an  order  of  the Minister 
of  Economics  of  12.12.1955.  In  1956  the  committee  began  work under  the Chairmanship 
of the  Inspecteur-Generaal der  Mijnen.  Representatives  of  the following  bodies  and 
groups  sat· on  this committee:  Ministry  of  Economics,  Ministry  for  Social  Prohlems  and 
Public Health,  Mines  Inspectorate,  "Raad  van  Beroep  voor  het  Mijnwezen"  (Consultative 
Council  for  Mining),  companies  carrying on  the mining  of  bituminous  coal and  brown 
coal,  producing  petroleum and  natural gas,  and  mining salt,  as well as workers'  organi-
zations  from  the appropriate branches  of  industry. 
The  basis of  the work,  which  was  carried out  by  five  sub-committees,  was 
- in addition to the mining  regulations  of  1939  - the mining  regulations  for electrical 
equipment  of  1947.  The  Recommendations  of  the  Conference  on Safety  in Coal  Mines  of 
1957  and the Recommendations  subsequently  formulated  by  the  Mines  Safety  Commission 
were  taken  into account  to a  great  extent. 
It  was  found  to be  necessary to cancel  a  series of  provisions of  the mining 
regulations of  1939  which  had  in the meantime  become  outdated,  and to include  a  vari-
ety  of  new  provisions,  not  the  least  of  the reasons  for this being the rapid scientifi(' 
and  technical developments  which  made  it necessary to modify  the regulations to keep 
pace with the latest state of  techniques.  This  fact  was  given full weight  in the  new 
mining  regulations.  · 
In addition to this it was  found  that  the mining regulations  of  1939  were, 
in particular,  no  longer suitable for  application to the production  of  petroleum and 
natural gas  which  had  grown  considerably  in the Netherlands  in  the period after the 
war.  It was  also necessary to allow for  special considerations  in formulating  the 
regulations for  brown  coal mining. 
To  sum  up,  it may  be  pointed out  that  in spite of  various difficulties which 
were  encountered,  it has  been possible to draw  up  a  set  of  regulations which  are,  by 
reason of  their logical structure,  suitable for  application to all branches  of  mining. 
It is also worth  remarking  that the  new  regulations  provide for the participation of 
professional associations when  individual regulations are being  prepared for  issue, 
in contrast to the provisions of  the  1939  regulations which  only  envisaged discussions 
with the appropriate mine  managements. 
A  large number  of  copies  of  these mining  regulations  of  1964  were distrib-
uted,  in German  and  French translation as well as  in the Dutch version. 
C.- BELGIAN  MINE  REGULATIONS.ENTERING  INTO  FORCE  DURING  THE  REPORTING  PERIOD 
Within the period  covered by  this report,  a  series of  regulations  have 
entered into force  in Belgium,  the most  important  being  listed below: 
- By  Royal  Decree  of  19.9.1961,  the regulation on  mine  ventilation and the classifica-
tion of  pits with regard to methane  content; 
- By  Ministerial Decree  of .11.9.1961,  the regulation regarding the approval  of  con-
veyor belts; 
-By Ministerial Decree  of  26.6.1962,  the regulation regarding the prevention of 
explosions  of  coal dust; 
-By Royal  Decree  of  16.9.1965 and  by  Ministerial Decree  of  27.9.1965; 
- The  regulations regarding dust  suppression; 
-By Royal  Decrees  of  13.  and  16.4.1965'the regulations regarding measures  to protect 
health. 89 
It  is also worthy  of  note  that  the  following  regulations are being revised: 
- Regarding  supports  and  strata control; 
- Regarding electrical equipment; 
- Regarding  transport,  and 
- the regulation covering shafts and  access  routes. 91 
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In the First  and  Second lteports  of  the  Mines  Safety  Commission,  the reader 
was  given  a  survey  not  only  of  the arrangement  of  the Recommendations  of  the  Conference 
on  Safety  in  Coal  Mines  set  up  in  1957  by  decision  of  the Governments  represented  in 
the Special Council  of  Ministers,  but  also of  the state at  1.11.1958 and 31.12.1960 
of  t~~e  implementation  of all these Recommendations  and  of  the measures  taken  in detail. 
In the Second  Report  the  Mines  Safety  Commission stated that  in subsequent 
reports it would  no  longer  - as  hitherto - report  on the situation in respect  of all 
the  Conference  Recommendations,  but  only with  regard to those which  had  not  been 
implemented  by  a  particular arbitrary date,  either in the  form  of  laws  or  regulations 
or  de  facto. 
The  last  Report  contained for  the first  time,  in addition to the tabular 
survey  of all Recommendations,  the situation - in each  country  and  under  keyword 
headings  - with regard to those  recommendations  for  which 
l.  The  possibility of  issuing new  regulations  was  under  examination  (E), 
2.  Uncertainty still obtained with  regard to the steps to be  taken  (?)  and 
3.  Any  application of  the regulations to the  Conference  Recommendations  was  rejected 
(A)' 
in order to make  it possible for  the reader to gather the content  of  these  Recommenda-
tions,  without  it being necessary to refer to the bulky  Report  on  the  Conference  on 
Safety  in  Coal  Mines. 
Consequently,  no  account  is taken of  those Recommendations  which  are clas-
sified as  follows  by  the appropriate authorities: 
4.  c 
5.  C' 
6.  NRC 
7.  NRP 
National  regulations already  comply  with  Conference  Recommendations, 
The  Recommendations  are  not  embodied  in the regulations,  but  are  implemented 
de  facto, 
New  regulations  in conformity  have  been  prepared  and  issued, 
New  regulations  in conformity  are  in course of  preparation. 
It  should  however  be  pointed  out  that  the  process  of  applying  a  series of 
Conference  Recommendations  by  means  of  laws  or regulations  is in hand  in various 
countries  (NRP),  but  that  in various  cases  no final  publication of  regulations has 
yet  taken  place.  Further details on this point  will be  given  below,  showing the  latest 
situation for  the various  countries  in question. 
In addition,  the  answers  received  from  various countries as  a  preliminary 
to preparing this Report  have  shown  that  there are various  points which the  Mines 
Safety  Commission  is asked to examine  again  (EOP). 
This  type  of  presentation has  been  welcomed  by all those  involved  and  is 
continued  in the following  part  of  the Report,  in accordance with the wish expressed 
by  the  Mines  Safety  Commission  with regard to the  Conference  Recommendations. 
However,  before  going  into details,  it is necessary to recall that  the 
Conference  on Safety  in Coal  Mines  formulated  a  total of  280  Recommendations~  which 
the  Mines  Inspectorate had to consider with a  view to applying  them to existing 
regulations or to implementing them  by  issuing new  ones,  and  that  infrequently special 
problems  had to be  solved  and  a  variety of  difficulties cleared up. 
Looking at  the achievements  in this light,  the Mines  Safety  Commission 
noted with satisfaction at  its meeting  of  19  and  20.7.1965 that  most  of  the Govern-
ments  had  already  implemented  by  far the  largest  number  of these Recommendations, 
155  of  which  dealt  with technical  problems,  51  with safety provisions,  supervision 
of  safety and the participation pf  the workers  in safety supervision,  and  74  with 
human  factors. 94 
The  situation at  1.1.1966  is given  below,  together with the terms  of  those 
Conference  Recomm~ndations which still call for  action under  points  1  to 3  listed 
above,  or  which  are  no  longer  being  considered  for  implementation. 
A.  TECHNICAL  RECOMMENDATIONS 
a)  Federal Republic  of  Germany  (North  Rhine/Westphalia) 
With  only  two  exceptions,  all Technical  Recommendations  have  been  implemented. 
The  responsible  authority has  rejected  (A)  the  Recommendation  A-5,  page  35 
of  the  Conference  Report,  and  Recommendation  A  - 14  - M- b,  page  81  has  been 
referred to the  Mines  Safety  Commission  for  further  examination  (EOP),  as  had  been 
suggested  by  the  Mines  Inspectorates  of  the  other  countries. 
This  refers  in detail to  the  following  text: 
1)  A  - 5,  page  35  Conference  Report 
Clearing-out  of  compressed-air mains 
''The  clearing-out  of  compressed-air  mains  in  gassy  mines  should  only  be  under-
taken  provided: 
-The compressed-air  valve  is  opened  very  gradually. 
- Every  effort  is to be  made  not  to direct  the air jet towards  those  points 
where  firedamp  is most  likely to be  present. 
- It  has  been  ascertained that  there  is  no  accumulation  of  firedamp  in the area 
immediately  in front  of  the  end  of  the air pipe". 
2)  A  - 14  - M - b,  page  81  Conference  Report 
Internal-combustion  engines  below  ground 
"Where  there is a  danger  of  sudden  accumulations  of  firedamp  in haulage  roads 
used  by  locomotives,  the  latter must  be  equipped  with  devices  enabling the air 
inlet to be  shut  off  instantaneously". 
b)  Federal  Republic  of  Germany  (Saar) 
In  a  total of  twelve  cases  the Technical  Recommendations  have  not  yet  been 
implemented: 
- Three  Recommendations  are still being studied with  regard to the possibility of 
preparing  new  regulations  (E),  this study  referring in  one  case to only  one  part 
of  the  Recommendation,  the other  part  being already  embodied  in the existing 
regulations  (CE). 
1)  B  - 3  - 3  b,  page  59  Conference  Report 
Prevention  of  fires  in shafts 
"In  new  shafts,  and  where  possible in those being  overhauled,  it is advisable 
to use,  for  preference,  fire-resisting guides,  or  at  least  non-inflammable 
grease". 
2)  A  - 20  - M,  para.  2,  page  76  Conference  Report 
Locomotive  haulage 
"New  locomotives  and  other vehicles  should as far  as  possible be fitted with 
devices  which will ensure that  they  can  be set  and  kept  in motion  only  when  the 
driver is at  his  post". 95 
3)  A  - 5  - SC,  page  19  Conference  Report 
Face  support 
"In mechanized coal-getting,  the cylinders used  for  shifting the  conveyor  should 
be  staked  not  against  the  face  support  but  against  either the roof,  or  chocks, 
or  any  element  not  forming  part  of  the regular  face  support." 
- In  five  cases  the responsible  Inspectorate consider it appropriate to refer 
the  Recommendations  to the  Mines  Safety  Commission  for  further  checking  (EOP): 
4)  A  - 4  - SC,  pages  19/20 Conference  Report 
Face  support 
"At  the  faces,  the  props,  their bearing surface,  density,  etc.,  must  be  adapted 
to the  weight  to be  supported  and  the ultimate breaking strength of  the rock. 
The  aim  should  be  to make  increasing use  in future  of  steel props  of  permanently 
uniform  load-bearing  capacity,  evolving the  minimum  of  dependence  on  the  care 
or  otherwise  with  which  they  are  placed  in  position  by  the  propsetter." 
5)  B  - 6b,  page  49  Conference  Report  (1) 
Stone-dust  barriers 
''The  maximum  number  of  men  to be  employed  in  anyone  "isolated section"  during 
the  main  shift  must  be  fixed  by  the  competent  authority." 
6)  B  - 3  - 2  d,  page  54  Conference  Report  (1) 
Prevention  of  fires  in shafts 
"In all shafts,  and  particularly in downcast  shafts,  it is necessary to replace 
all inflammable  liquid  in  piping  and  in hydraulic  equipment  by  non-inflammable 
liquid." 
7)  B  - 6  - b,  page  58,  last  sentence,  Conference  Report 
Places  where  inflammable  materials  accumulate 
"If such  places are not  under  constant  supervision,  fire detectors  and  automatic 
fire-extinguishing apparatus  must  be  installed." 
8)  A  - 14  - M - b,  page  73 
Internal-combustion  engines  below  ground 
(For  text  see  above  under  I  a)  2) 
- In  four  cases the responsible authority  has  rejected  any  implementation  (A), 
this action applying to three of  the  Recommendations  only  in part  (CA): 
9)  B  - 5b,  page  48,  Conference  Report 
General neutralization 
"The  prescribed minimum  percentage  of  incombustible matter  in dust  must  be  fixed 
in proportion to the  amount  of  firedamp  present." 
(1)  Roof  problems  are at  the  present  moment  being  reexamined  by  the responsible 
Working  Parties of  the  Mines  Safety  Commission. 96 
10- 11)  B  - 2a  and  B  - 2b,  pages  52/53,  Conference  Report 
Detection of  underground  combustion 
"In pits and districts liable to spontaneous  combustion,  the carbon  monoxide 
content  should be  regularly  checked  in order to detect  any  incipient  beatings 
in time. 
To  this end,  it should be  the practice,  in the return airway  in  each  working 
where  coal-getting or drawing-off  is going  on: 
a)  To  measure  the carbon-monoxide  content  daily with  an  approved detector which 
will indicate the  CO  content  from  0.001  % upwards,  or  recorded with  an 
approved  CO-recording  apparatus,  if available,  unless  another  method  is 
used which would  detect  incipient  heating equally effectively; 
b)  To  make  a  thorough  analysis of  the air and  calculate the  C0/02  ratio at 
least  once  a  week." 
12)  A  - 7  - E,  second  sentence,  last  part  of  sentence,  page  63~  Conference  Report 
Restriction  of  the use  of  combustible oils 
" .•••  effective precautions  should  be  taken to prevent  any  risk of  fire  from 
leakages.  Such  precautions  should  include  .•.•  automatic  indicators  showing 
the temperature  of  the oil and  the  emission  of  decomposed  gases,  as well as 
fire-curtains  and  fire-extinguishers." 
c)  Belgium 
There  are still 13  Recommendations  which  have  not  yet  been fully  checked 
(E);  there is still uncertainty as to the steps to be  taken  in respect  of  2  Recom-
·mendations  (?);  in one  case  implementation has  been rejected  (A)  and  1  Recommenda-
tion has  been  referred back to the Safety  Commission  for  check and  amplification 
(EOP).  In  a  further  57  cases  work  on the  preparation of  new  regulations is already 
in hand  (NRP),  but  is not  yet  finished. 
- The  following  Recommendations  are still being  examined: 
1  - 6)  A  - 1  - M - a  to e,  page  67,  Conference  Report 
Signalling systems  in shafts 
"a)  In all main  shafts,  and  in all staple-pits where man-riding is carried  on 
regularly  on  a  considerable scale,  electric signalling devices  must  be 
installed.  As  far  as  possible,  shafts where  man-riding  is not  carried  on 
regularly should also be  provided with electric signalling devices. 
b)  The  electric signalling installations should  be so designed that it is 
impossible to signal at  the  same  time  from  two  or  more  landings. 
c)  Where  new  electric signalling systems are to be  installed  (particularly 
those with  relays),  it is recommended  that  they should be  provided with  a 
continuously-recording  insulation-measuring  instrument,  or  in simpler 
instances with  a  continuously-operating  indicating  instrument  for  the 
supervision of  insulation. 
d)  Electric signalling systems  connected with  intermediate  landings should be 
provided with an  emergency  signalling device enabling  an  emergency  signal 
to be  transmitted to the winding  engineman  from  any  landing at  any  time. 
e)  Existing electric and  mechanical signalling systems  should as far  as 
possible be  supplemented  by  telephone  installations." 
7  - 8)  A- 2  - M,  paras.  1  and  2,  pages  68/9,  Conference  Report 
"Wh~re two  or  more  decks at  a  single  landing are used  simultaneously  in man-
winding,  the signals of  the main  loading  point  should be  automatically  locked 
until all the other decks  have  signalled that  they  are ready. 97 
This  does  not  apply to synchronized signalling systems.  Where  these are used, 
the signallers at  each deck must  be  included  in the system." 
9)  A - 5  -M,  page  70,  Conference  Report 
Shaft-sinking 
"In shaft-sinking operations,  the  guides  for  the  kibbles should  reach  down  at 
least  as far  as  50 metres  above  the bottom of the shaft. 
If a  ladderway  is not  installed at  the  same  time  from  the start of  the sinking 
operations,  an  emergency  winding  installation should  be  provided,  operated  by 
means  independent  of  the  power  used  for the  main  winding engine." 
10)  A  - 6  - M,  page  70,  Conference  Report 
Cables 
"In staple-pits and  upcast  shafts with  a  high relative moisture  content  in the 
atmosphere,  and  in wet  shafts,  new  ropes  with  galvanized wires  should be  used, 
unless  galvanization is undesirable  owing to particularly corrosive elements 
in the air or water. 
Winding  ropes  attached to drums  or reels may  be  lubricated instead of  galva-
nized." 
11)  A - 7  - M,  page  70,  Conference  Report 
''Fixed  working  platforms  in shafts must  be  assessed for  maximum  load  plus  an 
adequate  safety  margin  before they  are  installed.  One  assessment  for  each  type 
is sufficient. 
The  material  employed  for  constructing platforms,  especially timber,  should 
be  examined  periodically for  quality  and  safety." 
12)  B  - 29  - M,  pages  80/81,  Conference  Report 
Checking  guide  equipment 
"In ventilation shafts which  are  showing  the effects of  continuous mining 
operations,  or  in which there is excessive wear  and tear on  the guide-rods, 
the guides  should be  examined at  regular intervals with  an  appropriate testing 
apparatus." 
13)  B - 30 - M,  page  81,  Conference  Report 
"The  use  below ground  of all inflammable oils,  with the exception of  lubricants 
and  diesel fuel,  should be discontinued as  far as possible,  even  for mechanical 
purposes,  such as the operation of hydraulic equipment,  couplings,  tub-decking 
plant,  props,  etc." 
14)  A - 14  - M- b,  page  73,  Conference  Report 
Internal-combustion engines  below  ground 
(For  text  see  under  I  a)  2) 
There  is still uncertainty  about  the following  Recommendations 
15)  B  - 9  - S,  page  17,  Conference Report 
Payment  for shotfirers 
"The  method  of  payment  for shotfirers and  acting shotfirers should ·be  such  as 
to give these  men  a  special incentive to see that shotfiring is carried out 
in accordance with the regulations.  Their  pay  should  be  commensurate with their 
position of responsibility." 98 
16)  A  - 3  - M,  page  60,  Conference  Report 
~Ian-riding installations in shafts 
"As  regards  existing electrical signalling installations,  it is recommended 
that  in all vent-ilation shafts where  man-riding is carried on  regularly  on  a 
considerable scale there should be  an  interlocking device  connected with the 
winding  engine,  which will  lock the winding  brake  during  man-riding,  so  long 
as  anyone  of  the shaft  gates is left open." 
- No  new  regulations are to be  issued in the following  instance: 
17)  B  - 1  - 3,  pages  51/52,  Conference  Report 
Prevention  of  underground  combustion 
"In the  preparation and  implementation of working  plans  relating to pits or 
districts subject  to spontaneous  combustion,  care should  be  taken: 
I.3.  To  employ,  for  preference,  retreated working  where  this does  not  involve 
danger  from  firedamp." 
The  57  Recommendations  already  referred to above,  in  respect  of  which  new  regula-
tions are being  prepared although the work  is not  yet  finished~  are  primarily 
concerned  with the  following fields: 
Electrification,  continuous  conveyors,  internal-combustion engines  underground, 
travelling,  locomotive  haulage  and  man-riding. 
d)  France 
One  Recommendation  is being  examined with  a  view to preparing  new  regula-
tions  (E),  one  Recommendation  has  been rejected  (A)  and  one  Recommendation  referred 
back to the Safety  Commission  (EOP).  New  regulations are being  prepared  in respect 
of  27  Recommendations~  but  the  work  is not  yet  finished  (NRP). 
- Examination  of  the  following  Recommendation  is not  yet  finished: 
1)  General working  plans 
"It is necessary,  in  the  interests of  safety,  that  the coal  owner  should  draw  up 
general  long-term and  short-term plans  of  operations,  and  forward  these  in  advance 
to the competent  authority.  These  plans  should  incorporate all such details as  may 
be  necessary to enable the authority to judge their implications  concerning safety. 
Any  amendments  of  importance  should be  intimated  in good  time  to the  same  authority. 
The  latter must  be  entitled,  where  necessary,  to enter objections to the  plans 
within  a  suitable time-limit." 
- The  following  Recommendation will not  be  implemented: 
2)  B  - 28  - M,  page  80,  Conference  Report 
Man-riding  in staple-pits 
"All staple-pits should if possible  be  provided with man-riding apparatus,  and 
man-riding  in such  pits should  be authorized." 
- The  following  Recommendation  has  been referred back to the Safety  Commission: 
3)  A  - 14  - M- b,  page  73,  Conference  Report 
Internal-combustion engines  underground 
(For  text  see  above  under  I  a)  2)  . 99 
- The  27  Recommendations  in respect  of  which  new  regulations are being  prepared 
although the work  is not  yet  finished  are  primarily concerned with  problems  of 
preventing fires  in shafts and  mine  workings,  electrification and  shaft-winding, 
e)  Italy 
9  Recommendations  are still being  examined with  a  view to preparing new 
re~ulations  (E),  no  decision  has  been taken  (?)  in respect  of  5  Recommendations, 
in  a  further  5  cases the  Recommendations  have  been  rejected  (A)  and  one  Recommenda-
tion has  been  referred back to the  Safety  Commission  (EOP), 
- Recommendations still being  examined: 
1)  A- 8- E,  para.l,  page  64,  Conference  Report 
Restriction of  use  of  combustible oils 
''Oil-filled electrical equipment  should  not  be used  either  on  coal  faces  or  in 
their  immediate  vicinity,  In  roadways  this type  of  equipment  should  always  be 
fixed,'' 
2- 3)  A- 15- M & 16-M,  pages  73/4,  Conference.Report 
Travelling below  ground 
''Loading  points and  similar places where  the travelling road  crosses the track 
and  where  mine-cars  are constantly being set  up  and/or  moved  about  during  opera-
tions,  and  points  in conveyor  roads  where  it is necessary  to cross the belt, 
should  be  bridged over  to ensure safe crossing, 
Every  effort  should  be  made  to ensure that  a  travelling road  is at all times 
left  along the  face.'' 
4  - 9)  A - 17  - M to A - 20  - M,  pages  74,  75  & 76,  Conference  Report 
Locomotive  haulage 
17  - M:  ''New  locomotives  and  other self-propelled vehicles  must  have  covered 
cabs,  and  must  be  so  constructed that  the driver  has  a  sufficient  view  of  the 
track from  his seat,  in whichever direction he  is travelling,  without  leaning 
out  of  the  cab, 
Locomotives  already  in use  must  be  converted to conform with  these requirements. 
Those  which  cannot  be  so converted must  be  either withdrawn  from  service within 
a  maximum  time-limit to be  laid down  by  the  competent  authority,  or used  only 
on those  roadways  which  afford sufficient clearance above  and  on either side 
to make  accidents unlikely," 
18  - M: 
"a)  All  locomotives  must  be  provided with side-friction brakes,  which  should be 
powerful  enough to ensure  maximum  braking efficiency  on  the  part  of  the  brake 
blocks,  Where  the mine-cars  are also fitted with brakes,  the braking-power  of 
the  locomotive  may  be  reduced  in proportion, 
b)  The  maximum  load to be  hauled  by  anyone  locomotive  should  be  fixed  in relation 
to the maximum  speed and to the average  gradient  of  the road,  in such  a  manner 
that the braking distance with  a  mean  coefficient  of  friction of  0,17  does  not 
exceed  a  given  length. 
For main-road  locomotives  travelling at  4  metres  per second,  a  braking distance 
of  80 metres  can as  a  rule  be  considered sufficient. 
c)  All  locomotives,  with the exception of  small  low-speed types,  must  be  equipped 
for travel in either direction with  electric headlights  which  can  be  dipped  from 
the driver's seat, 100 
The  headlights must  ensure adequate  illumination over  the entire  braking 
distance." 
19  - M:  "All  locomotives  should also be  fitted with  sandboxes  which will operate 
when  travelling in either direction." 
20  - 1\I:  "All  locomotives  and  other self-propelled vehicles should be fitted with 
devices  which  will prevent  their being set  in motion  by  any  unauthorized person. 
New  locomotives  and  other vehicles  should as far  as  possible be fitted with 
devices  which will ensure that  they  can  be  set  and  kept  in motion  only  when  the 
driver is at  his post." 
In the  following  cases there is still uncertainty with  respect to the  prepa-
ration of  new  regulations: 
10)  B- 9- S,  page  17,  Conference  Report 
Payment  of  shotfirers 
(For  text  see  under  I  c)  15) 
11)  A  - 4  SC,  pages  19/20,  Conference  Report 
Face  supports 
(For  text  see  under  I  b)  4) 
12)  A  - 14  - SC,  pages  22/3,  Conference  Report 
Gate-roads 
"In gate-roads the supports  should resist  the general  lowering  of  the rocks 
only  to the  point  where  it is still possible for  the whole  of  the strata to 
lower  together with the surrounding rocks,  without  bed  separation.  This  does 
not,  however,  apply  to steep and  semi-steep formations,  where  the roof  and  floor 
strata have  a  tendency to slide,  and  rigid supports are,  therefore,  necessary." 
13)  A-2-M,  para.2,  page  69,  Conference  Report 
Signalling systems  in shafts 
"With synchronized signalling systems,  the signals at  each deck must  be  included 
in the system." 
14)  A  - 21  - M,  page  76,  Conference  Report 
Locomotive  haulage 
"Points and  ventilation doors  in busy  roadways  should be  so constructed as to 
make  it possible to operate them  from the  locomotive. 
The  ventilation doors  should  furthermore  be  fitted with  a  contrivance which 
will give  warning  of  the approach  of  the  locomotive  before they  open." 
- The  responsible authority has  rejected the following  Recommendation: 
15)  A  - 4,  page  31,  Conference  Report 
Compressed-air  ejectors 
"Compressed air-ejectors  in use underground  must  be properly  placed  in appro-
priate tubing of  sufficient  length to ensure that the distance between the 
ejector  and the discharge  pofnt  is not  less than the specified minimum,  to be 
fixed  by  th~ competent  authority.  The  whole  apparatus  must  be  properly earthed." 101 
16)  B  - 4,  page  36,  Conference  Report 
Firedamp drainage 
"The  systematic drainage  of  firedamp  from  the adjacent  strata should  be  carried 
out  in all mines  where  the  firedamp  content  exceeds the permitted· maximum  with 
normal  methods  of ventilation.  A  network of  special piping should be  installed 
in such pits,  but all necessary  equipment  should be  available to ensure that 
firedamp  drainage  may  be  undertaken at  any  time." 
17)  B  - 1  - 3,  page  52,  Conference  Report 
• 
Prevention of  underground  combustion 
(For  text  see above  I  c)  17) 
18  - 19)  B  - 3d  and  e,  page  54,  Conference  Report 
Prevention  of  fires  in shafts 
"In new  shafts,  and  where  possible  in those  being  overhauled,  it is advisable: 
d)  t~ site the  gas-drainage pipes  in the upcast  shafts,  if at all possible; 
e)  to ensure that electric cables,  compressed-air  mains  and  gas-drainage pipes 
are  kept  well apart." 
- The  following  Recommendation  has  been referred back to the Safety  Commission 
for  check  and  amplification: 
20)  A  - 14  - M - b,  page  73,  Conference Report 
Internal-combustion engines  underground 
(For  text  see  above  under  I  a)  2) 
f)  Netherlands 
In respect  of  the total  155  technical Recommendations  the situation is as 
follows: 
-The checking  of  one  Recommendation  has  not  yet  been  finished  (E). 
1)  A- 20- M,  para.2,  page  76,  Conference  Report 
Locomotive  haulage 
"New  locomotives  and  other vehicles should as  far as possible be  fitted with 
devices which will ensure that  they  can  be set  and  kept  in motion  only  when  the 
driver is at  his post." 
- In  a  furtQer  instance the Recommendation  has  been referred back to the Safety 
Commission  (EOP). 
2)  A  - 14  - M - b,  page  73,  Conference  Report 
Internal-combustion engines  below  ground 
(For  text see  above  under  I  a)  2) 
-In a  further  5  cases  new  regulations are being prepared,'but the work is not 
yet  finished.  These  Recommendations  deal with electrification and with the use 
of  combustible oils in mechanical apparatus. 102 
B.  RECOMMENDATIONS  REGARDING  SAFETY  REGULATION  - SAFETY  SUPERVISION  -
WORKERS'  PART  IN  INSPECTION 
a)  Federal Republic  of  Germany  (North Rhine/Westphalia) 
Of  the total number  of  51  Recommendations  in this field,  all have  been 
applied except  three which  were  not  accepted. 
- No  application will be  made  of  the following  Recommendations: 
1)  I  - 2nd  paragraph,  page  85,  Conference  Report 
Safety Departments  in enterprises  - exchange  of  information 
"It is recommended  that  exchanges  in information be  organized  among  offices of 
the Safety  Department  of the different  collieries.  It is further  considered 
that  the  Mines  Inspectorate should take  part  in such  exchanges  from  time to 
time. 
Such  exchanges  should be  arranged  not  only  at  pit,  coal-field,  or  national  level, 
but  at  Community  level." 
While  the  Recommendation  embodied  in the first  paragraph  above  is already 
implemented  in  North  Rhine/Westphalia,  the  Recommendation  in the  second 
paragraph will not  be  implemented,  on  the  grounds  that this cannot  be  laid 
down  by  the  Inspectorate. 
2)  A - 2  - 2nd  paragraph,  pages  91/2 
Revision  of  the status of  the entire Mines  Inspectorate staff 
"The  Conference is of the unanimous  opinion that  a  revision of  the status of 
the entire Mines  Inspectorate staff is imperative.  It is desirable that the 
Governments  concerned  should see to it that the standing of  the personnel  of 
the  Mines  Inspectorate is such as to ensure satisfactory recruitment  and  reten-
tion of  staff. 
In return,  it is felt  that  the  Government  may  reasonably require  them to work 
in  the  Inspectorate for  a  stated minimum  period,  and  to  engage  full-time  in 
their inspection duties." 
- The  Recommendation  embodied  in the second  paragraph is rejected. 
3)  B,  page  97,  Conference  Report 
Disciplinary action  in the event  of  breaches  in safety regulations 
"The  Conference holds the view that  at  the  same  time,  disciplinary action,  al-
though  indispensable,  is not  the most  effective method  of  improving safety,  and 
a  study  of  the causes  of  accidents  shows  the human  factor to be all-important. 
Greater safety can be  attained primarily through  a  detailed study  of working 
methods,  through  proper training of  the personnel,  and  through full co-operation 
by  all concerned  in creating safety-mindedness. 
The  granting of  bonuses  in enterprises where  the personnel have  conducted them-
selves  in  a  manner  calculated to prevent  accidents  can also be  an  extremely 
effective means  of  improving the standard of  safety." 
- The  responsible  Mines  Inspectorate has  rejected  implementation  of  this Recom-
mendation,  holding the view that this is a  matter for the two contracting 
parties. 103 
b)  Federal Republic of  Germany  (Saar) 
A total of  5  Recommendations  have  not  yet  been  implemented,  two  of  which 
are being examined  with  a  view to deciding what  measures to take  (E)  and  three 
having been  rejected  (A). 
- The  following  Recommendations  are still being  examined: 
1)  A  - 3,  page  92,  Conference  Report 
Refresher  courses for  inspectors'  assistants and  workers'  delegates 
"The  Conference  considers that  the  Mines  Inspectorate should  organize regular 
refresher  cours~s  for  inspectors'  assistants and  workers'  delegates,  in order 
to ensure that  their technical training is always  adequate to what  is required 
of  them." 
2)  C,  page  95,  Conference Report 
Participation by  workers  in safety  inspection 
"It is considered that  foreign workers  should  be  allowed to participate in 
safety  inspection  on  the  same  terms  as  nationals  of  the country  concerned." 
- The  following  Recommendations  will not  be  applied  in the regulations: 
3  - 4)  I  - 1st  and  2nd  paras.,  safety departments  in enterprises  - exchanges  of 
information 
(For  text  see  above  under  II  a)  1) 
The  responsible  Inspectorate  considers that these two  Recommendations  cannot 
be  la~d down  by  the  Inspectorate. 
5)  A  - 2  - 2nd  par~,  pages  91/2 
Revision  of  the status of  the entire Mines  Inspectorate staff 
(For text  see  above  under  II  a)  2) 
As  in the  previous  case,  this applies  only to the 2nd  paragraph of this Recom-
mendation. 
c)  Belgium 
In  a  total of  15  cases the Recommendations  have  not  yet  been  implemented. 
7  Recommendations  are still being  checked  (E),  7  Recommendations will not  be 
embodied  in the Regulations  (A}  and  no  decision has  yet  been  reached with respect 
to one  further  Recommendation  (?). 
- The  following  Recommendations  are still being examined with  a  view ~u preparing 
regulations: 
1- 2)  D-- 1  and  2,  page  83 
Safety Departments  and  Enterprises 
"1.  There  should be an adequate  number  of  safety  personnel,  and  they  should 
work full  time  on safety and  health,  to the exclusion of all other duties. 
In cases where  this is not  practicable,  exceptions  should  be  made  only  with the 
approval  of  the  Mines  Inspectorate. 
2.  Safety  personnel,  of whatever  grade,  should be  given rank and  pay  equivalent 
to those of  operational personnel with the  same  qualifications." 104 
3)  A- 2,  pages  86  & 87,  Conference  Report 
Organization  of  the supervision of  safety arrangements within the enterprises 
"The  Conference  considers that: 
1.  The  coal-owner  must  place every  underground workplace  or working  and all work 
carried out  below  ground  under  the management,  direction,  supervision or 
responsibility of  persons  whose  functions  and  obligations must  be  clearly 
defined  and  communicated  to the  competent  authority. 
2.  Every  member  of  the managerial  or supervisory staff to whom  such duties are 
assigned must  possess  the appropriate qualifications as  recognized by  the 
competent  authority." 
In the  above  passage it is the  Recommendation  contained  in the second  paragraph 
which  is still being  examined  with  a  view to implementation. 
4  - 5)  B  - 3rd and  4th paraa,  page  89,  Conference  Report 
Framing  of  regulations  and  inspection for  compliance with  them  - exemptions 
"It is desirable that  there  should be  consultation between  the  employers  and 
the  workers  regarding  any  exemption. 
The  Conference  considers it essential that  in any  event  the bodies  representing 
the workers'  interests within the enterprise should be  notified of  all exemptions 
granted during the  period  concerned." 
6)  A  - 1,  page  91,  Conference  Report 
Number  of  inspection appointments 
"The  Conference  recommends  ...• that  strong representations  should be  made  to 
the various Governments  to raise,  if necessary,  the  number  of  inspection appoint-
ments  (Inspectors,  Assistants,  and  Workers'  delegates),  which will make  it 
possible to increase the  number  of  inspections." 
7)  A  - 3,  page  92,  Conference  Report 
Refresher  courses  for  inspectors'  assistants  and workers'  delegates 
(For  text  see  above  under  II  b)  1) 
- The  responsible authority will not  embody  the  following  Recommendations  in 
new  regulations: 
8)  G,  page  84,  Conference  Report 
Safety Departments  in Enterprises 
"The  Conference  considers that  "besides the safety department,  specialist staff 
on  the operational side may  be  made  responsible for certain matters of partic-
ular  importance  in connection with safety.  Like  the operational staff generally, 
these men  should be  administratively  independent  of the safety department,  but 
they should  work  in intimate co-operation with it. 
The  management  must  make  all appropriate  arrangements to avoid  any  conflict  of 
authority between the safety  and  operational departments." 
9)  I  - 2nd  para~  page  85,  Conference  Report 
Safety Departments  in enterprises,  exchanges  of  information 
(For  text  and  remarks  see above  under  II  a)  1) 105 
10 - 11)  A - 1  - 2nd  and  3rd  paras~  page  88,  Conference Report 
Organization  of  inspection departments 
"Since  in the pits and their surface buildings  and  installations safety is a 
single integrated element,  yet  presents  two  separate aspects,  the technical 
and  the social,  it is considered that  the work  of  the  Mines  Inspectorate should 
be  so organized  as  to take this fact  into account.  · 
It is,  therefore,  felt to be essential that  safety,  health  and  technical in-
spection in the mines  should be  carried out  by  one  and  the  same  inspection 
service,  the  inspectors to have all the qualifications required for this pur-
pose. 
The  departments  and  organizations  which  have  to study the  inspection ieports 
and  to take action accordingly  must  be  answerable  only to the Minister respon-
sible for  the  mines.  The  Minister will,  where  appropriate,  inform the colleagues 
of  observations  made  on  matters  concerning them  and either arrange with them, 
or  leave it to them  t-o  decide,  what  action,  if any,  is to be  taken." 
The  responsible  authority has  rejected any  implementation of  the Recommendations 
in the foregoing  paragraphs  2  and 3. 
12)  A - 2,  page  89,  Conference Report 
Delegation of  authority 
"The  Conference  is of  the unanimous  op1n1on that  where  authority  or partial 
authority concerning safety  in mines  is delegated  by  the Minister,  it should 
be  delegated  only to the  Mines  Inspectorate. 
The  Mines  Inspectorate should,  however,  inform the national,  regional or  local 
authorities,  to such  extent  as  may  be  deemed  necessary,  of the action taken 
in virtue of  this delegation of  authority." 
13)  A  - 2,  1st  para~  pages  91  and  92,  Conference  Report 
Revision  of  the status of  the entire Mines  Inspectorate staff 
','The  Conference  is of  the  unanimous  opinion  that  a  revision of  the status of 
the entire Mines  Inspectorate staff is imperative.  It is desirable that  the 
Governments  concerned  should see to it that the standing of  the personnel  of 
the Mines  Inspectorate is such  as to ensure satisfactory recruitment  and  re-
tention of staff. 
14)  A- 1,  page  97,  Conference  Report 
Prosecution of  offences  against  safety regulations 
"The  Conference therefore desires that  the prosecutions  requested  by  the Mines 
Inspectorate following  particularly flagrant  and  clearly proven  offences, 
which  greatly affect  general safety,  should  lead to appropriate penalties." 
- There  is still uncertainty with regard to the steps to be  taken in respect  of 
th·e  following  Recommendation. 
15)  A - 2,  2nd  para. 
Following the text  quoted  above  under  13 ,_  there is for the second  para:graph, 
quoted  below,  still uncertainty as to how  to  implement 'the following Recommen-
dation: 
"In return,  it is felt that  the Government  may  reasonably require them to work 
in the  Inspectorate for  a  stated minimum  period,  and to engage full-time  in 
their inspection duties." 106 
d)  France 
Implementation  has  not  yet  been  completed for  a  total of  10 Recommendations, 
of  which  8  are being  examined with respect  to the decisions to be taken and  two  of 
which will  not  be  implemented. 
- The  following  Recommendations  are being examined: 
1  - 2)  B  - 1  and  2,  page  82,  Conference  Report 
Safety Departments  in enterprises 
"1.  There  should be  in each  country  an  Act  or Regulation  making  it  compulsory 
for  every  enterprise to set  up at  least  a  safety department. 
2.  Furthermore,  minimum  requirements  should be  laid down  concerning 
- the duties  and  functions  of  such  a  department; 
- the qualifications and.abilities needed  by  its staff; 
- the general principles on  which it is to be  organized  (to be  implemented 
in accordance with practical experience,  in co-operation with the  Mines 
Inspectorate)." 
3)  C- 3rd  par~,  page  83,  Conference  Report 
Appointment  of  leaders  and staff of  safety departments 
"It would  be  advisable  for the colliery manager  to make  sure,  particularly 
from the men's  representatives,  that  the safety  personnel  appointed would  be 
acceptable to the  men." 
4)  D  - 1,  page  83,  Conference  Report 
(For text  see  above  under  II  c)  1) 
5)  A  - 2,  page  86,  Conference  Report 
Organization of  the supervision of  safety arrangements within the enterprises 
(For  text  see  above  under  II  c) 3),  para  2) 
6)  Para.3,  page  90,  Conference  Report 
Framing  instructions 
"The  Conference  recommends  that  when  such instructions are  drawn  up  by  the 
employer,  the latter shall consult  the Safety  Committee  on  which the workers 
are represented." 
7)  D  - 1,  page  90,  Conference Report 
Composition of  the Consultative Councils  and  Committees  for  Safety  Problems 
assisting the Minister  responsible for  the mines 
"The  Conference regards it as desirable that all Councils  and  Committees  as-
sisting the  Minister  responsible for the mines  dealing with safety matters 
should  include representatives of  the employers  and  of the workers." 
8)  C,  page  95,  Conference  Report 
Participation by  workers  in safety  inspection 
(For text  see above  under  II  b)  2) 
- In the following  two  cases,  the regulations will not  embody  the  Recommenda-
tions: 107 
9)  C- para.2,  page  83,  Conference  Report 
Appointment  of  the  leaders  and  the staff of  the Safety  Department 
"The colliery management  should consult  the bodies  representing the workers' 
interests in the enterprise before taking any  decision with regard to the 
appointment  of  leaders  and staff of  the safety department." 
10)  F  - 2nd  para.,  page  84,  Conference  Report 
Tasks  of  the safety department 
"The safety department  must,however,  have  the right to decide itself on  the 
action to be  taken  in the event  of  imminent  danger,  provided it notifies the 
management  later." 
e)  Italy 
Fourteen Recommendations  have still not  yet  been  implemented,  1  Recommenda-
tion still being  examined  (E),  while  in nine  cases the Recommendations will not  be 
accepted  (A)  and  with regard to another  four  Recommendations  there is uncertainty 
as  to what  decisions will  be  taken  (?). 
The  following  Recommendation  is still being studied with  a  view to the prepara-
tion of  new  regulations: 
1)  B  - 2,  pages  94/95,  Conference  Report 
Participation by  workers  in safety inspection 
"In view  of  the differences which  exist  between the systems  in force  in the 
countries  of  the  Community  as  regards the position of  the workers'  delegates 
in relation to the Mines  Inspectorate  (method  of  appointment,  powers,  subordi-
nation),  the  Conference  considered that  any  attempt  to alter the system would 
be  a  somewhat  complicated matter,  which is better left to the discretion of  the 
various countries  themselves.  It is,  however,  essential that  due  account  be 
taken  of  the following  recommendations,  which  have  been  approved  unanimously 
by  the Conference. 
Workers'  delegates  engaged  on safety  inspection under  the Mines  Inspectorate 
must 
-work solely and-wholly  on  safety  inspection,  to the exclusion of all other 
duties and  appointments  (e.g.  personnel representatives); 
- be  independent  of  the enterprises they are called upon to inspect; 
- possess the essential knowledge  and  capability before taking up their duties; 
- be  given  thorough training and  regular refresher  courses; 
-be paid at the same  rate as. operational ·underground workers  with the  same 
qualifications. 
The  Mines  Inspectorate must  see to it that these conditions are fulfilled." 
- ~he responsible authority  has  rejected  implementation of  the following  Recommen-
dations: 
2  - 3)  C  - 2nd  and  3rd paras?  page  83,  Conference  Report 
Safety departments  in enterprises 
"The  colliery manager  should consult  the bodies  representing the workers'  inter-
ests  in the enterprise before taking any  decision with respect  to the appoint-
ment  of  the  leaders and staff of  the safety department. 108 
It would  be  advisable  for  the colliery manager  to make  sure,  particularly from 
the men's  ~·eprP.sentatives,  that  the safety personnel appointed will be  accept-
able to the men." 
4)  F  - 2nd  para~  page  84,  Conference  Report 
(For  text  see  above  under  II  d)  10) 
5)  G,  page  84,  Conference  Report 
Responsibility  of  the officials for  certain safety  problems 
"The  Conference  considers that,  besides the safety department,  specialist staff 
on  the operational side  may  be  made  responsible for  certain matters  of  partic-
ular  importance  in connection with safety.  Like  the operational staff generally, 
these  men  would  be  administratively  independent  of  the safety department,  but 
they  should work  in  intimate co-operation with it. 
The  management  must  make  all appropriate arrangements to avoid  any  conflict  of 
authority between  the safety  and  operational departments." 
6)  I  - 1st  para~  page  85,  Conference  Report 
Safety departments  in enterprises  - exchanges  of  information 
The  Conference  recommends  that  exchanges  of  information be  organized among 
officers of  the safety departments  of  the different  collieries.  It is further 
considered that  the  Mines  Inspectorate should take part  in such  exchanges  from 
time to time." 
7)  B  - para. 4,  page  89,  Conference Report 
Framing  of  regulations  and  inspection for  compliance with  them  - exemption 
"The  Conference  considers it essential that  in any  event  the bodies  representing 
the workers'  interest within the enterprise should  be  notified of all exemptions 
granted during  the  period concerned." 
8)  C  - para.3,  page  90,  Conference  Report 
Framing  of  instructions  - consultation with the workers 
(For  text  see  above  under  II  d)  6) 
9)  C,  page  95,  Conference Report 
Participation by  workers  in safety  inspection 
(For  text see  above  under  II  b)  2) 
10)  B,  page  97,  Conference  Report 
Disciplinary action in the event  of  breaches  of safety regulations 
(For text  see  above  under  II  a)  3) 
- There is still uncertainty about  the  implementation  of  the following  Recommen-
dations: 
11)  D- para.2,  page  83,  Conference  Report 
Safety departments  and enterprises 
(For text  see  above  under  II  c)  2) 109 
12) I- para.2,  page  85,  Conference  Report 
Safety departments  in enterprises  - exchanges  of  information 
"It is recommended  •.•. that  such  exchanges  should  be  arranged  not  only  at pit, 
coal-field or national  level,  but  also at  Community  level." 
(Also see  the first  para.  in. this connection:  For text  see  above  under  II  e)  6) 
13)  A  - 2  - par~ 2,  pages  91/2,  Conference Report 
Revision  of  the status of  the  Mines  Inspectorate staff 
(For  text  see  above  under  II  c)  15) 
14)  A  - 3,  page  92,  Conference  Report 
Refresher  courses  for  inspectors'  assistants  and  workers'  delegates 
(For  text  see  above  under  II  b)  1) 
f)  Netherlands 
The  Netherlands  have  implemented all 55  Recommendations  in the fields  of 
safety regulations,  safety supervision  and  participation by  workers  in safety 
inspection. 
C.  RECOMMENDATIONS  REGARDING  HUMAN  FACTORS 
a)  Federal Republic  of  Germany  (North Rhine/Westphalia) 
Of  the total of  74  Recommendations  of  the Conference  in this field,  one 
part  of  a  Recommendation  is still being studied  (CE);  in  5  cases the Recommendations 
will not  be  applied  (A)  and  in 3  cases  they will be  only  partly applied  (CA). 
- The  text  which  is still being studied is as  follows: 
1)  Para.  4,  page  107,  Conference Report 
Entrants undergoing medical  and  psychological examination 
"In view  of  the ever-present  and widely-varying hazards  in coal-mines,  medical 
and  psychological examination should not  be  confined,  as  is frequently  the case 
in other  industries,  men  assigned  to strenuous or  dangerous  occupations;  it 
should  be  extended to the entire personnel,  carried out  with  due  thoroughness 
and  attention to detail,  and  based  on special,  carefully-defined criteria." 
- No  application will be  made  of  the  5  Recommendations  listed below: 
2)  Para.  9,  page  103,  Conference Report 
Practical reception methods:  organization 
"In the country  of  recruitment,  especially  in the case of collective recruitment, 
it is necessary to organize  "assembly  centres"  responsible for  seeing that,  in 
areas where  workers  are recruited on  a  considerable  sca~e,  they are given mate-
rial and  moral  assistance  (lodging,  administrative formalities,  etc.),  medical 
examination to ensure that  they  are physically fit for  work  in the pits,  adequate 
and  unbiased  information concerning their future  life as miners,  including its 
hazards,  and  if possible  a  certain amount  of  guidance.  The  Committee  concerned 
recommends  in particular that  in the case of  collective recruitment ina country 
of  emigration,  the country  concerned should see that its assembly  centres receive 
migrant  workers  under  the  most  favourable  material and  moral  conditions  and 
provide such workers with appropriate information  on  the life awaiting them." 110 
3)  Para.  2,  page  110,  Conference  Report 
Methods  of  observing  and  assessing  individual miners  at  work 
"Inasmuch as various specialists have  to observe  the men  at work and/or make 
assessments  concerning them,  more  particularly  in connection with time  and 
motion studies,  job analysis,  job evaluation,  etc.,  it has  been  found that, 
although essentially of  a  technical and  economic  nature,  these special work-
study  methods  offer excellent  opportunities 
- for detecting dangerous  situations,  practices  and  equipment, 
- for  checking whether  the man  is properly adjusted to his work,  and  consequent-
ly, 
- for  introducing certain preventive and  remedial  measures  designed to improve 
safety. 
All  those  concerned with safety  (managerial  and  supervisory staff,  medical 
practitioners,  psychologists,  safety engineers,  etc.)  should be  associated with 
the  employment  of  these  work-study  methods.  They  would  thus be  enabled,  quite 
apart  from  the  regular  tours of  inspection  and  leaving it to the  specialists 
actually  to  implement  the  methods  concerned,  to extend  their knowledge  of  the 
men's  working conditions  and  behaviour,  and  to  submit  their views  with  the 
object of ensuring greater safety". 
4)  Para.  10 a,  page  123,  Conference ·Report 
Psychological  and sociological aspects  of  the environment  - Problems  in connec-
tion with  foreign workers 
"Foreign workers  should  be  given  instruction in the  language  of  the  country  of 
reception for  a  suitable period,  according to the prevailing circumstances, 
such  instruction to include  in particular technical mining  terms  and  expressions, 
and the  instruction period to count  as  paid working  time."  (1) 
5  - 6)  Paras.  10  c  and  10 d,  page  123,  Conference  Report 
Problems  in connection with  fo~eign workers 
"10  c  - As  far  as  possible,  the  instructors  in  charge  of  the training of  foreign 
workers  should  have  an  adequate  knowledge  of  the workers'  language  as well  as 
that  of  the country  of  employment. 
10 d  - So  far  as possible,  every  team should  include at  least  one  worker  with 
an adequate  knowledge  of  both  languages." 
-In the  case  of  the·following Recommendations,  only  part will not  be  applied: 
7  - 8)  Paras.  7  and  8,  pages  102  and  103,  Conference  Report 
Reception  of  new  workers  - Responsibility for reception 
"7  - Outside the enterprise,  where  men  have  been recruited some  distance away 
(either in the  same  country  or abroad),  and  more  particularly in the case of 
collective recruitment,  responsibility for the reception organizations set  up 
in the country  of  recruitment  and/or  employment  should be  shared as  may  be 
deemed  most  suitable between the  local or national authorities and the employers. 
It is recommended  that the workers  should also be  associated with these activ-
ities.  Under  no  circumstances should responsibility for reception arrangements 
be  delegated to outside  commercial  bodies. 
8  - Within the enterprise,  the reception services are the responsibility of the 
employers.  It is recommended  that  they  should be  organized in co-operation with 
the trade unions. 
(1)  The  responsible authority here states that it cannot  embody  this Recommendation 
in regulations,  and  that  it is much  more  a  matter for  the two contracting parties. 111 
Every  enterprise or  group of  enterprises should have  a  special reception depart-
ment  on  a  permanent  basis,  working  in co-operation with the other social services 
and with the vocational-training department,  which  have  themselves  a  contribu-
tion to make  as  regards  reception.  Reception  cannot,  however,  be  carried out 
satisfactorily by  one  single specialized department: 
it requires  an  atmosphere  of  mutual understanding  and  co-operation all round, 
particularly from  the supervisory staff,  who  need  to be specially trained for 
this purpose." 
9)  Para.  10 f,  page  123,  Conference  Report 
Problems  in connection with  foreign workers 
In addition to translations of  the safety and  operational rules  and  regulations, 
it is further  recommended  that  the enterprise should  provide foreign  workers 
with translations of all other technical documents  of  value  in connection with 
their further  training. 
b)  Federal Republic  of  Germany  (Saar) 
Implementation has  not yet  been  achieved  in a  total of  20  cases  in this 
field.  In detail the situation is: 
4  Recommendations  are still being studied  (E),  in  12  cases  the examination has 
only  been partially completed  (CE),  4  Recommendations  will not  be  applied  in part 
· (CA)  and  1  Recommendation  has  been  referred back to the  Mines  Safety  Commission 
(EOP). 
- Examination  of  the following  Recommendations  is not  yet  completed: 
1)  Para.  1  - 1st  sentence,  page  106,  Conference  Report 
Medical  and  psychological examination  - Medical  and  psychological supervision 
"As  the  psychological  and  pathological condition  and  the  intelligence and  char-
acter rating of  the personnel  can affect safety,measures concerning the medical 
and  psychological  examination and  supervision of  the workers  should be  intro-
duced  generally." 
2)  1  - para.  5,  1st sentence,  page  106,  Conference  Report 
Medical  and  psychological  examination  - Medical  and  psychological supervision 
"Suitable medical,  and  if necessary  psychotechnical,  supervision should be 
carried out  regularly  and systematically,  to ensure that  each worker  is always 
in  a  fit state to perform his duties  in a  normal manner." 
3)  Para.  8,  page  108,  Conference Report 
Aims  and  objects of  medical  and  psychological supervision 
"Medical  and  psychological supervision should be  carried out  periodically 
throughout  the worker's  career,  with the object  of  making sure that  he  is at 
all times fit for  his job from  the safety point  of  view,  of  helping to get  him 
employed  on  the right  type  of  work  at different  stages  in his career,  and  of 
protecting his health generally.  Supervision should  cover both the medibal  and 
the psychological aspects." 
- In the case  of  the following  Recommendations  examination is still proceeding 
in part,  especially in connection with psychological  problems: 
4)  1  - para.  5,  2nd  sentence,  page  106,  Conference Report 
Medical  and  psychological  examination 
"Where  a  worker  is found  unfit  to perform his duties in a  normal  manner,  such 112 
worker  should be  assigned to more  suitable duties,  as  far as  possible  in the 
same  col:'..iery." 
5)  Para.  3,  pnge  107,  Conference  Report 
Aims  and  ohje~ts of  medical  and  psychological examination 
''The  pre-entry  examination  should not  be  confined solely to the physical and 
pathological side  on the basis  of  a  medical  examination,  but  should if neces-
sary  include the use  of  applied  psychology  with the  object  of ascertaining the 
character and  mental abilities of  the subject." 
6  - 7)  Paras.  5  and  6,  pages  107  and  108,  Conference  Report 
Medical  and  psychological services 
"5  - Every  enterprise or  group  of  enterprises should  have  a  medical  service and 
an  applied-psychology  service,  each with  proper facilities and  equipment  at 
its disposal.  These  services should work  in close co-operation as regards  pre-
entry examinations(and subsequent  supervision);  it would  also be  of  value to 
institute or  extend  co-ordination  among  the various medical  services and  among 
the  various  applied-psychology services." 
''6  - Medical  examinations  must  b~ carried out  by  qualified medical practitioners 
experienced  in industrial medicine  in collieries and  working  in consultation 
with specialists in the various branches  of  the profession whenever  necessary. 
Psychological  examinations  must  be carried out  by  competent  psychologists with 
adequate  knowledge  of  the structure of  the enterprise,  the  environment  and the 
working  conditions." 
8)  Para.  10,  page  114,  Conference  Report 
Shortened training for  juvenile workers 
"Wherever  it is not  possible to send  boys  to an  apprenticeship centre,  they 
should be  given systematic training including theoretical instruction at  the 
surface and  practical instruction in  a  surface training gallery and at  reserved 
training faces.  Upon  completion  of  such courses,  they  should receive  a  certifi-
cate  of  proficiency,  and.should  subsequently  be specially supervised for  some 
months." 
9  - 12)  Paras.  13  to 16,  pages  115  to  116,  Conference  Report 
Intensified training of  adults 
"13  - Every  adult  entrant  must  be  given  systematic training according to a 
detailed  programme  drawn  up  in advance  and falling  into the following three 
stages: 
systematic intensified preliminary training,  to be  given  by  qualified instruc-
tors at  special centres above  and  below ground,  and  lasting not  less than 
two to three weeks  when  the teaching methods  employed are those suited to 
intensified training; 
- follow-up  training supplementary to the intensified preliminary training, 
provided at training faces,  and  lasting not  less than six weeks  when  the 
teaching methods  employed are those suited to intensified training;  during 
this period,  the tiainee to work under  an  instructor responsible at  a  single 
face  for  three to six trainees  (but  not  more),  the  instructor in no  circum-
stances to have  any  connection with the production side; 
- a  period during which the trainee is employed  in easy workings  under  suitable 
supervision. 
Promotion  from  one  stage to another should be  made  on the advice  of  a  responsible 
instructor,  and  promotion  from stage 3  to regular  production work  on  the advice 
of  the supervisors  or  inspectors." 113 
"14  - On  completion  of  stage 2  of this intensified training for  adult workers, 
the trainee should receive  a  certificate of  proficiency stating the type  of 
training received." 
"15  - Where  no  system of  training by  qualified instructors in accordance with 
the principles referred to in subsection  13  above  has  yet  been  introduced,  the 
"worker-and-mate"  system  (with  a  senior worker  initiating newcomers)  may  be used 
only  as  a  temporary  arrangement  pending the introduction of  the methodical train-
ing  outlined above.  Where  this situation obtains,  training should fall into two 
stages: 
systematic intensified preliminary training to be  provided by  qualified in-
structors and  lasting not  less than two to four  weeks  when  the teaching methods 
employed  are those suited to intensified training; 
- follow-up training of  the  "worker-and-mate"  system,  designed to supplement  the 
intensified preliminary training,  and  lasting not  less than three months  to 
one  year;  so ·far as possible the ratio of  trainee to skilled miner  under this 
system should be  one-to-one." 
"16  - The  skilled worker  instructing newcomers  must  be  primarily  concerned with 
teaching his "mate",  not  (so far  as  his wages  are concerned)  with production. 
Wherever this type  of  training is still practised,  the work the  new  entrants are 
set to do  (especially those with  non-mining  backgrounds)  should be  carefully 
graded to enable  them to adapt  themselves  to the job as  time  goes  on,  so as to 
prevent  any  over-taxing  of  their capacity or psychological reaction detrimental 
to safety." 
13)  Para.  21,  page  132,  Conference  Report 
Training of  managerial  and  supervisory staff 
"Promotion to the higher  grades  of  the supervisory staff must  be  preceded  by 
special ·advanced training,  taking the form  of  either intensive training periods, 
or of  periodic  instruction,  or both.  To  this end,  each country should  have  one 
or  more  training-centres for the higher  supervisory  appointments  (second-stage 
training)." 
14)  4,  page  119,  Conference  Report 
Physical aspects  of  the environment 
"Complaints attributable to the effects of  physical factors  inherent  in the 
environment  should rank as  occupational diseases." 
15)  8,  page  130,  Conference Report 
Difficult  and  unhealthy  working conditions 
"Endeavours  should be  made  to frame  appropriate regulations  in respect  of the 
special conditions associated with difficult or unhealthy  work.  In the arrange-
ment  of  working  hours  allowance  should be  made  for  extra fatigue  due to the 
difficult  or  unhealthy  character of  certain workings,  particularly those where 
the temperature is unusually high." 
- No  application will be  made  of  parts of  the following  Recommendations: 
16)  8,  page  116,  Conference  Report 
Responsibility for  reception 
(For text see  above  under  III a)  8) 114 
17)  11,  page  104,  Conference  Report 
Practical reception methods:  organization 
"Finally,  the enterprise must  have  a  reception department  for both native and 
foreign workers,  in order to establish a  welcoming  atmosphere,  and to facilitate 
the adaptation of. the newcomers  to their new  living and  working  conditions. 
This  department  must  help the men  with the necessary  engagement  formalities, 
see that  they  become  properly familiar with  the colliery,  and  continue to  look 
after them during the  period of  adaptation." 
18  - 19)  12  and  13,  pages  104  and  105,  Conference Report 
Practical reception methods:  facilities 
"12  - The  process  of  acquainting the  newcomers  with the set-up and  working  of  the 
enterprise,  carried out  by  the methodical  employment  of  appropriate measures, 
is more  effective if it is arranged with the assistance of  senior workers.  In 
the case of  foreign  workers,  all necessary action should  be  taken to dispose 
of  language difficulties and to facilitate the psychological  and social adjust-
ment  of  the men  concerned to their new  living and  working  conditions  and  sur-
roundings. 
To this end the reception department  should  provide  the  newcomers  with  informa-
tion,  in a  language they  understand,  on  the collieries,  the workers'  organiza-
tions and  the conditions regarding work  and  particularly,  safety,  and  should 
establish contact  with the services dealing with the workers,  especially the 
social services.  Workers  speaking a  language other than that  of their future 
environment  should be  received by  representatives able to understand them  and 
make  themselves  understood  by  them." 
"13  - Adaptation to work at  the colliery is a  process  extending over  a  certain 
period of  time,  lasting anything  from  a  few  weeks  to several months,  during 
which  the reception department  should maintain contact  with the  newcomers  in 
order to give  them all necessary assistance,  for  instance by  visiting them  and 
arranging meetings  for  them.  During the  same  period,  the departments  with which 
the newcomers  are  in contact,  and  particularly the social services,  should take 
up  and  extend the work  of  the reception department.  Finally,  in the department 
to which  he  is ultimately  appointed,  the newcomer's  superiors and  fellow-workers 
should give  him whatever  help he  needs  and  a  welcome  which will make  it easier 
for  him to settle down  well to his job." 
- The  following  Recommendation  has  been referred back to the Safety  Commission 
for  check and  amplification: 
20)  25,  page  118,  Conference  Report 
Training 
"The  Trade  Unions  should be  associated with the organization of  vocational 
training." 
c)  Belgium 
In  14  cases the Recommendations  have  not  yet  been  implemented:  this applies 
in detail to 8  Recommendations  which  are still being checked  (E),  5  Recommendations 
which  are still partly being  checked  (CE)  and  1  Recommendation  in respect  of  which 
there is still uncertainty  (?). 
- The  following  Recommendations  are still being examined: 
1)  3,  page  107,  Conference Report 
Aims  and  objects  of  medical  and  psychological examination 
(For  text  see  above  under  III b)  5) 115 
2)  6,  pages ,107/108,  Conference  Report 
Medical  and  psychological services 
(For  text  see  above  under  III  b)  7) 
3)  7,  page  108,  Conference  Report 
Medical  and  psychological services 
"The medical practitioners and  psychologists  concerned  must  have  full profes-
sional  independence  and full responsibility  in conducting their examinations 
and  making  diagnoses.  They  must  be  given  every  facility for calling in special-
ists in doubtful  cases,  while the employer  must  retain full responsibility as 
to whether  or  not  he  engages  an  applicant  on  the basis of  the fitness  grading 
certified by  the medical practitioner and  psychologist." 
4  - 6)  9  and  10,  sentences  1  and  2,  and  3  and  4,  pages  108/109,  Conference Report 
Practical methods  of  medical  and  psychological supervision 
"In the case  of  juvenile workers,  special attention must  be  given to their 
regular supervision,  with the object  of watching their physical development  and 
assessing their adaptability to conditions  in the pit.  They  should be  re-examined 
at  least  once  a  year. 
In the case  of  adult  workers,  all personnel  should be  re-examined at  regular 
intervals,  with particularly frequent  and  systematic  checks  on  those  employed 
on  strenuous,  dangerous  or unhealthy  work,  and  on  any  men  of  weakly  constitution, 
in bad  health or  showing  predisposition to illness.  All transfers or  promotions 
involving an  appreciable  change  in working habits must  be  preceded  by  re-examina-
tion to detect  any  contra-indications and help to ensure that  the subject will 
be  put  on  to work  suited to him.  If any  contra-indication  as  regards under-
ground  work  is found,  the worker  must  be  given more  suitable work,  so far as 
possible at  the  same  colliery.  In carrying out  this medical  supervision,  the 
doctor  should take  into account  the conditions under  which the  man  has  to work." 
7  - 8)  2  and  3,  pages  110/111,  Conference Report 
Methods  of  observing and  assessing  individual miners  at  work 
(For  text  of  para.  2,  see  above  under  III a)  3) 
"3  - In the course  of their regular duties,  the managerial  and  supervisory staff 
have  the opportunity  of  keeping  a  constant  check  on  whether the  men  are properly 
placed in,  and  adapted to,  their jobs.  Their attention should,  therefore,  be 
drawn to this aspect  of  their responsibilities,  in order that  they  may  make  any 
suggestions they  consider necessary as to the transfer of  men  to more  suitable 
work  or further  vocational training." 
- The  following  Recommendations  are still partly being  examined: 
9)  1  - Paras.  2,  3  and  4,  page  106,  Conference  Report 
Medical  and  psychological  examination  - Medical  and  psychological supervision 
"Medical examination  of  mine-workers  prior to their engagement  and to any  impor-
tant  change  of  job should  be  made  compulsory,  such  examination to be  supplemented 
if necessary  by  a  psychotechnical or equivalent  examination  in respect  of  jobs 
calling for special physical and/or  psychical qualities. 
The  examination should  be  carried out  by  a  specially-appointed medical practi-
tioner possessing the requisite qualifications and  working  in conditions which 
make  it possible for  him to perform his duties entirely on his  own  responsibility 
and  in complete  independence.  In the case  of  mass  recruitment  of  foreign workers, 
a  thorough medical  examination should be carried out  prior to departure  from  the 
country  of  origin. 116 
In addition,  the Governments  should  encourage the establishment  and  extension 
of  colliery :.1edical services,  and  more  particularly of  arrangements  adapted to 
the working  conditions  in mines  for  giving first  aid quickly to workers  injured 
in the course  of  their work." 
10)  1  - Para.  5,_  l~t  sentence,  page  106,  Conference  Report 
(For  text  see  ~bove under  Ill b)  2) 
11)  4,  page  107,  Conference  Report 
Entrants undergoing medical  and  psychological  examination 
(For  text  see  above  under  Ill a)  1) 
12)  5,  page  107,  Conference  Report 
Medical  and  psychological services 
(For text  see  above  under  III  b)  6) 
13)  8,  page  108,  Conference Report 
Aims  and  objects of  medical  and  psychological supervision 
(For  text  see  above  under  III  b)  3) 
- There  is still uncertainty with  regard to the  implementation of  the following 
Recommendation: 
14)  1  - Para.  1,  page  106,  Conference  Report 
Medical  and  psychological examination 
(For  text  see  above  under  III  b)  1) 
d)  France 
All  74  Recomme~dations have  been  implemented,  either by  means  of  regulations 
or  laws,  or  de  facto  •. Under  the heading  ''Medical  and  psychological examination-
Medical  and  psychological supervision"  which  covers  a  total of  14  Recommendations, 
it is additionally pointed out  that  these regulations are very  largely carried out 
in practice in France  in medical  examination and  supervision,  but that  the psycho-
logical examination and  supervision is applied only  to clearly-defined categories 
of  staff whose  activities are of  considerable  importance  in connection with safety. 
e)  Italy 
Of  the  74  Recommendations,  18  have  been  implemented hitherto;  of  the  56 
Recommendations  not  yet  implemented,  47  are still being examined  (E),  8  will not 
be  applied  (A)  and  there is still uncertainty about  1  Recommendation  (?).  In the 
introduction it is stated that  in the  8  cases where  Recommendations will not  be 
applied,  this covers texts dealing with the  problems  of  foreign workers,  a  question 
which  does  not  arise in the Italian mining  industry. 
- The  following  Recommendations  are still being  examined: 
1  - 2)  Pages  103/104,  Conference Report 
Practical reception methods:  organization 
"10 - In the country  of  employment,  it is necessary to organize "reception cen-
tres",  with responsibility mainly for  helping the migrant  workers  over the ini-
tial stages and  channelling them forthwith to the reception departments  of the 
collieries.  Where  no  such  reception centres exist,  the enterprises concerned 
must  start their reception work  from the moment  entrants  coming  from  a  distance 117 
first arrive at  the station,  to ensure that  they  and their families are  given 
all the assistance they  may  need  to enable  them to settle in." 
11  ~  (For  text  see  above  under  III  b)  17) 
3  - 6)  1  - Para.  1,  page  106;  Paras.  2,  3  and  4,  page  106;  Para.  5,  1st sentence, 
page  106;  Para.  5,  2nd  sentence,  page  106,  Conference Report 
Medical  and  psychological  examination  and  supervision 
(For  text  see  above  under  Ill b)  1);  III  c)  9);  III  b)  2)  and  III  b)  4) 
7)  3,  page  107,  Conference  Report 
Aims  and  objects  of  medical  and  psychological  examination 
(For text  see  above  under  Ill b)  5) 
8)  4,  page  107,  Conference  Report 
Entrants undergoing medical  and  psychological examination 
(Fo~ text  see  above  under  Ill a)  1) 
9  - 11)  5  to 7,  pages  107/108,  Conference  Report 
Medical  and  psychological supervision 
(For text  see  above  under  III  b)  6);  III  b)  7)  and  III  c)  3) 
12  - 13)  2  and  3,  pages  110/111,  Conference  Report 
Methods  of  observing and  assessing  individual miners  at  work 
(For text  see  above  under  Ill a)  3)  and  III  c)  8) 
14  - 15)  1  and  2,  2nd  paragraph,  page  112,  Conference  Report 
Vocational training - Aims  and  objects of  general  recommendation 
Each  individual must  be  given training appropriate to the job assigned to him. 
All  vocational-training schemes  must  take due  account  of  safety requirements. 
16- 19) 4- Para.  2;  Para.  3;  Para.  4  and  Para.  5,  pages  112/113,  Conference 
Report 
Training requirements 
The  training must  be  based  on  systematic,  carefully-adapted training scheme. 
The  instructors must  be specially trained,  employed full time  on teaching and 
not  connected with the production side. 
The  instructional facilities and  equipment  must  make  it possible to provide 
instruction in progressive stages. 
The  systems  and  methods  of  vocational training should be  based  on the general 
principles set  forth  in Resolutions  Nos.  13  and  46  adopted  by  the Coal  Mines 
Committee  of the  International  Labour  Organization at  it"s  Second  and  Sixth 
Sessions. 118 
20 - 21)  8  and 9,  page  114,  Conference  Report 
Full systematic training of  juveniles 
The  systematic training must  be  provided for  a  minimum  period in  specialized 
apprenticeship centres. 
Every  colliery should  have facilities for apprentice training providing three 
years'  training for the boys.  On  the  completion of  the apprenticeship a  trainee 
should be  given a  proficiency certificate;  the boys  should be  formed  into 
groups  from  time  to time to  und~rgo further training. 
22)  10,  page  114,  Conference Report 
Shortened training for  juvenile workers 
(For text  see  above  under  III b)  8) 
23  - 27)  12,  2nd  sentence,  page  115;  13,  page  115;  14,  page  115:  15  and  16,  page 
116,  Conference  Report 
Intensified training of  adults 
"The  instructors must  be  full-time specialists and  must  not  have  anything to 
do with the  production side." 
(For text  of  13  to 16  see  above  under  III b)  9)  to 12) 
28  - 29)  17  -Paras. 1  and  17  - Paras.  2  and  3,  page  116,  Conference Report 
Training of  specialists 
"As  regards electricians,  locomotive-drivers  and all other  personnel with 
collective responsibilities,  or  engaged  on especially responsible work,  the 
"worker-and-mate"  training system should be  forbidden,  and  appointment  to such 
jobs should be subject  to selection for ability. 
Shotfirers must  be  given  adequate  and  systematic vocational training.  Such 
training should carry  a  certificate valid for  a  specified period only,  and 
should be  repeated at regular intervals. 
Training and  retraining in shotfiring should also be  provided for  the super-
visory staff  immediately  concerned." 
30- 33)  18,  19,  20 and  21,  page  117,  Conference  Report 
Training of  managerial staff,  with special reference to supervisory  personnel 
A considerable proportion of their training should be  aimed  at_  ensuring that 
they  are thoroughly familiar with the safety regulations and  accident-preven-
tion measures. 
The training and further training of  the supervisory  personnel should therefore 
give special attention to preparing the supervising staff to take their full 
share of  responsibility in the  leadership and safety. 
Appointments to the supervisory staff should be  possible only  upon  completion 
of  a  course of special training.  A certificate of  proficiency  should be  con-
ferred  upon  completion of  the supervisor's training. 
Promotion to the higher  grades of the supervisory staff must  be  preceded by 
special advanced training;  training-centres must  be set up  for the higher 
supervisory  appointments. 119 
34  - 36)  22,  23  and  24,  last  sentence,  page  118,  Conference Report 
Training of  instructors 
Training of  instructors can  only  be  provided effectively by  specially-selected 
staff trained in the use  of  instructional methods  suitable for  teaching coal-
mining  subjects. 
The  instructors must  be  given special training for their duties by  highly-
qualified teachers. 
Establishment  of  an  instructors'  training centre. 
37)  25,  page  118,  Conference Report 
(For  text  see  above  under  III  b)  20) 
38)  4,  page  11~,  Conference  Report 
Physical aspects  of  the  environment 
{For  text  see  above  under  III  b)  14) 
39)  5,  page  125,  Conference  Report 
Method  of  payment  of  supervisory staff 
''The  pay  of  the supervisory staff should be  fixed  in such  a  manner  as to enable 
them to bear their full share of responsibility regarding safety without  suf-
fering  any  disadvantage  in regard to their wages.'' 
40)  7,  page  125,  Conference  Report 
Method  of  payment  of shotfirers 
"In a  number  of  countries shotfirers are not  paid at  piece rates.  Shotfirers 
should  have  a  financial  interest  in seeing that shotfiring is carried out  in 
accordance with safety regulations,  and their position of responsibility in 
regard to safety should be  duly  remunerated". 
41)  9  a,  sentences  1  and  2,  page  126,  Conference  Report 
Piece  work 
"When  he is paid at  piece rates,  the worker  must  be  able to take all necessary 
safety precautions without  thereby  incurring any  loss  in wages.  The  piece rate 
paid must  therefore allow for the time  taken  up  by  safety duties carried out 
in accordance with  regulations~  In order to facilitate this for all concerned, 
the Conference  recommends  the High  Authority to prepare  a  comparative survey 
of  methods  now  used  in the various  member  countries to make  allowance for 
safety duties  in the calculation of  piece rates." 
42- 44)  9  d,  para.  2;  10 and  11,  pages  126/127,  Conference Report 
Piece work  rates 
"In all cases where  those employed  on  piece work  include a  considerable pro-
portion of  foreign workers,  special care should be  taken to ensure that the 
latter are suitably represented at  such discussions. 
It is recognized that  piece work necessitates particular alertness to safety 
on the part  of the supervisory staff. The  training and  rates of  pay  of  the 
supervisory staff should  be specially fixed to  allo~ for this. 
Where  one  of  the men  is given special responsibilities for  a  team  in regard 
to safety,  the piece rates paid him must  make  allowance  for the time  he  has 
to spend  on safety duties. 120 
It is,  in particular,  essential that  only  men  who  have  undergone  adequate 
vocational trai.ning should be  put  on  piece work." 
45)  8,  page  130,  Conference Report 
Difficult  and  unhealthy working  conditions 
(For text  see  above  under  III b)  15) 
46  - 47)  5  and  6,  pages  131/132,  Conference  Report 
Measures  against  alcoholism 
"The  measures  already  adopted to combat  alcoholism should be  kept  up.  Enter-
prises are  recommended  to provide their personnel with healthy drinks." 
Housing 
"All miners  should be  housed within  a  reasonable distance from their work,  in 
accommodation  adequate to their requirements  and  those  of  their families. 
Social amenities  (shopping,  educational,  cultural and religious facilities) 
should be  provided in proportion to the size of  the population.  Housing  should 
be  allocated  on  as practical  a  basis as  possible,  with the object  of  integrating 
miners'  families  into the  population of  the area as  a  whole. 
For unmarried workers  specially-adapted hostels  should be  provided,  equipped 
with suitable educational  and  cultural facilities. 
Migrant  workers  should be  enabled to find suitable accomodation  fairly quickly." 
48)  12,  page  104,  Conference  Report 
Practical reception methods:  facilities 
(For  text  see above  under  III  b)  18) 
49  - 55)  9,  10 a,  b,  c,  d,  e  and  f,  page  123,  Conference  Report 
Problems  in connection with  foreign workers 
"9  - Wherever  foreign workers  are  employed  in coal-mining they  should be  given 
the opportunity to acquire  an  adequate  knowledge  of  the  language  of  the country 
in which  they  are working.  Such  knowledge  affects safety,  inasmuch  as it pelps 
to prevent  misunderstandings  between  one  miner  and  another  and  between miners 
and  supervisory staff." 
"10 a  - (For  text  see  above  under  III a)  4)" 
"10 b  - On  every shift  on  which  foreign workers  are  employed there should be 
at  least  one  interpreter available,  for  so long as they are not  able to make 
themselves  properly understood  in the  language  of  the country." 
"10  c  and  d  - (For  text  see  above  under  III a)  5  and 6)" 
"10  e  - The  enterprises must  provide foreign workers  with translations of the 
safety and  operational rules  and  regulations free  of  charge." 
"10  f  - It is further  recommended  that  the enterprises should  provide  foreign 
workers  with translations of  all other·technical documents  of  value  in connec-
tion with their further training." 
56)  7,  page  102,  Conference  Report 
Reception  of  new  workers  - Responsibility for  reception 
(For text  see above  under  III a)  7) 121 
f)  Netherlands 
The  Netherlands  Mines  Inspectorate have  implemented all Recommendations 
regarding  human  factors. 123 
C H A P  T  E  R  T  H R E E 
IMPLEMENTATIONS  OF  RECOMMENDATIONS 
OF  THE  MINES  SAFETY  COMMISSION 125 
-The  Recommendations,  assessments,  principles and  reports  prepared by  the 
Mines  Safety  Commission  since the beginning of its activities and distributed to the 
Governments  and  other interested bodies  in accordance with its terms  of  reference, 
for further  action or for  information,  can usefully be classified in two  groups 
according to their implementation  in time: 
- Recommendations  published  in the First and  Second  Reports  of  the  Mines  Safety 
Commission,  and 
- Recommendations  discussed in the present Third Report,  the full text  being given 
in appendices to this Report. 126 
A.- SURVEY  ON  MEASURES  BASED  ON  RECOMMENDATIONS 
OF  THE  FIRST  AND  SECOND  REPORTS 
The  survey  which  follows  shows  the position on  1st  January  1966,  based on 
reports  by  Governments  to the Safety  Commission.  From this tabulation it is possible 
to read  off easily,  without  reference to any  other  documents,  what  action has been 
taken  on  the Recommendations  of  the  Conference  embodied  in the First and  Second 
Reports  of  the  Mines  Safety  Commission.  In the  present  Report  the tables contain the 
text  of  the Recommendations  (virtually unabridged),  and the  present  position can be 
read off  by  means  of  the  key  to the symbols,  given  in Section B  below. 
Since this survey  (like that  further  below  in Section  C  II)  gives for  the 
first time  information as at  1st  January  1966,  it would  be  premature to make  any 
comments  in detail;  such  comments  will be  reserved for  one  of  the future  reports. 
This will allow for  a  certain preparatory  period before  implementation of  the  recom-
mendations,  especially those  issued  in recent  years. 
Nevertheless,  the reader will be  able to see that  the Recommendations  listed 
in the following  survey  have,  for the  m~st part,  been  implemented,  while the studies 
with  a  view to formulating  new  regulations  have  been finished  in almost  every  instance. 
In the small  number  of  cases  where  the authorities have  abstained  from 
applying the regulations,  the reason is in each  case  given  in  a  footnote. 
The  following  symbols  are used  in the tables: 
C  The  national regulations are already  in accordance with the  Recommendations 
C'  The  Recommendations  have  not  been  embodied  in regulations,  but  have  been 
implemented  de  facto 
NRC  New  regulations  in accordance with the Recommendations  have  been  drawn  up 
and  issued 
NRP  The  preparation of  new  regulations  in accordance with the Recommendations  is 
in hand 
EOP  The  national authorities consider that the Recommendations  require re-examina-
tion by  the  Commission 
E  The  preparation of  new  regulations is being studied 
?  There  is uncertainty regarding the steps to be  taken 
A  The  national authorities have  abstained from  bringing their regulations into 
line with the Recommendations. 127 
Regular  report  on  the  implementation 
of  the  Conference's  Recommendations 
I.  TECHNICAL  ASPECTS 
Recommendations  by  the Commission 
A - ELECTRIFICATION 
I  - Recommendations  regarding elimination 
of oil from  underground electrical 
equipment  (1st  Report  of  Safety  Com-
mission,  p.  7  (German  text)). 
2a  - Resistances installed under-
ground  should not  contain any 
combustible oil.  (Exceptions are 
allowed  for  the starting-up 
resistances of  large motors 
N.R./Wph. 
1.1. 
1966 
driving water  pumps).  C 
Saar 
1.1. 
1966 
NRP 
Belgium 
1.1. 
1966 
NRP 
France 
1.1. 
1966 
E 
Italy 
~.1. 
966 
c' 
Nether-
lands 
1.1. 
;1966 
c 
~--+---+---~---r---+---+--~----r---+---+---~--~ 
b  - Condensers  and  transformers 
installed underground  must  not 
contain either combustible oil, 
or dielectric substances which 
can give off noxious  gases.  C  NRP  NRP  E  c'  NRP 
~---r----~---r--~~--~--~~~4---~~--4----4----+---~ 
Otherwise effective measures 
should  be  taken against  the 
dangers  to workers  caused  by  the 
use  of  these devices.  C 
c  - Switches  and  relays,  used under-
ground  and  operating  on  voltages 
below  1,100 V,  must  not  contain 
any  flammable  oils.  C 
d  - Protection of workers against 
dangers  involved in the use  of 
switches  and  relays,  which  work 
on voltages  above  1,100 V and 
contain  flammable  oil. 
3.  - Recommendation  to continue 
r-esearch  into the  manufacture 
of  low-oil  or oil-less HT 
Switchgear  and  protective relays 
which  can  give riskfree service 
in gassy pits. 
- Recommendation  to begin 
detailed investigation into 
the  degree  of  increased safety 
which  can  be  achieved,  with 
the  intention of  pres~ribing 
an explosion-proof  housing 
only  for  normally  spark-pro-
ducing  components,  and  a 
design of  the  "increased 
safety"  type  for all other 
equipment. 
c 
c 
NRP 
c 
_(2) 
_(2) 
(1)  cannot  be  laid down  in inspectorate regulations. 
(2)  not  applicable. 
NRP 
NRP 
NRP 
c' (3) 
f"' (3) 
~ 
c' 
C'+ 
NRP 
c' 
C'+ 
NRP 
IE<4> 
c'  NRP 
c'  NRP 
_(1)  c 
_(2'  NRP 
c'  NRP 
(3)  devices with  satisfactory characteristics exist;  the conditions of application must  be 
specified. 
(4)  approval  regulations have  been  issued for  equipment  in the  "increased safety" category.  but 
the  type of protection is left to the  individual  firms. Recommendations  by  the Commission 
128 
N.R./Wph. 
1.1. 
1966 
4.  - Extending  the use of  low-oil or 
oil-less HT  switchgear and oil-
less HT  protective relays at 
points where there is no  gas 
risk.  A(l) 
II - Recommendations  for  Shotfiring Leads 
(Second  Rept.  of  Safety  Commission, 
p.  10). 
2.  - Recommendations  for all Shot-
firing  Leads 
- Every  conductor  must  be pro-
vided with at least  one  good-
quality  insulation. 
- All  connections must  be  pro-
perly insulated. 
- Every  shotfiring lead must 
have  the appropriate  degree 
of flexibility. 
- The  conductors must  be  of 
such  c~oss-sectional area 
that they  do  not  occasion an 
excessive voltage drop. 
- The  shotfiring leads must  be 
made  up  and  laid so that  the 
risk of any  fault  current  -
resulting from contact with 
metal  objects - is reduced. 
- Before  any  shotfiring opera-
tion in particular workings 
and  before the simultaneous 
firing of  a  fairly  large num-
ber of  shots,  the ohmic  re-
sistance of  the circuit must 
be  measured. 
a  - Temporary  shotfiring leads 
- Careful  inspection before 
each firing. 
- Regular  and  thorough  testing 
by  an  expert either at  the 
surface or  in an underground 
workshop. 
A thorough checking must 
consist of at least: 
- a  careful  inspection of  the 
lead over its whole  length; 
- measurement  of the  insula-
tion between the  two  conduc-
tors,  if the  lead consists 
of  a  cable  or  rubber-covered 
lead; 
c 
c 
c 
c 
c 
c 
c 
c 
c 
c 
Saar 
1.1. 
1966 
c 
c 
c 
c 
c 
c 
c 
c 
c 
c 
c 
Belgium 
1.1. 
1966 
(2) 
NRP 
NRC 
NRC 
NRC 
NRC 
NRC 
NRC 
NRC 
NRC 
NRC 
NRC 
France 
1.1. 
1966 
C'+ 
NR~ 
c 
c 
c' 
c' 
c 
c 
c 
c 
c 
c 
Italy 
.1. 
966 
c' 
NRP 
NRP 
NRP 
NRP 
c 
c 
c' 
E 
E 
E 
Nether-
lands 
1.1. 
1966 
E 
c 
c 
c 
C'+ 
NRP 
NRP 
+ c 
c 
c' 
c' 
c' 
+  E 
c' 
----+--~~--+----r--~----~--~--~----~--~---r----1 
- measurement  of the  ohmic 
resistance of the  lead.  c 
(1)  = cannot  be  laid down  in inspectorate regulations. 
c 
(2)  = with regard to the approval  of  high-voltage switches. 
NRC  c  E  c Recommendations  by  the Commission 
b  - Permanent  shotfiring leads 
- Regular  and  thorough  checks 
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N.R./Wph. 
1.1. 
1966 
Saar 
1.1. 
1966 
c 
Belgium 
1.1. 
1966 
NRC 
France 
1.1. 
1966 
c 
Italy 
.1. 
~966 
c' 
Nether-
lands 
1.1. 
~966 
by  an expert.  C 
~--+---+---~--~---+---4--~~--~--+---+---4---~ 
- Written record of every  thor-
ough  check,  with the date.  A  (l),  c  NRC  c'  E  _(2 
~--+---+---~--~---+---4--~~--~--+---+---4---~ 
3.  - Further  Recommendations  for 
Permanent  and  Temporary  Shot-
firing  Leads  used in Gassy 
~· 
- The  shotfiring leads must  ful-
fil conditions which  ensure 
sufficient safety,  with regard 
to: 
a  - mechanical  strength and  in par-
ticular tensile strength;  bend-
ing  and abrasion strength; 
b  - electrical insulation; 
c 
c 
c  NRC  c'  NRP  C+C' 
c  NRC  c'  NRP  C+C' 
c  - impermeability  (to moisture)  of  C'+ 
the insulation and  the  sheathing.r-C-;----+-C--~---4-N_R_C~---4--c--'+---~N_R_P-4----~N_R_P-4----I 
- Recommendation that  checking 
standards which  correspond to 
the conditions be  laid down. 
4.  - Supplementary  Recommendations 
for  Permanent  Shotfiring Leads 
used  in Gassy Pits. 
- Permanent  leads should  be  so 
arranged that,  as far  as 
possible,  damage  during  firing 
of the shots or  from  other 
c  c  NRC 
1----+----1---+----l---------
causes is avoided.  C  c  NRC 
_(2  NRP  E 
c'  c' 
r---+---4---~--~---+---4--~~--+---+---4---~--~ 
- If the shotfiring lead con-
sists of  two  separate  conduc-
tors,  these should be arranged 
sufficiently far apart  and  in 
such  a  way  that  inspection is 
CE  NRC  c'  c'  - (2)  possible.  C 
r---+---;---~--~---+--~--~~--+---+---4---~--~ 
- In shafts and dipping  roads, 
the  leads  must  have  an adequatE 
c  NRC  c  c  c'  mechanical strength.  C 
~-1---+---+---r--4---+---~~~-4---+--~--4 
III - Recommendations  regarding the protec-
tion of underground distribution net-
works  against the  danger  of  causing 
electric shocks.  (Second  Report  of 
the  Safety Commission,  p.  13) 
I  - The  following  recommendations 
refer only to the MT  networks 
defined below:  Medium  tension 
(MT):  The  normal  voltage range 
for working  equipment  used under-
ground with three-phase A.c. 
(between 380 and  1,100 V).  These 
networks  should fulfil all the 
recommendations  set  out  below. 
(1)  seems unnecessary  and would  increase administrative work. 
(2)  not  applicable. Recommendations  by  the Commission 
These  recommendations  refer 
neither  to the  HT  networks,  nor 
to voltages which are  lower  than 
the medium-tension  range  and  are 
used  for particular purposes 
(lighting,  drilling apparatus, 
telephone installations,  etc.). 
II  - Protection against  the risk of 
electric shocks. 
A.  First order precautions 
(Protection against  direct 
contact with  a  live phase) 
1.  Every  chance  contact with 
a  live phase  should  be 
avoided as  far  as possible, 
by  laying the  conductor 
out  of  the workmen's  reach, 
by  interposing effective 
barriers or  even  by  sheath-
ing  the phase or  by  insu-
130 
N.R./Wph. 
1.1. 
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Saar 
1.1. 
1966 
c 
Belgium 
1.1. 
1966 
c 
France 
1.1. 
1966 
c 
Italy 
.1. 
966 
c 
Nether-
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1.1. 
1966 
c  lating it.  C 
r---+---~--~---r---+--~--~~--+---+---4---4---~ 
2.  The  cables  and  leads used 
in medium-tension under-
ground  networks  should  be 
protected either by  means 
of  a  metal  armouring  con-
nected to the pilot  lead, 
or  given mechanical  pro-
tection by  a  flexible  en-
velope of  the best  possible 
design.  C  c  c  c  c 
c + 
NRP 
r----r----r----r----r---~--~r---~----r---~--~~--4----4 
- Leads without  metal 
armouring  must  be  elec-
trically protected  by 
separate  or  common  pro-
tective screens,  which 
trip safety devices  in 
the  event  of  a  fault.  C(l) 
3.  Only  trained men  should  be 
allowed to open the hous-
ings of accessible  live 
parts  (medium-tension volt-
age  range)  and this only 
under  conditions which  have 
been clearly laid down  in 
advance.  C 
4.  The  repair and  maintenance 
of  the electrical equipment 
should be entrusted only to 
trained personnel.  C 
B.  Second  order precautions 
(Potential connection between 
conductive parts of  the 
installation) 
1.  All underground  networks 
must  be provided with  an 
equipotential connection 
between the conductive  (not 
live in normal  operation) 
(1)  in the case of  new  cables. 
c 
c 
c 
c  c  c  NRP 
c  c  c  c 
c  c  c  c 131 
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components  of  the  installa-
tion and  the other metal 
elements  connected thereto, 
such  that its conductance 
is sufficient to prevent 
the occurrence,  between  any 
two  points accessible to a 
workman  simultaneously,  of 
a  voltage higher than the 
weak  voltage.  c  c  c  c  c  NRP 
2.  This  equipotential  connec-
tion  (protective lead)  must 
ensure electric connection 
between the conductive ele-
ments  of the installation 
over the whole  length of 
the  network.  It must  be 
maintained in satisfactory 
condition and  must  be  in-
spected as often as is 
necessary to ensure this.  c  c  c  c  c  NRP 
3.  The  above-mentioned equi-
potential connection  (pro-
tective lead)  must  be 
earthed to at least one 
point  of  the  network  via 
an earth connection of the 
lowest possible resistance.  c  c  c  c  c  NRP 
4.  This earth connection must 
be  combined with the star-
point  earth connection,  if 
a  star-point is employed.  c  c  c  NRP  c'  NRP 
c.  Third order 2recautions 
(Reduction of fault  duration). 
1.  Any  fault  current  must  be 
considered dangerous  in 
underground medium-tension 
networks if - when  the 
fault  current  flows  thro~gh 
the protective lead and 
connected conductive  compo-
nents of the installation 
or earth - there is pro-
duced  between  any  two 
points accessible to a 
workman  simultaneously  a 
voltage exceeding the  level 
of  a  weak voltage,  regard-
less of whether it occurs 
only between parts of the 
installation or between  NRP 
such parts and earth.  c  c  c  + c'  E  c 
2.  If the star-Eoint of  a  net-
work is earthed via a  weak 
imEedance  or without anl 
imEedance,  so that the Ere-
sumed  fault  current is not 
restricted to a  low  value, 
then the  network must  be 
provided with safety de-
vices which  can at any  time 
automatically isolate the 
damaged  section of  the net-
work  from  the current 
source  (or render it com-
pletely dead),  before the 
fault  current  flowing 
through the protective lead 
and  connected conductive Recommendations  by the Commission 
components  of  the  installa-
tion or earth reach  a  dan-
gerous  value. 
- Since  the  complete  or 
partial cutting-off of  a 
line voltage  can have 
serious effects on  the 
current  supply  to  impor-
tant  equipment,  suitable 
preventive measures 
should  be  taken. 
- Only  when  the  line has 
been repaired or  the 
fault  eliminated,  or  at 
the direction of  a  spe-
cialist who  has  taken all 
necessary precautions, 
may  that  section of  the 
network  be brought  under 
voltage  again. 
3.  If the  star-point  of  a  net-
work  is insulated or  earth-
ed via  some  impedance, 
which  restricts fault  cur-
rents to a  low  value,  the 
network  must  be  fitted 
with  supervising devices 
which  are  always  in a  state 
of readiness  and which  are 
suitable: 
a  - either to check  the 
insulation-or-the vari-
ous  parts of  the  net-
work  and  to  indicate 
any  damage  they  may 
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have  suffered or  C 
- automatically to cut 
off the  damaged  section 
of  the  network  from  its 
source  of  current  (~ 
render  the entire net-
work  dead). 
- If  no  automatic out-
off device is installed, 
the responsibility  for 
cutting-off should  be 
entrusted to an  expert 
man,  who  can  intervene 
as  soon  as  the warning 
signal of  the  super-
visory  system is tripped 
or  the  fault  assumes 
_(2) 
major  dimensions.  C 
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- If cutting-off has  been 
necessitated by  one  of 
the  two  cases cited 
above,  the restoration 
of  current  may  be  ac-
cepted only after repair 
of  the  line or  elimina-
tion of  the  fault  only 
at the direction of  an 
expert  official,  who 
has  taken all necessary 
precautions.  c  c 
(1)  not  applicable,  as  only  insulated circuits are used. 
(2)  not  applicable. 
NRP  NRP  E  c Recommendations  by the Commission 
- If no  automatic cut-off 
device is installed the 
rubber-covered  leads  of 
mobile  machines  must  be 
fitted with  an  automa-
tic device which  ren-
ders  them  dead  as  soon 
as  there occurs  a  fault 
current which  is caused 
by  damage  to the  exter-
nal  installation or  by 
damage  of the  insula-
tion to an  individual 
phase; 
b  - or  automatically to ~ 
off the  damaged  section 
~the network  from  its 
current  source  (or  ren-
der  the entire network 
dead),  as  soon  as  a 
dOUble  fault  occurs 
leading to a  dangerous 
fault  current  in the 
protective  lead  and 
connected parts of  the 
installation. 
- In this instance the 
current  may  be  switched 
on  again  only  after the 
133 
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or  the fault  eliminated.  _(l 
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NRP 
N.B.  The  comments  on  this 
Recommendation  are giv-
en  in the  Second  Report 
of  the  Mines  Safety 
Commission,  pp.  16/23. 
B  - MECHANIZATION  AND 
LOCOMOTIVES 
I  - Recommendations  regarding  locomotive 
equipment.  (First report  of the 
Safety Commission,  p.  20 (German text)). 
1.  - New  locomotives  must  be  equipped 
with  fixed,  rigid cabins which 
at all times  give  the driver  a 
clear view  along the  roadway, 
ahead  and  behind,  without  any 
need  for  him to put  his  head  out 
of  the  cabin.  (Fixed cabins are 
understood to cover  those  forming 
a  part  of  the structure or which 
can be  removed  only  laboriously 
with special tools). 
2.  - The  locos  in service must  be 
modified to meet  this require-
ment. 
(1)  not  applicable. 
(~('3) 
C  A 
c 
~2)C3) 
C  A 
c 
NRP 
NRP 
(4) (5) 
C E 
E 
c  c 
c  A 
(2)  in the  case  of  main-road  locos,  with  the  exception of  "a clear view  behind",  which  is 
difficult technically. 
(3)  no  application made  to gateroad  locos  because  the risk of accident  is increased. 
(4)  for  trolley  locos. 
(5)  for  other than trolley  locos. 134 
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- locos which cannot  be  modified 
should gradually be withdrawn 
from service,  within a  period 
to be  fixed by  the responsible 
1.1. 
1966 
Inspectorate.  C 
- only to be used  in roadways 
which are wide  and  high  enough 
to eliminate accident risk.  C 
3.  - For  particular types of  loco or 
in certain circumstances the 
responsible  Inspectorate can 
grant  exceptions from  the above 
regulations in special cases of 
application,  provided that safe-
ty regulations of  equal strin-
gency  are laid down.  C 
II - Recommendations regarding  the neutra-
lization of  Diesel-engine exhaust 
fumes  (First Report  of  the  Safety 
Commission,  p.  23  (German  text)l. 
- General  use  of better starters. 
- Intensified research into  improv-
ing combustion  by  the use of cata-
lysts. 
c 
- Informing  mining enterprises regard-_(3) 
ing  the existence  of  this process. 
- Continuation of the research  into 
an automatic transmission system, 
which would  make  it possible to 
give  Diesel engines a  constant  rpm. 
Subsequent  resumption of trials 
with the  Houdry  carbon monoxide 
purification process.  A(4) 
C - FIRES  AND  UNDERGROUND 
COMBUSTION 
I  - Recommendations  regarding eguipment 
for  shafts in connection with the 
prevention of fires.  (First Report 
of  the Safetl Commission,  p.  11 
(German  text).~ 
2.  - Steps to prevent  any  accumula-
tion of grease and  coaldust 
(First Report  of  the s.c.  p.  15 
(German  text)  and  Report  of the 
Conference,  p.  54,  No.  2,  para. 
c.) 
- Skip-winding  installations 
should as  far  as possible be 
sited only  in upcast  shafts;  c' 
- Equipment  in new  shafts should 
be  of  aerodynamic  form.  c' 
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- all suitable steps should 
be  taken to avoid in every 
case any  accumulation of 
dust  or  to ensure that  any 
such  accumulation is re-
moved. 
3.  - Preferred siting of  methane-
drainage  lines in upcast  shafts. 
(First Report  of the  Safety 
Commission,  p.  16  (German  text) 
and  Report  of  the Conference, 
p.  54,  No.  3,  Para.  (d)). 
- This  Recommendation  of the 
Conference  applies particu-
larly to pressure  lines. 
4.  - Siting electric cables,  com-
pressed-air mains  and  gas-drain-
age  pipes.(First report  of the 
Safety Commission,  p.  16  (Ger-
man  text)  and  Report  of  the  Con-
ference,  p.  54,  No.  3,  Para e)). 
- Electric cables and  leads, 
compressed-air drains and  gas-
drainage pipes should  not  be 
sited in the  haulage  compart-
1.1. 
1966 
c 
c 
ment:  C 
- Electric cables should  not 
all be  sited in the  same 
shaft.  C 
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II - Guiding  principles for  fighting mine 
fires  by  sending  down  water.  (Second 
Report  of  Safety  Commission,  p.  26) 
1.  - Installations 
a  - At  the  top of  every shaft 
reaching to the surface there 
must  be  a  device which  can  send 
down  at  least  50 litres of 
water  per  minute  and per  square 
metre  of  shaft cross-section. 
b  - This  device must  be  installed 
in such  a  way  that the  supply 
of water  can at  no  time  be 
seriously affected by  drawing-
off or  flowing-away  of water at 
other points. 
c  - The  water  pipes and  the spray 
jets must  be  set  in such  a  way 
that  they are protected  from 
frost. 
d  - The  damming  device(s)  must  be 
set outside the  shaft-top buil-
ding  in such  a  way  that  they 
can  be  operated at  any  time. 
They  must  be  marked  by  means  of 
an instruction plate. 
c  c 
c  c 
c  c 
c  c 
NRC  E  E  c 
NRC  E  E  c 
NRC  E  E  c 
NRC  E  E  c 
(1)  in the case of electric cables and  leads,  and  compressed-air  lines;  no  methane-drainage 
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2.  - Fires in  Downcast  Shafts 
a  - Immediate measures 
- It is essential to indicate 
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in the fire-fighting plan the 
maximum  amount  of water which 
can be  sent  down  each  of  the 
downcast  shafts,  without 
creating. additional  dangers 
for  the workers  by its effects 
on  the ventilation.  A(l) 
- The  damming  device which  can 
be  operated at this stage 
must  not  release more  than 
this prescribed quantity of 
water.  A( 2) 
- Until  the  leader of the rescue 
operations has  issued his 
instructions and as  long  as 
there has  been  no  reversal of 
ventilation,  water  may  be  sent 
q9wn  only  by  opening  the  dam-
ming  device  prescribed for 
this purpose. 
b  - Measures to be  taken on  the 
instructions of  the  leader  of 
rescue  operations. 
- The  leader of the rescue oper-
ations must  therefore  decide 
- taking  into account  all the 
circumstances  - either to 
send  down  an  increased quan-
tity of water  - or  he  must 
give orders that reversal  of 
the ventilation be  brought 
about  or  encouraged.  A(3) 
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- To  facilitate the reversal of 
the ventilation in the burning 
downcast  shaft,  once  this has 
been opened  and  the main  fan 
stopped,  water  can be sent 
down  the upcast  shaft.  C  c'  E  E  E  c 
~--+---~--,_--~---+--~--~r---+---+---~--~--~ 
- If reversal  of  the ventilation 
has already occurred - either 
as  a  result of the upward 
current produced  by  the heat 
of the  fire or deliberately -
downcast  shafts should be 
treated as though  they were 
upcast shafts.  C  c'  E  E  E  c 
r---+---~--,_--~---+--~--~r---+---+---~--~--~ 
- If the calculated water  quan-
tity appears  to be  too small 
to extinguish the fire  imme-
diately,  or to hinder its 
spread,  additional precautions 
must  be  worked out  and  laid 
down  in the  fire-fighting plan. 
(1)  there are doubts  as to the practicability of  the ·Recommendation;  minimum  water quantities 
are laid down. 
(2)  there are doubts as to the practicability of  the Recommendation. 
(3)  not  suitable for  inclusion in  regulations~ Recommendations  by  the Commission 
- simultaneous  supply  of water 
down  all downcast  shafts 
- partial shutting-off of  the 
burning shaft at surface 
level. 
- Shut  underground  fire-doors 
etc. 
3.  - Fires in upcast  shafts 
- In upcast shafts water  may  be 
sent  down  only  on  the instruc-
tions of the leader of the 
rescue operation. 
- As  long as  there are still 
any  workers  in the pit,  only 
so much  water  may  be  sent 
down  as will allow the  fumes 
of the fire to continue to be 
extracted whilst  the water  is 
falling. 
Note.  A commentary  and  examples 
(with diagrams),  regarding the cal-
culation of  the effect of  falling 
water  on  the ventilation are given 
in the  Second  Report  of the  Commis-
sion,  pp.  29-50. 
III  - Recommendations  for  the sealing-off 
b~ dams  of  mine  fires and  underground 
combustion.  (Second Report  of Safety 
Commission,  p.  53) 
Introductory  remark. 
The  following  Recommendations  are 
not  binding.  They  are not  intended 
to give  Inspectorates "ready-made" 
regulations;  on  th& contrary,  it 
remains  for  the responsible author-
ities to decide  how  these Recommenda-
tions are to be  applied as  regula-
tions,  circulars or  service instruc-
tions. 
These  Recommendations refer only to 
the actual  fighting of  the  fire or 
combustion;  they  do  not  refer to the 
measures to be  taken as  a  matter of 
priority to rescue  men  following  the 
outbreak. 
A.  When  a  mine  fire has  broken out 
or  underground combustion  devel-
o'ped it is indispensable to take 
~he necessary preparatory steps 
for  any  later sealing-off by  dams 
which  may  be  necessary while  the 
direct fire-fighting operations 
are still going  on. 
In the event  of sealing-off  by 
dam  becoming  necessary,  as  a 
general rule the first stoppings 
to be erected must  be advance 
dams •. 
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c Recommendations  by the Commission 
These  advance  dams  are  in fact 
the real subject  of  the present 
Recommendations. 
B.  Structure and erection of  the 
advance  dams. 
1.  If there is no  risk of explo-
sion  {1): 
a  - to make  the  advance  dams 
themselves as  impermeable 
as possible  and  to create 
the closest possible seal 
between the  dam  and  the 
surrounding walls; 
b  - there is nothing against 
shutting off first of all 
the  intake air. 
2.  If there is a  risk of  explo-
sion: 
a  - to have at all times the 
most  precise information 
possible regarding the 
degree  of  explosion risk 
in the fire zone; 
- it may  e.g.  be  necessary 
to provide  the men  with 
fireproof  clothing; 
b  - to  ~nsure that the advance 
dams  are as  impermeable  as 
possible,  and  strong  enough 
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c  - to  ensure that  for  the 
entire period during which 
the stopping is being 
erected,  there is suffi-
cient ventilation of the 
fire zone  to counter as 
far as absolutely possible 
the  formation  of  an explo-
c  NRC  c'  E  c  sive gas  mixture.  C 
~--+---+---~---r---+--~--~~--+---+---4---~--~ 
d  - to ensure that all suit-
able measures  are  taken 
fo  reduce as  far as pos-
sible the effects of  any 
explosion which  may  occur; 
(dustbarriers,  stone-dust-
ing or water  trough bar-
riers); 
e  - if at all possible,  the 
dams  on  the  intake  and 
return sides should be 
finally sealed simulta-
neously; 
- only the  number  of work-
ers and officials 
strictly necessary  for 
this work  should stay 
behind; 
c  c 
c  c 
c  c 
(1)  for  the assessment  of this risk,  see  Chap.  A  - II a),  P• 
NRC  c'  E  c 
NRC  c'  E  c 
NRC  c'  E  c 139 
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- as soon as the  dams  have 
been sealed,  the danger 
area must  be  completely 
evacuated.  c  c  NRC  c'  E  c 
c.  The  final  dams  must  be  durable, 
built of brick or concrete under 
the protection offered by  the 
advance  dams.  c  c  NRC  c'  E  c 
Note: 
Complementary  details to the  fore-
going  Recommendations  are given  in 
a  Commentary  (Second  Report  of  the 
Commission,  pp.  53/58). 140 
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Recommendations  by  the Commission 
A.  Recommendations  regarding medical 
examination  (Second  Report  of  the 
Commission,  p.  79). 
I  - Pre-Entry  Medical  Examinations 
- All  applicants for  employment  at 
collieries should undergo  a  pre-
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entry medical  examination.  C 
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- This  must  establish that  the ap-
plicant  shows  no  symptoms  render-
ing  him unfit  for  such  employment.  C 
The  pre-entry medical  examination 
must  include  : 
- a  general  examination 
- such special examination as may  be 
c  c  c  c  c 
deemed  necessary  for  the purpose.  ~c---r----~C---r----r--c--r---~-C--~----r-c--~--~~c--~---4 
- The  examinations effected must 
include,  as regards  the chest,  a 
radiograph or radiophotograph  of 
format  not  smaller than 70 x  70  mm  C  c  c  c  E  c 
~--+---+---~--~---+---+---4----+---+---~--~--~ 
- the latter to be  supplemented if 
need  be  by  a  standard-format 
(1  :  1)  radiograph.  C  c  c  c  E  c 
1-----r----r----r--~r---~--~----~--~r---~---4----+---~ 
- The  nature of  these  examinations 
and 
- the practical details 
- together with the criteria on 
which  the  doctor  should base  his 
findings, 
- should  be  defined  by  medical 
experts. 
- In the case of recruitment  for 
work,  whether  below  or above  ground 
where  the worker will be  exposed 
c 
c 
c 
c 
to a  dust'hazard,  the  examination 
must  show  a  normal  pulmonary  image.  C 
c 
c 
c 
c 
c 
c  c'  E  c 
c  c'  E  c 
c  c'  E  c 
c  c'  E  c 
c  c'  E  c 
~---r----r----r----~---r--~~--~----r---~--~~--4----4 
- The  "normal  pulmonary  image"  must 
be  defined  by  medical  experts. 
- These  are to be  regarded as mini-
mum  recommendations. 
- The  points concerning the  number 
and  type  of examinations to be 
carried out, 
- the effecting of radiological 
examinations 
- the definition of  the  normal  pul-
monary  image 
- can  be  subjected to review  in each 
country 
c  c  c  c'  E  c Recommendations  by the Commission 
- to the extent that this is felt 
to be  appropriate in the  light of 
developments  in working  conditions 
and 
- progress in preventive measures. 
II - Special  Examinations 
1.  The  object  of  special medical 
examinations  should  be  to estab-
lish - taking  into account,  ac-
cording to circumstances, 
141 
N.R./Wph. 
1.1. 
1966 
Saar 
1.1. 
1966 
c 
Belgium 
LL 
1966 
NRP 
France 
1.1. 
1966 
c' 
Italy 
~.1. 
~966 
E 
Nether-
lands 
~-1. 
~966 
c  - the  opinions  of  the training,  C 
r---+---4---~--~---+---4--~~--~--+---4---~--~ 
- vocational-guidance  and  applied 
c  NRP  c'  E  c'  psychology  C 
~--+---4---~--~---+---4--~~--~--+---4---~--~ 
- and  other services concerned 
a  worker's fitness  for  certain 
c  NRP  c  c  c  specific occupations.  C 
~--+---4---~--~---+---4--~----~--+---4---~--~ 
2.  Such  examinations  are  essential 
in the  case of  jobs 
- which  either in themselves  or 
owing  to the conditions under 
which  they are performed  in-
volve  a  special hazard  to the 
worker  himself  or to others as 
regards  health and/or safety, 
- or which  demand  particular 
physical aptitudes or charac-
terological qualities. 
3.  No  attempt  has  been  made  to list 
in full  the cases in which  spe-
cial examinations are necessary, 
this being left to the  competent 
authorities in each  country. 
Examples  include: 
- winding  enginemen; 
- staple-pit  enginemen; 
- motormen  (drivers of  locomo-
tives,  mobile haulers and 
surface vehicles); 
- workers  assigned to hot 
workings; 
- all those  employed  on  cage 
handling. 
III - Routine  Examinations  during  employ-
~ 
A - Periodic health checks 
- The  object  here is to establish 
whether  the  subject is still 
fit for  duty, 
- to detect  any  symptoms  of occu-
pational disease at  the earliest 
possible  stage," 
- where appropriate to help 
supervise the subject's health 
generally. 
c 
c 
c  NRP  c  c  c 
c  NRP  c  c  c 
CE  c  c  c  c 
c  c  c  c 
c  c  c  c Recommendations  by the Commission 
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1966 
c  c  such  check-ups at intervals.  ~E(l 
~--~---4----+---~----~--4----4----+---~--~~--+---~ 
- The  interval should be  fixed at 
two  years.  C  CE  c  c 
~--~---4----+---~----~--4----4----+----+--~~--+---~ 
- This  interval is reduced  for 
workers  under  21.  C  CE  c  c  E 
- The  interval named  above  should 
be  conside.red as  a  maximum  _ (2)  _ (2) 
figure.  ~c--4---~---+---4----+---4--c--~--4-c--~---+-c--4---~ 
This  interval can also be 
reduced: 
- if the state of health of a 
worker  indicates that such a 
reduction is desirable; 
- in connection with the  type of 
work  performed 
- because  of  the nature  of  the 
place at which  he works 
B - Medical  Examinations  on specific 
occasions 
1.  Prior to reassignment 
- Workers  whom  it is proposed 
to assign to jobs involving 
hazards not previously 
taken  into account  for  the 
man  concerned should be 
c 
c 
c 
re-examined.  C 
2.  Medical  examination  follow-
ing  absence  from work. 
- Where  a  man's return to 
work after an illness or 
accident  involves risk to 
the safety of  himself  or 
others,  he  may  be  subjected 
to a  special examination, 
for  his own  safety or  that 
of others,  C 
- the  type  and extent  of  the 
examination should  be 
fixed  in each case accord-
ing to the  circumstances.  C 
c 
c 
c 
CE 
c' 
c' 
c 
NRP 
NRP 
NRP 
NRP 
NRP 
c 
c 
c 
c 
NRP 
+  c' 
c' 
E  c' 
E  c 
E  c 
E  E 
E  c' 
E  c' 
(1)  fulfilled for  underground workers;  fulfilled only  for certain categories of  surface workers. 
(2)  not  applicable. 
(3)  the interval is one year. 
(4)  for workers  below  18  years of  age. 
(5)  article 648  of  Inspectorate Regulations  provides  for  an  interval of  1  year. 143 
B.  REGULAR  REPORT  ON  MEASURES  BASED  ON  RECOMMENDATIONS 
OF  THE  PRESENT,  THIRD  REPORT 
To  ensure  a  certain degree  of uniformity with regular reports on the 
measures  taken,  the following  survey also shows  - as  mentioned  under  C  I  - the 
situation at  1.1.66,  but  does  not  list those  Recommendations  which  are met  by 
appropriate modification of  the  ~egulations and  can therefore be  indicated by  the 
letters used  for the  purpose.  It does,  however,  list those which  cannot  be directly 
implemented  by  means  of  regulations  or  laws.  These  latter call for  other modes  of 
application. 
The  situation with regard to implementation of  the  last-mentioned Recom-
mendations  and  Proposals  is indicated,  with appropriate notes,  in the proper  place 
in the following tables. 
In the case of  these Recommendations  it is again satisfying to note that 
all the  coal-producing countries  of  the  Community  have,  in almost all cases,  taken 
those steps - or are  about  to do  so  (NRP)  - which  were  considered by  the Mines 
Safety  Commission  to be desirable to improve  safety in mines. 145 
Regular report  on the implementation 
of  the Conference's Recommendations  (continuation I) 
I.  TECHNICAL  ASPECTS 
Recommendations  by  the Commission 
I  - Recommendations  regarding the protec-
tion of  underground electrical net-
works against fire and  firedamp - ex-
plosion risks  (Doc.  1151/61/4). 
1.  Recommendations  regarding the protec-
tion of  underground electrical net-
works  against fire risk. 
A.  First order precautions - elimina-
tion of fire risk. 
1.  Prevention of  excessive heating 
of cables  in normal  use  by  pro-
viding adequate  conductivity. 
Prevention of unforeseen  local 
heatings by  the use  of  suitable 
designs  and  by  proper supervi-
sion. 
2.  Prevention of  the occurrence of 
faults  and short-circuits be-
tween  conductors,  or  between 
conductor  and  earth,  by  adequate 
insulation or proper spacing of 
N.R./Wph. 
1.1. 
1966 
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1966 
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~--~--~----+----r--~~--~---+----+---~--~----+---~ 
B.  Second  order precautions - protec-
tion against  the effects of  a 
heating or a  fault. 
1.  Use  of heat-stable insulations. 
2.  Use  of  protective sheathing for 
equipment  and  for  cables,  made 
of flame-resistant  and non-prop-
agating material. 
Use  of oil as  a  non-conductor 
only if no fire risk for the 
workers  is involved. 
3.  Accumulations  of  flammable  or 
combustible materials and  of 
pipelines for  combustible gases 
should be sited well away  from 
electrical equipment. 
C.  Third order precautions - effects 
on the network. 
1. Automatic  protection of circuits 
c 
c 
c 
c + 
NRP 
against  overloads.  C 
2.  Automatic protection of circuits 
against short-circuit; these 
protective devices must  be capa-
ble of handling the maximum 
short-circuit voltage at their 
point  of installation.  C 
c 
NRC 
+  E 
c 
c  + 
C' 
c 
c 
c 
NRP 
NRP 
c 
c 
c 
NRP 
C(l) 
c 
C'  + 
NRP 
c 
NRP 
C' 
C' 
C' 
C' 
C' 
C' 
c  + 
NRP 
c  + 
NRP 
c·  + 
NRP 
c + 
NRP 
c + 
NRP 
c  + 
NRP 
Selection and  use of  such de- ~--~--~----+----r--~~--~---+----+----r--~----+---~ 
vices allowing for the minimum 
short-circuit voltage which  can 
occur at the end of the section 
they protect.  C 
(1)  •  with respect to armoured cables. 
c  c  NRP  C' 
c + 
NRP Recommendations  by the Commission 
3,  Steps to give effective protec-
tion against faults with  low 
voltages,  which  might  get  past 
the above-named  protective de-
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vices  and  cause  dangerous  C'  -t 
heatings.  r-NR  __  P,_  __  -+_?_(_1~)---+_NR  __  P~---4--C--~--~-C-'-+--~~NR  __  P-+--~ 
2.  Recommendations  for  the protection of 
underground electrical networks 
against  firedamp-explosion risks. 
A.  First  order  precautions  - preven-
tion of  accumulations  of  firedamp. 
1.  The  firedamp  content  at the site 
of  the electrical apparatus  must 
be  kept  within the  limits pre-
scribed by  the  Inspectorate.  r--c-;----+--c~r---+--c--~--4--C--~--~-C-'-+----~C~+---~ 
2.  The  ventilation situation must 
be  checked before any  new  in-
stallation or extension of  elec- C'  + 
trical equipment.  r--c---t----+--c~~--+--c--r---~-c--+---~-C-'-+----~N_R_P-+--~ 
3.  There  must  be  a  thorough  inves-
tigation of  the possible conse-
quences  of  any  alterations in 
working method,  ventilation or 
gas  emission,  which  might  cause 
problems  in the vicinity of 
electrical equipment.  r--C~r---,__c  __  +----+-NR  __  P-r  __  _,  __  c  __  +----+--C-'-r--~r-C-'-+--~ 
B.  Second  order precautions - preven-
tion of  ignition. 
1.  In  gassy  workings:  use  of elec-
trical equipment  which  is per-
mitted by  the  Inspectorate only 
under  its own  specified condi-
tions. 
2.  The electrical equipment  must 
be  installed,  used  and  main-
tained in such  a  way  as to keep 
it flame-proof. 
All cables must  be  of adequate 
mechanical strength. 
All cables  must  be  installed 
and maintained without  damage. 
c.  Third order precautions - cutting 
off the circuit. 
1.  Networks  must  be  installed in 
such  a  way  that  any  fault  cur-
rent  which  may  arise between 
c  c 
c  c 
c  c 
c  c 
c  c 
c  c 
c  c 
c  c 
? 
C' 
c 
C' 
c + 
NRP 
c  + 
NRP 
c  + 
NRP 
c 
phase  and earth is reduced to a  C + 
low  value  or quickly  cut  off.  r-N_R_P~---+--C~~--+-NR  __  P-r-----t--C--+----r-C-'-+-----~NR  __  P-+--~ 
2.  A protective relay,  preferable 
automatic,  must  be  provided 
against  between-phase faults  C(2)t  C'  + 
and  earth faults.  r-NR  __  P,_  __  -+_NR  __  P~---+-NR  __  P~---4--C--+---~-C-'-+----rNR  __  P-+----i 
3.  Precautions must  be  taken to 
avoid accidents when  faults are 
being sought  or dealt with.  C 
C(2)+ 
NRP  NRP  c 
(1)  - no suitable devices for the determination of these faults available. 
(2)  occur with movable  machines. 
C' 
CC'+ 
NRP Recommendations  by the Commission 
4.  Protection must  be  given to 
leads without  metallic sheath-
ing,  and  to those which  supply 
movable  machines,  by  means  of 
screens which bring  a  protective 
device  into operation if a  fault 
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lc'  +  jrmp 
must  be  cut  off.  ~-c~~--~-c--+---~-c--~---4--c--+----+-C~'--~--4-c~-+--~ 
Issuing instructions to maintain 
in operation certain machines  C  + 
which  provide ventilation.  ~-C~~--4--c--+---~-C--~---4--C--+----+-C-'  __  ~--4-C~'-+--~ 
Restarting only  when  the fire-
damp  content  has  fallen below 
the  permissible value,  and  only 
on the orders of  a  trained  C  + 
person.  ~c--+---~-c--+---4-NR  __  P~---+-c--~---+-C-'~----~NR  __  :P-+--~ 
Supplementary  precautions for pits liable 
to sudden outbursts of  gas. 
1.  Risk of  damage  by  particles projected 
by  an outburst  of  gas. 
- The  threatened zones  in which  pro-
jection can occur  should not  be 
electrified, 
- The electrical equipment  and  cables 
should be  protected against  heavy 
A  c  NRP  C(l)  A(2)  A 
c  blows.  A  C  C  C  A(4) 
~--+---~--~--~---+---4--~~--~~+---~--4---~ 
- The electrical equipment  should be 
designed to give maximum  robustness.~~A~~--~-C~+---~-C~~---4~C--+----+A_(~4_)~---4~C--+---~ 
2.  The  risk of  firedamp concentrations. 
- Increased ventilation.  ~-C-'~---4--C~'-+----~C~'~---4~C--+----+A_(~4_)~--~~C--+---~ 
- Use  of  remote-indicating methanome-
ters or ventilation-fault detectors 
which can cut  off the threatened  C'  + 
section of  the circuit.  ~-C-'+---~E~(-~~--~--E--~--+--C~~--+A~(4_)~·~--~NR  __  P-+--~ 
- Relaxation shot-firing only after 
all equipment  has  been switched  off.~~C~'4----+~C~'~---+~NR~P~---+~C~~--~A~(~4~)+---~----+---~ 
3,  Supplementary electrical precautions. 
a)  Preferable use  of  a  starpoint 
earthed via  a  strong  impedance, 
e.g.  by  means  of  an  insulation 
detector.  ~~C-+---4~C~~--~NR~P~---4~N~R~P4---~A~(~4~)+-__  4NR~P~--~ 
b)  Quickest  possible automatic protec-
tion of  the  network against all in-
sulation faults,  even if formed  by 
resistances between  phase  and 
earth,  NRP 
c + 
NRP  NRP  c  A(4) 
c  + 
NRP 
(1)  = the use  of  electricity is forbidden  in pits liable to sudden outbursts of  gas,  excepting for 
lighting and shot-firing.  Exceptions  can  however  be approved by the senior mining engineers: 
when  using armoured  cables,  telephone  installations and  remote-indicating methanometers  in 
intake airways  - provided that  no  damage  is likely to occur as  a  result  of  a  gas outburst  -
and  also in main return airways. 
(2)  no pits liable to sudden outbursts of gas. 
(3)  already  implemented  in individual cases. 
(4)  the opening-up of  fire areas is·carried out  on  the responsibility of  the mine-owner,  who  pre-
pares  a  reopening  plan - taking into account the scale and  type of fire and  the ventilation 
situation in the fire area  - in collaboration with the  Main  Rescue Station.  The action plans 
of  the Main  Rescue  Stations very  largely  embody  the principles laid down  in Doc.  1304/3/64. Recommendation•  by the Commission 
II - Principles for  the opening-up of 
sealed-off fire areas. 
(Doc.  1304/3/64) 
I  - GENERAL 
Special reasons for  opening-up  a 
district sealed-off after a  fire: 
- Recovery  of  bodies 
- Salvage  of material 
- Recovery  of  roadways  and 
workings 
- Reduction of  the sealed-off area 
- Inspection of  the district 
and,  if necessary, 
- direct fire-fighting. 
The  following hazards  can arise 
from  reopening  a  sealed-off 
district: 
- Release  of  CO,  foul air and  hot 
damp  air 
- Explosion of  firedamp or fire 
gas,  where  the fire is not  yet 
extinct 
- Recrudescence  of  the fire. 
Recrudescence of the fire can 
occur  only  when  fresh air reaches 
the seat  of  the fire,  so that  with 
all operations  involved in reopen-
ing a  fire area it is of  prime 
importance to inspect  the individ-
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ual air currents constantly.  ~-C~----+--C~~--+--C--~--+--C-'-r----r-C-'-+----~NR  __  lP-+--~ 
All  places suspected of  having 
been seats of fire or beatings 
must  be ascertained with the ut-
most  speed.  ~-E-;----r--C-'~---+--C-'~---;--C-'-r--~r-C-'-+----r-C-'-+--~ 
II - BASIC  RULES 
Sealed-off districts may  be re-
opened only after the competent 
authorities have been notified or 
have  given their permission. 
Before opening  commences,  gas 
samples  must  be  taken from the 
fire area,  at  each stopping  and 
from all sampling pipes. 
The  gas  samples are analysed  and 
the results assessed  from  the 
point  of  view of  explosion risk 
and  the state of the seat  of the 
fire. 
c  c 
c  c 
c  ·C 
c  C(2)  C'  C' 
c  C'  C'  C' 
c  C'  C'  C' 
(1)  - The  opening-up of fire areas is carried out  on the responsibility of the mine-owner,  who 
prepares  a  reopening plan - taking into account  the scale and  type of fire and the ventila-
tion situation in the fire area - in collaboration with the  Main  Rescue  Station.  The action 
plans of the Main  Rescue Stations very  largely  embody  the principles laid down  in Doc.  1304/ 
3/64. 
(2)  - applies only to the opening-up of fire areas ~particularly large fires. Recommendations  by the Commission 
The  cooling-off time of the seat 
of the fire must  be taken into 
account. 
If possible,  the sealed-off dis-
trict should be  inspected before 
any air is circulated or  any 
operations are started. 
Before opening  commences,  a  plan 
should be  drawn  up jointly with 
the  Main  Rescue  Centre. 
This  plan must  cover the following 
points  in writing: 
- the method, 
- nature,  scope  and  order of 
operations, 
- direction and  supervision, 
- checking of the ventilation sys-
tem and  of  the composition of 
the air, 
- communications, 
- preparation of material, 
- evacuation,  prohibition of  ac-
cess to and  remanning  of  endan-
gered workings, 
- deployment  of  the Rescue  Team, 
- connection  and disconnection of 
electrical equipment  and  isola-
tion from the supply  of  elec-
tricity, 
- opening  and closing of  the  com-
pressed-air,  water  and  methane-
drainage  pipeline valves, 
- re-sealing of  the fire area in 
emergency. 
The  method to be adopted for re-
opening sealed-off districts de-
pends  on the presence or.otherwise 
of 
- non-explosive  gaseous mixtures 
which  remain  non-explosive on 
dilution with air 
- gaseous mixtures  which may  be-
come  explosive  on dilution with 
air,  or 
- explosive gaseous  mixtures. 
Fire areas may  be  opened at  one 
point  only  or at several points. 
In the latter case  a  continuous 
direct circulation of air is es-
tablished and the fire area is 
permeated with fresh air.  An  exam-
ination should be  made  of the 
effects of  the opening of  t~e are~ 
on  the ventilation system of the 
pit as  a  whole  and within the firE 
area. 
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C' Recommendations  by the Commission 
A  sealed-off district  can  be  re-
opened  by 
- breaching  one  or more  stoppings 
(with or without  the use  of  an 
air-lock),  or 
- cutting a  new  entry  into the 
fire area. 
Before  opening  a  sealed-off area, 
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C' 
provision should be  made  for 
immediate  reclosure if necessary.  C 
~--+---;----r--~---+--~--~~--+---+---4---~--~ 
Stoppings  may  be  opened  only  on 
the instructions of  the manager 
and  under  the constant  supervi-
sion of  personnel  appointed by 
him.  ~-c--~--~--c--~--~-C--'~----~c--~----~c_'--~--~~c-'-4----~ 
Workings,  into which the  opening 
of  a  stopping  may  release toxic 
gases  or foul air,  or where  there 
is  a  risk of  explosion,  must  be 
evacuated  and  put  out  of  bounds 
to personnel before opening.  r-~C--r----r~C--r----r-C~'-r----~c~-r----~C~'--~--~~c~~--~ 
Since conditions  in the district, 
the state of  the seat  of  the fire 
and  the risk of  gas  explosion may 
change  during the  opening  opera-
tion,  the  composition of  the fire 
gases  or  fumes  must  be  checked at 
regular  intervals.  r-~C--r----r~C--r----r-C---r----~C~~----r-C~'--~--~~C~'~----~ 
The  kind  and  number  of  samples 
and  the points at  which  they  are 
to be  taken should  be  fixed  in 
c  C'  C'  C'  C'  advance.  C 
~--~----~--~----~--~----~--~----~--~----~--~--~ 
In doing  so,  the possibility of 
gas  accumulations  forming  should 
be  allowed for.  (In general,  the 
formation  of  gas  layers  is fosteP 
ed  by  low air velocities and 
differences  in temperature.)  ~-C--~--~N_R  __  C~----~C--'~----~C-'--~--~-C-'--~--~-C--~--~ 
Where  a  stopping is opened  in the 
knowledge  that the fire is not 
yet  extinguished,  or where  the 
fire is revived as  a  result,  the 
area  in question must  be  resealed 
at  once,  if the composition of 
the fire gases  or  fumes  changes 
in such  a  way  that  an  explosion 
hazard  might  arise.  ~~C~----+-~C~+----r-C~~---4~C~'-+----+-C~'-r--~~C-'-+--~ 
With  non-explosive gas  mixtures 
in the fire area,  this is neces-
sary only  if extinguishing opera-
tions.seem unlikely to succeed.  ~~C~~--~-C=-'~--~~C~'~--~~C~'~----~~C~'~----4-~C~'-4----~ 
It is the responsibility of the 
Rescue  Team  to open and  inspect 
fire areas,  even after they  have 
been ventilated.  ~~c~~--~~c--~--~-C~'~----~C~'~----~C~'--~--~~C~'~----~ 
On  the intake side,  breaching of 
stoppings  need  not  be  carried out 
by  the Rescue Team  provided that 
no  gas  hazard is to be  reckoned 
with.  C  C'  C'  C'  C'  C' Recommendations  by the Commission 
When  deploying  in the Rescue  Team, 
allowance  should  be  made  for the 
adverse climatic conditions which 
are  likely to obtain at  any  point 
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where  they  may  be  employed.  r--C~----+--c--+----r-C--'~---4--C-'-+----~C-'~~--4-C---+--~ 
III  - OPENING-UP  SEALED-OFF  DISTRICTS 
CONTAINING  NON-EXPLOSIVE  GAS 
MIXTURES 
1.  Opening-up  on  one side dnly. 
A sealed-off district containing 
non-explosive  gas  mixtures  may  be 
opened  on  one  side even if the 
fire is not  yet  extinguished. 
It must  first  be  established 
whether  the remaining stoppings 
and  seals are sufficiently air-
tight  and that there is no  risk of 
releasing fire gases,  in particu-
lar carbon  monoxide,  in other 
parts of  the working,  which  may  be 
connected with the fire area.  ~-C~r---1--C--+----+-C--'-r---4~C--+----+-c~·--~--~~C-'-+--~ 
If the stopping to be  opened is  on 
the return side,  special attention 
should be  paid to the release of 
co or  of  foul air.  r-~c~r---1-~c~·-4----~C=-'-r--~~c~+----+~c~·--~--~~C-'-+--~ 
The  decision as  to whether to 
carry out  the operations  in the 
fire area without  ventilation air 
or with auxiliary ventilation de-
pends  on  the purpose  of  the re-
opening  of  the area,  the expected 
duration of  the Rescue  Team's 
operations  and  the possible  haz~ 
involved.  Auxiliary ventilation is 
especially desirable for  extended 
operations within the fire area. 
a)  Working  without  ventilation 
air,  especially behind  an air-
lock,  has the advantage  of 
eliminating the risk of reviv-
ing the fire.  When  carrying out 
extinguishing operations with-
out  ventilation air and  under 
unfavourable climatic condi-
tions,  it is  advisabl~ first to 
set  up water sprinklers  and to 
put  these  into operation only 
after the Rescue  Team  has  left 
the fire area.  ~-c~~--4--C~+---~-C--'~---4~C-'-+----+-C~'--~--4-C~'-+--~ 
b)  If auxiliary ventilation is 
used,  it should preferably be 
by  suction.  r-c~+---~A~(~l~)+---4-~C_'-r---+-c~·~---+?~·~<2~)~--~~C~'-+--~ 
It is advisable to isolate the 
area ventilated by  an auxiliary 
fan  from the non-ventilated 
section by  means  of  an auxilia-
ry  stopping if the seat  of  the 
fire  is situated in the  non-
ventilated section.  C  c  C'  C'  C'  C' 
(1)  - Experience hitherto has  shown  that  blowing auxiliary ventilation is preferable,  to ensure 
that  no  explosive gases  are aspirated by  the auxiliary fan. 
(2)  The  use  of  blowing auxiliary ventilation is preferred. Recommendations  by the Commission 
2.  Opening  on two sides to estab-
lish a  circulation of air round 
the fire area. 
A fire area containing non-explo-
sive gas mixtures  may  be ventilat-
ed  only  if it is likely that the 
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fire is extinct.  r-~c~r---~~c~4----+-=C-'-+----~c~·~----4--=C-'+---~~c~·4---~ 
As  soon as ventilation is estab-
lished,  a  Rescue  Team  wearing 
breathing apparatus  may  enter the 
fire area to examine  conditions 
within it and to extinguish any 
fires. 
IV  - REOPENING  OF  SEALED-OFF  DISTRICTS 
CONTAINING  GAS  MIXTURES  WHICH  MAY 
BECOlffi  EXPLOSIVE  ON  DILUTION  WITH 
~. 
1.  Opening  on  one side only 
A fire area containing  gas  mix-
tures which  may  become  explosive 
on dilution with air may  be  opened 
on  one side,  even if the fire is 
not  yet  extinguished. 
It is however,  essential to instau 
a  tight  airlock in front  of  the 
stopping to be  opened,  so as to 
c  c  C'  C'  C'  C' 
ensure an effective air seal.  ~~C--~--4-~C~4----+-C=-'~----~C~'-4----4--C=-'~--~~C~'4---~ 
It must  first  be  checked whether 
the remaining stoppings  and seals 
are sufficiently airtight  and that 
there is no risk of  releasing fire 
gases,  in particular carbon monox-
ide,  into other parts of  the work-
ings  which  may  be  connected with 
the fire area.  ~-c--~--~-c--+-~-+-c~·~---4--c~·-4----+--c~·~--~~C-'4---~ 
If the stopping to be  opened  is on 
the return side,  particular atten-
tion must  be  paid to the possibil-
ity of  releasing  CO,  CH4  or foul 
air.  r-~C~~--~~C~4----+-=C-'~--~~C~4----4--C=-'~--~~C~'4---~ 
All operations must  be carried out 
without  ventilation air.  ~~C~~--4-~C~4----+-=c-·~--~~c~4----4--C=-'~--~~C~'4---~ 
There  must  be  continuous sampling 
and evaluation of the results of 
analysis to check whether  the  gas 
mixture  remains non-explosive.  r-~C~~--~~C~4----+-=C-'~--~~C~4----4--C=-'~--~~C~'4---~ 
For extinguishing operations,  see 
note  in III  - 1. 
If the size of  the sealed-off area 
is to be  reduced,  a  new  explosion-
proof  stopping must  be erected.  r-~C~~--;-~C~+---~-=c-·~---4~C~'-+----+--C~'r---~~C~'+---~ 
In order to be  able to erect this 
stopping under  tolerable climatic 
conditions and  possibly without 
wearing breathing apparatus,  auxil 
iary ventilation may  be  provided. 
For this purpose,  an auxiliary 
stopping must  first  be erected and 
sealed in an unventilated atmo-
sphere.  (Before constructing the 
main  stopping,  it should be consi-
dered whether to erect several suc-
cessive auxiliary  stoppings,  ac-
cording to the possible hazards.)  C  c  C'  C'  C'  C' Recommendations  by the Commission 
The  section of  roadway  thus  reco-
vered must  then  be  ventilatea by 
an  auxiliary fan so as  to create  a 
suitable climate for the erection 
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of the main  stopping.  ~~C-'~---4~C~+---~~C-'~---4~C~'-+----+--C~'~--~~C~'+---~ 
When  starting up the auxiliary 
ventilation it must  be  remembered 
that the gas mixture becomes  ex-
plosive on dilution with air. It 
is therefore essential to ensure 
that there is no source of  igni-
tion in the workings  to be venti-
lated.  ~-C~~--4--C~'-+----r-~C-'~---4~C~'-+----+--C~'~--~~C-'+---~ 
In addition,  it is essential to 
make  certain that the fan  used 
cannot  cause  any  risk of  ignition.~_c_,  ____  +-_c  __  +---~-C--'~---4~C-'-+----+--C-'~---4--~C-'+---~ 
Before starting up the auxiliary 
ventilation,  all workings  likely 
to be  exposed to the hazards  of 
fire gases  or explosions must 
first  be  evacuated  and  access 
thereto prohibited.  ~~C~r---~-C~+----+~C-'~--~~C~'-4----+-~C-'r---~~C~'4---~ 
Electrical equipment  must  be  cut 
off  from the  power  supply.  ~-C-4----+--C--~--+--C--~--4--C-'~----~C-'~(~D+---~~C-'+---~ 
In addition,  the ventilation must, 
as far as  possible,  be  regulated 
so that  no  explosive gas mixtures 
can  be  released over  long dis-
tances. 
For this purpose,  the quantity of 
air circulated should,  if neces-
sary,  be  increased. 
2.  Opening  on  two sides to estab-
lish a  circulation of air 
through the fire area. 
This method  of  opening automati-
cally results in the formation  of 
a  through air-circuit  in the open 
district,  but  not  necessarily in 
all air-circuits in the fire area. 
The  method  can  be used only if 
there are  no  remaining signs of 
c  c 
c  C' 
C'  C'  C'  C' 
C'  C'  C'  C' 
fire in the district.  ~~C~~--4--C~+----+~C-'~--~~C~'-+----+-~C-'~--~~C~'+---~ 
In addition,  a  period  long  enough 
for the seat of the fire to cool 
off must  have  elapsed since the 
supposed time  of extinction.  r--C-;----+--C--+---~--C-'~---4~C~'-+----+--C--'r---4---C-'+---~ 
If possible,  the Rescue Team 
should carry out  an  inspection in 
an unventilated atmosphere. 
Failing this,  the results of the 
snuffle pipe tests should  be used 
to determine the condition of the 
seat of  the fire. 
Furthermore,  it should be consi-
dered in such cases whether  the 
method  described in section  IV  -1 
might  not  be  preferable. 
A 
c 
E 
c 
c 
-(2) 
C'  C' 
C'  C' 
C'  C' 
(1)  Special attention is drawn to the fact  that the fan  must  be switched off. 
(2)  = Not  applicable. 
C'  C' 
C'  C' 
C'  C' Recommendations  by the Commission 
In each  case,  it is essential to 
check the  likelihood of  a  recru-
descence  of  the fire during venti-
lation,  by  means  of  fire gas 
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r---+---+---~---r---+--~--~~--r---+---4---~--~ 
This  is particularly important 
where  a  fire area has  a  much-
branched ventilation system.  r--C-'~---4--C-'-+----r--C-'~---4--C-'-+----+--C~'r---~~C-'+---~ 
Before ventilating the fire area, 
all workings  exposed to the 
hazards  of fire gases  or  explo-
sions of fire gases  or  firedamp 
when  the stopping is opened  must 
be evacuated.  r-~C~~--4-~C~+---~~C_'~---4~C~'-+----+--C~'r---~~C~'+---~ 
All electrical installations in 
these workings  must  be  cut  off 
from the  power  supply.  ~-C~~--4--C--+---~--C--~--4--C-'-+----+--C--'~--~--C-'+---~ 
On  safety grounds,  it is advisable 
to open the return stopping  first.r-_E~~--4--C--+---~--C-'~---4--C-'-+----+--C--'r---~--C-'+---~ 
After the Rescue  Team  has with-
drawn to less dangerous  zones,  the 
intake stopping should be  opened.  r--E--~--4--C--4----+--C-'~--~~C-'~----+---C-'+---~--C~'4---~ 
When  ventilating the fire area, 
the quantity of  air and  the  con-
tent  of  inflammable  gases  in the 
air-current  circulating through 
the fire area,  and  in the  current 
into which it subsequently  flows, 
should  be  checked.  r-~C~~--4--C~+----+~C-'~--~~C~'-4----+-~C-'~--~~C~'4---~ 
The  two air currents should be 
mutually  adjusted in such  a  manner 
as to ensure that  no  explosive 
mixture  of  gases  is present  over 
long distances after their junc-
tion.  r--c~~--4--c--+----+--C-'~--~~C-'~----+---C-'+---~--C-'4----; 
Access to the fire area during 
ventilation is prohibited.  ~-C~----+--C--+---~--C-'~--~--C-'-+----+--C--'~--~--C-'+---~ 
V  - OPENING  OF  FIRE  AREAS  CONTAINING 
EXPLOSIVE  GAS  MIXTURES 
Sealed-off districts may  not  be 
reopened,  either on  one  side or  on 
two sides,  if the  presence  of  ex-
plosive gas mixtures behind the 
stoppings is established.  ~~C~~--4--c~+----+--C-'~--~~C-'-4----+---C-'~--~--C-'~--~ 
VI  - OPENING  OF  FLOODED  FIRE  AREAS 
The  composition of  the air in fire 
areas flooded  to extinguish the 
fire must  be  checked after drain-
ing.  ~~C~~--4--C~'+---~~C-'~---4~C~'-+----+-~C-'~--~~C~'+----i 
In workings with solid coal, 
allowance must  be  made  for the  in-
creased hazard of  spontaneous  ig-
nition after drainage.  Where  fire 
areas have  been isolated by  local 
flooding  instead of  by  stoppings, 
the rules mentioned  in sections  I 
to V  should be  observed insofar as 
applicable.  C  C'  C'  C'  C'  C' Recommendations  by  the Commission 
VII  - REMANNING  OF  FIRE  AREAS 
After ventilating a  fire area, 
workings  may  not  be  manning until 
a  Rescue  Team  has  established that 
all workings are free  of  noxious 
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gases.  r-~c~~--+-~c~+----r-c~·4----+~C_'-+----~~c~·~---4--c~·~--~ 
If the fire area is merely  being 
r.educed  in size,  workings  free  of 
noxious  gases  may  be  manned  only 
when  the remainder  of  the fire-
area has  been sealed-off  by  perma-
nent  stoppings.  r-~c~r---4-~c~+----+-C=-'~---4~C~'-+----+-~c~·~---4--~C~'+---~ 
III - Principles for  the construction of  ad-
vance fire stoppings  from  plaster 
(Doc.  4928/63/2) 
In all cases  where  it is possible and 
advantageous,  the  erection of  plaster 
stoppings to seal off fires  and  beat-
ings is justified. 
Is this process  applied in practice as 
laid down  in the principles contained  (2) 
in the Report?  rN~R~P1----fN~o~(~l~)~--+Y~e~s~---4Y~e~s~---4~=E-+---4~=E-+--~ 
Is the application of  this process 
prescribed by  regulations?  r-N_R_P~---4--N~o-+----~N_o~~--4-~N~o-+----+-~E~~--4--E=-+---~ 
Is this process  applied in practice in 
a  manner  differing from  the principles 
No  E  laid down?  NRP  E 
~--+---4---~---r---+---4--~~--~--+---4---4---~ 
No  No 
Is the application of this modified 
No  No  No  E  E  process  prescribed by  regulations?  NRP 
~--+---4---~---r---+---4--~~--~--+---4---4---~ 
IV  - Second Report  on  Specifications and 
testing conditions relating to fire-
resistant fluids  used for  power  trans-
mission.  (Doc.  700/2/63) 
Part  II - Specifications of  test 
conditions  (pp.  12  onwards) 
Article  1  - Conditions  of  approval 
1.  Fire-resistant fluids for hydraulic 
power  transmission and hydraulic 
control,  before being used  in mine  c•m> 
workings,  must  be  given a  certifi- + 
cate  of  approval.  ~C--+---~N_R_C-+---4--C-'~---+E~(4_)~---+--E-4----~-E-+--~ 
Consequently,  the product  must 
undergo the following tests: 
a)  Laboratory tests  (Articles 3-7) 
aa)  To  determine technical cri-
teria of flammability 
(Article 3  - p.  15)  ~C~+---~NR~C~---4~C-'~---+C~'E~~--+-~E~----~=E-+--~ 
ab)  To  determine health criteria 
(Article 4  - p.  16)  r-C~~--~NR~C~--~~C~'-r---+C~'E~----r-=E-+----+~E~--~ 
ac)  To  determine technical·cri-
teria  (Article  5  - p.  16)  C  NRC  C'  C'E  E  E 
(1)  Tests with wet-flushed fly-ash  dams  are to be  made,  instead of plaster stoppings,  which will 
be tested subsequently. 
(2)  The  choice  of  means  is however  left to the mine-owner. 
(3)  =  In the Charbonnages  de  France register,  the Safety Commission  Recommendations  have  been taken 
into account. 
(4)  =The question of  preparing a  new  regulation is being examined  by  the responsible authority. Recommendations  by the Commission 
b)  Long-term tests during practical 
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E  E  operations  (Article  8  - p.  24)  C 
r---+---+---~---r---+--~--~~--~--+---4---~--~ 
C'  C'E  C' 
2.  These tests are carried out  under  a  (1) 
specialist institute.  C+C'  NRC  C'  C'E  E  E 
r---+---4---~---r--~---4----~--+---4---~--~--~ 
3.  Approval  for use underground  is de-
pendent  on  presentation of the cer-
tificate mentioned  in 1.  C  NRC  C'  C'E  E  E 
r---T---;----r--~---+---;----~--+---~--~--~--~ 
Article 9  - Withdrawal  of  approval 
At  the request  of the specialist 
institute,  the permitting authority 
may  withdraw the approval for the 
fluid to be  used  in mine  workings. 
V - Report  on  the Electro-magnetic exami-
nation of  winding ropes. 
(Doc.  8470/64/2) 
Steps taken to develop the electro-
magnetic testing method  and results 
obtained. 
VI  - Report  on  the use of  accelerometers to 
test winding installations.  (Doc.  37~ 
1/61,  P.  9)  (German  text) 
Tests with accelerometers should be. 
continued  on  a  large scale. 
Use  of  accelerometers should be 
extended. 
VII  - Recommendation  regarding the provision 
of  advice  from foreign experts  in the 
case of  ma,or accidents. 
(Doc.  4364  61/3) 
Advice  by  the  leaders of  the rescue 
operation by  qualified foreign  experts 
in mine-rescue matters. 
The  heads  of the Main  Rescue  Station 
are provided for this purpose with a 
plan containing the most  important 
addresses  and  information needed. 
This plan should be  constantly main-
tained up-to-date. 
c 
(2) 
C' 
C' 
C' 
(6) 
C' 
(6) 
C' 
(1)  - for  the execution of  the  long-term tests. 
NRC 
(3) 
(5) 
(5) 
(6) 
C' 
(6) 
C' 
(2)  -Tests to improve electro-magnetic testing are underway. 
(3)  - Measurements  are taken in individual cases. 
NRP 
(2) 
C' 
(6) 
C' 
(6) 
C' 
C'E 
(2)+ 
(4) 
C' 
(6) 
C' 
(6) 
C' 
E 
? 
? 
? 
(7) 
A 
(7) 
A 
E 
C' 
C' 
C' 
(6) 
C' 
(6) 
C' 
(4)  - Electro-magnetic testing is required in certain exceptional cases  in the General  Mines  Regula-
tions. 
(5)  - Tests carried out  in individual cases. 
(6)  - The  Main  Rescue Stations are in touch with the Main  Rescue  Stations in the Community  countries. 
(7)  •  Not  applicable in the Sulcis coal-field. Recommendations  by the Commission 
~III - Report  on  firedamp-proof  electrical 
equipment  for  nominal volta,es above 
1,100 volts.  (Doc.  2460V64/  1) 
1.  What  use is made  of  the informa-
tion in this report,  and,  in par-
ticular,  to whom  was  it distrib-
uted? 
What  is the position regarding 
continuation of this research and 
what  data have  been  obtained to 
date? 
3.  The  Working  Party has  noted that 
oil is being used  in respect  of 
relays,  and that  research would  be 
needed  to reduce or eliminate the 
use  of oil.  What  research is being 
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(6)  = in certain circumstances these devices will also be  used  in Belgium after the promulgation of 
the new  regulations. 158 
I I •  HUMAN  FACTORS 
Recommendations  by the Commission 
Recommendation  in the fixing  of  climatic 
limits.  (The  unabridged text  is reproduced 
in Document  3034/4/62). 
1.1  The  basis is the American  effective 
temperature  ( 0  eff basic scale). 
Air  velocities  above  3  metres/sec 
should be  considered as  only  3  metres/ 
sec  in determining the American  effec-
N.R,/Wph. 
1.1. 
1966 
c 
Saar 
1.1. 
1966 
c 
Belgium 
L1. 
1966 
C' 
France 
1.1. 
1966 
A 
Italy 
.1. 
~966 
E 
Nether-
lands 
~-1. 
~966 
c 
tive temperature.  C(U  - C 
~~+---4---~--~---+---4--~~--~--+---4---~--~ 
C'  E 
1.2  The  temperature dates  must  be  given  so 
as to make  possible  a  comparison  on 
the basis  indicated under  1.1.  ~-C~~--4--C--+---~--C-'~---4-----+----+--E--~--4---C-+--~ 
1.3  The  climatic  limits determined shall 
be  maximum  values.  C  - - C 
~--+---~--~---r---+--~--~~--+---+---~--~--~ 
E 
Better climatic values for  the workers 
remain unchanged.  C  C  - - E  -(2) 
~--+---4---~--~---+---4--~~--~--+---~--~--~ 
1.4  There  should be further  investigation 
into the suitability and  corrections 
of  the various climatic indices. 
2.  Determination of  a  maximum  climatic 
value. 
2.2  Work  or  location is forbidden  in work-
ing places where the temperature ex-
ceeds  32°  eff A  (basic scale),  except-
?  E  -(2) 
ing the  cases  named  in 2 •  3  and  2.  4.  I--C-+---t--C-+---~----+--+(:....3..:.)~---+-E-I--+--C::......J---I 
2.3  An  exception can  be  made  to the ban  on 
working  on  location in temperatures 
above  32°  eff A  (basic scale)  if the 
responsible authority has  given per-
mission  and  the workers  in question 
have  been medically  examined.  ~C~(~4~)--+-~C~I---+-----~--4-~A~~--~~E~----~~C~---~ 
In this case the following  conditions 
must  be fulfilled: 
2.3.1 The  responsible authority can  only 
issue permission for  a  fixed period 
and  for  given working operations.  ~-C~~--4--C--+---~----~---4--A--+----+--E--~--~~C-+----1 
2.3.2 The  work must  be  carried out  under 
medical  supervision.  ~-C-4----+-C~(_S~)---+-----~--4------~--~--E-+----t---C-+--~ 
Principles must  be  worked  out,  in col-
laboration with medical experts,  cov-
ering the medical supervision and the 
examination envisaged under 2.3.  ~~C~~--4-----+----r----~--~-----+----+--E--~--~~C-+--~ 
2.3.3  Work  must  not  continue uninterrupted 
for more  than  one  hour.  A suitable 
break must  then be  arranged in a  better 
"climate".  ~~c~~--4-~c~+----r----~--~~A~+----+_:..._E~~--;-~c-+----; 
The  duration of uninterrupted working 
time,  as well as 
- the duration and  frequency  of  the 
breaks and 
(1)  .. 3,5 m/s. 
(2)  = not  applicable. 
(3)  = working  points where  the temperature reaches  28°C  are considered as particularly hot  (without 
this being an absolute maximum  value). 
(4)  a  for  mine  rescue  personnel. 
(5)  the work should be carried out  under  medical supervision. Recommendations  by the Commission 
- the climatic range  in which this 
break is spent,  as also 
- all other necessary provisions 
are to be  laid down  in writing by  the 
159 
N.R./Wph. 
1.1. 
1966 
Saar 
1.1. 
1966 
c 
Belgium 
1.1. 
1966 
France 
1.1. 
1966 
A 
Italy 
fl·l. 
~966 
E 
Nether-
lands 
~.1. 
~966 
c 
Inspectorate together with the respon-
sible doctor before the work begins.  C(l 
r-~---+---+---r--,_--+---~~~-4---+--~~ 
c  E  c  2.3.4 Acclimatised  persons  must  be  chosen.  C 
r-~---+---+---r--,_--+---~~~-4---+--~~ 
Persons  over  40 years  of  age  must  not 
be  put  on this work.  C  - - - E  C 
r-~---+---+--~--4---+---~~~~---+~~~ 
Persons  under  21  and  over  45  years  of 
age  must  not  be  put  to work.  C  C(2  - - E  C 
r-_,---+~~--~--+---~~~~~~--~~~~ 
2.4  An  exception  can also be  made  to the 
ban  on working  on  location in tempera-
tures above  32°  eff A  (basic scale)  if 
danger threatens or in special circum-
stances calling for  immediate action.  C  C  C'  C(3)  E  C 
r-~---+---+--~~4---~~~~~~---+~~~ 
In other cases,  however: 
2.4.1 the responsible authority and the re-
sponsible doctor must  be  immediately 
informed; 
2.4.2 the work  must  be  performed as  soon  as 
possible under the conditions  listed 
in 2.3.1 to 2.3.4. 
3.  Climatic range  between 32°  eff  A  and 
28°  eff A  (basic scale) 
3.1.1 Only  persons  shown  by  medical  examina-
tion to be  suitable can be  employed 
c  c 
c  c 
C'  A  E  c 
C'  C'  E  c 
(4) 
in this climatic range.  r--A~r---~-C-'-+----T----~---4~C~+----+~E~~--~~C-'+---~ 
The  medical  examination must  pay  par-
ticular attention to heart  and  blood 
C'  circulation.  A  - C  E  C' 
r-~---+---+---r--;---+-~~~~~---+~~~ 
Persons  continually  employed  in this 
climatic range  must  be  examined medi-
cally at  least  once  a  year.  A  - - C  E  C' 
r-~---+---+--~--4---+---~~~-+---+~~--~ 
In addition,  the following  provisions 
apply: 
3.1.2 As  soon as  a  working-point  reaches  a 
temperature above  28°  eff A  (basic 
scale)  the responsible authority must 
be  informed  in writing.  r-A--+---~C_(~5~')+---~----~--+-A--~---+~E~----~~C-+--~ 
3.1.3 The  length of  stay in the climatic 
range  between 30°  and  32°  eff  A  (basic 
scale)  is restricted to 5  hours,  and  A  C(6)  - E  C 
~--~--+-~~--~--~---+---4----~--+---4---4---~ 
in the range  between  28°  and  30°  eff  A 
(basic scale)  to 6  hours.  A  c  C'  A  E 
(1)  ~ laid down  generally in the mine  rescue plans. 
(2)  no provision for  excluding persons below  21  years  of  age  from exceptional hot  work. 
(3)  =in the case  of  the  ban  on  work or location in excessively high temperatures  •••••. 
(4)  range  of  climatic conditions above  28°C. 
c 
(5)  if 30°  eff A  (basic scale)  is reached or  exceeded the  Mines  Inspectorate must  be  informed. 
(6)  6  hours. 160 
N.R./lfph.  Saar  Belgium  France 
Nether-
Italy  lands 
Recommendations  by  the Commission 
1.1.  1.1.  1.1.  1.1.  .1.  1.1. 
1966  1966  1966  1966  &.966  1966 
3.1.4 For work  in a  climatic range  between 
28°  and 32°  eff A  (basic scale)  a 
method  of  payment  corresponding to 
these conditions must  be applied to 
eliminate any  overloading.  A  A(l'  - C'  E  C' 
3.1.5 The  provisions quoted  in 3.1.3 and 
3.1.4 apply to all persons who  during 
one shift have to work  more  than half 
the time  of  that .shift  in one  of the 
climatic ranges mentioned.  A  c  - A  E  C' 
(1)  •  must  be arranged by  tariff,  outside the responsibility of the Mines  Inspectorate. PART  FOUR 
STATISTICAL  DATA  ON  MINE  SAFETY 163 
The  Second Report  published for  the first  time  common  accident  statisti~a, 
covering  the  years  1959-1960 and  laid out  in the  manner  worked  out  by  the  Commission. 
These statistical tables,  together with  those  for  1961-1964  contained in the  present 
report  comprise  only underground accidents  - presented in  a  single classification -
group accidents being dealt  with  separately.  The  number  of casualties is in each 
instance broken  down  into the  same  series of  twelve  causes.  In all cases,  the  only 
accidents  recorded were  those which  caused  the  death  of  the  victim within 8  weeks  or 
which  prevented the  casualty  from  resuming work  underground within 8  weeks.  The  ac-
cident  frequency  is expressed in each case in terms  of  accidents  per million man-
hours.  A minimum  of  five  fatalities or  injured persons constitutes  a  standard  yard-
stick for  group  accidents. 
The  statistical data  are first  presented by coal-fields,  then  by countries, 
and  comprise  :  total  number  of  persons  disabled,  total  number  of fatalities,  frequency 
of  accidents  causing  disablement,  frequency  of fatalities,  number  of group accidents, 
number  of  persons  disabled in  a  group accident  and  number  of  fatalities in a  group 
accident. 
Finally,  there is  a  comparative  table of  the  figures  for  frequency  of 
disablement  and  of  fatalities,  and  the  number  and severity  (disablement  of  death) 
of  group  accidents. 
In working  out  this standard presentation the  Commission considered that 
it was  necessary  - bearing  in mind  the difficulties already encountered in present-
ing  national statistics - to have  a  simple  but clear system in the initial stages. 
After  a  period of trial, it would  be  advisable  to see  to what  extent  the standard 
form  would  need  to be  extended or  improved. 
However,  it has  been  found  that  there exists  a  divergence  of  views  as  to 
the  true  value  of  the  comparison  of  these  common  statistics.  It is not suitable for 
the statistical information  to be  presented in the  form  then in use. 
The  Mines  Safety Commission  has  entrusted a  Working  Party with  the  task 
of establishing whether  a  better degree  of comparability can  be  reached. 165 
A.  COMMON  STATISTICAL  SURVEY  OF  UNDERGROUND 
ACCIDENTS  IN  1960  (1) 
(1)  For  the  common  statistics for  1958 & 1959,  see  Second Report  of  the Mines  Safety 
Commission,  pp.  163 et seq. Year:  1960 
COMMON  STATISTICAL  SUMMARY  OF  UNDERGROUND  ACCIDENTS 
AT  MINES  IN  THE  E.C.S.C.  COUNTRIES 
Country:  North-Rhine/ 
Westphalia 
Coal-field:  Ruhr 
Number  of  Number  of 
casualties  disablements 
Man- as  under  (a) 
C A U S  E  Disable- Fatal- hours  per million 
ments  as  ities  worked  man-hours 
under  (a)  as under  (to third 
(b)  decimal  below  below  place) 
1)  Falls of  ground  2,265  122  4.808 
2)  Haulage  and transport  1,128  85  2.395 
3)  Movement  of personnel  1,169  35  2.482 
4)  Machinery,  handling of tools 
and supports  462  5  0.981 
5)  Falling objects  1,230  21_  2.611 
6)  Explosives  and  fumes  4  - 0.008 
7)  Explosions of firedamp or coal 
dust  - - -
8)  Sudden outbursts of firedamp, 
suffocation by  natural gases  - - -
9)  Underground  combustion and fires  2  - 0.004. 
10)  Inrushes of water  - - -
11)  Electricity  7  1  0.015 
12)  Other  causes  261  20  0.554 
TOTAL  6,528  289  471,053,408  13.858 
(a)  Casualties were  unable  to resume  work  below ground for  at least eight weeks. 
(b)  Casualties died within eight weeks. 
(c)  Accidents  involving more  than five casualties of types  (a)  and/or  (b). 
Number  of  Group  accidents 
fatalities  as under  (c)  below 
as under  (b) 
per million Number  Number  Number  man-hours  of  of dis- of fatal- (to third  acci- ablements  ities as  decimal  as  under 
place  dents  (a)  under  (b) 
0.259  1  2  4 
0.180  - - -
0.074  - - -
0.013  - - -
~-045  - - -
- - - -
- - - -
- - - -
- - - -
- - - -
0.002  - - -
0.042  - - -
0.615  1  2  4 Year: 
Country:  COMMON  STATISTICAL  SUMMARY  OF  UNDERGROUND  ACCIDENTS 
AT  MINES  IN  THE  E.C.S.C.  COUNTRIES  Coal-field: 
1960 
North-Rhine/ 
'lfestuha1ia 
.Aachen 
Number  of  Number  of 
casualties  disablements 
Man- as  under  (a) 
C A·U  S  E  Disable- Fatal- hours  per million 
ments  as  ities  worked  man-hours 
under  (a)  as under  (to third 
(b)  decimal  below  below  place) 
1)  Falls of  ground  151  15  3-698 
2)  Haulage  and  transport  113  6  2.  767 
3)  Movement  of personnel  71  2  1.  739 
4)  Machinery,  handling of tools 
and supports  14  2  0.343 
5)  Falling objects  108  - 2.645 
6)  Explosives  and  fumes  - - -
7)  Explosions of firedamp or coal 
dust  - - -
8)  Sudden outbursts of firedamp, 
suffocation by  natural gases  - 1  -
9)  Underground  combustion  and fires  - - -
10)  Inrushes of water  - l  -
11)  Electricity  - - -
12)  Other causes  1  1  0.024 
TOTAL  458  28  40,831,592  11.217-
(a)  Casualties were  unable  to  resume  work  below  ground for  at least eight weekso 
(b)  Casualties died within eight weeks. 
(c)  Accidents  involving more  than five casualties of types  (a)  and/or  (b). 
Number  of  Group  accidents 
fatalities  as  under  (c)  below 
as under  (b) 
per million Number  Number  Number  man-hours  of  of dis- of fatal- (to third  acci- ablements  ities  decimal  as  under  as 
place  dents  (a)  under  (b) 
0.367  1  6 
0.147 
0.049 
0.049 
-
-
-
0.024 
-
0.024 
-
0.024 
0.686  1  6 Year:  1960 
COMMON  STATISTICAL  SUMMARY  OF  UNDERGROUND  ACCIDENTS 
AT  MINES  IN.THE  E.C.S.C.  COUNTRIES 
Country:  North-Rhine/ 
Westphalia 
Coal-field:  IbbenbUren 
Number  of  Number  of 
casualties  disablements 
Man- as  under  (a) 
CAUSE  Disable- Fatal- hours  per million 
ments  as  ities  worked  man-hours 
under  (a)  as under  (to third 
below 
(b)  decimal 
below  place) 
1)  Falls of ground  27  5  2.  7 43 
2)  Haulage  and  transport  17  1  1.  727 
3)  Movement  of personnel  21  1  2.133 
4)  Machinery,  handling of tools 
and supports  8  - Oo813 
5)  Falling objects  18  - 1.829 
6)  Explosives  and  fumes  - 1  -
7)  Explosions  of· firedamp or coal 
dust  - - -
8)  Sudden outbursts of firedamp, 
suffocation by natural gases  - - -
9)  Underground combustion and fires  - - -
10)  Inrushes of water  - - -
11)  Electricity  - - -
12)  Other causes  5  - 0.508 
TOTAL  96  8  9,843,478  9·753 
(a)  Casualties were unable to  resume  work  below  ground  for  at least eight weekso 
(b)  Casualties died within eight weeks. 
(c)  Accidents  involving more  than five casualties of types  (a)  and/or  (b). 
Number  of  Group  accidents 
fatalities  as under  (c)  below 
as under  (b) 
per million Number  Number  Number  man-hours  of  of dis- of fatal- (to third  acci- ablements ities as  decimal  dents  as under  under  (b)  place  (a) 
0.507  - - -
0.102  - - -
0.102  - - -
- - - -
- - - -
0.102  - - -
- - - -
- - - -
- - - -
- - - -
- - - -
- - - -
0.813  - - -COMMON  STATISTICAL  SUMMARY  OF  UNDERGROUND  ACCIDENTS 
AT  MINES  IN  THE  E.C.S.C.  COUNTRIES 
Year:  1960 
Country:  North-Rhine/ 
Westphalia 
Coal-field: 
Number  of  Number  of 
casualties  disablements 
Man- as  under  (a) 
c  A-U  S  E  Disable- Fatal- hours  per million 
ments  as  ities  worked  man-hours 
under  (a)  as under  (to third 
(b)  decimal  below  below  place) 
1)  Falls of ground  2,443  142  4.682 
2)  Haulage  and transport  1,258  92  2.411 
3)  Movement  of personnel  1,261  38  2.417 
4)  Machinery,  handling of tools 
and supports  484  7  0.928 
5)  Falling objects  1,356  21  2.599 
6)  Explosives  and  fumes 
~  4  1  0.008 
7)  Explosions of firedamp or coal 
dust  - - -
8)  Sudden outbursts of firedamp, 
suffocation by natural gases  - 1·  -
9)  Underground combustion and  fires  2  ·- 0.004 
10)  Inrushes of water  - 1  -
11)  Electricity  7  1  0.013 
12)  Other causes  267  21  0.512 
TOTAL  7'  082  325  521,728,478  13.57  4 
(a)  Casualties were  unable  to  resume  work  below  ground for  at least eight weeks. 
(b)  Casualties died within eight weeks. 
(c)  Accidents  involving more  than five casualties of· types  (a)  and/or  (b). 
.Number  of  Group  accidents 
fatalities  as  under  (c)  below 
as under  (b) 
per million Number  Number  Number  man-hours  of  of dis- of fatal- (to third  acci- ablements  ities. as  decimal  as  under 
place  dents  (a)  under  (b) 
0.272  2  2  10 
0.176  - - -
0.073  - - -
0.013  - - -
0.040  - - -
0.002  - - -
- - - -
0.002  - - -
- - - -
0.002  - - -
0.002  - - -
0.040  - - -
0.622  2  2  10 Year: 
Country: 
1960 
Saar  COMMON  STATISTICAL  SUMMARY  OF  UNDERGROUND  ACCIDENTS 
AT  MINES  IN  THE  E.C.S.C.  COUNTRIES  Coal-field: 
Number  of  Number  of 
casualties  disablements 
Man- as  under  (a) 
C A U S  E  Disable- Fatal- hours  per million 
ments  as  ities  worked  man-hours 
under  (a)  as under  (to third 
(b)  decimal  below  below  place) 
1)  Falls of ground  435  13  6.466 
2)  Haulage  and  transport  182  15  2.705 
3)  Movement  of personnel  122  3  1.814 
4)  Machinery,  handling of tools 
and supports  58'  - 0.862 
5)  Falling objects  257  2  3.820 
6)  Explosives  and  fumes  2  1  0.030 
7)  Explosions of firedamp or coal 
dust  - - -
8)  Sudden outbursts of  firedamp, 
suffocation by  natural gases  - - -
9)  Underground combustion and  fires  - - -
10)  Inrushes of water  - - -
11)  Electricity  - - -
12)  Other  causes  2  - 0.030 
TOTAL  1,058  34  67,273,201  15.727 
(a)  Casualties were  unable to resume  work  below  ground for  at least eight weeks. 
(b)  Casualties died within eight weeks. 
(c)  Accidents  involving more  than five casualties of types  (a)  and/or  (b). 
Number  of  Group  accidents 
fatalities  as  under  (c)  below 
as under  (b) 
per million Number  Number  Number  man-hours  of  of dis- of fatal- (to third  acci- ablements ities as  decimal  as  under 
place  dents  (a)  under  (b) 
0.193 
0.223 
0.045 
-
0.030 
o. 015  ' 
-
-
-
-
-
-
0.506 Year: 
Country: 
1960 
Germany  COMMON  STATIS~ICAL SUMMARY  OF  UNDERGROUND  ACCIDENTS 
AT  MINES  IN  THE  E.C.S.C.  COUNTRIES  Coal-field:  North-Rhine  /.'/estpha1ia 
and  Saar 
Number  of  Number  of 
casualties  disablements 
Man- as  under  (a) 
C A U S  E  Disable- Fatal- hours  per million 
ments as  ities  worked  man-hours 
under  (a)  as under  (to third 
(b)  decimal  below  below  place) 
1)  Falls of  ground  2,878  155  4.886 
2)  Haulage  and transport  1,440  107  2.445 
3)  Movement  of personnel  1,383  41  2.348 
4)  Machinery,  handling of tools 
and supports  542  1  0.920 
5)  Falling objects  1,613  23  2.738 
6)  Explosives  and  fumes  6  2  0,010 
7)  Explosions of firedamp  or coal 
dust  - - -
8)  Sudden outbursts of  firedamp, 
suffocation by natural gases  - 1  -
9)  Underground combustion and fires  2  - 0.003 
10)  Inrushes of water  - 1  -
11)  Electricity  7  1  0.012 
12)  Other causes  269  21  0.457 
TOTAL  8,140  359  589,001,679  13.819 
r 
(a)  Casualties were  unable to resume  work  below  ground for  at least eight weeks. 
(b)  Casualties died within eight weeks. 
(c)  Accidents  involving more  than five casualties of types  (a)  and/or  (b). 
Number  of  Group  accidents 
fatalities  as under  (c)  below 
as under  (b) 
per million Number  Number  Number  man-hours  of  of dis- of fatal- (to third  acci- ablements  ities as 
decima~  as  under 
place  dents  (a)  under  (b) 
0.263  2  2  10 
0.182  - - -
0.010  - - -
0.012  - ·- -
0.039  - - -
0.003  - - -
0.002  - - -
0.002  - - -
- - - ·-
0.002  - - -
'0.002  - - -
0.036  - - -
' 
0.611  2  2  10 Year:  1960 
Country:  Belgium ·  COMMON  STATISTICAL  SUMMARY  OF  UNDERGROUND  ACCIDENTS 
AT  MINES  IN  THE  E.C.S.C.  COUNTRIES  Coal-field:  Charleroi-Namur 
Number  of  Number  of 
casualties  disablements 
Man- as under  (a) 
C A U S  E  Disable- Fatal- hours  per million 
ments  as  ities  worked  man-hours 
und.er  (a)  as under  (to third 
(b)  decimal  below  below  place) 
1)  Falls of  ground  154  8  5.121 
2)  Haulage  and  transport  106  6  3-525 
3)  Movement  of personnel  35  - 1.164 
4)  Machinery,  handling of tools 
and supports  86  - 2.860 
5)  Falling objects  7  - 0.233 
6)  Explosives  and  fumes  1  - 0.033 
7)  Explosions of firedamp or coal 
dust  - - -
8)  Sudden outbursts of firedamp, 
suffocation by natural gases  - - -
9)  Underground  combustion and fires  - - -
10)  Inrushes of water  - - -
11)  Electricity  - - -
12)  Other causes  11  1  0.366 
TOTAL  400  15  30,070,120  13-302 
(a)  Casualties were  unable  to resume  work  below  ground for  at least eight weeks. 
(b)  Casualties died within eight weeks. 
(c)  Accidents  involving more  than five casualties of types  (a)  and/or  (b). 
Number  of  Group  accidents 
fatalities  as under  (c)  below 
as under  (b) 
per million Number  Number  Number  man-hours  of  of dis- of fatal- (to third  acci- ablements ities as  decimal  as under 
place  dents  (a)  under  (b) 
0.266 
0.200 
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
0.0~3 
0~499 Year:  1960 
Country:  Belg.ium  COMMON  STATISTICAL  SUMMARY  OF  UNDERGROUND  ACCIDENTS 
AT  MINES  IN  THE  E.C.S.C.  COUNTRIES  Coal-field:  L.i~ge 
Number  of  Number  of 
casualties  disablements 
Man- as  under  (a) 
C A·U  S  E  Disable- Fatal- hours  per million 
ments  as  ities  worked  man-hours 
under  (a)  as under  (to third 
(b)  decimal  below  below  place) 
1)  Falls of  ground  10.5  5  4.280 
2)  Haulage  and transport  67  4  rd  2. 784 
3)  Movement  of personnel  28  1  fJ  1.163 
4)  Machinery,  handling of tools  rd 
F--1 
and  supports  32  -
aj  •  1.330 
~ 
C1.l 
5)  Falling objects  8  -
~  0.332  ·r-1  Q) 
6)  Explosives  and  fumes  - - F--1  s  - a·"~ 
7)  Explosions of firedamp  or coal  ct-1  0 
•IJ 
dust ;J t  - - CD  -
Srd 
8)  Sudden outbursts of  firedamp,  ·r-1  H 
~ ctl 
suffocation by  natural gases  - - ~  - Qo-f-l 
9)  Underground  combustion and fires  - -
~ ::j  - ·r-1  0 
10)  Inrushes of water  -
rd  - :::::1  -
...-i 
11)  Electricity  1  -
C)  0.042 
~ 
12)  Other causes  4 
H  0.166  -
TOTAL  243  10  24,066,536  10.097 
(a)  Casualties were  unable  to  resume  work  below  ground for  at least eight weeks. 
(b)  Casualties died within eight weeks. 
(c)  Accidents  involving more  than five casualties of types  (a)  and/or  (b). 
Nllmber  of  Group  accidents 
fatalities  as  under  (c)  below 
as under  (b)  ! 
per million Number  Number  Number  man-hours  of  of dis- of fatal- (to third  acci- ablements  ities as  decimal  as  under 
place  dents  (a)  under· (b) 
0.208 
0.166 
0.042 
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
0.416 Year: 
Country: 
1960 
Belgium  COMMON  STATISTICAL  SUMMARY  OF  UNDERGROUND  ACCIDENTS 
AT  MINES  IN  THE  E.C.S.C.  COUNTRIES 
Coal-field:  Borinage 
Number  of  Number  of 
casualties  disablements 
Man- as  under  (a) 
C  A  U  S  E  Disable- Fatal- hours  per million 
ments  as  ities  worked  man-hours 
under  (a)  as  under  (to third 
(b)  decimal  below  below  place) 
1)  Falls of  ground  111  9  8.003 
2)  Haulage  and  transport  70  1  .-o  5. 047 
~ 
3)  Movement  of personnel  18 
cU  1.298  -
4)  Machinery,  handling of tools 
r"d 
~ 
and supports  75 
cO  . 
5·407  - ~  en 
5)  Falling objects  7  1 
~ >., 
0.505  ·rl  (]) 
6)  Explosives  and  fumes  - - F-t  ~  - 0  ~ 
7)  Explosions of firedamp or coal 
~  0 
·r-;, 
dust  - 1 
(])  - s.-o 
8)  Sudden outbursts of  firedamp,  ·rl  F-t 
..p  ctl 
suffocation by  natural  gases  - - is:  - Qo..P 
9)  Underground  combustion  and fires  -
~ ~  - - •ri  0 
Inrushes of 
.-o 
10)  water  - -
~  - ,-; 
11)  Electricity  - -
0  - ~ 
12)  Other  causes  7 
H 
0.505  -
TOTAL  288  12  13,869,696  20.765 
(a)  Casualties were  unable  to resume  work  below  ground for  at least eight  weekso 
(b)  Casualties died within eight weeks. 
(c)  Accidents  involving more  than five casualties of types  (a)  and/or  (b). 
Number  of  Group  accidents 
fatalities  as under  (c)  below 
as under  (b) 
per million Number  Number  Number 
man-hours  of  of dis- of fatal- (to third  acci- ablements  ities as  decimal  as  under 
place  dents  (a)  under  (b) 
0.649 
0.072 
-
-
0.072 
-
0.072 
-
-
... 
-
-
0.865 Year:  1960 
Country:  Belgium  COMMON  STATISTICAL  SUMMARY  OF  UNDERGROUND  ACCIDENTS 
AT  MINES  IN  THE  E.C.S.C.  COUNTRIES  Coal-field:  Centre 
Number  of  Number  of 
casualties  disablements 
Man- . as under  (a) 
C  A.  U S  E  Disable- Fatal- hours  per million 
.ments  as  ities  worked  man-hours 
under  (a)  as under  (to third 
(b)  decimal  below  below  place) 
1)  Falls of  ground  78  7  6.249 
2)  Haulage  and  transport  39  - rd  3.125  s:: 
3)  Movement  of personnel  27  -
d  2.163 
4)  Machinery,  handling of tools 
rd 
H 
and supports  55  1 ..  ro  •  4.406  ~ Ul 
5)  Falling objects  14 
s::  ~  1.122  - ·ri  Q) 
s:: 
6)  Explosives  and  fumes  2  -
H  H  Ool60  0  :;j 
7)  Explosions of firedamp or coal 
ct--4  0 
•rj 
dust  - -
Q)  - Srd 
8)  Sudden outbursts of  firedamp, 
·r-f  H 
~ cd 
suffocation by natural gases  - -
~ 
~~  -
9)  Underground  combustion and fires  s::  ::s  - - ·r-f  0  -
rd 
10)  Inrushes of water  - - ::s  - ....-t 
11)  Electricity 
0  - - s::  -
H 
12)  Other causes  8  - 0.641 
TMAL  223  8  12,481,480  17.866 
(a)  Casualties were  unable  to resume  work  below  ground for  at least eight weeks. 
(b)  Casualties died within eight weeks. 
(c)  Accidents  involving more  than five casualties of types  (a)  and/or  (b). 
Number  of  Group  accidents 
fatalities  as under  (c)  below 
as under  (b) 
per million Number  Number  Number 
man-hours  of  of dis- of fatal- (to third  acci- ablements  ities as  decimal  as under 
place  dents  (a)  under- (b) 
0.561 
-
-
0.080 
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
0.641 Year: 
Country: 
1960 
Belgium  COMMON  STATISTICAL  SUMMARY  OF  UNDERGROUND  ACCIDENTS 
AT  MINES  IN  THE  E.C.S.C.  COUNTRIES  Coal-field:  South 
Number  of  Number  of 
casualties  disablements 
Man- as  under  (a) 
C AU  S  E  Disable- Fatal- hours  per million 
ments  as  ities  worked  man-hours 
under  (a)  as under  (to third 
(b)  decimal  below  below  place) 
. ~~ 
1)  Falls of ground  446  29  5.  54,1 
2)  Haulage  and  transport  282  11  rd  3-504 
3)  Movement  of personnel  108  1  §  1.342 
4)  Machinery,  handling of tools  rd 
Fi 
and supports  248  1 
aj  .  3.081  iii:  m 
5)  Falling objects  36  1 
~ ~  0.447  ·r-f  Q) 
~ 
0.037  6)  Explosives  and  fumes  3  -
~ Fi 
0  :::s 
7)  Explosions of firedamp  or coal  Ct-i  0 
•r;, 
dust  - 1  Q)  - Srt:J 
8)  Sudden outbursts of firedamp, 
·r-f  ,... 
~ aJ 
suffocation by  natural gases  - ~ - ~~  -
9)  Underground  combustion and  fires 
~ :::s  - - - ·r-f  0 
10) 
rd 
Inrushes of water  - - :::s  -
r-1 
11)  Electricity  .1  -
0  0.012. 
~ 
12)  Other causes  30  1 
.H  o. 373 
TOTAL  l-~154  45  80,487,832  14-337 
(a)  Casualties were  unable to resume  work  below ground for  at least eight weeks. 
(b)  Casualties died within eight weeks. 
(c)  Accidents  involving more  than five casualties of types  (a)  and/or  (b). 
Number  of  Group  accidents 
fatalities  as under  (c)  below 
as under  (b) 
per million Number  Number  Number  man-hours  of  of dis- of fatal- (to third  acci- ablements  ities as  decimal  as under 
place  dents  (a)  under  (b) 
0.361 
0.138 
0.012 
0.012 
0.012 
-
0.012 
-
-
-
-
0.012 
0.559 Year:  1960 
Country:  Belgium  COMMON  STATISTICAL  SUMMARY  OF  UNDERGROUND  ACCIDENTS 
AT  MINES  IN  THE  E.C.S.C.  COUNTRIES  Coal-field:  Campine 
Number  of  Number  of 
casualties  disablements 
Man- as  under  (a) 
C A·U  S  E  Disable- Fatal- hours  per million 
ments  as  ities  worked  man-hours 
under  (a)  as under  (to third 
below  (b)  decimal 
below  place) 
1)  Falls of ground  103  9  2. 216  . 
2)  Haulage  and  transport  62  9  rei  1.334  a  3)  Movement  of personnel  20  - 0.430 
rd 
4)  Machinery,  handling of tools  H 
and supports  55  1  m .  1.183  ~  ttl  s::  :>:, 
5)  Falling objects  9  - ·rl  Q)  0.194  s:: 
6)  Explosives  and  fumes  1  -
H  H  0.021  0  ::j 
7)  of  firedamp  or coal 
ct-1  0  Explosions  ·.r:> 
dust  1 
Q)  - Srel  -
8)  Sudden outbursts of  firedamp, 
·rl  H 
+>  m 
suffocation by  natural gases  - -
~ 
QO+>  -
9)  and fires  s::  ::j 
Underground  combustion  - - ·rl  0  - rei 
10)  Inrushes of water 
::j  - - - r-1 
11)  Electricity 
0  0.021'  1  3  s:: 
H 
12)  Other causes  3  - 0.065 
TOTAL  254  23  46,489,408  5.464 
(a)  Casualties were  unable  to  resume  work  below  ground for  at least eight weekso 
(b)  Casualties died within eight weeks. 
(c)  Accidents  involving more  than  five casualties of types  (a)  and/or  (b). 
N\lmber  of  Group  accidents 
fatalities  as  under  (c)  below 
as under  {b) 
per million Number  Number  Number  man-hours  of  of dis- of fatal- (to third  acci- ablements  ities. as  decimal  dents  as under  under· (b)  place  (a) 
0.194 
0.194 
-
0.021 
-
-
0.021 
-
-
-
0.065 
-
0.495 Year: 
Country: 
l960 
Beigium  COMMON  STATISTICAL  SUMMARY  OF  UNDERGROUND  ACCIDENTS 
AT  MINES  IN  THE  E.C.S.C.  COUNTRIES  Coal  field·  - (Total  for  the 
Kingdom) 
Number  of  Number  of 
casualties  disablements 
Man-
as  under  (a) 
C  A  U  S  E  Disable-
Fatal- hours  per million 
ments  as 
ities  worked  man-hours 
under  (a)  as under  (to third 
below  (b)  decimal 
below  place) 
1)  Falls of  ground  549  38  4-324 
2)  Haulage  and transport  344  20  r'd  2o 709 
3)  Movement  of personnel  128  1  ~  1.008 
4)  Machinery,  handling of tools 
rc:l 
H 
and supports  303  2  cU  .  2.386 
~ 
{/) 
5)  Falling objects  45  1 
:>;, 
0.354  ·r-1  <J) 
~-
6)  Explosives  and  fumes  4  - H  H  0.032 
0  ::) 
7)  Explosions  of firedamp  or coal 
~ 0 
•<.> 
dust  - 2 
Q)  - Src:l 
8)  Sudden outbursts of  firedamp, 
·r-1  H 
-P  m 
suffocation by  natural gases  - -
~ 
Qo..P  -
9)  Underground  combustion  and fires 
~ ::)  - - ·r-1  0  -
r'd 
10)  Inrushes of water  - -
::)  - r-i 
11)  Electricity  2  3 
C)  0.016  ~ 
J--f 
12)  Other causes  33  1  0.260 
TOTAL  1,408  68  126,977, 24C  11.089 
(a)  Casualties were  unable  to resume  work  below ground for  at least eight  weekso 
(b)  Casualties died within eight weeks. 
(c)  Accidents  involving more  than five  casualties of types  (a)  and/or  (b). 
Number  of  Group  accidents 
fatalities  as under  (c)  below 
as under  (b) 
per million Number  Number  Number 
man-hours  of  of dis- of fatal-
(to third  acci-
ablements  ities as 
decimal  dents  as  under  under  (b) 
place  (a) 
0.299 
0.157 
0.008 
0.016 
0.008 
-
0.016 
-
-
-
0.024 
0.008 
0.536 Year:  1960 
Country:  France  COMMON  STATiSTICAL  SUMMARY  OF  UNDERGROUND  ACCIDENTS 
AT  MINES  IN  THE  E.C.S.C.  COUNTRIES  Coal-field:  Nord/Pas-de-Calais 
Number  of  Number  of 
casualties  disablements 
Man- as  under  (a) 
CAUSE  Disable- Fatal- hours  per million 
ments  as  ities  worked  man-hours 
under  (a)  as under  (to third 
(b)  decimal  below  below  place) 
1)  Falls of ground  744  28  4-833 
2)  Haulage  and transport  270  16  1.754 
3)  Movement  of personnel  368  4  2.391 
4)  Machinery,  handling of tools 
and supports  215  3  1. 397 
5)  Falling objects  221  1  1.436 
6)  Explosives  and  fumes  5  - 0.032 
7)  Explosions of firedamp or coal 
dust  - - -
8)  Sudden outbursts of firedamp, 
suffocation by  natural gases  - 3  -
9)  Underground  combustion and fires  - - -
10)  Inrushes of water  - - -
11)  Electric~ty  - 2  -
12)  Other causes  137  - 0.890 
TOTAL  1,960  57  153,926,191  12.733 
(a)  Casualties were  unable to resume  work  below  ground  for  at least eight weeks. 
(b)  Casualties died within eight weeks. 
(c)  Accidents  involving more  than five casualties of types  (a)  and/or  (b). 
Number  of  Group  accidents 
fa.talities  as under_(c)  below 
as under  (b) 
per million Number  Number  Number  man-hours  of  of dis- of fatal- (to third  acci- ablements 
itie~ as  decimal  as under 
place  dents  (a)  under·  (b) 
Oo182 
0.104 
0.026 
0.019 
0.007 
-
-
0.019 
-
-
0.013 
0.013 
o. 370 
..... 
aJ 
0 Year: 1960 
Country: France  COMMON  STATISTICAL  SUMMARY  OF  UNDERGROUND  ACCIDENTS 
AT  MINES  IN  THE  E.C.S.C.  COUNTRIES  Coal-field: Centre-Midi  (not 
including Provence) 
Number  of  Number  of 
casualties  disablements 
Man- as  under  (a) 
C A U S  E  Disable- Fatal- hours  per million 
ments  as  ities  worked  man-hours 
under  (a)  as under  (to third 
(b)  decimal  below  below  place) 
1)  Falls of ground  230- 12  4-179 
2)  Haulage  and transport  141  2  2.562 
3)  Movement  of personnel  248  1  4.506 
4)  Machinery,  handling of tools 
and supports  137  - 2.489 
5)  Falling objects  131  - 2.380 
6)  Explosives  and  fumes  1  - 0.018 
7)  Explosions of firedamp  or coal 
dust  - - -
8)  Sudden outbursts of  firedamp, 
suffocation by  natural gases  - 2  -
9)  Underground combustion  and fires  - - -
10)  Inrushes of water  - - -
11)  Electricity  1  1  0.018 
12)  Other causes  37  - o. 672 
TOTAL  926  18  55,040,434  16.824 
(a)  Casualties were  unable  to  resume  work  below  ground  for  at least eight weeks. 
(b)  Casualties died within eight weeks. 
(c)  Accidents  involving more  than· five casualties of types  (a)  and/or  (b). 
Number  of  Group  accidents 
fatalities  as under  (c)  below 
as under  (b) 
per million Number  Number  Number  man-hours  of  of dis- of fatal- (to third  acci- ablements  ities as  decimal  as  under 
place  dents  (a)  under  (b) 
0.219 
0.036 
0.018 
-
-
-
-
0.036 
-
-
0.018 
-
o. 327 
..... 
00  ..... Year:  1960 
Country:  France  COMMON  STATISTICAL  SUMMARY  OF  UNDERGROUND  ACCIDENTS 
AT  MINES  IN  THE  E.C.S.C.  COUNTRIES  Coal-field:  Lorraine 
Number  of  Number  of 
casualties  disablements 
Man- as  under  (a) 
C  A·U  S  E  Disable-
Fatal- hours  per million 
ments  as  ities  worked  man-hours 
under  (a)  as under  (to third 
below  (b)  decimal 
below  place) 
1)  Falls of  ground  254  8  5. 262 . 
2)  Haulage  and  transport  83  3  1.  719 
3)  Movement  of personnel  123  2  2.548 
4)  Machinery,  handling of tools 
and supports  65  1  1. 347 
5)  Falling objects  135  - 2. 797 
6)  Explosives  and  fumes  2  - 0.041 
7)  Explosions  of firedamp or coal 
dust  - - -
8)  Sudden outbursts of  firedamp, 
suffocation by  natural gases  - - -
9)  Underground  combustion and  fires  - - -
10)  Inrushes of water  - - -
11)  Electricity  - - -
12)  Other causes  30  2  0.621 
TOTAL  692  16  48,269,743  14.335 
(a)  Casualties were  unable  to  resume  work  below  ground  for  at least eight  weekso 
(b)  Casualties died within eight weeks. 
(c)  Accidents  involving more  than five casualties of types  (a)  and/or  (b). 
Number  of  Group  accidents 
fatalities  as  under  (c)  below 
as under  (b) 
per million Number  Number  Number 
man-hours  of  of dis- of fatal- (to third  acci- ablements  i ties. as  decimal  dents  as  under  under  (b) 
place  (a) 
0.166 
0.062 
0.041 
0.021 
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
0.041 
0.331 Year:  1960 
Country:  France  COMMON  STATISTICAL  SUMMARY  OF  UNDERGROUND  ACCIDENTS 
AT  MINES  IN  THE  E.C.S.C.  COUNTRIES  Coal field·  (not including  - J?rovence)- · 
Number  of  Number  of 
casualties  disablements 
Man- as under  (a) 
C A U S  E  Disable- Fatal- hours  per million 
ments  as  ities  worked  man-hours 
under  (a)  as under  (to third 
(b)  decimal  below  below  place) 
1)  Falls of ground  1,228  48  4·774 
2)  Haulage  and  transport  494  21  1.920 
3)  Movement  of personnel  739  7  2.873 
4)  Machinery,  handling of tools 
and supports  417  4  1.621 
5)  Falling objects  487  1  1.893 
6)  Explosives  and  fumes  8  - 0.031 
7)  Explosions of firedamp or coal 
dust  - - -
8)  Sudden outbursts of firedamp, 
suffocation by  natural gases  - 5  -
9)  Underground combustion  and fires  - - -
10)  Inrushes of water  - - -
11)  Electricity  1  3  0.004 
12)  Other causes  204  2  o. 793 
TOTAL  3, 578  91  g57,236,371  13.909 
(a)  Casualties were  unable to resume  work  below  ground for  at least eight weeks. 
(b)  Casualties died within eight weeks. 
(c)  Accidents  involving more  than five casualties of types  (a)  and/or  (b). 
-
Number  of  Group  accidents 
fatalities  as  under  (c)  below 
as under  (b) 
per million Number  Number  Number  man-hours  of  of dis- of fatal- (to third  acci- ablements  ities as  decimal  as under 
place  dents  (a)  under  (b) 
0.186 
0.082 
0.027 
0.016 
0.004 
-
-
0.019 
-
-
0.012 
0.008 
0.354 
1-' 
00 
w Year:  1960 
Country:  Italy  COMMON  STATISTICAL  SUMMARY  OF  UNDERGROUND  ACCIDENTS 
AT  MINES  IN  THE  E.C.S.C.  COUNTRIES  Coal-field:  Su1cis 
Number  of  Number  of 
casualties  disablements 
Man- as  under  (a) 
C A.U  S  E  Disable- Fatal- hours  per million 
ments  as  ities  worked  man-hours 
under  (a)  as under  (to third 
(b)  decimal  below  below  place) 
1)  Falls of  ground  9  1  1.808 
2)  Haulage  and  transport  r  1.205  0  -
3)  Movement  of personnel  5  - 1.005 
4)  Machinery,  handling of tools 
and supports  3  - 0.603 
5)  Falling objects  9  - 1.808 
6)  Explosives  and  fumes  - - -
7)  Explosions of  firedamp or coal 
dust  - - -
8)  Sudden outbursts of  firedamp, 
suffocation by  natural gases  - - -
9)  Underground combustion  and fires  - - -
10)  Inrushes of water  - - -
11)  Electricity  - - -
12)  Other causes  3  - 0.603 
TOTAL  35  1  4,977,450  7.032 
(a)  Casualties were  unable to  resume  work  below  ground  for  at least eight weeks. 
(b)  Casualties died within eight weeks. 
(c)  Accidents  involving more  than five  casualties of types  (a)  and/or  (b). 
Number  of  Group  accidents 
fatalities  as under  (c)  below 
as under  (b) 
per million Number  Number  Number 
man-hours  of  of dis- of fatal- (to third  acci- ablements  ities. as  decimal  as under 
place  dents  (a)  under· (b) 
0.201 
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
0.201 ~ 
Year:  1960 
Country:  Netherlands  COMMON  STATISTICAL  SUMMARY  OF  UNDERGROUND  ACCIDENTS 
AT  MINES  IN  THE  E.C.S.C.  COUNTRIES  Coal-field:  Limbourg 
Number  of  Number  of 
casualties  disablements 
Man- as under  (a) 
C  A.  U S  E  Disable- Fatal- hours  per million 
ments  as  ities  worked  man-hours 
under  (a)  as under  (to third 
below·  (b)  decimal 
below  place) 
1)  Falls of  ground  11  2  1.305 
2)  Haulage  and transport  112  4  1.898 
3)  Movement  of personnel  11  - 0.187 
4)  Machinery,  handling of tools 
and  supports  46  - o. 780 
5)  Falling objects  29  - 0.492 
6)  Explosives  and  fumes  - - -
7)  Explosions of firedamp or coal 
dust  10  - -
8)  Sudden outbursts of firedamp, 
suffocation by natural gases  - - -
9)  Underground  combustion and fires  - - -
10)  Inrushes of water  - - -
11)  Electricity  - - -
12)  Other causes  23  1  0.390 
-;:., 
TOTAL  298  7  58,994,136  5-052 
(a)  Casualties were  unable  to resume  work  below ground for  at least eight weeks. 
(b)  Casualties died within eight weeks. 
(c)  Accidents  involving more  than five casualties of types  (a)  and/or  (b). 
Number  of  Group  accidents 
fatalities  as  under  (c)  below 
as under  (b) 
per million Number  Number  Number  man-hours  of  of dis- oi fatal- (to third  acci- ablements  ities as  decimal  dents  as under  under  (b)  place  (a) 
0.034 
0.067 
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
0.017 
0.118 
...... 
00 
CJ1 187 
B.  COMMON  STATISTICAL  SURVEY  OF  UNDERGROUND 
ACCIDENTS  IN  1961 COMMON  STATISTICAL  SUMMARY  OF  UNDERGROUND  ACCIDENTS 
AT  MINES  IN  THE  E.C.S.C.  COUNTRIES 
Year:  1961 
Country:  North-Rhine/ 
,/estpha1ia 
Coal-field:  Ruhr 
Number  of  Number  of 
casualties  disablements 
Man- as  under  (a) 
C A U S  E  Disable- Fatal- hours  per million 
ments  as  ities  worked  man-hours 
under  (a)  as under  (to third 
(b)  decimal  below  below  place) 
1)  Falls of ground  2,085  103  - 4. 702 
2)  Haulage  and  transport  1,073  89  - 2.420 
3)  Movement  of personnel  1,122  44  - 2.530 
4)  Machinery,  handling of tools 
and supports  398  11  - 0.898 
5)  Falling objects  1,224  24  - 2.  760 
6)  Explosives  and  fumes  3  - - 0.007 
7)  Explosions of firedamp or coal 
dust  1  - - 0.002 
8)  Sudden outbursts of  firedamp, 
suffocation by  natural gases  - 2  - -
9)  Underground  combustion and  fires  1  1  - 0.002 
10)  Inrushes of water  - - - -
11)  Electricity  6  3  - 0.014 
12)  Other causes  252  27  - 0.568 
TOTAL  6,165  304  443,414,925  13.903 
(a)  Casualties were  unable to resume  work  below  ground for  at least eight weeks. 
(b)  Casualties died within eight weeks. 
(c)  Accidents  involving more  than five casualties of types  (a)  and/or  (b). 
Number  of  Group  accidents 
fatalities  as  under  (c)  below 
as under  (b) 
per million Number  Number  Number  man-hours  of  of dis- of fatal- (to third  acci- ablements  ities as  decimal  as under 
place  dents  (a)  under  (b) 
0.232  - - -
0.201  - - -
0.099  - - -
0.025  - ·- -
0.054  - - -
- - - -
- - - -
0.005  - - -
0.002  - - -
- - - -
0.007  - - -
0.061  - - -
0.686  - - -Year: 
Country:  COMMON  STATISTICAL  SUMMARY  OF  UNDERGROUND  ACCIDENTS 
AT  MINES  IN  THE  E.C.S.C.  COUNTRIES  Coal-field: 
t961 
North-Rhine/ 
Westphalia 
Aachen 
Number  of  Number  of 
casualties  disablements 
Man- as  under  (a) 
C A·U  S  E  Disable- Fatal- hours  per million 
ments  as  ities  worked  man-hours 
under  (a)  as under  (to third 
(b)  decimal  below  below  place) 
1)  Falls of  ground  154  8  - ).892 
2)  Haulage  and  transport  97  7  - 2.452 
3)  Movement  of personnel  65  1  1  1.643 
4)  Machinery,  handling of tools 
and supports  16  2  - Oo404 
5)  Falling objects  96  2  - 2.426 
6)  Explosives  and  fumes  - - - -
7)  Explosions of  firedamp  or coal 
dust  - - - -
8)  Sudden outbursts of  firedamp, 
suffocation by  natural gases  - - - -
9)  Underground  combustion and  fires  - - - -
10)  Inrushes of water  - - - -
11)  Electricity  1  - - 0.025 
12)  Other causes  1  - - 0.025 
TOTAL  430  20  39, 564, 40Li  10.868 
(a)  Casualties were  unable  to  resume  work  below  ground for  at least eight weeks. 
(b)  Casualties died within eight weeks. 
(c)  Accidents  involving more  than five casualties of types  (a)  and/or  (b). 
Number  of  Group  accidents 
fatalities  as under  (c)  below 
as under  (b) 
' 
per million Number  Number  Number  man-hours  of  of dis- of fatal- (to third  acci- ablements  ities. as  decimal  as  under 
place  dents  (a)  under· (b) 
0.202  - - -
0.177  - - -
0.025  - - -
0.051  - - -
0.051  - - -
- - - -
- - - -
- - - -
- - - -
- - - -
- - - -
- - - -
. o. 506  - - -
..... 
(,0 
0 Year: 
Country: 
1961 
No1:th-Rhine/  COMMON  STATISTICAL  SUMMARY  OF  UNDERGROUND  ACCIDENTS 
AT  MINES  IN  THE  E.C.S.C.  COUNTRIES  Coal-field: 
Westphalia 
IbbenbUren 
Number  of  Number  of 
casualties  disablements 
Man- as  under  (a) 
C  A  U  S  E  Disable-
Fatal- hours  per million 
ments  as  ities  worked  man-hours 
under  (a)  as under  (to third 
below  (b)  decimal 
below  place) 
1)  Falls of  ground  26  - - 2.{  45 
2)  Haulage  and  transport  16  1  1  1.689 
3)  Movement  of personnel  24  - - 2o534 
4)  Machinery,  handling of tools 
and supports  5  2  - 0.528 
5)  Falling objects  11  1  - 1.161 
6)  Explosives  and  fumes  2  - - 0.211 
7)  Explosions  of firedamp  or coal 
dust  - - - -
8)  Sudden outbursts of  firedamp, 
suffocation by  natural gases  - - - -
9)  Underground  combustion  and fires  - - - -
10)  Inrushes of water  - - - -
11)  Electricity  - - - -
12)  Other causes  16  - - 1.689 
TOTAL  100  4  9,472,595  10.557 
(a)  Casualties were  unable  to  resume  work  below  ground  for  at least eight weeks. 
(b)  Casualties died within eight weeks. 
(c)  Accidents  involving more  than  five casualties of  types  (a)  and/or  (b). 
Number  of  Group  accidents 
fatalities  as under  (c)  below 
as under  (b) 
per million  Number  Number  Number 
man-hours  of  of dis- of fatal- (to third  acci- ablements  ities as 
decimal  dents  as under  under  (b) 
place  (a) 
- - - -
0.106  - - -
- - - -
0.211  - - -
0.106  - - -
- - - -
- - - -
- - - -
- - - -
- - - -
- - - -
- - - -
0.423  - - -Year: 1961 
Country: North-Rhine/  COMMON  STATISTICAL  SUMMARY  OF  UNDERGROUND  ACtiDENTS 
AT  MINES  IN  THE  E.C.S.C.  COUNTRIES  Coal-field: Westph_a1ia 
Number  of  Number  of 
casualties  disablements 
Man- as under  (a) 
C A.U  S  E  Disable- Fatal- hours  _per  million 
ments  as  ities  worked  man-hours 
under  (a)  as under  (to third 
(b)  decimal  below  below  place) 
1)  Falls of ground  2, 265  .  111  - 4·)99 
2)  Haulage and  transport  1,186  97  . - 2.408 
3)  Movement  of personnel  1,211  45  - 2.459 
4)  Machinery,  handling of tools 
and supports  419  15  - 0.851 
5)  Falling objects  1,331  27  - 2. 702 
6)  Explosives  and  fumes  5- - - 0.010 
7)  Explosions of firedamp or coal 
dust  1'  - - 0.002 
8)  Sudden outbursts of firedamp, 
suffocation by natural gases  - 2  - -
9)  Underground combustion and fires  1  1'  - 0.002 
10)  Inrushes of water  -·  - - -
11)  Electricity  7  3  - 0.014 
12)  Other causes  269.  27  - 0.546 
TOTAL  6,695  328  492,511,924  13.593 
(a)  Casualties were  unable to resume  work  below ground for  at least eight weeks. 
(b)  Casualties died within eight weeks. 
(c)  Accidents  involving more  than five casualties of types  (a)  and/or  (b). 
Number  of  Group  accidents 
fatalities  as under  (c)  below 
as under  (b) 
per million Number  Number  Number  man-hours  of  of dis- of fatal- (to third  acci- ablements  ities as  decimal  as under 
place  dents  (a) 
un~er·. (b) 
0.225  - - -
0.197  - - -
0.091  - - -
0.030  - - -
0.055  - - -
- - - -
- - - -
0.004  - - -
0.002  - - '!"'" 
- - - -
0.006  - - -
0.055  - - -
' 
0.665  - - -Year:  1961 
Country:  Saar  COMMON  STATISTICAL  SUMMARY  OF  UNDERGROUND  ACCIDENTS 
AT  MINES  IN  THE  E.C.S.C.  COUNTRIES  Coal-field: 
Number  of  Number  of 
casualties  disablements 
. Man- as under  (a) 
CAUSE  Disable- Fatal-
bOUTS  per million 
ments  as  ities  worked  man-hours 
under  (a)  as under  (to third 
(b)  decimal  below  below  place) 
1)  Falls of ground  395  9  - 6. 37 4 
2)  Haulage  and  transport  177  12  - 2.856 
3)  Movement  of personnel  182  3  - 2.937 
4)  Machinery,  handling of tools 
and supports  62  - - 1.001 
5)  Falling objects  302  9  - 4.874 
6)  Explosives  and  fumes  - - - -
7)  Explosions of firedamp or coal 
dust  - - - -
8)  Sudden outbursts of  firedamp, 
suffocation by natural gases  - - - -
9)  Underground  combustion and fires  - - - -
10)  Inrushes of water  - - - -
11)  Electricity  1  - - 0.016 
12)  Other  causes  10  - - 0.161 
TOTAL  1,129  33  61,966,241  18.220 
(a)  Casualties were  unable to resume  work  below  ground for  at least eight weeks. 
(b)  Casualties died within eight weeks. 
(c)  Accidents  involving more  than five casualties of types  (a)  and/or  (b). 
Number  of  Group  accidents 
. fatalities  as under  (c)  below 
as under  (b) 
per· million Number  Number  Number  man-hours  of  of dis- of fatal- (to third  acci- ablements ities as  decimal  as under 
place  dents  (a)  under  (b) 
0.145  - - -
0.194  - - -
0.048  - - -
- - - -
0.145  - - -
- - - -
- - - -
- - - -
- - - -
- - - -
- - - -
- - - -
0.~33  - - -Year: 1961 
Country: Germany  COMMON  STATISTICAL  SUMMARY  OF  UNDERGROUND  ACCIDENTS 
AT  MINES  IN  THE  E.C.S.C.  COUNTRIES  .  North-Rhine/Westphalia 
Coal-f1.eld: and  Saar 
Number  of  Number  of 
casualties  disablements 
Man- as  under  (a) 
C A U S  E  Disable- Fatal- hours  per million 
ments  as  ities  worked  man-hours 
under  (a)  as under  (to third 
below  (b)  decimal 
below  place) 
1)  Falls of  ground  2,660  120  - 4. 797 
2)  Haulage  and  transport  1,363  109  - 2.458 
3)  Movement  of personnel  1,393  48  - 2.512 
4)  Machinery,  handling of tools 
and supports  481  15  - 0.867 
5)  Falling objects  1,633  36  - 2.945 
6)  Explosives  and  fumes  5  - - 0.009 
7)  Explosions of firedamp  or coal 
dust  1  - - 0.002 
8)  Sudden outbursts of  firedamp, 
suffocation by  natural  gases  - 2  - -
9)  Underground  combustion and fires  1  1  - 0.002 
10)  Inrushes of water  - - - -
11)  Electricity  8  3  - 0.014 
12)  Other causes  279  27  - 0.503 
TOTAL  7,824  361  554,478,16:  14.109 
(a)  Casualties were  unable  to  resume  work  below  ground  for  at least eight weeks. 
(b)  Casualties died within eight weeks. 
(c)  Accidents  involving more  than five casualties of types  (a)  and/or  (b). 
Number  of  Group  accidents 
fatalities  as under  (c)  below 
as under  (b) 
per million Number  Number  Number 
man-hours  of  of dis- of fatal- (to third  acci- ablements  ities as  decimal  dents  as  under  under  (b)  place  (a) 
0.216  - - -
0.196  - - -
0.086  - - -
0.027  - - -
0.065  - - -
- - - -
- - - -
0.004  - - -
0.002  - - -
- - - -
0.005  - - -
Oo049  - - -
0.651  - - -Year: 
Country: 
1961 
Belgium  COMMON  STATISTICAL  SUMMARY  OF  UNDERGROUND  ACCIDENTS 
AT  MINES  IN  THE  E.C.S.C.  COUNTRIES  Coal-field:  Charleroi-Namur 
Number  of  Number  of 
casualties  disablements 
Man- as  under  (a) 
C  A  U  S  E  Disable- Fatal- hours  per million 
ments  as  ities  worked  man-hours 
under  (a)  as under  (to third 
below  (b)  decimal 
below  place) 
1)  Falls of  ground  134  16  - 4.955 
2)  Haulage  and  transport  91  6  - 3.365 
3)  Movement  of personnel  36  1  - 1.331 
4)  Machinery,  handling of tools 
and  supports  71  - - 2.626 
5)  Falling objects  7  - - 0.259 
6)  Explosives  and  fumes  1  - - 0.037 
7)  Explosions  of  firedamp  or coal 
dust  - - - -
8)  Sudden outbursts of  firedamp, 
suffocation by  natural gases  - ...  - -
9)  Underground  combustion and fires  - - - -
10)  Inrushes of water  - - - -
11)  Electricity  1  - - Oo037 
12)  Other causes  10  1  - o. 370 
TOTAL  351  24  27,040,400  12.980 
(a)  Casualties were  unable  to  resume  work  below ground  for  at least eight  weekso 
(b)  Casualties died within eight weeks. 
(c)  Accidents  involving more  than five casualties of types  (a)  and/or  (b). 
Number  of  Group  accidents 
fatalities  as  under  (c)  below 
as under  (b) 
per million Number  Number  Number 
man-hours  of  of dis- of fatal- (to third  acci- ablements  ities as  decimal  dents  as under  under  (b)  place  (a) 
0.592  - - -
0.222  - - -
0.037  - - -
- - - -
- - - -
- - - -
- - - -
- - - -
- - - -
- - - -
- - - -
0.037  - - -
0.888  - - -Year:  1961 
Country:  Belgium  COMMON  STATISTICAL  SUMMARY  OF  UNDERGROUND  ACCIDENTS 
AT  MINES  IN  THE  E.C.S.C.  COUNTRIES  Coal-field:  Liege 
Number  of  Number  of 
casualties  disablements 
Man- as under  (a) 
C A.U  S  E  Disable- Fatal- hours  per million 
ments  as  ities  worked  man-hours 
under  (a)  as under  (to third 
below  (b)  decimal 
below  place) 
1)  Falls of ground  66  2  - 3.426 
2)  Haulage  and  transport  52  2  - 2.~99 
3)  Movement  of personnel  19  1  - 0.986 
4)  Machinery,  bundling of tools 
and supports  24  1  - 1.246 
5)  Falling objects  4  - - 0.208 
6)  Explosives  and  fumes  - - - -
7)  Explosions of firedamp  or coal 
dust  - - - -
8)  Sudden outbursts of  firedamp, 
suffocation by  natural gases  - - - -
9)  Underground  combustion  and  fires  - - - -
10)  Inrushes of water  - 5.  - -
11)  Electricity  - - - -
12)  Other causes  5  - - 0.260 
TOTAL  170  11  19,260,712  8.825 
(a)  Casualties were  unable  to resume  work  below  ground for  at least eight weeks. 
(b)  Casualties died within eight weeks. 
(c)  Accidents  involving more  than five casualties of types  (a)  and/or  (b). 
Number  of  Group  accidents 
fatalities  as under  (c)  below 
as under  (b) 
per million Number  Number  Number  man-hours  of  of dis- of fatal- (to third  acci- ablements  ities. as  decimal  dents  as under  under  (b)  place  (a) 
0.104  - - -
0.104  - - -
0.052  - - -
0.052  - - -
- - - -
- - - -
- - - -
- - - -
- - - -
0.259  - - -
- - - -
- - - -
o. 571  - - -Year:  1961 
Country:  Belgium  COMMON  STATISTICAL  SUMMARY  OF  UNDERGROUND  ACCIDENTS 
AT  MINES  IN  THE  E.C.S.C.  COUNTRIES  Coal-field:  Borinage/Centre 
Number  of  Number  of 
casualties  disablements 
Man- as  under  (a) 
C A U S  E  Disable- Fatal- hours  per million 
ments  as  ities  worked  man-hours 
under  (a)  as under  (to third 
(b)  decimal  below  below  place) 
1)  Falls of  ground  170  3  - 1·141 
2)  Haulage  and transport  114  4  - 5.195 
3)  Movement  of personnel  43  2  - 1.959 
4)  Machinery,  handling of tools 
and supports  82  1  - 3·737 
5)  Falling objects  1  - - 0  •. 319 
6)  Explosives  and  fumes  - - - -
7)  Explosions of firedamp  or coal 
dust  - - - -
8)  Sudden outbursts of  firedamp, 
suffocation by  natural gases  - - - -
9)  Underground  combustion  and fires  :- - - -
10)  Inrushes of water  - - - -
11)  Electricity  - - - -
1~)  Other causes  10  - - 0.456 
TOTAL  426  10  21,943,56C  19.413 
(a)  Casualties were  unable to resume  work  below  ground  for  at least eight weeks. 
(b)  Casualties died within eight weeks. 
(c)  Accidents  involving more  than five  casualt~es of types  (a)  and/or  (b). 
Number  of  Group  accidents 
fatalities  as under  (c)  below 
as under  (b) 
per million Number  Number  Number  man-hours  of  of dis- of fatal- (to third  acci- ablements  ities as  decimal  as under 
place  dents  (a)  under  (b) 
0.137  - - -
0.182  - - -
0.091  - - -
0.046.  - - -
- - - -
- - - -
- - - -
- - - ·-
- - - -
- - - -
- - - -
- - - -
0.456  - - -Year:  1961 
Country:  Belgium  COMMON  STATISTICAL  SUMMARY  OF  UNDERGROUND  ACCIDENTS 
AT  MINES  IN  THE  E.C.S.C.  COUNTRIES  Coal-field:  South 
Number  of  Number  of 
casualties  disablements 
Man- as  under  (a) 
C A-U  S  E  Disable- Fatal- hours  per million 
ments  as  ities  worked  man-hours 
under  (a)  as under  (to third 
below  (b)  decimal 
below  place) 
1)  Falls of  ground  370  21  - 5-420 
2)  Haulage  and transport  257  12  - 3.765 
3)  Movement  of personnel  98  4  - 1.436 
4)  Machinery,  handling of tools 
and  supports  177  2  - 2.593 
5)  Falling objects  18  - - 0.264 
6)  Explosives  and  fumes  1  - - 0.015 
7)  Explosions of firedamp  or coal 
dust  - - - -
8)  Sudden outbursts of firedamp, 
suffocation by  natural gases  - - - -
9)  Underground  combustion and fires  - - - -
10)  Inrushes of water  - 5  - -
11)  Electricity  1  - - 0.015 
12)  Other  causes  25  1  - 0.366 
TOTAL  947  45  68,244,672  13.87 4 
(a)  Casualties were  unable  to  resume  work  below  ground  for  at least eight weeks. 
(b)  Casualties died within eight weeks. 
(c)  Accidents  involving more  than five casualties of types  (a)  and/or  (b). 
Number  of  Group  accidents 
fatalities  as  under  (c)  below 
as under  (b) 
per million Number  Number  Number  man-hours  of  of dis- of fatal- (to third  acci- ablements  ities as  decimal  dents  as  under  under. (b)  place  (a) 
0.307  - - -
0.176  - - -
0.059  - - -
0.029  - - -
- - - -
- - - -
- - - -
- - - -
- - - -
0.073  - - -
- - - -
0.015  - - -
0.659  - - -
..... 
(.0 
co Year:  1961 
Country:  Be1giuiJ1 .  COMMON  STATISTICAL  SUMMARY  OF  UNDERGROUND  ACCIDENTS 
AT  MINES  IN  THE  E.C.S.C.  COUNTRIES  Coal-field:  Campine 
Number  of  Number  of 
casualties  disablements 
Man- as  under  (a) 
C  A  U  S  E  Disable-
Fatal- hours 
per million 
ments  as  ities  worked  man-hours 
under  (a) 
as under  (to third 
below  (b)  decimal 
below  place) 
1)  Falls of  ground  90  9  - 2.015 
2)  Haulage  and  transport  56  7  - 1.254 
3)  Movement  of personnel  22  - - 0.493 
4)  Machinery,  handling of tools 
and  supports  60  1  - 1.343 
5)  Falling objects  16  - - 0.358 
6)  Explosives  and  fumes  1  - - 0.022 
7)  Explosions  of firedamp or coal 
dust  - - - -
8)  Sudden outbursts of firedamp, 
suffocation by  natural  gases  - - - -
9)  Underground combustion  and  fires  - - - -
10)  Inrushes of water  - - - -
11)  Electricity  1  - - 0.022 
12)  Other causes  9  - - 0.202 
TOTAL  255  17  44,656,712  5· 709 
(a)  Casualties were  unable  to resume  work  below  ground  for  at least eight weekso 
(b)  Casualties died within eight weeks.· 
(c)  Accidents  involving more  than five casualties of types  (a)  and/or  (b). 
Number  of  Group  accidents 
fatalities  as  under  (c)  below 
as under  (b) 
per million Number  Number  Number 
man-hours  of  of dis- of fatal-
(to third  acci-
ablements  ities as 
decimal  dents  as  under  under  (b) 
place  (a) 
0.202  - - -
0.157  - - -
- - - -
o.c22  - - -
- - - -
- - - -
- - - -
- - - -
- - - -
- - - -
- - - -
- - - -
0.381  ·- - -Year: 
Country: 
1961. 
COMMON  STATISTICAL  SUMMARY  OF  UNDERGROUND  ACCIDENTS 
AT  MINES  IN  THE  E.C.S.C.  COUNTRIES  Coal-field: 
Belgium  (Total for 
the  Kingdom) 
Number  of  Number  of 
casualties  disablements 
Man- as  under  (a) 
C A·U  S  E  Disable- Fatal- hours  per million 
ments  as  ities  worked  man-hours 
under  (a)  as under  (to third 
below  (b)  decimal 
below  place) 
1)  Falls of  ground  460  30  - 4-071 
2)  Haulage  and transport  313  19  - 2.770 
3)  Movement  of personnel  120  4  - 1.062 
4)  Machinery,  handling of tools 
and supports  237  3  - 2.097 
5)  Falling objects  34  - - 0.301 
6)  Explosives  and  fumes  2  - - 0.018 
7)  Explosions of firedamp or coal 
dust  - - - -
8)  Sudden outbursts of firedamp, 
suffocation by  natural gases  - - - -
9)  Underground  combustion  and fires  - - - -
10)  Inrushes of water  - 5·  - -
11)  Electricity  2  - - 0.018 
12)  Other causes  34  l  - 0.301 
TOTAL  1,202  62  112,901,38~  10.638 
(a)  Casualties were  unable to resume  work  below  ground  for  at least eight weeks. 
(b)  Casualties died within eight weeks. 
(c)  Accidents  involving more  than five casualties of types  (a)  and/or  (b). 
Number  of  Group  accidents 
fatalities  as under  (c)  below 
as under  (b) 
per million Number  Number  Number  man-hours  of  of dis- of fatal- (to third  acci- ablements  ities. as  decimal  dents  as under  under· (b)  place  (a) 
0.266  - - -
0.168  - - -
0.035  - - -
0.027  - - -
- - - -
- - - -
- - - -
- - - -
- - - -
0.044  - - -
- - - -
0.009  - - -
0.549  - - -Year:  1961 
Country:  France  COMMON  STATISTICAL  SUMMARY  OF  UNDERGROUND  ACCIDENTS 
AT  MINES  IN  THE  E.C.S.C.  COUNTRIES  Coal-field:  Nord/Pas-de-Calais 
Number  of  . Number  of 
casualties  disablements 
Man- as  under  (a) 
C A U S  E  Disable- Fatal- hours  per million 
ments  as  ities  worked  man-hours 
under  (a)  as·under  (to third 
(b)  decimal  below  below  place) 
1)  Falls of ground  662  20  - 4-632 
2)  Haulage  and transport  270  17  - 1.889 
3)  Movement  of personnel  306  1  - 2.141 
4)  Machinery,  handling of tools 
and supports  333  - - 2.330 
5)  Falling objects  285  1  - 1-994 
6)  Explosives  and  fumes  1  - - 0.007 
7)  Explosions of firedamp  or coal 
dust  - - - -
8)  Sudden outbursts of  firedamp, 
suffocation by  natural gases  - - - -
9)  Underground  combustion and fires  - - - -
10)  Inrushes of water  - - - -
11)  Electricity  -3  - - 0.021 
12)  Other causes  40  - - 0.279 
TOTAL  1,900  39  .142, 920,82A  13.29} 
(a)  Casualties were  unable  to resume  work  below  ground for  at least eight weeks. 
(b)  Casualties died within eight weeks. 
(c)  Accidents  involving more  than five casualties of types  (a)  and/or  (b). 
Number  of  Group  accidents 
fatalities  as under  (c)  below 
as under  (b) 
per million Number  Number  Number 
man-hours  of  of dis- of fatal- (to third  acci- ablements  ities as  decimal  as under 
place  dents  (a)  under  (b) 
0.140  - - -
0.119  - - -
0.007  - - -
- - - -
0.007  - - -
- - - -
- - - -
- - - -
- - - -
- - - -
- - - -
- - - -
0.273  - - -Year:  1961 
COMMON  STATISTICAL  SUMMARY  OF  UNDERGROUND  ~CCIDENTS 
AT  MINES  IN  THE  E.C.S.C.  COUNTRIES 
Country:  France 
Coal-field:  Centre-Midi  (not 
including Provence) 
Number  of  Number  of 
casualties  disablements 
Man- as  under  (a) 
C A.U  S  E  Disable- Fatal- hours  per million 
ities  man-hours  ments  as  as under  worked  (to third  under  (a) 
below  (b)  decimal 
below  place) 
1)  Falls of  ground  209  14  - 4-233 
2)  Haulage  and  transport  150  6  - 3. 038  ' 
3)  Movement  of personnel  137  - - 2. 775 
4)  Machinery,  handling of tools 
and  supports  208  - - 4.212 
5)  Falling objects  119  1·  - 2.410 
6)  Explosives  and  fumes  2  - - 0.040 
7)  Explosions  of firedamp  or coal 
dust  - - - -
8)  Sudden outbursts of  firedamp, 
suffocation by natural gases  - - - -
9)  Underground  combustion  and fires  - - - -
10)  Inrushes of water  - - - -
11)  Electricity  3  - - 0.061 
12)  Other causes  35  - - o. 709 
TOTAL  863  21  49,376,693  17.478 
(a)  Casualties were  unable to  resume  work  below  ground  for  at least eight weekso 
(b)  Casualties died within eight weeks. 
(c)  Accidents  involving more  than five  casualties of types  (a)  and/or  (b). 
Number  of  Group  accidents 
fatalities  as under  (c)  below 
as under  (b) 
per million Number  Number  Number  man-hours  of dis-
(to third  of  ablements of fatal-
acci- ities as  decimal  dents  as  under  under·. (b)  place  (a) 
0.283  - - -
0.122  - - -
- - - -
- - - -
0.020  - - -
- - - -
- - - -
- - - -
- - - ·-
- - - -
- - - -
- - - -
'-
0.425  - - -Year:  1961 
Country:  France  COMMON  STATISTICAL  SUMMARY  OF  UNDERGROUND  ACCIDENTS 
AT  MINES  IN  THE  E.C.S.C.  COUNTRIES  Coal-field:  Lorraine 
Number  of  Number  of 
casualties  disablements 
Man- as under  (a) 
C A U S  E  Disable- Fatal- hours  per million 
ments  as  ities  worked  man-hours 
under  (a)  as under  (to third 
(b)  decimal  below  below  place) 
1)  Falls of  ground  177  18  - 3.927 
2)  Haulage  and transport  80  6  - 1.  775 
3)  Movement  of personnel  111  1  - 2.462 
4)  Machinery,  handling of tools 
and supports  58  2  - 1.287 
5)  Falling objects  140  2  - 3~106 
6)  Explosives  and  fumes  1  - - 0.022 
7)  Explosions of firedamp or coal 
dust  - ....  - -
8)  Sudden outbursts of  firedamp, 
suffocation by natural gases  - 1  - -
9)  Underground  combustion  and fires  - - - -
10)  Inrushes of water  - 1  - .... 
11)  Electricity  1  - - 0.022 
12)  Other causes  11  - - 0.244 
TOTAL  579  31  45,076,248  12.845 
(a}  Casualties were  unable  to resume  work  below  ground for  at least eight weekso 
(b)  Casualties died within eight weeks. 
(c)  Accidents  involving more  than five casualties of types  (a)  and/or  (b). 
Number  of  Group  accidents 
fatalities  as  under  (c)  below 
as under  (b) 
per million Number  Number  Number 
man-hours  of  of dis- of fatal- (to third  acci- ablements  ities as 
decimal  as under 
place  dents  (a)  under  (b) 
0.399  1  - 7 
0.133  - - -
0.022  - - -
0.045  - - -
0.045  - - -
- - - -
- - - -
0.022  - - -
- - - -
0.022  - - -
- - - -
- - - -
0.688  1  - 1 Year:  1961  . 
Country:  France  (total)  COMMON  STATISTICAL  SUMMARY  OF  UNDERGROUND  ACCIDENTS 
AT  MINES  IN  THE  E.C.S.C.  COUNTRIES  Coal-field:  not including Provence 
Number  of  Number  of 
casualties  disablements 
Man- as  under  (a) 
C A.U  S  E  Disable- Fatal- hours  per million 
ments  as  ities  worked  man-hours 
under  (a)  as under  (to third 
below  (b)  decimal 
below  place) 
1)  Falls of  ground  1,048  52  - 4.416 
2)  Haulage  and  transport  500  29  - 2.106 
3)  Movement  of personnel  554  2  - 2.334 
4)  Machinery,  handling of tools 
and  supports  599  2  - 2.523 
5)  Falling objects  544  4  - 2o292 
6)  Explosives  and  fumes  4  - - 0.017 
7)  Explosions of firedamp or coal 
dust  - - - -
8)  Sudden outbursts of firedamp, 
suffocation by  natural gases  - 1  - -
9)  Underground  combustion and  fires  - - - -
10)  Inrushes of water  - 1  - -
11)  Electricity  1  - - 0.029 
12)  Other causes  86  - - 0.362 
TarAL  3, 342  91  2  37 ' 37 3'  7  65  14.079 
(a)  Casualties were  unable to  resume  work  below  ground for  at least eight weeks. 
(b)  Casualties died within eight weeks. 
(c)  Accidents  involving more  than five casualties of types  (a)  and/or  (b). 
Number  of  Group  accidents 
fatalities  as under  (c)  below 
as under  (b) 
per million Number  Number  Number  man-hours  of  of dis- of fatal- (to third  acci- ablements  ities.as  decimal  dents  as under  under· (b)  place  (a) 
0.219  1  - 1 
0.122  - - -
0.008  - - -
0.008  - - -
0.017  - - -
- - - -
- - - -
0.004  - - -
- - -
~ 
0.004  - - -
- - - -
- - - -
0.382  1  - 7 Year: 
Country: 
1961 
Italy  COMMON  STATISTICAL  SUMMARY  OF  UNDERGROUND  ACCIDENTS 
AT  MINES  IN  THE  E.C.S.C.  COUNTRIES  Coal-field:  Su1cis 
Number  of  Number  of 
casualties  disablements 
Man- as  under  (a) 
C A U S  E  Disable- Fatal- hours  per million 
ments  as  ities  worked  man-hours 
under  (a)  as under  (to third 
(b)  decimal  below  below  place) 
1)  Falls of ground  - 1  - -
2)  Haulage  and transport  3  - - 0.676 
3)  Movement  of personnel  7  - - 1. 578 
4)  Machinery,  handling of tools 
and supports  4  - - 0.902 
5)  Falling objects  9  - - 2.029 
6)  Explosives  and  fumes  1  - - 0.225 
7)  Explosions of firedamp or coal 
dust  - - - -
8)  Sudden outbursts of firedamp, 
suffocation by  natural gases  - - - -
9)  Underground combustion and fires  - - - -
10)  Inrushes of water  - - - -
11)  Electricity  - - - -
12)  Other causes  2  - - 0.451 
TOTAL  26  1  4, 434,781  5.861 
(a)  Casualties were  unable to  resume  work  below  ground for  at least eight weeks. 
(b)  Casualties died within eight weeks. 
(c)  Accidents  involving more  than. five casualties of types  (a)  and/or  (b). 
Number  of  Group  accidents 
fatalities  as under  (c)  below 
asf  under  (b) 
per million Number  Number  Number  man-hours  of  of dis- of fatal- (to third  acci- ablements ities as  decimal  as under 
place  dents  (a)  under  (b) 
0.225  - -··  -
- - - -
- - - -
- - - -
- - ':""  -
- - - -
- - - -
- - - -
...  - - -
- - - -
- - - -
- - - -
0.225  - - -
tl.) 
0 
CJl Year: 1961 
Country: Netherlands  COMMON  STATISTICAL  SUMMARY  OF  UNDERGROUND  ACCIDENTS 
AT  MINES  IN  THE  E.C.S.C.  COUNTRIES  Coal-field: Limbourg 
Number  of  Number  of 
casualties  disablements 
Man- as  under  (a) 
CA-USE  Disable- Fatal- hours  per million 
ments  as  ities  worked  man-hours 
under  (a)  as under  (to third 
below  (b)  decimal 
below  place) 
1)  Falls of  ground  96  6  - 1.829 
2)  Haulage  and  transport  101  5  - 1.924 
3)  Movement  of personnel  27  - - 0.514 
4)  Machinery,  handling of tools 
and supports  48  - - 0.915 
5)  Falling objects  43  - - 0.819 
6)  Explosives  and  fumes  - - - -
7)  Explosions of firedamp or coal 
dust  - - - -
8)  Sudden outbursts of  firedamp, 
suffocation by  natural gases  - - - -
9)  Underground  combustion and fires  - - - -
10)  Inrushes of water  - - - -
11)  Electricity  - 1  - -
12)  Other causes  11  - - 0.210 
TOTAL  326  12  52,482,54~  6.212 
(a)  Casualties were  unable  to  resume  work  below  ground  for  at least eight weeks. 
(b)  Casualties died within eight weeks. 
(c)  Accidents  involving more  than five casualties of types  (a)  and/or  (b). 
Number  of  Group  accidents 
fatalities  as under  (c)  below 
as under  (b)  !  per million Number  Number  Number  man-hours  of  of dis- of fatal- (to third  acci- ablements  ities as  decimal  dents  as  under  under  (b)  place  (a) 
0.114  - - -
0.095  - - -
- - - -
- - - -
- - - -
- - - -
- - - -
- - - -
- - - -
- - - -
0.019  - - -
- - - -
-
0.229  - - -207 
C.  COMMON  STATISTICAL  SURVEY  OF  UNDERGROUND 
ACCIDENTS  IN  1962 Year:  1962 
COMMON  STATISTICAL  SUMMARY  OF  UNDERGROUND  ACCIDENTS 
AT  MINES  IN  THE  E.C.S.C.  COUNTRIES 
Country:  North-Rhine/ 
Vfes tpha1ia 
Coal-field:  Ruhr 
Number  of  Number  of 
casualties  disablements 
Man- as  under  (a) 
C A U S  E  Disable- Fatal- hours  per million 
ments  as  ities  worked  man-hours 
under  (a)  as under  (to third 
(b)  decimal  below  below  place) 
1)  Falls of  ground  1,836  124  -.  4-474 
2)  Haulage  and  transport  982  61  - 2.393 
3)  Movement  of personnel  1,081  26  - 2.634 
4)  Machinery,  handling of tools 
and supports  435  16  - 1.060 
5)  Falling objects  1,114  42  - 2. 715 
6)  Explosives  and  fumes  3  . 2  - 0.007 
7)  Explosions of firedamp or ·coal 
dust  2  30"  - 0.005 
8)  Sudden outbursts of firedamp, 
suffocation.by natural·gases  - 1  - -
9)  Underground  combustion and  fires  - - - -
10)  Inrushes of water  - - - -
11)  Electricity  2  4  - 0.005 
12)  Other causes  236  23  - 0.575 
TOTAL  5,691  329  410,383,434  13.868 
(a)  Casualties were  unable  to resume  work  below  ground for  at least eight weeks. 
(b)  Casualties died within eight weeks. 
(c)  Accidents  involving more  than five casualties of types  (a)  and/or  (b). 
Number  of  Group  accidents 
fatalities  as under  (c)  below 
as under  (b) 
per million Number  Number  Number  man-hours  of  of dis- of fatal- (to third  acci- ablements ities  decimal  as under  as 
place  dents  (a)  under  (b) 
Oo302  1  1  6 
0.149  - - -
0.063  - - -
0.039  - - -
0.102  - - -
0.005  - - -
0.073  1  1  31 
0.003  - - -
- - - -
- - - -
o. 010  - - -
0.056  - - -
0.802  .2  2  37 Year: 
Country:  COMMON  STATISTICAL  SUMMARY  OF  UNDERGROUND  ACCIDENTS 
AT  MINES  IN  THE  E.C.S.C.  COUNTRIES  Coal-field: 
1962 
North-Rhine/ 
Westphalia 
Aachen 
Number  of  Number  of 
casualties  disablements 
Man- as  under  (a) 
C A.U  S  E  Disable- Fatal- hours  per million 
ments  as  ities  worked  man-hours 
under  (a)  as under  (to third 
(b)  decimal  below  below  place) 
1)  Falls of ground  138  9  - 3·753 
2)  Haulage  and transport  81  4  - 2.203 
3)  Movement  of personnel  58  1  - 1.577 
4)  Machinery,  handling of tools 
and supports  9  2  - 0.245 
5)  Falling objects  112  3  - 3-046 
6)  Explosives  and  fumes  - - - -
7)  Explosions of firedamp or coal 
dust  2  a·  - 0.054 
8)  Sudden outbursts of  firedamp, 
suffocation by  natural gases  - - - -
9)  Underground combustion and fires  - - - -
10)  Inrushes of water  - - - -
11)  Electricity  - - - -
12)  Other causes  - - - -
TOTAL  400  27  36,771,595  10.878 
(a)  Casualties were  unable to resume·work  below  ground for  at least eight weeks. 
(b)  Casualties died within eight weeks. 
(c)  Accidents  involving more  than five casualties of types  (a)  and/or  (b). 
Number  of  Group  accidents 
fatalities  as  under  (c)  below 
as under  (b) 
per million Number  Number  Number  man-hours  of  of dis- of fatal- (to third  acci- ablements  ities as  decimal  as under 
place  dents  (a)  under  (b) 
0.245  - - -
0.109  - - -
0.027  - - -
0.054  - - -
0.082  - - -
- - - -
0.218  1  2  8 
- - - -
- - - - - - - -
- - - -
- - - -
" 
0.734  1  2  8 
1\:)  .... 
0 Year:  1962 
COMMON  STATISTICAL  SUMMARY  OF  UNDERGROUND  ACCIDENTS 
AT  MINES  IN  THE  E.C.S.C.  COUNTRIES 
Country:  North-Rhine/ 
Westphalia 
Coal-field:  IbbenbUren 
Number  of  Number  of 
casualties  disablements 
Man- as  under  (a) 
CAUSE  Disable- Fatal- hours  per million 
ments  as  ities  worked  man-hours 
under  (a)  as under  (to third 
(b)  decimal  below  below  place) 
1)  Falls of  ground  27  2  - 2.908 
2)  Haulage  and transport  19  1  - 2.046 
3)  Movement  of personnel  8  - - 0.861 
4)  Machinery,  handling of tools 
and supports  3  - - 0.323 
5)  Falling objects  8  - - 0~862 
6)  Explosives  and  fumes  - -:- - -
7)  Explosions of firedamp or coal 
dust  - - - -
8)  Sudden outbursts of firedamp, 
suffocation by natural gases  - - - -
9)  Underground combustion and fires  - - - -
10)  Inrushes of water  - - - -
11)  Electricity  - - - -
12)  Other causes  11  1  - 1.185 
TOTAL  76  4  9,284,752  8.185 
(a)  Casualties were  unable to resume  work  below ground for  at least eight weeks. 
(b)  Casualties died within eight weeks. 
(c)  Accidents  involving more  than five casualties of types  (a)  and/or  {b). 
Number  of  Group  accidents 
fatalities  as under  (c)  below 
as under  (b) 
per million Number  Number  Number  man-hours  of  of dis- of fatal- (to third  acci- ablements  ities as  decimal  as under 
place  dents  (a)  under  (b) 
0.215  - - -
0.108  - - -
- - - -
- - - -
- - --- -
- - - -
- - - -
- - - -
- - - -
- - - -
- - - -
0.108  - - -
0.431  - - -Year:  1962 
COMMON  STATISTICAL  SUMMARY  OF  UNDERGROUND  ACCIDENTS 
AT  MINES  IN  THE  E.C.S.C.  COUNTRIES 
Country:  North-Rhine/ 
Westphalia 
Coal-field: 
Number  of  Number  of 
casualties  disablements 
Man- as  under  (a) 
C A.U  S  E  Disable- Fatal- hours  per million 
ments  as  ities  worked  man-hours 
under  (a)  as under  (to third 
(b)  decimal  below  below  place) 
1)  Falls of ground  2,001  135  - 4.384 
2)  Haulage  and transport  1,082  66  - 2. 370 
3)  Movement  of personnel  1,147  27  - 2.513 
4)  Machinery,  handling of tools 
and supports  447  18  - o, 979 
5)  Falling objects  1,234  45  - 2. 703 
6)  Explosives  and  fumes  3.  2  - 0.006 
7)  Explosions of firedamp or coal 
dust  4  38  - 0.009 
8)  Sudden outbursts of firedamp, 
suffocation by natural  gases  - 1  - -
9)  Underground combustion and  fires  - - - -
10)  Inrushes of water  - - - -
11)  Electricity  2  4  - 0.004 
12)  Other causes  247  24  - 0.541 
TOTAL  6,167  360  456,439,781  13.511 
(a)  Casualties were  unable  to resume  work  below  ground for  at least eight weeks. 
(b)  Casualties died within eight weeks. 
(c)  Accidents  involving more  than five casualties of types  (a)  and/or  (b). 
Number  of  Group  accidents 
fatalities  as under  (c)  below 
as under  (b) 
per million Number  Number  Number  man-hours  of  of dis- of fatal- (to third  acci- ablements  ities as  decimal  as  under 
place  dents  (a)  under·. (b) 
0.296  1  1  6 
0.144  - - -
0.059  - - -
0.039  - - -
o.-o98  - - -
0.004  - - -
--·  ·-
0.083  2  .3  39 
0.002  - - -
- - - ~ 
- - - -
0.009  - - -
0.052  - - -
0.789  3  4  45 Year: 
Country: 
1962 
Germany  COMMON  STATISTICAL  SUMMARY  OF  UNDERGROUND  ACCIDENTS 
AT  MINES  IN  THE  E.C.S.C.  COUNTRIES  Coal-field:  Saar 
Number  of  Number  of 
casualties  disablements 
Man- as  under  (a) 
C A U S  E  Disable- Fatal- hours  per million 
ments  as  ities  worked  man-hours 
under  (a)  as under  (to third 
below  (b)- decimal 
below  place) 
1)  Falls of ground  388  8  7.207 
2)  Haulage  and transport  194  10  3.604 
3)  Movement  of personnel  184  3  3.418 
4)  Machinery,  handling of tools 
and supports  87  1  1.616 
5)  Falling objects  336  3  6.241 
6)  Explosives  and  fumes  1  - 0.019 
7)  Explosions of firedamp or coal 
dust  59  299  1.096 
8)  Sudden outbursts of firedamp, 
suffocation by  natural gases  - - -
9)  Underground  combustion and fires  - - -
10)  Inrushes of water  - - -· 
11)  Electricity  1  1  0.019 
12)  Other causes  2  1  0.037 
TOTAL  1,252  326  53,833,701  23.257 
(a)  Casualties were  unable  to resume  work  below  ground  for  at least eight weeks. 
(b)  Casualties died within eight weeks. 
(c)  Accidents  involving more  than five casualties of types  (a)  and/or  (b). 
Number  of  Group  accidents 
fatalities  as under  (c)  below 
as under  (b) 
per million Number  Number  Number  man-hours  of  of dis- of fatal- (to third  acci- ablements  ities as  decimal  dents  as under  under  (b)  place  (a) 
0.149  - - -
0.186  - - -
0.056 .  - - -
0.019  - - -
0.656  - - -
- - - -
5o554  1  59  299 
- - - -
- - - -
- - - -
o·.o19  - - -
0.019  - - -
6.05~  1  59  299 COMMON  STATISTICAL  SUMMARY  OF  UNDERGROUND  ACCIDENTS 
AT  MINES  IN  THE  E.C.S.C.  COUNTRIES 
Year:  1962 
Country:  Germany 
Coal-field:  North-Rhine/Westphalia 
and  Saar 
Number  of  Number  of 
casualties  disablements 
Man- . as under  (a) 
C A.U  S  E  Disable- Fatal- hours  per million 
ments  as  ities  worked  man-hours 
under  (a)  as under  (to third 
(b)  decimal  below  below  place) 
1)  Falls of  ground  2, 389.  143  4.682 
2)  Haulage  and  transport  1,276  76  2.501 
3)  Movement  of personnel  1,331  30  2.608 
4)  Machinery,  handling of tools 
and supports  534  19  lo046 
5)  Falling objects  1, 570  48  3.077 
6)  Explosives  and  fumes  4  2  0.008 
7)  Explosions of firedamp or coal 
dust  63  337  0.123 
8)  Sudden outbursts of firedamp, 
suffocation by  natural gases  - 1  -
9)  Underground combustion and fires  - - -
10)  Inrushes of water  - - -
11)  Electricity  3  5  0.006 
12)  Other causes .  249  25  -.  0.488 
TOTAL  7,419  686  510,273,482  14.539 
(a)  Casualties were  unable to resume  work  below ground for  at least eight weeks. 
(b)  Casualties died within eight weeks. 
(c)  Accidents  involving more  than five casualties of types  (a)  and/or  (b). 
Number  of  Group  accidents 
fatalities  as under  (c)  below 
as under  (b) 
per million Number  Number  Number  man-hours  of  of dis- of fatal- (to third  acci- ablements ities as  decimal  as  under 
place  dents  (a)  under· (b) 
o. 280 '  1  1  6 
0.149  - - -
0.059  - - -
0.037  - - -
0.094  - - -
0.004  - - -
0.660  3.  62  . 338 
0.002  - .- -
- - - . -
- - - -
0.010  - - -
0.049  - - -
1.344  4  63  344 Year:  1962 
Country:  Belgium  COMMON  STATISTICAL  SUMMARY  OF  UNDERGROUND  ACCIDENTS 
AT  MINES  IN  THE  E.C.S.C.  COUNTRIES  Coal-field:  Char1eroi-Namur 
Number  of  Number  of 
casualties  disablements 
Man- as  under  (a) 
C A U S  E  Disable- Fatal- hours  per million 
ments  as  ities  worked  man-hours 
under  (a)  as under  (to third 
(b)  decimal  below  below  place) 
1)  Falls of ground  122  14  4-594 
2)  Haulage  and transport  11  1  2.900 
rO 
3)  Movement  of personnel  33  -
~  1.243  ttl 
4)  Machinery,  handling of tools  rO 
and supports  71  1  F-t  2o674  ttl  . 
5)  Falling objects  !3:  11) 
o. 376  10  - ~ :>., 
•rl  Q) 
6)  Explosives  and  fumes  - ·-
~  - F-t  F-t 
7)  Explosions of firedamp or coal  0  :::::1 
Cf.-1  0 
dust  - -
•r:>  - Q) 
8)  Sudden outbursts of firedamp,  are 
-riF-t 
suffocation by  natural gases  - 1 
~  a3  - !3: 
9)  Underground  combustion and fires 
~~  - - ~ :::::1  -
10)  Inrushes of water  -
•rl  0  -
rO  - :::::1 
11)  Electricity  - -
.......  - 0 
12)  Other causes  16  1 
,;-:: 
0.602  H 
TOTAL  329  18  26,555,73E  12.389 
(a)  Casualties were  unable to resume  work  below ground for  at least eight weeks. 
(b)  Casualties died within eight weeks. 
(c)  Accidents_ involving more  than five casualties of types  (a)  and/or  (b). 
Number  of  Group  accidents 
fatalities  as under  (c)  below 
as under  (b) 
per million Number  Number  Number  man-hours  of  of dis- of fatal- (to third  acci- ablements ities as  decimal  as under 
place  dents  (a)  under  (b) 
Oo527  1  2  6 
0.038  - - -
- - - -
0.038  - - -
- - - -
- - - -
- - - -
0.038  - - -
- - - -
- - - -
- - - -
0.037  - - -
0.678  :1  2  6 Year:  1962 
Country:  Belgium  COMMON  STATISTICAL  SUMMARY  OF  UNDERGROUND  ACCIDENTS 
AT  MINES  IN  THE  E.C.S.C.  COUNTRIES  Coal-field:  Liege 
Number  of  Number  of 
casualties  disablements 
Man- as under  (a) 
C  A.  U S  E  Disable- Fatal- hours  per million 
ments  as  !ties  worked  man-hours 
under  (a)  as under  (to third 
below  (b)  decimal 
below  place) 
1)  Falls of  ground  92  9  4.847 
2)  Haulage  and transport  69  8  3o636 
rd 
3)  Movement  of personnel  26  -
~  1. 370  m 
4)  Machinery,  handling of tools  rd 
and supports  21  -
~  1  •. 106  m . 
5)  Falling objects  4  1 
fj:  CJ) 
0.211  ~  ;::..;, 
·rl  Q) 
6)  Explosives  and  fumes  - -
~  - ~  ~ 
7)  Explosions  of firedamp  or coal 
0  ::1 
Ct-t  0 
dust  - -
•r-;,  - Q) 
8)  Sudden outbursts of firedamp,  Srd 
·rl  ~ 
suffocation by natural gases  - -
~ m  - ~ 
9)  Underground  combustion  and fires 
f:ID~  - - ~  ::1  -
·rl  0 
10)  Inrushes of water  - 5  rd  - ::1 
11)  Electricity  - -
r-1  - 0 
4 
s::  0.211  12)  Other causes  - H 
TOTAL  216  23  18,978,208  11.381 
(a)  Casualties were  unable  to  resume  work  below  ground for  at least eight weekso 
(b)  Casualties died within eight weeks. 
(c)  Accidents  involving more  than five casualties of types  (a)  and/or  (b). 
Number  of  Group  accidents 
fatalities  as under  (c)  below 
as under  (b) 
per million Number  Number  Number  man-hours  of  of dis- of fatal- (to third  acci- ablements  ities as  decimal  dents  as under  under. (b)  place  (a) 
0.474  - - -
0.422  - - -
- - - -
- - ·- -
0.053  - - -
- - - -
- - - -
- - - -
- - - -
0.263  - - -
- - - -
- - - -
1.212  - - -Year:  1962 
Country:  Belgium  COMMON  STATISTICAL  SUMMARY  OF  UNDERGROUND  ACCIDENTS 
AT  MINES  IN  THE  E.C.S.C.  COUNTRIES  Coal-field:  Borinage-Centre 
Number  of  Number  of 
casualties  disablements 
Man- as  under  (a) 
C A U S  E  Disable- Fatal- hours  per million 
ments  as  ities  worked  man-hours 
under  (a)  as under  (to third 
below  (b)  decimal 
below  place) 
1)  Falls of ground  134  2  8.209 
2)  Haulage  and  transport  105  1  rd  6.432 
3)  Movement  of personnel  37 
~  2.267  - tU 
4)  Machinery,  handling of tools  rd 
f.-1 
and supports  88  - tU  •  5.391 
~ 
Cl) 
5)  Falling objects  17  -
~  1.041  ·r-1  a> 
6)  Explosives  and  fumes 
~  - - f.-1  H  -
0  d 
7)  Explosions of firedamp or coal  ~ 0  .  .., 
dust  - - a>  -
Srd 
8)  Sudden outbursts of firedamp,  ·r-1  H 
~  tU 
suffocation by  natural gases  - 4  !:=  - QO~ 
9)  Underground  combustion  and fires  - -
~ !::1  - •rf  0 
10)  Inrushes of water  1 
rd  0.061  - !::1 
r-i 
11)  Electricity  1  -
0  0.061 
~ 
12)  Other causes  9  1 
H  0.551 
TOTAL  392  8  16,324,400  24.013 
(a)  Casualties were  unable  to resume  work·below ground for  at least eight weeks. 
(b)  Casualties died within eight weeks. 
(c)  Accidents  involving more  than five casualties of types  (a)  and/or  (b). 
Number.of  Group  accidents 
fatalities  as  under  (c)  below 
as under  (b) 
per million Number  Number  Number 
man-hours  of  of dis- of fatal- (to third  acci- ablements  ities as 
decimal  dents  as  under  under  (b) 
place  (a) 
0.123  - - -
0.061  - - -
- - - -
- - - -·· 
- - - -
- - - -
- - - -
0.245  - - -
- - - -
- - - -
- - - -
0.061  - - -
0.490  - - -Year:  1962 
Country:  Belgiu.'Il  COMMON  STATISTICAL  SUMMARY  OF  UNDERGROUND  ACCIDENTS 
AT  MINES  IN  THE  E.C.S.C.  COUNTRIES  Coal-field:  South 
Number  of  Number  of 
casualties  disablements 
Man- as  under  (a) 
Fatal- per million  C AU  S  E  Disable- hours 
ments  as  ities  worked  man-hours 
under  (a)  as under  (to third 
below  (b)  decimal 
below  place) 
1)  Falls of  ground  348.  25  5.626 
2)  Haulage  and  transport  .251  10  rd  4-058  s:: 
3)  Movement  of personnel  96 
cd  1.552  -
4)  Machinery,  handling of tools 
rd 
F-t 
and supports  180 
m . 
2.910  1  1:':  (/) 
5)  Falling objects  s::  ~ 
31  1  ·r-1  Q)  0.501 
6)  Explosives  and  fumes  F-t  e  - - 0  :::1  -
7)  Explosions of firedamp  or coal 
ct-i  0 
·r.~ 
dust 
Q)  - - E!rd  -
8)  Sudden outbursts of  firedamp, 
·r-1  F-t 
~ L\3 
suffocation by  natural gases  - 5 
~  - QD~ 
9)  Underground combustion and  fires  s::  :::1  - -
·r-1  0  - rd 
10)  Inrushes of water  1  5 
:::1  0.016  r-f 
11)  Electricity  1 
C) 
0.016  - s:: 
H 
12)  Other causes  29  2  0.469 
TOTAL  937  49  61,858,34Ll  15.148 
(a)  Casualties were  unable  to resume  work  below  ground  for  at least eight weeks. 
(b)  Casualties died within eight weeks. 
(c)  Accidents  involving more  than five casualties of types  (a)  and/or  (b). 
Number  of  Group  accidents 
fatalities  as under  (c)  below 
as under  (b) 
per million  Number  Number  Number  man-hours  of  of dis- of fatal- (to third  acci- ablements  ities as  decimal  dents  as under  under.  (b)  place  (a) 
0.404  1  2  6 
0.162  - - -
- - - -
'0. 016  - - -
0.016  - - -
- - - -
- - - -
0.081  - - -
- - -
~ 
0.081  - - -
- - - -
0.032  - - -
0.792  1  2  6 Year:  1962 
Country:  Belgium  COMMON  STATISTICAL  SUMMARY  OF  UNDERGROUND  ACCIDENTS 
AT  MINES  IN  THE  E.C.S.C.  COUNTRIES  Coal-field:  Cam pine 
Number  of  Number  of 
casualties  disablements 
Man- as  under  (a) 
C A U S  E  Disable- Fatal- hours  per million 
ments  as  ities  worked  man-hours 
under  {a)  as under  {to third 
{b)  decimal  below  ,  below  place) 
1)  Falls of ground  121  1  2.762 
2)  Haulage  and transport  101  5  '"d  2.306 
3)  Movement  of personnel  24  1  §  0.548 
4)  Machinery,  handling of tools  rO 
H 
and supports  80  4 
oj  .  1.827 
~ 
en 
5)  Falling objects  16 
~  0.365  - ·r-1  Q) 
6)  Explosives  and  fumes  - - H  ~  -- 0  :j 
7)  Explosions of firedamp or coal  ~ 0 
"r;) 
dust  - -
(])  - S<U 
8)  Sudden outbursts of firedamp,  ·n  f-i 
...p  oj 
suffocation by natural gases  - - ~~  -
9)  Underground combustion and fires 
s:::::  :j  - - ·n  o  -
10)  Inrushes of 
'1:1 
water  - -
:j  - M 
11)  Electricity 
C)  - - - s::::: 
12)  Other causes  6  -
~  0.137 
TOTAL  348  11  43,803,760  7-945 
(a)  Casualties were  unable to resume  work  below ground for  at least eight weeks. 
(b)  Casualties died within eight weeks. 
(c)  Accidents  involving more  than five casualties of types  (a)  and/or  (b). 
Number  of  Group  accidents 
fatalities  as under  {c)  below 
as under  {b) 
per million Number  Number  Number  man-hours  of  of dis- of fatal- {to third  acci- ablements  ities as  decimal  as under 
place  dents  {a)  under  {b) 
0.023  - - -
0.114  - - -
0.023  - - -
0.091  - - -
- - - -
- - - -
- - - -
- - - -
- - - -
- - - -
- - - -
- - - -
0.251  - - -Year: 
Country: 
1962 
Belgium  COMMON  STATISTICAL  SUMMARY  OF  UNDERGROUND  ACCIDENTS 
AT  MINES  IN  THE  E.C.S.C.  COUNTRIES  Coal-field:  (Total  fQr 
Kingdom) 
the 
Number  of  Number  of 
casualties  disablements 
Man- as  under  (a) 
C  A.  U S  E  Disable- Fatal- hours  per million 
ities  man-hours  ments  as  as under  worked  (to third  under  (a) 
below  (b)  decimal 
below  place) 
1)  Falls of  ground  469  26  4-439 
2)  Haulage  and  transport  352  15  rd  3·331  s;:: 
3)  Movement  of personnel  120  1 
cd  1.136 
4)  Machinery,  handling of tools 
rd 
~ 
and supports  260  5 
cd  •  2.461  ~  Ul 
5)  Falling objects 
~ ~ 
47  1  ·r-f  a>  0.445  >::: 
6)  Explosives  and  fumes  -
~  ~  - 0  :j  -
7)  Explosions of firedamp or coal 
ct;  0  .  .., 
dust  a>  - - arc~  -
8)  Sudden outbursts of firedamp,  ·r-1  ~ 
+='  cd 
suffocation by natural gases  - 5 
iS: 
~+='  -
9)  Underground combustion  and  fires 
Q  :::1  - -
.,;  0  - '"d 
10)  Inrushes of water  1  5 
:j  0.010  r-1  . 
11)  Electricity  1 
0  0.010  - ~ 
H 
12)  Other causes  35.  2·  0.331 
TOTAL  1,285  60  105,662,104  12.161 
(a)  Casualties were  unable to resume  work  below ground.for at least eight weeks. 
(b)  Casualties died within eight weeks. 
(c)  Accidents  involving more  than five casualties of types  (a)  and/or  (b). 
Number  of  Group  accidents 
fatalities  as  under  (c)  below 
as under  (b) 
per million Number  Number  Number  man-hours  of dis-
(to third  of  ablements of fatal-
acci- ities as  decimal  dents  as under  under.  (b)  place  (a) 
0.246  1  2  6 
0.142  - - -
0.010  - - -
0.047  - - -
6.010  - - -
- - - -
- - - -
0.047  - - -
- - - -
0.047  - - -
- - - -
Oo019  - - -
0.568  1  '.2  6 Year:  1962 
COMMON  STATISTICAL  SUMMARY  OF  UNDERGROUND  ACCIDENTS 
AT  MINES  IN  THE  E.C.S.C.  COUNTRIES 
Country:  France 
Coal-field:  Nord/Pas-de- Calais 
Number  of  Number  of 
casualties  disablements 
Man- as  under  (a) 
C A U S  E  Disable- Fatal- hours  per million 
ments  as  ities  worked  man-hours 
under  (a)  as under  (to third 
(b)  decimal  below  below  place) 
1)  Falls of  ground  657  24  4.629 
2)  Haulage  and  transport  309  10  2.177 
3)  Movement  of personnel  299  5  2.106 
4)  Machinery,  handling of tools 
and supports  420  5  2.959 
5)  Falling objects  284  4  2.001 
6)  Explosives  and  fumes  4  ·- 0.028 
7)  Explosions of firedamp or coal 
dust  - - -
8)  Sudden outbursts of firedamp, 
suffocation by natural gases  - - -
9)  Underground  combustion and fires  - - -
10)  Inrushes of water  - - -
11)  Electricity  1  2  0.007 
12)  Other causes  41  1  0.289 
TOTAL  2,015  51  ~41,935,032  14.196 
(a)  Casualties were  unable  to resume  work  below ground for  at least eight weeks. 
(b)  Casualties died within eight weeks. 
(c)  Accidents  involving more  than five casualties of types  (a)  and/or  (b). 
Number  of  Group  accidents 
fatalities  as  under  (c)  below 
as under  (b) 
per million Number  Number  Number  man-hours  of  of dis- of fatal- (to third  acci- ablements  ities as  decimal  as  under 
place  dents  (a)  under  (b) 
0.170  1  - 6 
0.070  - -
0.035  - - -
0.035  - - -
0.028  - - -
- - - -
- - - -
- - - -
- - - -
- - - -
0.014  - - -
0.001  - - -
0.359  .1.  - 6 Year: 1962 
COMMON  STATISTICAL  SUMMARY  OF  UNDERGROUND  ACCIDENTS 
AT  MINES  IN·  THE  E.C.S.C.  COUNTRIES 
Country: France 
Centre-Midi  (not 
Coal-field: including Provence) 
Number  of  Number  of 
casualties  disablements 
Man- _  as under  (a) 
C  A.  U S  E  Disable- Fatal- hours  per million 
ments as  ities  worked  man-hours 
under  (a)  as under  (to third 
below  (b)  decimal 
below  place) 
1)  Falls of ground  172  6  3.699 
2)  Haulage  and  transport  109  1  2.343 
3)  Movement  of personnel  144  2  3.096 
4)  Machinery,  handling of tools 
and supports  208  1  4·472 
5)  Falling objects  105  1  2.257 
6)  Explosives  and  fumes  6  - 0.129 
7)  Explosions of firedamp  or coal 
dust  - - -
8)  Sudden outbursts of firedamp, 
suffocation by natural gases  - - -
9)  Underground  combustion and fires  - - -
10)  Inrushes of water  - - -
11)  Electricity  - - -
12)  Other causes  13  1  o. 279 
TOTAL  757  12  46,491,552  16.27 5 
(a)  Casualties were  unable  to resume  work  below  ground for  at least eight weeks. 
(b)  Casualties died within eight weeks. 
(c)  Accidents  involving more  than five casualties of types  (a)  and/or  (b). 
Number  of  Group  accidents 
fatalities  as under  (c)  below 
as under  (b) 
per million Number  Number  Number 
man-hours  of  of dis- of fatal- (to third  acci- ablements ities as 
decimal  dents  as under  under  (b) 
place  (a) 
0.128  - - -
0.022  - - -
0.042  - - -
0.022  - - -
0.022  - - -
- - - -
- - - -
- - - -
- - - -
- - - -
- - - -
o.o22  - - -
0.258  - - -Year:  1962 
Country:  France  COMMON  STATISTICAL  SUMMARY  OF  UNDERGROUND  ACCIDENTS 
AT  MINES  IN  THE  E.C.S.C.  COUNTRIES  Coal-field:  Lorraine 
Number  of  Number  of 
casualties  disablements 
Man- ·  as  under  (a) 
C A U S  E  Disable- Fatal- hours  per million 
ments  as  ities  worked  man-hours 
under  (a)  as under  (to third 
(b)  decimal  below  below  place) 
1)  Falls of ground  155  9  3.469 
2)  Haulage  and transport  94  7  2.105 
3)  Movement  of personnel  130  3  2.911 
4)  Machinery,  handling of tools 
and supports  69  1  1o545 
5)  Falling objects  94  2  2.105 
6)  Explosives  and  fumes  2  ~  0.045 
7)  Explosions of firedamp or coal 
dust  1  1  0.022 
8)  Sudden outbursts of firedamp, 
suffocation by  natural gases  - - -
9)  Underground  combustion and fires  - - -
10)  InrusheS of water  - - -
11)  Electricity  - - -
12)  Other causes  2  - 0.045 
TOTAL  547  23  44,655,224  12.247 
(a)  Casualties were  unable  to  resume  work  below  ground for  at least eight weeks. 
(b)  Casualties died within eight weeks. 
(c)  Accidents  involving more  than five casualties of types  (a)  and/or  (b). 
Number  of  Group  accidents 
fatalities  as under  (c)  below 
as under  (b) 
per million Number  Number  Number  man-hours  of  of dis- of fatal- (to third  acci- ablements  ities  decimal  as under  as 
place  dents  (a)  under  (b) 
0.202  - - -
0.157  - - -
0.067  - - -
0.022  - - -
0.045  - - -
- - - -
0.022  - - -
- - - -
- - - -
- - - -
- - - -
- - - -
0.515  - - -Year: 1962 
Country:  France  (not 
including  Provence) 
COMMON  STATISTICAL  SUMMARY  OF  UNDERGROUND  ACCIDENTS 
AT  MINES  IN  THE  E.C.S.C.  COUNTRIES  Coal-field: 
Number  of  Number  of 
casualties  disablements 
Man- as  under  (a) 
C  A·  U S  E  Disable- Fatal- hours  per million 
ments  as  ities  worked  man-hours 
as under  (to third  under  (a)  (b)  decimal  below  below  place) 
1)  Falls of  ground  984.  39  4.222 
2)  Haulage  and  transport  512  18  2.196 
3)  Movement  of personnel  573  10  2.458 
4)  Machinery,  bundling of tools 
and supports  687  7  2o991 
5)  Falling objects  483  7  2.073 
6)  Explosives  and  fumes  12  - 0.051 
7)  Explosions of firedamp or coal 
dust  1  1  0.004 
8)  Sudden outbursts of  firedamp, 
suffocation by natural gases  - - -
9)  Underground combustion and fires  - - -
10)  Inrushes of water  - - -
11)  Electricity  1  2  0.004 
12)  Other causes  56  2  0.240 
TOTAL  3,319  86.  233,081, soc  14.239 
(a)  Casualties were  unable  to  resume  work  below  ground  for  at least eight weeks. 
(b)  Casualties died within eight weeks. 
(c)  Accidents  involving more  than five casualties of types  (a)  and/or  (b). 
Number  of  Group  accidents 
fatalities  as under  (c)  below 
as under  (b) 
per million Number  Number  Number  man-hours  of  of dis- of fatal- (to third  ablements 
decimal  acci- as  under  ities as 
place  dents  (a)  under  (b) 
0.167  1  - 6 
o. 077  - - -
0.043  - - -
0.030  - - -
0.030  - - -
- - - -
0.004  - - -
- - - -
- - - -
- - - -
0.009  -·  - -
0.009  - - -
0.369  1  - 6 Year: 1962 
Country:  Italy  COMMON  STATISTICAL  SUMMARY  OF  UNDERGROUND  ACCIDENTS 
AT  MINES  IN  THE  E.C.S.C.  COUNTRIES  Coal-field: Sulcis 
Number  of  Number  of 
casualties  disablements 
Man- as  under  (a) 
C  A  U  S  E  Disable- Fatal- hours  per million 
ities  man-hours  ments  as  as  under  worked  (to  third  under  (a)  (b)  decimal  below  below  place) 
1)  Falls of  ground  3  - o. 792 
2)  Haulage  and  transport  7  - 1.847 
3)  Movement  of personnel  4  - 1.056 
4)  Machinery,  handling of tools 
and supports  6  - 1.584 
5)  Falling objects  9  - 2. 375 
6)  Explosives  and  fumes  - - -
7)  Explosions of  firedamp  or coal 
dust  - - -
8)  Sudden outbursts of  firedamp, 
suffocation by  natural  gases  - - -
9)  Underground  combustion  and fires  - - -
10)  Inrushes of water  - - -
11)  Electricity  - - -
12)  Other  causes  - - -
TOTAL  29  - 3,788,603  7.654 
(a)  Casualties were  unable  to  resume  work  below  ground  for  at least eight weekso 
(b)  Casualties died within eight weeks. 
(c)  Accidents  involving more  than five casualties of types  (a)  and/or  (b). 
Number  of  Group  accidents 
fatalities  as  under  (c)  below 
as  under  (b) 
per million  Number  Number  Number 
man-hours  of  dis-
(to third  of  ablements  of fatal-
decimal  acci- as  under  ities as 
place  dents  (a)  under  (b) 
- - - -
- - - -
- - - -
- - - -
- - - -
- - - -
- - - -
- - - -
- - - -
- - - -
- - - -
- - - -
- - - -Year: 1962 
Country: Netherlands  COMMON  STATISTICAL  SUMMARY  OF  UNDERGROUND  ACCIDENTS 
AT  MINES  IN  THE  E.C.S.C.  COUNTRIES  Coal-field: Lim  bourg 
Number  of  Number  of 
casualties  disablements 
Man- as under  (a) 
C A·U  S  E  Disable- Fatal- hours  per million 
ments  as  ities  worked  man-hours 
under  (a)  as under  (to third 
below  (b)  decimal 
below  place) 
1)  Falls of  ground  108  3  2.238 
2)  Haulage  and  transport  125  3  2.590 
3)  Movement  of personnel  28  - 0.580 
4)  Machinery,  handling of tools 
and supports  49  2  1.015 
5)  Falling objects  31  - 0.642 
6)  Explosives  and  fumes  - - -
7)  Explosions of firedamp or coal 
dust  - - -
8)  Sudden outbursts of  firedamp, 
suffocation by natural gases  - - -
9)  Underground combustion  and fires  - - -
10)  Inrushes of water  - - -
11)  Electricity  1  - 0.021 
12)  Other causes  24  - 0.497 
TOTAL  366  8  48,269,112  7-583 
(a)  Casualties were  unable to resume  work  below  ground for  at least eight weeks. 
(b)  Casualties died within eight weeks. 
(c)  Accidents  involving more  than five casualties of types  (a)  and/or  (b). 
Number  of  Group  accidents 
fatalities  as under  (c)  below 
as under  (b) 
per million Number  Number  Number  man-hours  of  of dis- of fatal- (to third  acci- ablements  ities as  decimal  dents  as under  under  (b)  place  (a) 
0.062  - - -
0.062  - - -
- - - -
0.041  - - -
- - - -
- - - -
- - - -
- - - -
- - - -
- - - -
- - - -
- - - -
0.166  - - -227 
Do  COMMON  STATISTICAL  SURVEY  OF  UNDERGROUND 
ACCIDENTS  FOR  1963 Year: 1963 
COMMON  STATISTICAL  SUMMARY  OF  UNDERGROUND  ACCIDENTS 
AT  MINES  IN  THE  E.C.S.C.  COUNTRIES 
Country: North-Rhine/ 
Westphalia 
Coal-field: Ruhr 
Number  of  Number  of 
casualties  disablements 
Man- as  under  (a) 
C A U S  E  Disable- Fatal- hours  per million 
ments  as  ities  worked  man-hours 
under  (a)  as under  (to third 
(b)  decimal  below  below  place) 
1)  Falls of ground  1,823  100  - 4. 676 
2)  Haulage  and  transport  922  70  - 2.365 
3)  Movement  of personnel  1,017  37  - 2.609 
4)  Machinery,  handling of tools 
and supports  480  8  - 1.231 
5)  Falling objects  1,095  33  - 2.809 
6)  Explosives  and  fumes  1  - - 0.002 
7)  Explosions of firedamp or coal 
dust  5  1  - 0.013 
8)  Sudden outbursts of  firedamp, 
suffocation by  natural gases  - - - -
9)  Underground  combustion and fires  - 3  - -
10)  Inrushes of water  - - - -
11)  Electricity  2  1  - O.OC5 
12)  Other causes  212  12  - 0.544 
TOTAL  5,557  265  389,843,667  14.254 
(a)  Casualties were  unable  to resume  work  below ground for  at least eight weeks. 
(b)  Casualties died within eight weeks. 
(c)  Accidents  involving more  than five casualties of types  (a)  and/or  (b). 
Number  of  Group  accidents 
fatalities  as under  (c)  below 
as under  (b) 
per million Number  Number  Number  man-hours  of  of dis- of fatal- (to third  acci- ablements  ities as  decimal  as under 
place  dents  (a)  under  (b) 
0.257  - - -
0.180  - - -
0.095  - - -
0.020  - - -
0.085  - - -
- - - -
0.002  - - -
- - - -
0.008  - - -
- - - -
0.002  - - -
0.031  - - -
Oo680  - - -Year: 
Country: 
1963 
No rth-1thine I 
·:,· r~ s t phu.l i. a 
1  COMMON  STATISTICAL  SUMMARY  OF  UNDERGROUND  ACCIDENTS 
AT  MINES  IN  THE  E.C.S.C.  COUNTRIES  Coal-field:  Aachen 
Number  of  Number  of 
casualties  disablements 
Man- as  under  (a) 
C  A  U  S  E  Disable- Fatal- hours  per million 
ities  man-hours 
ments  as  as  under  worked  (to third 
under  (a)  (b)  decimal 
below  below  place) 
1)  Falls of  ground  93  4  - 2. 703 
2)  Haulage  and  transport  85  4  - 2. 470 
3)  Movement  of personnel  51  3  - 1.4U2 
4)  Machinery,  handling of  tools 
and  supports  15  l  - c./~  )tJ 
5)  Falling objects  7 l- - - 2.150 
6)  Explosives  and  fumes  - - - -
7)  Explosions  of  firedamp  or  coal 
dust  - - - -
8)  Sudden outbursts of  firedamp, 
suffocation by  natural  gases  - - - -
9)  Underground  combustion  and  fires  - - - -
10)  Inrushes of water  - - - -
11)  Electricity  2  - - Oo058 
12)  Other  causes  2  - - 0.058 
TOTAL  322  12  34,410,642  9-358 
(a)  Casualties were  unable  to  resume  work  below  ground  for  at  least eight  weekso 
(b)  Casualties died within eight weeks. 
(c)  Accidents  involving more  than five  casualties of types  (a)  and/or  (b). 
Number  of  Group  accidents 
fatalities  as  under  (c)  below 
as  under  (b) 
per million  Number  Number  Number 
man-hours  of dis-
(to third  of  ablements  of  fatal-
decimal  acci- under  ities as 
dents  as  under  (b) 
place  (a) 
0.116  - - -
0.116  - - -
0.087  - - -
'  I  , ') J 
\..I.  \,.I  L....  /  - - -
- - - -
- - - -
- - - -
- - - -
- - - -
- - - -
- - - -
- - - -
0-349  - - -Year: 1963 
COMMON  STATISTICAL  SUMMARY  OF  UNDERGROUND  ACCIDENTS 
AT  MINES  IN  THE  E.C.S.C.  COUNTRIES 
Country: North-Rhine/ 
\·~·e s tpha1ia 
Coal-field: IbbenbUren 
Number  of  Number  of 
casualties  disablements 
Man- as  under  (a) 
C  A  U  S  E  Disable- Fatal- hours  per million 
ities  man-hours  ments  as  as under  worked  (to third  under  (a)  (b)  decimal  below  below  place) 
1)  Falls of  ground  21  7  - 2.222 
2)  Haulage  and  transport  11  2  - 1.164 
3)  Movement  of personnel  17  - - 1.798 
4)  Machinery,  handling of tools 
and supports  9  - - 0.952 
5)  Falling objects  17  - - 1.798 
6)  Explosives  and  fumes  - - - -
7)  Explosions of  firedamp or coal 
dust  - - - -
8)  Sudden outbursts of  firedamp, 
suffocation by  natural  gases  - - - -
9)  Underground  combustion and fires  - - - -
10)  Inrushes of water  - - - -
11)  Electricity  - - - -
12)  Other  causes  13  - - 1. 376 
TOTAL  88  9  9,452,280  9-310 
(a)  Casualties were  unable  to  resume  work  below  ground for  at least eight weeks. 
(b)  Casualties died within eight weeks. 
(c)  Accidents  involving more  than five casualties of types  (a)  and/or  (b). 
Number  of  Group  accidents 
fatalities  as under  (c)  below 
as under  (b) 
per million  Number  Number  Number 
man-hours  of dis-
(to third  of  ablements of fatal-
decimal  acci- as  under  ities as 
place  dents  (a)  under  (b) 
0.740  - - -
0.212  - - -
- - - -
- - - -
- - - -
- - - -
- ....  - -
- - - -
- - - -
- - - -
- - - -
- - - -
0.952  - - -Year:  1963 
COMMON  STATISTICAL  SUMMARY  OF  UNDERGROUND  ACCIDENTS 
AT  MINES  IN  THE  E.C.S.C.  COUNTRIES 
Country:  North-llliine/ 
i/estpha1ia 
Coal-field: 
Number  of  Number  of 
casualties  disablements 
Man- as  under  (a) 
C  A.  U  S  E  Disable- Fatal- hours  per million 
ments  as  ities  worked  man-hours 
under  (a)  as under  (to third 
(b)  decimal  below  below  place) 
1)  Falls of  ground  1, 937  111  - 4.466 
2)  Haulage  and  transport  1,018  76  - 2.347 
3)  Movement  of personnel  1,085  40  - 2.502 
4)  Machinery,  handling of tools 
and supports  504  9  - 1.162 
5)  Falling objects  1,186  33  - 2.735 
6)  Explosives  and  fumes  1  - - C.OJ2 
7)  Explosions  of  firedamp  or coal 
dust  5  1  - 0.011 
8)  Sudden outbursts of  firedamp, 
suffocation by  natural  gases  - - - -
9)  Underground  combustion  and  fires  - 3  - -
10)  Inrushes of water  - - - -
11)  Electricity  4  1  - 0.009 
12)  Other  causes  227  12  - 0.523 
TOTAL  5,967  286  433,706,585  13.7  58 
(a)  Casualties were  unable  to  resume  work  below  ground  for  at  least eight  weekso 
(b)  Casualties died within eight weeks. 
(c)  Accidents  involving more  than five  casualties of  types  (a)  and/or  (b). 
Number  of  Group  accidents 
fatalities  as  under  (c)  below 
as under  (b) 
per million Number  Number  Number 
man-hours  of  of dis- of fatal- (to third  acci- ablements  ities as  decimal  as  under 
place  dents  (a)  under  (b) 
0.256  - - -
0.175  - - -
0.092  - - -
0.021  - - -
0. 076  - - -
- - - -
0.002  - - -
- - - -
0.001  - - -
- - - -
0.002  - - -
0.028  - - -
0.659  - - -Year: 1963 
Country: Germany  COMMON  STATISTICAL  SUMMARY  OF  UNDERGROUND  ACCIDENTS 
AT  MINES  IN  THE  E.C.S.C.  COUNTRIES  Coal-field: Saar 
Number  of  Number  of 
casualties  disablements 
Man- as  under  (a)  . 
Fatal- per million  C  A  U  S  E  Disable- ities  hours  man-hours  ments  as  as under  worked  (to third  under  (a)  (b)  decimal  below  below  place) 
1)  Falls of  ground  319  15  - 6.366 
2)  Haulage  and  transport  159.  10  - 3-173 
3)  Movement  of personnel  195  3  - 3.891 
4)  Machinery,  handling of tools 
and  supports  83  - - 1.656 
5)  Falling objec·cs  284  2  - 5.667 
6)  Explosives  and  fumes  2  - - Oo0)9 
7)  Explosions of  firedamp  or coal 
dust  - - - -
8)  Sudden outbursts of  firedamp, 
suffocation by  natural  gases  - - - -
9)  Underground  combustion  and  fires  - - - -
10)  Inrushe~ of water  2  2  - 0.039 
11)  Electricity  2  - - 0.039 
12)  Other  causes  2  - - 0.039 
TOTAL  1,048  32  50,108,834  20.914 
(a)  Casualties were  unable  to  resume  work  below  ground  for  at least eight weekso 
(b)  Casualties died within eight weeks. 
(c)  Accidents  involving more  than five casualties of  types  (a)  and/or  (b). 
Number  of  Group  accidents 
fatalities  as under  (c)  below 
as under  (b) 
per million  Number 
man-hours 
Number  of dis- Number 
(to third  of  ablements of fatal-
decimal  acci- as  under  ities as 
place  dents  (a)  under  (b) 
0.299  - - -
0.199  - - -
0.059  - - -
- - - -
0.039  - - -
- - - -
- - - -
- - - -
- - - -
0.039  - - -
- - - -
- - - -
0.638  - - -Year:  1963 
COMMON  STATISTICAL  SUMMARY  OF  UNDERGROUND  ACCIDENTS 
AT  MINES  IN  THE  E.C.S.C.  COUNTRIES 
Country:  Germany 
North-Hhine/Westphalia 
Coal-field:  and  Saarland 
Number  of  Number  of 
casualties  disablements 
Man- as  under  (a) 
C A.U  S  E  Disable- Fatal- hours  per million 
ments  as  ities  worked  man-hours 
under  (a)  as under  (to third 
below  (b)  decimal 
below  place) 
1)  Falls of  ground  2,256  126  - 4.663 
2)  Haulage  and transport  1,177  86  - 2.433 
3)  Movement  of personnel  1,280  43  - 2.646 
4)  Machinery,  handling of tools 
and  supports  587  9  - 1.213 
5)  Falling objects  1,470  35  - 3.038 
6)  Explosives  and  fumes  3  - - o.oo6 
7)  Explosions of firedamp or coal 
dust  5  1  - 0.010 
8)  Sudden outbursts of  firedamp, 
suffocation by  natural gases  - - - - - 9)  Underground  combustion  and fires  - 3  - -
10)  Inrushes of water  2  2  - 0.004 
11)  Electricity  6  1  - 0.012 
12)  Other causes  229  12  - 0.473 
TOTAL  7,015  318  ~8  3' 815 ' 4  2  3  14.499 
(a)  Casualties were  unable to resume  work  below  ground for  at least eight weeks. 
(b)  Casualties died within eight weeks. 
(c)  Accidents  involving more  than five casualties of types  (a)  and/or  (b). 
Number  of  Group  accidents 
fatalities  as under  (c)  below 
as under  (b) 
per million Number  Number  Number  man-hours  of  of dis- of fatal- (to third  acci- ablements  ities as  decimal  dents  as  under  under  (b)  place  (a) 
0.260  - - -
0.178  - - -
0.089  - - -
0.019  - - -
0.072  - - -
- - - -
0.802  - - -
- - - -
0.006  - - -
O.J04  - - -
0.002  - - -
0.025  - - -
0.657  - - -Year: 1963 
Country: Be 1gl  urn  COMMON  STATISTICAL  SUMMARY  OF  UNDERGROUND  ACCIDENTS 
AT  MINES  IN  THE  E.C.S.C.  COUNTRIES  Coal-field: Char1eroi-Namur 
Number  of  Number  of 
casualties  disablements 
Man- as under  (a) 
Disable- Fatal- hours  per million  C  A  U  S  E  ities  man-hours  ments  as  as under  worked  (to third  under  (a)  (b)  decimal  below  below  place) 
1)  Falls of ground  111  10  4.001 
2)  Haulage  and  transport  90  6  rd  3-244 
3)  Movement  of personnel  44  l  s:::  1.586  m 
4)  Machinery,  handling of tools  rd 
H  and supports  64  - m  •  2. 307 
~  CJl 
5)  Falling objects  14  - s::  ~  0.505  ·ri  <L> 
6)  Explosives  and  fumes  1  s::  0.036  - H  H 
0  ::$ 
7)  Explosions of firedamp or coal  'H  0 
dust 
•r:>  - - <L>  -
8)  Sudden outbursts of  firedamp, 
Srd 
·rl  H 
suffocation by  natural gases 
~ m  - - ~  -
9)  Underground  combustion  and fires  -
b.O~  - s::  ::$  - ·rl  0 
10)  Inrushes of water  - 2  rd  - ::$ 
11)  Electricity 
r-1  - - 0  - s::: 
12)  Other causes  11  1 
H  0.397 
TOTAL  335  20  27,740,720  12.076 
(a)  Casualties were  unable  to  resume  work  below  ground for  a·t  least eight weeks. 
(b)  Casualties died within eight weeks. 
(c)  Accidents  involving more  than five casualties of types  (a)  and/or  {b). 
Number  of  Group  accidents 
fatalities  as under  (c)  below 
as under  (b) 
per million Number  Number  Number 
man-hours  of dis-
(to third  of  ablements of fatal-
decimal  acci- as under  ities as 
place  dents  {a)  under  (b) 
0.361  - - -
0.216  - - -
0.036  - - -
- - - -
- - - -
- - - -
- - - -
- - - -
- - - -
O.J72  - - -
- - - -
0.036  - - -
o. 721  - - -Year:  1963 
Country:  Belgium  COMMON  STATISTICAL  SUMMARY  OF  UNDERGROUND  ACCIDENTS 
AT  MINES  IN  THE  E.C.S.C.  COUNTRIES 
~  Coal-field:  Liege 
Number  of  Number  of 
casualties  disablements 
Man- as under  (a) 
C  A.  U S  E  Disable- Fatal- hours  per million 
ments as  ities  worked  man-hours 
under  (a)  as under  (to third 
(b)  decimal  below  below  place) 
1)  Falls of ground  87  7  4·593 
2)  Haulage and  transport  78  7  rd  4.118 
3)  Movement  of personnel  15  3  §  0.792 
4)  Machinery,  handling of tools  rd 
H  and supports  39  - ctl  •  2.059 
~  Ul 
5)  Falling objects  12  - r;:::  ~  0.633 
·r-f  (]) 
6)  Explosives  and  fumes  - -
r;:::  - H  H 
0  ~ 
7)  Explosions of firedamp or coal  ct-1  0 
dust 
'r;)  - - - (]) 
8)  Sudden outbursts of  firedamp, 
S'Ll 
·r-f  H 
suffocation by natural 
~ ctl  - gases  - - tu:J! 
9)  Underground combustion and fires  - - s::  ~  - ·r-f  0 
10)  Inrushes of water  rd  - - - ~ 
r-l . 
11)  Electricity  - -
()  - s:: 
12)  Other  causes  3  2  H  0.158 
TOTAL  234  19  18,941,342  12.353 
(a)  Casualties were unable  to resume  work  below ground for at least eight weeks. 
(b)  Casualties died within eight weeks. 
(c)  Accidents  involving more  than five casualties of types  (a)  and/or  (b). 
Number  of  Group  accidents 
fatalities  as under  (c)  below 
as under  (b) 
per million Number  Number  Number  man-hours  of  of dis- of fatal- (to third  acci- ablements  ities as  decimal  as under 
place  dents  (a)  under  (b) 
o. 370  - - -
o. 370  - - -
0.158  - - -
- - - -
- - - -
- - - -
- - - -
- - - -
- - - -
- - - -
- - - -
0.105  - - -
1.003  - - -Year:  1963 
Country:  Belgium  COMMON  STATISTICAL  SUMMARY  OF  UNDERGROUND  ACCIDENTS 
AT  MINES  IN  THE  E.C.S.C.  COUNTRIES  Coal-field:  Borinage-Centre 
Number  of  Number  of 
casualties  disablements 
Man- as  under  (a) 
C A U S  E  Disable- Fatal- hours  per million 
ments  as  ities  worked- man-hours 
under  (a)  as under  (to third 
(b)  decimal  below  below  place) 
1)  Falls of  ground  116  6  7.650 
2)  Haulage  and transport  95  2  6.265 
3)  Movement  of personnel  21  1 
rd  1.385  § 
4)  Machinery,  handling of tools 
rd  and  supports  57  - ~  3· 759  oj  • 
5)  Falling objects  11  -
!?:  Ul  0.726  ~  ~ 
6)  Explosives  and  fumes 
·r-1  Q) 
- - ~  - ~ ~ 
7)  Explosions of firedamp or coal  0  ,:j 
dust 
ct-t  0  - -
•rj  - <D 
8)  Sudden outbursts of  firedamp,  Srd 
·r-1  ~  suffocation by  natural gases  - - -P  ~  -
9)  Underground combustion  and fires  - -
QQ.;;  - ~ ,:j 
10)  InrusheS of water 
·r-1  0  - - rd  -
,:j 
11)  Electricity  - - r-1  .  - 0 
12)  Other causes  4  - ~  Oo264 
TOTAL  304  9  15,161,632  20.049 
(a)  Casualties were unable to resume  work below ground for  at least eight weeks. 
(b)  Casualties died within eight weeks. 
(c)  Accidents  involving more  than five casualties of types  (a)  and/or  (b). 
Number  of  Group  accidents 
fatalities  as under  (c)  below 
as under  (b) 
per million Number  Number  Number  man-hours  of  of dis- of fatal- (to third  acci- ablements ities as  decimal  as under 
place  dents  (a)  under  (b) 
0.396  - - -
0.132  - - -
0.066  - - -
- - - -
- - - -
- - - -
- - - -
- - - -
- - - -
- - - -
- - - -
- - - -
0.594  - - -Year: 1963 
Country: Belgium  COMMON  STATISTICAL  SUMMARY  OF  UNDERGROUND  ACCIDENTS 
AT  MINES  IN  THE  E.C.S.C.  COUNTRIES  Coal-field: South 
Number  of  Number  of 
casualties  disablements 
Man- as  under  (a) 
S  E  Disable- Fatal- hours  per million  C AU  ities  man-hours  ments  as  as under  worked  (to third  under  (a) 
below  (b)  decimal 
below  place) 
1)  Falls of ground  314  23  5-07 4 
2)  Haulage  and transport  263  15  rd  4.250 
3)  Movement  of personnel  80  5 
q  1.293  ctl 
4)  Machinery,  handling of tools  rd 
H  and supports  160  - ctl  .  2.586 
~  Ul 
5)  Falling objects  37  -
q  ~  0.598  ·.-I  Q) 
6)  Explosives  and  fumes  l 
q  0.016  - H  H 
7)  Explosions of  firedamp  or coal 
0  :1 
Ct--i  0 
dust 
"I'J  - - Q)  -
8)  Sudden outbursts of  firedamp, 
Srd 
·.-I  H 
suffocation by  natural gases  +»  ro  - - ~  -
9)  Underground  combustion and fires  -
r:-.o  +> 
-
q  ~  - ·.-I  0 
10)  Inrushes of water  2 
rd  - :1  -
11) 
r-1  Electricity  - - 0  - q 
12)  Other causes  18  3 
H  0.291 
TOTAL  873  48  61,843,694  14.1·J8 
(a)  Casualties were  unable to  resume  work  below ground  for  at least eight weeks. 
(b)  Casualties died within eight weeks. 
(c)  Accidents  involving more  than five casualties of types  (a)  and/or  (b). 
Number  of  Group  accidents 
fatalities  as under  (c)  below 
as under  (b) 
per million Number  Number  Number  man-hours  of dis-
(to third  of  ablements of fatal-
acci- ities as  decimal  dents  as  under  under  (b)  place  (a) 
o. 372  - - -
0.242  - - -
0.081  - - -
- - - -
- - - -
- - - -
- - - -
- - - -
- - - -
0.032  - - -
- - - -
0.049  - - -
o. 776  - - -Year:  1963 
Country:  Belgium  COMMON  STATISTICAL  SUMMARY  OF  UNDERGROUND  ACCIDENTS 
AT  MINES  IN  THE  E.C.S.C.  COUNTRIES  Coal-field:  Canpine 
Number  of  Number  of 
casualties  disablements 
Man- as  under  (a) 
C A U S  E  Disable- Fatal- hours  per million 
meqts  as  ities  worked  man-hours 
as under  (to third 
under  (a)  (b)  decimal  below  below  place) 
1)  Falls of  ground  156  5  ).529 
2)  Haulage  and transport  115  11  rd  2. ·521 
3)  Movement  of personnel  33  1 
t:: 
C·. 7  46  as 
4)  Machinery,  handling of tools  r-0 
and supports  96 
H  2.171  - ru  . 
~ Ul 
5)  Falling objects  21  2  ~  ~  J-475  .,.;  Q) 
6)  Explosives  and  fumes  1  - H  e  J.C23 
0  .:::::$ 
7)  Explosions  of firedamp or coal  ct-;  0 
dust 
•I,)  - - (J)  -
8)  Sudden outbursts of  firedamp,  s.-o 
·rl  H 
suffocation by  natural gases 
-P  cO  - -
l>  -
bD~ 
9)  Underground  combustion and fires  - - ~  ::::$  -
·rl  0 
10)  Inrushes of water 
r-0  - - - ::::$ 
11)  Electricity 
,......; 
0.023  l  1  0 
s::: 
12)  Other causes  3  -
H  0.068 
TOTAL  426  2'""'  v  44,199,31(  9.636 
(a)  Casualties were  unable  to resume  work  below ground for at least eight weeks. 
(b)  Casualties died within eight weeks. 
(c)  Accidents  involving more  than five casualties of types  (a)  and/or  (b). 
Number  of  Group  accidents 
fatalities  as  under  (c)  below 
as under  (b) 
per million Number  Number  Number 
man-hours  of  of dis- of fatal- (to third  ablements 
decimal  acci- as under  ities as 
place  dents  (a)  under  (b) 
0.113  - - -
,2. 249  - - -
,). 023  - - -
- - - -
.J. 045  - - -
- - - -
- - - -
- - - -
- - - -
- - - -
0.023  - - -
- - - -
0.453  ....  - -COMMON  STATISTICAL  SUMMARY  OF  UNDERGROUND  ACCIDENTS 
AT  MINES  IN  THE  E.C.S.C.  COUNTRIES 
Year: 1963 
Country: Belgium 
(Total for  the 
Coal-field:  Kingdom) 
Number  of  Number  of 
casualties  disablements 
Man- as under  (a) 
C  A.  U S  E  Disable- Fatal- hours  per million 
ments  as  ities  worked  man-hours 
under  (a)  as under  (to third 
(b)  decimal  below  below  place) 
1)  Falls of ground  470  28  4-432 
2)  Haulage  and transport  378  26  3.565 
3)  Movement  of personnel  113  6  1.066 
4)  Machinery,  handling of tools 
and  supports  256  - 2.414 
5)  Falling objects  58  2  0.547 
6)  Explosives  and  fumes  2  - 0.019 
7)  Explosions of firedamp or coal 
dust  - - -
8)  Sudden outbursts of firedamp, 
suffocation by natural gases  - - -
9)  Underground  combustion  and fires  - - -
10)  Inrushes of water  - 2  -
11)  Electricity  1  1  0.009 
12)  Other causes  21  3  0.198 
TOTAL  1,299  68  106,043,  01C  12.250 
(a)  Casualties were  unable  to  resume  work  below ground for  at least eight weeks. 
(b)  Casualties died within eight weeks. 
(c)  Accidents  involving more  than five casualties of types  (a)  and/or  (b). 
Number  of  Group  accidents 
fatalities  as under  (c)  below 
as under  (b) 
per million Number  Number  Number  man-hours  of  of dis- of fatal- (to third  acci- ablements  ities as  decimal  as under 
place  dents  (a)  under  (b) 
0.2b4  - - -
0.245  - - -
J.057  - - -
- - - -
0.019  - - -
- - - -
- - - -
- - - -
- - - -
0.019  - - -
0.009'.  - - -
0.028  - - -
0.641  - - -Year: 1963 
Country: Franee  COMMON  STATISTICAL  SUMMARY  OF  UNDERGROUND  ACCIDENTS 
AT  MINES  IN  THE  E.C.S,C.  COUNTRIES  Coal-field:Nord/Pas-de-Ca1ais 
Number  of  Number  of 
casualties  disablements 
Man- as  under  (a) 
C A U S  E  Disable- Fatal- hours  per million 
ments  as  ities  worked  man-hours 
as under  (to third  under  (a)  (b)  decimal  below  below  place) 
I 
1)  Falls of ground  565  16  4-441 
2)  Haulage  and transport  295  18  2.319 
3)  Movement  of personnel  264  1  2.075 
4)  Machinery,  handling of tools 
and supports  361  2  2.837 
5)  Falling objects  278  - 2.185 
6)  Explosives  and  fumes  2  1  0.016 
7)  Explosions of firedamp or coal 
dust  - - -
8)  Sudden outbursts of firedamp, 
suffocation by  natural gases  - - -
9)  Underground  combustion and fires  - - -
10)  InrusheS of water  - - -
11)  Electricity  2  2  0.016 
12)  Other causes  50  2  0.393 
TOTAL  1,817  42  127' 224, 544  14.28~ 
(a)  Casualties were  unable to resume  work  below ground for  at least eight weeks. 
(b)  Casualties died within eight weeks. 
(c)  Accidents  involving more  than five casualties of types  (a)  and/or  (b). 
Number  of  Group  accidents 
fatalities  as under  (c)  below 
as under  (b) 
per million Number  Number  Number  man-hours  of  of dis- of fatal- (to third  ablements 
decimal  acci- as under  ities as 
place  dents  (a)  under  (b) 
0.126 
0.141 
0.008 
0.016 
-
0.008 
-
-
-
-
0.016 
0.016 
0.330 Year:  1963 
COMMON  STATISTICAL  SUMMARY  OF  UNDERGROUND  ACCIDENTS 
AT  MINES  IN  THE  E.C.S.C.  COUNTRIES 
Country:  Li'rance 
Centre-Midi  (not  Coal-field: 
Number  of  Number  of 
casualties  disablements 
Man- as  under  (a) 
C A U S  E  Disable- Fatal- hours  per million 
ments  as  ities  worked  man-hours 
under  (a)  as under  (to third 
(b)  decimal  below  below  place) 
1)  Falls of  ground  158  5  - ) •  7  i37 
2)  Haulage  and  transport  114  2  - 2. 7 j) 
3)  Movement  of personnel  115  - - 2.  7  57 
4)  Machinery,  handling of tools 
and supports  230  - - 5.513 
5)  Falling objects  108  2  - :2.589 
6)  Explosives  and  fumes  - - - -
7)  Explosions of firedamp  or coal 
dust  - - - -
8)  Sudden outbursts of  firedamp, 
suffocation by natural gases  - 3  - -
9)  Underground combustion and fires  - - - -
10)  Inrushes of water  - - - -
11)  Electricity  l  2  - 0.224 
12)  Other causes  15  - - 2·. 3,,)2 
TOTAL  741  14  41,716,688  l7.7·S3 
(a)  Casualties were  unable  to resume  work  below  ground  for  at least eight weeks. 
(b)  Casualties died within eight weeks. 
(c)  Accidents  involving more  than five casualties of types  (a)  and/or  (b). 
including  rrovence) 
Number  of  Group  accidents 
fatalities  as under  (c)  below 
as under  (b) 
per million Number  Number  Number  man-hours  of  of  diS-·  of fatal- (to third  acci- ablements  ities  decimal  as  under  as 
place  dents  (a)  under  (b) 
J.l20  - - -
0.048  - - -
- - - -
- - - -
o. •J48  - - -
- - - -
- - - -
2.·Jl9  - - -
- - - -
- - - -
,j. J48  - - -
- - - -
c·. 5  36  - - -Year: 1963 
Country: France  COMMON  STATISTICAL  SUMMARY  OF  UNDERGROUND  ACCIDENTS 
AT  MINES  IN  THE  E.C.S.C.  COUNTRIES  Coal-field: Lorraine 
Number  of  Number  of 
casualties  disablements 
Man-
as  under  (a) 
C  A  U  S  E  Disable- Fatal- hours  per million 
ments  as  ities  worked  man-hours 
under  (a) 
as under  (to third 
(b)  decimal 
below  below  place) 
1)  Falls of  ground  150  4  - 3-745 
2)  Haulage  and  transport  85  5  - 2.122 
3)  Movement  of personnel  116  1  - 2.896 
4)  Machinery,  handling of tools 
and  supports  56  - - 1.398 
5)  Falling objects  90  - - 2. 247 
6)  Explosives  and  fumes  - - - -
7)  Explosions  of firedamp or coal 
dust  - - - -
8)  Sudden outbursts of  firedamp, 
suffocation by  natural. gases  - 1  - -
9)  Underground  combustion and fires  - - - -
10)  Inrushes of water  - - - -
11)  Electricity  - 1  - -
12)  Other causes  9  1  - 0.225 
TOTAL  506  13  40,058,12(  12.631 
(a)  Casualties were  unable  to  resume  work  below ground for  at least eight weekso 
(b)  Casualties died within eight weeks. 
(c)  Accidents  involving more  than five casualties of types  (a)  and/or  (b). 
Number  of  Group  accidents 
fatalities  as  under  (c)  below 
as under  (b) 
per million Number  Number  Number 
man-hours  of  of dis- of fatal-
(to third  acci-
ablements  ities as 
decimal  as  under 
place 
dents  (a)  under  (b) 
0.100  - - -
0.125  - - -
0.025  - - -
- - - -
- - - -
- - - -
- - - -
0.025  - - -
- - - -
- - - -
0.025  - - -
0.025  - - -
0.325  - - -Year:  1963 
COMMON  STATISTICAL  SUMMARY  OF  UNDERGROUND  ACCIDENTS 
AT  MINES  IN  THE  E.C.S.C.  COUNTRIES 
Country:  ~ranee  (not  includ-
ing .?rovence)  Coal-field: 
Number  of  Number  of 
casualties  disablements 
Man- as under  (a) 
C A U S  E  Disable- Fatal- hours  per million 
ments  as  ities  worked  man-hours 
under  (a)  as under  (to third 
(b)  decimal  below  below  place) 
1)  Falls of  ground  873  25  - 4-177 
2)  Haulage  and  transport  494  25  - 2.364 
3)  Movement  of personnel  495  2  - 2.368 
4)  Machinery,  bundling of tools 
and supports  647  2  - 3.096 
5)  Falling objects  476  2  - 2.278 
6)  Explosives  and  fumes  2  1  - 0.009 
7)  Explosions of firedamp or coa! 
dust  - - - -
8)  Sudden outbursts of  firedamp, 
suffocation by natural gases  - 4  - -
9)  Underground  combustion and  fires  - - - -
10)  Inrushes of water  - - - -
11)  Electricity  3  5  - J.Ol4 
12)  Other causes  74  3  - 0.354 
TOTAL  3,064  69  ~J8,999,352  14.G68 
(a)  Casualties were  unable to  resume  work  below  ground  for  at least eight weeks. 
(b)  Casualties died within eight weeks. 
(c)  Accidents  involving more  than five casualties of types  (a)  and/or  (b). 
Number  of  Group  accidents 
fatalities  as under  (c)  below 
as under  (b) 
per million Number  Number  Number  man-hours  of  of dis- of fatal- (to third  acci- ablements ities as  decimal  as  under 
place  dents  (a)  under  (b) 
0.120  - - -
0.121  - - -
0.009  - - -
J.009  - - -
O.OJ9  - - -
0.005  - - -
- - - -
0.019  - - -
- - - -
- - - -
J.024  - - -
0.014  - - -
0.33J  - - -Year:  1963 
Country:  Ita:Ly  COMMON  STATISTICAL  SUMMARY  OF  UNDERGROUND  ACCIDENTS 
AT  MINES  IN  THE  E.C.S.C.  COUNTRIES  Coal-field:  0u1cis 
Number  of  Number  of 
casualties  disablements 
Man- as  under  (a) 
C A U S  E  Disable- Fatal- hours  per million 
ments  as  !ties  worked  man-hours 
under  (a)  as under  (to third 
(b)  decimal  below  below  place) 
1)  Falls of ground  l  l  - 0.366 
2)  Haulage  and  transport  4  - ...  1.465 
3)  Movement  of personnel  2  - - J. 732 
4)  Machinery,  handling of tools 
and supports  4  - - 1.465 
5)  Falling objects  9  - - 3.296 
6)  Explosives  and  fumes  1  - - 0.366 
7)  Explosions of firedamp  or coal 
dust  - - - -
8)  Sudden outbursts of firedamp, 
suffocation by natural gases  - - - -
9)  Underground  combustion and fires  - - - -
10)  Inrushes of water  - - - -
11)  Electricity  - - - -
12)  Other causes  - - - -
TOTAL  21  l  2,730,847  7-690 
(a)  Casualties were  unable  to resume  work  below ground  for  at least eight weeks. 
(b)  Casualties died within eight weeks. 
(c)  Accidents  involving more  than five casualties of types  (a)  and/or  (b). 
Number  of  Group  accidents 
fatalities  as under  (c)  below 
as under  (b) 
per million Number  Number  Number 
man-hours  of  of dis- of fatal- (to third  acci- ablements ities as  decimal  as  under 
place  dents  (a)  under  (b) 
0.366  - - -
- - - -
- - - -
- - - -
- - - -
- - - -
- - - -
- - - -
- - - -
- - - -
- - - -
- - - -
~.366  - - -Year: 1963 
Country: Netherlands  COMMON  STATISTICAL  SUMMARY  OF  UNDERGROUND  ACCIDENTS 
AT  MINES  IN  THE  E.C.S.C.  COUNTRIES  Coal-field: Limbourg 
Number  of  Number  of 
casualties  disablements 
Man- as under  (a) 
C A U S  E  Disable- Fatal- hours  per million 
ments  as  ities  worked  man-hours 
under  (a)  as under  (to third 
(b)  decimal  below  below  place) 
1)  Falls of  ground  83  4  - 1.742 
2)  Haulage  and  transport  87  5  - 1.826 
3)  Movement  of personnel  30  - - 0.630 
4)  Machinery,  handling of tools 
and  supports  50  - - 1.050 
5)  Falling objects  30  - - 0.630 
6)  Explosives  and  fumes  - - - -
7)  Explosions of  firedamp  or coal 
dust  - - - -
8)  Sudden outbursts of  firedamp, 
suffocation by  natural gases  - - - -
9)  Underground  combustion and  fires  - - - -
10)  Inrushes of water  - - - -
11)  Electricity  - - - -
12)  Other  causes  7  - - 0.147 
TOTAL  287  9  47,633,952  6.025 
(a)  Casualties were  unable  to  resume  work  below  ground  for  at least eight weeks. 
(b)· Casualties died within eight weeks. 
(c)  Accidents  involving more  than five casualties of types  (a)  and/or  (b). 
Number  of  Group  accidents 
fatalities  as  under  (c)  below 
as under  (b) 
per million Number  Number  Number  man-hours  of  of dis- of fatal- (to third  acci- ablements  ities as  decimal  as'under 
place  dents  (a)  under  (b) 
0.084  - - -
0.105  - - -
- - - -
- - - -
- - - -
- - - -
- - - -
- - - -
- - - -
- - - -
- - - -
- - - -
0.189  - - -247 
E.  COMMON  STATISTICAL  SURVEY  OF  UNDERGROUND 
ACCIDENTS  IN  1964 Year: 1964 
Country: North-Rhine/ 
·westphalia 
COMMON  STATISTICAL  SUMMARY  OF  UNDERGROUND  ACCIDENTS 
AT  MINES  IN  THE  E.C.S.C.  COUNTRIES  Coal-field: Ruhr 
Number  of  Number  of 
casualties  disablements 
Man- as under  (a) 
C A U S  E  Disable- Fatal- hours  per million 
meQts  as  ities  worked  man-hours 
as under  (to third  under  (a)  (b)  decimal  below  below  place) 
1)  Falls of  ground  1,854  78  4.839 
2)  Haulage  and  transport  881  80  2.300 
3)  Movement  of personnel  1,024  29  2. 673 
4)  Machinery,  handling of tools 
and supports  487  12  1.271 
5)  Falling objects  1,142  19  2.981 
6)  Explosives  and  fumes  3  1  0.008 
7)  Explosions of firedamp or coal 
dust  - l  -
8)  Sudden outbursts of firedamp, 
suffocation by  natural gases  - - -
9)  Underground  combustion and fires  - 4  -
10)  Inrushes of water  - - -
11)  Electricity  2  2  0.005 
12)  Other causes  216  7  0.564 
TarAL  5,609  233  383,107,691  14.641 
(a)  Casualties were  unable  to resume  work  below ground for  at least eight weeks. 
(b)  Casualties died within eight weeks. 
(c)  Accidents  involving more  than  five casualties of types  (a)  and/or  (b). 
Number  of  Group  accidents 
fatalities  as under  (c)  below 
as under  (b) 
per million Number  Number  Number  man-hours  of  of dis- of fatal- (to third  ablements 
decimal  acci- as under  ities as 
place  dents  (a)  under  (b) 
0 •  .204  - - -
0.209  2  5  14 
0.076  - - -
0.031  - - -
0.049  - - -
0.003  - - -
0. !J03  - - -
- - - -
0.010  - - -
- - - -
0.005  - - -
0.018  - - -
0.608  2  5  14 Year: 1964 
COMMON  STATISTICAL  SUMMARY  OF  UNDERGROUND  ACCIDENTS 
AT  MINES  IN  THE  E.C.S.C.  COUNTRIES 
Country: North-Rhine/ 
vfestphalia 
Coal-field: Aachen 
Number  of  Number  of 
casualties  disablements 
Man- as under  (a) 
C  A.  U S  E  Disable- Fatal- hours  per million 
ments  as  ities  worked  man-hours 
under  (a)  as under  (to third 
below 
(b)  decimal 
below  place) 
1)  Falls of  ground  88  6  2.67  4 
2)  Haulage  and  transport  62  10  1.884 
3)  Movement  of personnel  36  2  1.094 
4)  Machinery,  handling of tools 
and supports  20  1  0.608 
5)  Falling objects  86  3  2.613 
6)  Explosives  and  fumes  - - -
7)  Explosions of firedamp  or coal 
dust  - - -
8)  Sudden outbursts of  firedamp, 
suffocation by  natural gases  - - -
9)  Underground  combustion and fires  - - -
10)  Inrushes of water  - - -
11)  Electricity  - - -
12)  Other  causes  - - -
TOTAL  292  22  32, 909,'"15:1  c3.873 
(a)  Casualties were  unable  to  resume  work  below  ground  for  at least eight weeks. 
(b)  Casualties died within eight weeks. 
(c)  Accidents  involving more  than five casualties of types  (a)  and/or  (b). 
Number  of  Group  accidents 
fatalities  as  under  (c)  below 
as under  (b) 
per million Number  Number  Number  man-hours  of  of dis- of fatal- (to third  acci- ablements  ities as  decimal  dents  as under  under  (b)  place  (a) 
0.182  - - -
0.304  - - -
0.061  - - -
0.030  - - -
0.091  - - -
- - - -
- - - -
- - - -
- - - -
- - - -
- - - -
- - - -
0.668  - - -
~ 
CJ1 
0 Year:  1964 
COMMON  STATISTICAL  SUMMARY  OF  UNDERGROUND  ACCIDENTS 
AT  MINES  IN  THE  E.C.S.C.  COUNTRIES 
Country:  North-Rhine/ 
~-{estpha1ia 
Coal-field: 
Number  of  Number  of 
casualties  disablements 
Man- as under  (a) 
C A U S  E  Disable- Fatal- hours  per million 
ments  as  ities  worked  man-hours 
under  (a)  as under  (to third 
below  (b)  decimal 
below  place) 
1)  Falls of ground  1,942  84  4.667 
2)  Haulage  and  transport  943  90  2.266 
3)  Movement  of personnel  1,060  31  2.547 
4)  Machinery,  handling of tools 
and supports  507  13  1.218 
5)  Falling objects  1,228  22  2.951 
6)  Explosives  and  fumes  3  1  0.007 
7)  Explosions of firedamp or coal 
dust  - 1  -
8)  Sudden outbursts of firedamp, 
suffocation by natural gases  - - -
9)  Vnderground combustion and fires  - 4  -
10)  Inrushes of water  - - -
11)  Electricity  2  2  0.005 
12)  Other causes  216  7  0.519 
TOTAL  5,901  255  416,117,450  14.18~ 
(a)  Casualties were  unable to resume  work  below ground for  at least eight weeks. 
(b)  Casualties died within eight weeks. 
(c)  Accidents  involving more  than five casualties of types  (a}  and/or  (b). 
Number  of  Group  accidents 
fatalities  as under  (c)  below 
as under  (b) 
per million Number  Number  Number 
man-hours  of  of dis- of fatal- (to third  acci- ablements  ities as 
decimal  dents  as under  under  (b) 
place  (a) 
0.202  - - -
0.216  2  5  14 
0.074  - - -
0.031  - - -
0.053  - - -
0.002  - - -
0.002  - - -
- - - -
0.010  - - -
- - - -
0.005  - - -
0.017  - - -
0.613  2  5  14 Year:  1964 
Country:  Saar  COMMON  STATISTICAL  SUMMARY  OF  UNDERGROUND  ACCIDENTS 
AT  MINES  IN  THE  E.C.S.C.  COUNTRIES  Coal-field: 
Number  of  Number  of 
casualties  disablements 
Man- as under  (a) 
C A U S  E  Disable- Fatal- hours  per million 
ments  as  ities  worked  man-hours 
as under  (to third  under  (a)  (b)  decimal  below  below  place) 
1)  Falls of ground  327  9  6.884 
2)  Haulage  and  transport  163  3  3.431 
3)  Movement  of personnel  212  2  4.4.53 
4)  Machinery,  bundling of tools 
and supports  69  - 1.4)3 
5)  Falling objects  275  3  5.789 
6)  Explosives  and  fumes  - - -
7)  Explosions of firedamp or coal 
dust  - - -
8)  Sudden outbursts of  firedamp, 
suffocation by natural gases  - - -
9)  Underground combustion  and  fires  - - -
10)  Inrushes of water  - - -
11)  Electricity  2  - 0.042 
12)  Other causes  5  1  0.105 
TOTAL  1,053  18  47,501,106  22.167 
(a)  Casualties were  unable  to  resume  work  below  ground  for  at least eight weeks. 
(b)  Casualties died within eight weeks. 
(c)  Accidents  involving more  than five casualties of types  (a)  and/or  (b). 
Number  of  Group  accidents 
fatalities  as under  (c)  below 
as under  (b) 
per million Number  Number  Number  man-hours  of  of dis- of fatal- (to th.ird  ablements 
decimal  acci- as under  ities as 
place  dents  (a)  under  (b) 
0.189  - - -
S.J63  - - -
0.042  - - -
- - - -
0.063  - - -
- - - -
- - - -
- - - -
- - - -
- - - -
- - - -
'J.021  - - -
o. 378  - - -COMMON  STATISTICAL  SUMMARY  OF  UNDERGROUND  ACCIDENTS 
AT  MINES  IN  THE  E.C.S.C.  COUNTRIES 
Year:  1964 
Country:  Germany 
coal-field:  North-Rhine  /Wes tpha1ia 
and  Saar 
Number  of  Number  of 
casualties  disablements 
Man- as under  (a) 
C A U S  E  Disable- Fatal- hours  per million 
ments  as  ities  worked  man-hours 
under  (a)  as under  (to third 
(b)  decimal  below  below  place) 
1)  Falls of  ground  2,269  93  4-894 
2)  Haulage  and transport  1;106  93  2.385 
3)  Movement  of personnel  1, 272  33  2. 7  44 
4)  Machinery,  handling of tools 
and  supports  576  13  1.242 
5)  Falling objects  1,503  25  3-242 
6)  Explosives  and  fumes  3  1  0.006 
7)  Explosions of firedamp or coal 
dust  - 1  -
8)  Sudden outbursts of firedamp, 
suffocation by  natural  gases  - - -
9)  Underground combustion and fires  - 4  -
10)  Inrushes of water  - - -
11)  Electricity  4  2  0.009 
12)  Other  causes  221  8  0.477 
TOTAL  6,954  273  ~63,618,556  14.999 
(a)  Casualties were  unable to resume  work  below  ground  for  at least eight weeks. 
(b)  Casualties died within eight weeks. 
(c)  Accidents  involving more  than five casualties of types  (a)  and/or  (b). 
Number  of  Group  accidents 
fatalities  as  under  (c)  below 
as under  (b) 
per million Number  Number  Number  man-hours  of  of dis- of fatal- (to third  acci- ablements  ities as  decimal  as  under 
place  dents  (a)  under  (b) 
0.200  - - -
0.200  2  5  14 
0.071  - - -
0.028  - - -
0.054  - - -
0.002  - - -
0.002  - - -
- - - -
0.009  - - -
- - - -
0.004  - - -
0.017  - - -
0.589  2  5  14 Year:  1964 
Country:  Belgium  COMMON  STATISTICAL  SUMMARY  OF  UNDERGROUND  ACCIDENTS 
AT  MINES  IN  THE  E.C.S.C.  COUNTRIES  Coal-field:  Char1eroi-Namur 
Number  of  Number  of 
casualties  disablements 
Man- as under  (a) 
C A U S  E  Disable- Fatal- hours  per million 
ments  as  ities  worked  man-hours 
under  (a)  as under  (to third 
below  (b)  decimal 
below  place) 
1)  Falls of  ground  133  8  4-894 
2)  Haulage  and  transport  99  3  3-644 
3)  Movement  of personnel  38  1  1.399 
4)  Machinery,  handling of tools 
and supports  74  - 2. 723 
5)  Falling objects  10  - 0.368 
6)  Explosives  and  fumes  1  - 0.037 
7)  Explosions of firedamp or coal 
dust  1  - 0.037 
8)  Sudden outbursts of  firedamp, 
suffocation by  natural gases  - - -
9)  Underground combustion and fires  - - -
10)  Inrushes of water  - - -
11)  Electricity  - - -
12)  Other causes  15  1  0.552 
TOTAL  371  13  27' 171,160  13.654 
(a)  Casualties were  unable to resume  work  below  ground for  at least eight weeks. 
(b)  Casualties died within eight weeks. 
(c)  Accidents  involving more  than five casualties of types  (a)  and/or  (b). 
Number  of  Group  accidents 
fatalities  as under  (c)  below 
as under  (b) 
per million Number  Number  Number  man-hours  of  of dis- of fatal- (to th·ird  acci- ablements  ities as  decimal  dents  as under  under  (b)  place  (a) 
0.294  - - -
0.110  - - -
0.037  - - -
- - - -
- - - -
- - - -
- - - -
- - - -
- - - -
- - - -
- - - -
0.037  - - -
0.478  - - -Year: 1964 
Country: Be1g::..um  COMMON  STATISTICAL  SUMMARY  OF  UNDERGROUND  ACCIDENTS 
AT  MINES  IN  THE  E.C.S.C.  COUNTRIES  Coal-field: Liege 
Number  of  Number  of 
casualties  disablements 
Man- as under  (a) 
C A U S  E  Disable- Fatal- hours  per million 
ments  as  ities  worked  man-hours 
under  (a)  as under  (to third 
(b)  decimal  below  below  place) 
1)  Falls of ground  91  6  4.512 
2)  Haulage  and transport  73  2  3.619 
3)  Movement  of personnel  23  - 1.140 
4)  Machinery,  handling of tools 
and supports  26  - 1.289 
5)  Falling objects  7  1  J.347 
6)  Explosives  and  fumes  1  - 0.050 
7)  Explosions of firedamp or coal 
dust  - - -
8)  Sudden outbursts of firedamp, 
suffocation by natural gases  - - -
9)  Underground  combustion and fires  - - -
10)  Inrushes of water  - - -
11)  Electricity  - - -
12)  Other causes  5  - 0.248 
TOTAL  226  9  20,167,000  11.205 
(a)  Casualties were  unable to resume  work below ground for  at least eight weeks. 
(b)  Casualties died within eight weeks. 
(c)  Accidents  involving more  than five casualties of types  (a)  and/or  (b). 
Number  of  Group  accidents 
fatalities  as under  (c)  below 
as under  (b) 
per million Number  Number  Number  man-hours  of  of dis- of fatal- (to third  acci- ablements  ities as  decimal  as under 
place  dents  (a)  under  (b) 
0.297  - - -
0.099  - - -
- - - -
- - - -
0.050  - - -
- - - -
- - - -
- - - -
- - - -
- - - -
- - - -
- - - -
0.446  - - -Year:  1964 
Country:  Belgium  COMMON  STATISTICAL  SUMMARY  OF  UNDERGROUND  ACCIDENTS 
AT  MINES  IN  THE  E.C.s.c.  COUNTRIES 
Coal-field:  Borinage/Centre 
Number  of  Number  of 
casualties  disablements 
Man- as under  (a) 
C A U S  E  Disable- Fatal- hours  per million 
ments  as  ities  worked  man-hours 
under  (a)  as under  (to third 
below  (b)  decimal 
below  place) 
1)  Falls of  ground  113  2  1·892 
2)  Haulage  and transport  85  2  5.936 
3)  Movement  of personnel  19  1  1.327 
4)  Machinery,  handling of tools 
and supports  62  - 4-330 
5)  Falling objects  14  - o. 978 
6)  Explosives  and  fumes  - - -
7)  Explosions of firedamp or  coal 
dust  - - -
8)  Sudden outbursts of  firedamp, 
suffocation by natural gases  - - -
9)  Undergrou.nd  combustion and fires  - - -
10)  Inrushes of water  - - -
11)  Electricity  - - -
12)  Other  causes  6  - 0.419 
TOTAL  299  5  14,318,008  20.882 
(a)  Casualties were  unable  to  resume  work  below  ground  for  at least eight weeks. 
(b)  Casualties died within eight weeks. 
(c)  Acpidents  involving more  than five casualties of types  (a)  and/or  (b). 
·Number  of  Group  accidents 
fatalities  as under  (c)  below 
as under  (b) 
per million Number  Number  Number  man-hours  of  of dis- of fatal- (to third  acci- ablements  ities as  decimal  dents  as under  under  (b)  place  (a) 
0.140  - - -
0.140  - - -
0.069  - - -
- - - -
- - - -
- - - -
- - - -
- - - -
- - - -
- - - -
- - - -
- - - -
0.349  - - -Year: 1964 
Country: Belgium  COMMON  STATISTICAL  SUMMARY  OF  UNDERGROUND  ACCIDENTS 
AT  MINES  IN  THE  E.C.S.C.  COUNTRIES  Coal-field: South 
Number  of  Number  of 
casualties  disablements 
Man- as under  (a) 
C A U S  E  Disable- Fatal- hours  per million 
ments  as  ities  worked  man-hours 
under  (a)  as under  (to third 
(b)  decimal  below  below  place) 
1)  Falls of  ground  337  16  5.463 
2)  Haulage  and transport  257  1  4.166 
3)  Movement  of personnel  80  2  1.297 
4)  Machinery,  handling of tools 
and supports  162  - 2.626 
5)  Falling objects  31  1  0.503 
6)  Explosives  and  fumes  2  - 0.032 
7)  Explosions of firedamp  or coal 
dust  1  - 0.016 
8)  Sudden outbursts of  firedamp, 
suffocation by  natural gases  - - -
9)  Underground  combustion and fires  - - -
10)  Inrushes of water  - - -
11)  Electricity  - - -
12)  Other causes  26  1  0.421 
TOTAL  896  27  61,656,168  14.524 
(a)  Casualties were  unable  to  resume  work  below ground for  at least eight weeks. 
(b)  Casualties died within eight weeks. 
(c)  Accidents  involving more  than five casualties of types  (a)  and/or  (b). 
Number  of  Group  accidents 
fatalities  as  under  (c)  below 
as under  (b) 
per million Number  Number  Number  man-hours  of  of dis- of fatal- (to third  acci- ablements  ities as  decimal  as under 
place  dents  (a)  under  (b) 
0.259  - - -
0.114  - - -
0.032  - - -
- - - -
0.016  - - -
- - - -
- - - -
- - - -
- - - -
- - - -
- - - -
0.016  - - -
0.437  - - -Year: 1964 
Country: Belgium  COMMON  STATISTICAL  SUMMARY  OF  UNDERGROUND  ACCIDENTS 
AT  MINES  IN  THE  E.C.S.C.  COUNTRIES  Coal-field: Campine 
Number  of  Number  of 
casualties  disablements 
Man- as under  (a) 
C  A.  U S  E  Disable- Fatal- hours  per million 
ments  as  ities  worked  man-hours 
under  (a)  as under  (to third 
below  (b)  decimal 
below  place) 
1)  Falls of  ground  141  8  3-033 
2)  Haulage  and transport  113  11  2.431 
3)  Movement  of personnel  24  1  0.516 
4)  Machinery,  handling of tools 
and supports  88  2  1.893 
5)  Falling objects  12  1  0.258 
6)  Explosives  and  fumes  - - -
7)  Explosions  of firedamp or coal 
dust  - - -
8)  Sudden outbursts of  firedamp, 
suffocation by  natural  gases  - - -
9)  Underground combustion and fires  - - -
10)  Inrushes of water  - - -
11)  Electricity  - 1  -
12)  Other causes  3  - 0.064 
TOTAL  381  24  46,488,16(  8.195 
(a)  Casualties were  unable  to  resume  work  below  ground  for  at least eight weeks. 
(b)  Casualties died within eight weeks. 
(c)  Accidents  involving more  than five  casualties of types  (a)  and/or  (b). 
Number  of  Group  accidents 
fatalities  as under  (c)  below 
as under  (b) 
per million Number  Number  Number  man-hours  of  of dis- of fatal- (to third  acci- ablements  ities as  decimal  dents  as under  under  (b)  place  (a) 
0.172  - - -
0.237  - - -
0.022  - - -
0.043  - - -
0.021  - - -
- - - -
- - - -
- - - -
- - - -
- - - -
0.021  - - -
- - - -
0.516  - - -Year: 1964 
Country: Belg:.Lum  COMMON  STATISTICAL  SUMMARY  OF  UNDERGROUND  ACCIDENTS 
AT  MINES  IN  THE  E.C.S.C.  COUNTRIES 
Coal-field: Total for Kingdom 
Number  of  Number  of 
casualties  disablements 
Man- as  under  (a) 
C A U S  E  Disable- Fatal- hours  per million 
ments  as  ities  worked  man-hours 
under  (a)  as under  (to third 
(b)  decimal  below  below  place) 
1)  Falls of ground  478  24  4.417 
2)  Haulage  and  transport  370  18  3-419 
3)  Movement  of personnel  104  3  0.961 
4)  Machinery,  handling of tools 
and supports  250  2  2.310 
5)  Falling objects  43  2  0.397 
6)  Explosives  and  fumes  2  - J.:JlS 
7)  Explosions of  firedamp or coal 
dust  l  - -J.J09 
8)  Sudden outbursts of  firedamp, 
suffocation by  natural gases  - - -
9)  Underground  combustion and  fires  - - -
10)  Inrushes of water  - - -
11)  Electricity  - 1  -
12)  Other causes  29  1  0.268 
TOTAL  1,277  51  10S,144,32e  11.799 
(a)  Casualties were  unable  to  resume  worK below  ground  for  at least eight weeks. 
(b)  Casualties died within eight weeks. 
(c)  Accidents  involving more  than five casualties of types  (a)  and/or  (b). 
Number  of  Group  accidents 
fatalities  as under  (c)  below 
as under  (b) 
per million Number  Number  Number  man-hours  of  of dis- of fatal- (to third  acci- ablements  ities as  decimal  as  under 
place  dents  (a)  under  (b) 
0.222  - - -
Oo166  - - -
0.028  - - -
0.018  - - -
0.018  - - -
- - - -
- - - -
- - - -
- - - -
- - - -
0.009  - - -
0.009  - - -
0.471  - - -Year: 1964 
Country:  France  COMMON  STATISTICAL  SUMMARY  OF  UNDERGROUND  ACCIDENTS 
AT  MINES  IN  THE  E.C.S.C.  COUNTRIES  Coal-field: Nord/Pas-de-Calais 
Number  of  Number  of 
casualties  disablements 
Man- as  under  (a) 
C A U S  E  Disable- Fatal- hours  per million 
ments  as  ities  worked  man-hours 
as under  (to third  under  (a)  (b)  decimal  below  below  place) 
1)  Falls of ground  583  16  4-382 
2)  Haulage  and transport  278  20  2.089 
3)  Movement  of personnel  264  2  1.984 
4)  Machinery,  handling of tools 
and supports  340  7  2.555 
5)  Falling objects  263  l  1.977 
6)  Explosives  and  fumes  l  1  0.008 
7)  Explosions  of firedamp or coat 
dust  - - -
8)  Sudden outbursts of firedamp, 
suffocation by natural gases  - 1  -
9)  Underground  combustion and fires  - - -
10)  Inrushes of water  - - -
11)  Electricity  1  - 0.008 
12)  Other causes  23  1  0.173 
TOTAL  1,  753  49  13 3  , 0  4  7 , 13E  13.176 
(a)  Casualties were  unable  to  resume  work  below  ground for  at least eight weeks. 
(b)  Casualties died within eight weeks. 
(c)  Ac~idents involving more  than five casualties of types  (a)  and/or  (b). 
Number  of  Group  accidents 
fatalities  as under  (c)  below 
as under  (b) 
per million Number  Number  Number  man-hours  of  of dis- of fatal- (to th-ird  ablements 
decimal  acci- as  under  ities as 
place  dents  (a)  under  (b) 
0.119  - - -
0.149  - - -
0.015  - - -
0.053  - - -
0.008  - - -
0.008  - - -
- - - -
0.008  - - -
- - - -
- - - -
- - - -
0.008  - - -
0.368  - - -
"'  en 
0 Year:  1964 
Country:  France  COMMON  STATISTICAL  SUMMARY  OF  UNDERGROUND  ACCIDENTS 
AT  MINES  IN  THE  E.C.S.C.  COUNTRIES  Coal-field:  Centre-2/Iidi  (not 
1  d ·  P  nee) 
Number  of  Number  of 
casualties  disablements 
Man- as under  (a) 
C A U S  E  Disable- Fatal- hours  per million 
ments  as  ities  worked  man-hours 
under  (a)  as under  (to third 
(b)  decimal  below  below  place) 
1)  Falls of  ground  184  6  4-243 
2)  Haulage  and  transport  119  8  2. 7  43 
3)  Movement  of personnel  113  - 2.605 
4)  Machinery,  handling of tools 
and supports  268  1  6.178 
5)  Falling objects  94  2  2.167 
6)  Explosives  and  fumes  2  - 0.046 
7)  Explosions of firedamp or coal 
dust  - - -
8)  Sudden outbursts of firedamp, 
suffocation by  natural gases  - 1  -
9)  Underground combustion and  fires  - - -
10)  Inrushes of water  3  - 0.009 
11)  Electricity  - - -
12)  Other causes  20  2  0.461 
TOTAL  803  20  43,376,696  18.512 
(a)  Casualties were  unable to resume  work  below ground  for  at least eight weeks. 
(b)  Casualties died within eight weeks. 
(c)  Accidents  involving more  than five casualties of types  (a)  and/or  (b). 
~nc u  ~ng  rove 
Number  of  Group  accidents 
fatalities  as under  (c)  below 
as under  (b) 
per million Number  Number  Number  man-hours  of  of dis- of fatal- (to third  acci- ablements ities as  decimal  as  under 
place  dents  (a)  under  (b) 
0.138  - - -
0.185  - - -
- - - -
0.023  - - -
0.046  - - -
- - - -
- - - -
0.023  - - -
- - - -
- - - -
- - - -
0.046  - - -
0.461  - - -Year: 1964 
Country:  France  COMMON  STATISTICAL  SUMMARY  OF  UNDERGROUND  ACCIDENTS 
AT  MINES  IN  THE  E.C.S.C.  COUNTRIES  Coal-field: Lorraine 
Number  of  Number  of 
casualties  disablements 
Man- as under  (a) 
C A  tJ  S  E  Disable- Fatal- hours  per million 
ments as  ities  worked  man-hours 
under  (a)  as under  (to third 
(b)  decimal  below  below  place) 
1)  Falls of ground  182  6  4-147 
2)  Haulage  and transport  105  3  2.392 
3)  Movement  of personnel  148  - 3. 371 
4)  Machinery,  handling of tools 
and supports  62  - 1.412 
5)  Falling objects  100  1  2.278 
6)  Explosives  and  fumes  - - -
7)  Explosions of firedamp or coal 
dust  - - -
8)  Sudden outbursts of firedamp, 
suffocation by natural gases  - - -
9)  Underground combustion and fires  - - -
10)  Inrushes of water  - - -
11)  Electricity  1  - 0.023 
12)  Other causes  7  - 0.159 
TOTAL  605  10  43,895,512  13.782 
(a)  Casualties were  unable  to resume  work  below  ground for  at least eight weeks. 
(b)  Casualties died within eight weeks. 
(c)  Accidents  involving more  than five casualties of types  (a)  and/or  (b). 
Number  of  Group  accidents 
fatalities  as under  (c)  below 
as under  (b) 
per million Number  Number  Number  man-hours  of  of dis- of fatal- (to thi.rd  acci- ablements ities as  decimal  as under 
place  dents  (a)  under  (b) 
0.137  - - -
0.068  - - -
- - - -
- - - -
0.023  - - -
- - - -
- - - -
- - - -
- - - -
- - - -
- - - -
- - - -
0.228  - - -Year:  1964 
COMMON  STATISTICAL  SUMMARY  OF  UNDERGROUND  ACCIDENTS 
AT  MINES-IN  THE  E.C.S.C.  COUNTRIES 
Country:  Frallce 
Coal-field:  (not including 
Provence) 
Number  of  Number  of 
casualties  disablements 
Man- as under  (a) 
CAUSE  Disable- Fatal- hours  per million 
ments  as  ities  worked  man-hours 
under  (a)  as under  (to third 
(b)  decimal  below  below  place) 
1)  Falls of  ground  949  28  4.308 
2)  Haulage  and transport  502  31  2.278 
3)  Movement  of personnel  525  2  2.383 
4)  Machinery,  handling of tools 
and supports  670  8  3.042 
5)  Falling objects  457  4  2.074 
6)  Explosives  and  fumes  3  1  0.013 
7)  Explosions of firedamp or coal 
dust  - - -
8)  Sudden outbursts of firedamp, 
suffocation by  natural gases  - 2  -
9)  Underground combustion and fires  - - -
10)  Inrushes of water  3  - 0.018 
11)  Electricity  2  - 0.009 
12)  Other causes  50  3  0.227 
TOTAL  3,161  79  R20,319,344  14.341 
(a)  Ca·sualties were unable  to resume  work below ground for  at least eight weeks. 
(b)  Casualties died within eight weeks. 
(c)  Accidents  involving more  than five casualties of types  (a)  and/or  (b). 
Number  of  Group accidents 
fatalities  as under  (c)  below 
as under  (b) 
per million Number  Number  Number  man-hours  of  of dis- of fatal- (to third  acci- ablements ities as  decimal  as under 
place  dents  (a)  under  (b) 
0.127  - - -
0.141  - - -
0.009  - - -
0.036  - - -
0.018  - - -
0.005  - - -
- - - -
0.009  - - -
- - - -
- - .,....  -
- - - -
0.014  - - -
0.359  - - -
N 
en 
w Year:  1964 
Country:  Italy  COMMON  STATISTICAL  SUMMARY  OF  UNDERGROUND  ACCIDENTS 
AT  MINES  IN  THE  E.C.S.C.  COUNTRIES  Coal-field:  Sulcis 
Number  of  Number  of 
casualties  disablements 
Man- as  under  (a) 
CAUSE  Disable- Fatal- hours  per million 
ments  as  ities  worked  man-hours 
under  (a)  as under  (to third 
below  (b) 
~  decimal 
below  place) 
1)  Falls of  ground  2  - 0.893 
2)  Haulage  and  transport  4  - l.  787 
3)  Movement  of personnel  4  - 1.  787 
4)  Machinery,  handling of tools 
and supports  7  - 3.127 
5)  Falling objects  8  - 3. 57 4 
6)  Explosives  and  fumes  - - -
7)  Explosions of firedamp or coal 
dust  - - -
8)  Sudden outbursts of  firedamp, 
suffocation by  natural  gases  - - -
9)  Underground  combustion and  fires  - - -
10)  Inrushes of water  - - -
11)  Electricity  - - -
12)  Other causes  - - -
TOTAL  25  - 2,238,436  11.168 
(a)  Casualties were  unable  to  resume  work  below  ground for  at least eight weeks. 
(b)  Casualties died within eight weeks. 
(c)  Accidents  involving more  than five casualties of types  (a)  and/or  (b). 
Number  of  Group  accidents. 
fatalities  as  under  (c)  below 
as under  (b) 
per million Number  Number  Number  man-hours  of  of dis- of fatal- (to thtrd  acci- ablements  ities as  decimal  dents  as under  under  (b)  place  (a) 
- - - -
- - - -
- - - -
- ·- - -
- - - -
- - - -
- - - -
- - - -
- - - -
- - - -
- - - -
- - - -
- - - -Year:  1964 
Country:  Netherlands  COMMON  STATISTICAL  SUMMARY  OF  UNDERGROUND  ACCIDENTS 
AT  MINES  IN  THE  E.C.S.C.  COUNTRIES  Coal-field:  Limbourg 
Number  of  Number  of 
casualties  disablements 
Man- as  under  (a) 
C A U S  E  Disable- Fatal- hours  per million 
ments  as  ities  worked  man-hours 
under  (a)  as under  (to third 
(b)  decimal  below  below  place) 
1)  Falls of  ground  94  2  2.017 
2)  Haulage  and transport  91  8  1.952 
3)  Movement  of personnel  22  - 0.472 
4)  Machinery,  handling of tools 
and supports  51  2  1.094 
5)  Falling objects  43  - 0.923 
6)  Explosives  and  fumes  1  - 0.021 
7)  Explosions of firedamp or coal 
dust  - - -
8)  Sudden outbursts of  firedamp, 
suffocation by  natural gases  - - -
9)  Underground  combustion and fires  - - -
10)  Inrushes of water  - - -
11)  Electricity  1  - 0.021 
12)  Other causes  6  - 0.129 
TOTAL  309  12  46,609,424  6.629 
(a)  Casualties .were  unable to resume  work  below ground for  at least eight weeks. 
(b)  Casualties died within eight weeks. 
(c)  Accidents  involving more  than five casualties of types  (a)  and/or  (b). 
Number  of  Group  accidents 
fatalities  as  under  (c)  below 
as under  (b) 
per million Number  Number  Number  man-hours  of  of dis- of fatal- (to third  acci- ablements ities as  decimal  as  under 
place  dents  (a)  under  (b) 
0.043  - - -
0.172  - - -
- - - -
0.043  - - -
- - - -
- - - -
- - - -
- - - -
- - - -
- - - -
- - - -
- - - -
0.257  - - -267 
Fo  COMPARATIVE  TABLES  OF  COMMON  STATISTICAL  SUMMARIES 
1958  - 1964 C  A  U  S  E 
(1958  - 1961) 
1)  Falls of ground 
2)  Haulage  and Transport 
3)  Movement  of  Personnel 
4)  Machinery,  Handling of  tools  and 
supports 
5)  Falling Objects 
6)  Explosives  and  fumes 
7)  Explosions  of  firedamp or coal 
dust 
8)  Sudden outburst  of  firedamp, 
suffocation  by  natural gases 
9)  Underground combustion  and fires 
10)  Inrushes  of water 
11)  Electricity 
12)  Other  Causes 
T  0  T  A  L 
(1962  - 1964) 
1)  Falls of  ground 
2)  Haulage  and Transport 
3)  Movement  of  Personnel 
4)  Machinery,  Handling of  tools  and 
supports 
5)  Falling Objects 
6)  Explosives  and  fumes 
7)  Explosives  of  firedamp or coal 
dust 
8)  Sudden  outbursts of  firedamp, 
suffocation by  natural gases 
9)  Underground  combustion  and fires 
10)  Inrushes  of water 
11) Electricity 
12) Other Causes 
T  0  TAL 
Germany 
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A.  Comparative Table  of  Numbers  of  Persons 
incapacitated by  Underground Accidents  for  eight weeks  or  longer 
For  the  years  1958  - 1964 
per million man-hours 
France 
(North-Rhine/Westphalia  Belgium  (excluding Provence)  Italy 
and Saar) 
1958  1959  1960  1961  1958  1959  1960  1961  1958  1959  1960  1961  1958  1959,  1960 
4,843  4,779  4,886  4,797  5~911  4,294  4,324  4,071  5,027  4,665  4,774  4,416  1,355  1,378  1,808 
2,550  2,569  2,445  2,458  4,13:2  2,979  2,709  2,770  1,980  1,695 1,920  2,106_  1,335 0,984  1,205 
2,497  2.,463  2,348  2,512  1,354 0,998  1,008 1,062  1,505  1,118  2,873  2,334 0,668 0,394 1,005 
0,767 0,914 0,920 0,867  2,804  2,085  2,386  2,097 0,914 1,022 1,621  2,523  1,169 0,984 0,603 
2,537  2,719  2,738  2,945 0,414 0,371 0,354 0,301  1,890  2,187 1,893  2,292  1,169 1,968  1,808 
0,015 0,011 0,010 0,009 0,027 0,007 0,032 0,018 0,043 0,051 0,031 0,017 0,167  - -
0,011 0,016  - 0,002  - - - - 0,047 0,088  - - - - -
- - - - 0,011  - - - 0,004  - - - - - -
- - 0,003 0,002  - - - - - - - - - - -
0,004  - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
0,010 0,014 0,012 0,014 0,011  - 0,015 0,018 0,014  - 0,004 0,029  - - -
0,487 0,522 0,457 0,503 0,260 0,255 0,260 0,301  2,956  2,768 0,793 0,362 0,334 0,591 0,603 
13,721  ~4,007  ~3,819 4,109  ~4,924  10,989  ~1,089 0,638  ~4,380  ~3,594  ~3,909 4,079 6,197 6,299  7,032 
1962  1963  1964  1965  1962  1963  1964  1965  1962  1963  1964  1965  1962  1963  1964 
4,682  4,663  4,894  - 4,43£  4,432  4,417  - 4,222  4,177  4,308  - 0,792 0,366 0,893 
2,501  2,433  2,385  - 3,331  3,565  3,419  - 2,196  2,364  2,278  - 1,847 1,465 1,787 
2,608  2,646  2,744  - 1,136  1,066 0,961  - 2,458  2,368  2,383  - 1,056 0,732  1,787 
1,046  1,213  1,242  - 2,461  2,414  2,310  - 2,991  3,096  3,042  - 1,584 1,465 3,127 
3,077 3,038 3,242  - 0,44!5  0,547 0,397  - 2,073  2,278  2,074  - 2,375  3,296  3,574 
0,008 0,006 o,oo6  - - 0,019 0,018  - 0,051 o,oo9 0,013  - - 0,366  -
0,123 0,010  - - - - 0,009  - 0,004  - - - - - -
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
- 0,004  - - 0,010  - - - - - 0,018  - - - -
0,006 0,012 0,009  - o,olC  0,009  - - 0,004 0,014 0,009  - - - -
0,481:!  0,473 0,477  - 0,331  o,l9B 0,268  - 0,240 0,354 0,227  - - - -
14,536  ~4,499  ~4,999  - 2,161 12,250  ~1,799  - 14,235  14,660  14,347  - 7,654  7,690 11,168 
1 
I 
Netherlands  Community 
1961  1958  19591  1960  1961  1958! 1959  1960  1961 
- 1,326  1,464 1,305  1,829 4,846  4,490  4,571  4,434 
0,676  1,511  1,562 1,898  1,924  2,602  2,347  2,310  2,371 
1,578 0,324 0,386 0,187 0,514  2,003  1,823  2,185  2,185 
0,902 0,617 0,402 0,780 0,915  1,098  1,064 1,264 1,423 
2,029 0,401 0,515 0,492 0,819 1,962  2,161  2,105  2,353 
0,225  - - - - 0,023 0,020 0,017 0,012 
- - - - - 0,017 0,030 0,010 0,001 
- - - - - 0,002  - - -
- - - - - - - 0,002 0,001 
- - - - - 0,002  - - -
- - - - - 0,0101 0,008 0,010 0,018 
0,451 0,262 0,161 0,390 0,210  o ,513 0,428  0,985  1,012 
_j 
5,861  4,441  4,490  5,051  6,212  3,551  ~2,954  11.2, 986  3,227 
1965  1962  1963  1964  1965  1962  1963  1964  1965 
- 2,238  1,742 2,017  - 4,38) 4,337  4,509  -
- 2,590  1,826  1,952  - 2,52112,520  2,346  -
- 0,580 0,630 0,472  - 2,282: 2,261  2,326  -
1,71~ 1,818  - 1,015 1,050  1,094  - 1,848  ~ 
- 0,642 0,630 0,923  - 2,375  2,406  2,442  -
- - - 0,021  - 0,0181 0,010 0,011  -
- - - - - 0,071 0,006 0,001  -
- - - - - - - - -
- - - - - - - - -
- - - - - 0,001 0,002 0,003  -
- 0,021  - 0,021  - O,OO'i  0,012 0,008  -
- 0,497 0 ,14'i  0,129  - 0,404  0,390 0,364  -
I---
- 7,583  6,02!5  6,629  - 13,781 13,761  3,860  -I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I Germany 
C  A  U  S  E 
(North-Rhine/Westphalia 
and Saar) 
(1958  - 1961)  1958  1959  1960  1961  1958 
1)  Falls of  ground  0,268 0,290 0,263 0,216 0,223 
2)  Haulage  and Transport  0,179 0,169 0,182 0,196 0,101 
3)  Movement  of  Personnel  0,094 0,097 0,010 0,086 0,011 
4)  Machinery,  Handling of  tools  and 
supports  0,010 0,027 0,012 0,027 0,005 
5)  Falling Objects  0,065 0,041 0,039 0,065 0,016 
6)  Explosives  and  fumes  0,009 0,003 0,003  - 0,011 
7)  Explosions  of  firedamp  or coal 
dust  0,011 0,012  - - -
8)  Sudden outbursts of  firedamp, 
suffocation by  natural  gases  0,005 0,003 0,002 0,004 0,016 
9)  Underground  combustion  and  fires  - 0,003  - 0,002  -
10)  Inrushes of water  - 0,003 0,002  - 0,011 
11)  Electricity  0,022 0,008 0,002 0,005 0,021 
12)  Other Causes  0,025 0,025 0,036 0,049 0,005 
T  0  T  A  L  0,687 0,680 0,611 0,651 0,420 
(1962  - 1964)  1962  1963  1964  1965  1962 
1) Falls of  ground  0,280 0,260 0,200  - 0,246 
2)  Haulage  and Transport  0,149 0,178 0,200  - 0,142 
3)  Movement  of  Personnel  0,059 0,089 0,071  - 0,010 
4)  Machinery,  Handling of  tools  and 
supports  0,037 0,019 0,028  - 0,047 
5)  Falling Objects  0,094 0,072 0,054  - 0,010 
6)  Explosives  and  fumes  0,004  - 0,002  - -
7)  Explosions  of  firedamp or coal 
dust  0,660 0_,002 0_,002  - -
8)  Sudden outbursts of  firedamp, 
suffocation by  natural  gases  0,002  - - - 0,047 
9)  Underground  combustion  and fires  - 0,006 0,009  - -
10)  Inrushes of water  - 0,004  - - 0,047 
ll) Electricity  0,010 0,002 0,004  - -
12)  Other Causes  0,049 0,025 0,017  - 0,019 
T  0  TAL  1,344 0,657 0,587  - 0,568 
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B.  Comparative Table of  accidents 
resulting in death within eight weeks  for 
the  years  1958  to  1964 
per million man-hours 
Belgium  France 
(excluding  Provence) 
1959  1960  1961  1958  1959  1960  1961  1958 
0,213 0,299 0,266 0,235 0,192 0,186 0,219 0,167 
0,124 0,157 0,168 0,115 0,085 0,082 0,122  -
0,027 0,008 0,035 0,001 0,018 0,027 0 ,oos.  -
0,014 0,016 0,027 0,018 0,040 0,016 0,008  -
- 0,008  - 0,025 0,007 0,004 0,017  -
0,014  - - - 0,026  - - 0,501 
- 0,016  - 0,115 0,121  - - -
0,014  - - 0,043 0,026 0,019 0,004 0,167 
0,007  - - - - - - -
- - 0,044  - - - 0,004  -
- 0,024  - - 0,011 0,012  - -
- 0,008 0,009 0,036 0,029 0,008  - -
0,413 0,536 0,549 0,594 0,555 0,354 0,382 0,835 
1963  1964  1965  1962  1963  1964  1965  1962 
0,264 0,222  - 0,167 0,120 0,127  - -
0,245 0,166  - 0,077 0,121 0,141  - -
0,057 0,028  - 0,043 0,009 0,009  - -
- 0,018  - 0,030 0,009 0,036  - -
0,019 0,018  - 0,030 0,009 0,018  - -
- - - - 0,005 0,005  - -
- - - o,oo4  - - - -
- - - - 0,019 0,009  - -
- - - - - - - -
0,019  - - - - - - -
0,009 0,009  - 0,009 0,024  - - -
0,028 0,009  - 0,009 0,014  0,014  - -
0,641 0,471  - 0,369 0,330  0,35~  - -
Italy  Netherlands  Community 
1959  1960  1961  1958  1959  1960  1961  1958  1959  1960  1961 
- 0,201 0,225 0,262 0,064 0,034 0,114 0,253 0,242 0,235 0,217 
0,197  - - o,o11 0,145 0,067 0,095 0,147 0,141 0,146 0,168 
- - - - - - - 0,057 0,063 0,047 0,056 
- - - 0,015 0,016  - - 0,011 0,028 0,012 0,021 
0,197  - - - 0,016  - - 0,045 0,027 0,024 0,041 
- - - - - - - 0,009 0,010 0,002  -
- - - - - - - 0,032 0,036 0,002  -
- - - - - - - 0,016 0,010 0,006 0,003 
- - - - - - - - 0,003  - 0,001 
- - - - - - - 0,002 0,002 0,001 0,006 
- - - - - - 0,019 0,016 0,007 0,007 0,004 
- - - - - 0,017  - 0,023 0,021 0,024 0,029 
0,394 0,201 0,225 0,355 0,241 0,119 0,229 0,610 0,590 0,507 0,546 
1963  1964  1965  1962  1963  1964  1965  1962  1963  1964  1965 
0,366  - - 0,062 0,084 0,043  - 01234 0,217 0,175  -
- - - 0,062 0,105 0,172  - 0,124 0,167 0,178  -
- - - - - - - 0,045 0,060 0,045  -
- - - 0,041  - 0,043  - 0,037 0,013 0,030  -
- - - - - - - 0,062 0,046 0,037  -
- - - - - - - 0,002 0,001 0,002  -
- - - - - - - 0,375 o,oo1 0,001  -
- - - - - - - 0,007 0_,005 o,oo2  -
- - - - - - - - 0,003 0,005  -
- - - - - - - 0,005 0,005  - -
- - - - - - - 0,008 0,008 0,003  -
- - - - - - - 0,03:1  0,021 0,014  -
po ,366  - - 0,166 0,189 0,257  - 0,93:1  0,54'i  0,492  -: l 
C  A  USE 
(1960-1962) 
1)  Falls of  ground 
2)  Haulage  and  Transport 
3)  Movement  of Personnel 
4)  Machinery,  Handling of  tools  and 
supports 
5)  Falling Objects 
6)  Explosives  and  fumes 
7)  Explosion of  firedamp  or coal 
dust 
8)  Sudden outbursts of  firedamp, 
suffocation by  natural  gases 
9)  Underground  combustion  and  fires 
10)  Inrushes  of water 
11)  Electricity 
12)  Other Causes 
T  0  T  A L 
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C.  Comparative  table of underground  group accidents  (see  (c)  below), 
for  the  years  1960 to  1964 
Germany 
(North-RhinelWest-
phalia  and Saar) 
1960  1961  1962  1960 
Xa  hSahS  a  h  S  a  h 
2  2  10  1  1  6 
Belgium 
1961 
S  .1  h  S 
France 
(excluding  Provence) 
1962  1960  1961  1962  1960 
a  h  S  a  h  :>  ;1  ))  h  "\  a  h 
1  2  6  1  - 7  1  - 6 
- - - - - - 3  62  b3f  - - - - - - - - - - - -
Italy 
1961 
:>  a  h 
1962 
:>  .I  IJ 
i  - ,_ 
- - - - - - - - - -1-
2  2  4  63 344- 1  2  6  - - - 6 
Netherlands  Community 
1960  1961  1962  1960  1961  1962 
I  IJ  S  a  h  S  n  b  s  :1 
- 2  2  10 1  - 7  3  3  18 
3  62338 
2  2  10 1  7  6  65 356 
i-L-L--- +  7  1 
- -- c___ f-·-L__L--J  _ _JL__J_+--'--'----t---1-1...-..f--1--L..-f---1-L..-..f--1--'--f---1-1.....-+--'--'--1 
1963  1964  1965  1963  1965  1963  1964  1965  1963  1964  1965 
(1963-1964) 
X  :1  h  S  a  h  ~  a  b  S  a  h  "\  .1  h  S  a  h  ~  a  h  :>  ·'  h  );  .a  h  "\  ;1  h  \  a  h  :>  .1  b 
1)  Falls of  ground 
2)  Haulage  and Transport 
3)  Movement  of Personnel 
4)  Machinery,  Handling of  tools  and 
supports 
5)  Falling Objects 
6)  Explosives  and  fumes 
7)  Explosions of  firedamp  or coal 
dust 
8)  Sudden outbursts of  firedamp, 
suffocation by  natural  gases 
9)  Underground  combustion  and fires 
10)  Inrushes  of water 
11)  Electricity 
, 12)  Other Causes 
T  0  TAL 
2  5  14  - -
- 2  5  14 
(a)  Casualties were  unable  to resume  work  below  ground  for at least eight weeks. 
(b)  Casualties died within eight weeks. 
(c)  Accidents  involving more  than five casualties of  types  (a)  and/or  (b). 
(N)  Number  of  group  accidents. 
- -1-
i  - ,_ 
I  ,_ 
1963  1964  1965  1963  1964  1965 
.1  h  S  a  h  S  "  b  S  a  h  S  n  b  S  :1 
2  5  14 
2  5 14-I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
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G.  CURVES  BASED  ON  COMPARATIVE 
TABLES  OF  COMMON  STATISTICS 
1958  - 1964 LEGEND 
COMMUNITY 
-- GERMANY 
---- FRANCE 
•-•-• BELGIUM 
•-••-•  ITALY 
••••••••••  NETHERLANDS 
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~\ 
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~ 
"tliliil 
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-, 
4 
3 
2 
rn  ... 
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A·l ) FALLS OF GROUND 
CASUALTIES  UNABLE TO  RESUME  WORK  BELOW GROUND  FOR 
AT  LEAST  EIGHT WEEKS 
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A·2 ) HAULAGE AND TRANSPORT 
CASUALTIES  UNABLE TO  RESUME  WORK  BELOW GROUND  FOR 
AT  LEAST  EIGHT WEEKS 
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A·3 ) MOVEMENT OF PERSONNEL 
CASUAL  TIES  UNABLE TO  RESUME  WORK  BELOW GROUND  FOR 
AT  LEAST EIGHT  WEEKS 
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LEGEND 
COMMUNITY  A·4 1 
MACHINERY,  HANDLING  OF. 
TOOLS  AND  SUPPORTS 
--GERMANY 
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R  E  P  0  R  T 
on  trials with  e~plosion-proof dams,  carried out  by  the 
Experimental  Roadway  Association of Dortmund  at the  re-
quest  of  the Mines  Safety  Commission  and  with  the  finan-
cial aid of  the  High  Authority.  Statement of  policy re-
garding  the erection of  advance  dams  of  plaster as  a  fire-
fighting measure. 
(Approved  by  the  Mines  Safety Commission  at its Plenary 
Session of  28.4.64) 
ANNEX  I 325 
I.  After  an  accident  due  to  firedamp  involving  a  number  of workers,  the  Mines  Safety 
Commission  at their  plenary session qf the  7th  July  1959  invited the  Working  Par-
ties  on  Mine  Fires  and  Rescue  Organization 
to  examine  the question of the erection of stoppings  in combating mine 
fires  and  to present suitable  proposals  on  this subject. 
After  the  Working  Parties had  given very careful attention to  the question 
and  had  increased their knowledge  by  two  experimental  explosions  in the  TREMONIA 
mine,  owned  by  the Versuchsgrubengesellschaft m.b.H.  Dortmund,  they  presented to 
the Safety  Commission  a  report  including Recommendations  on  the  use  of stoppings 
for  isolating areas  affected by  mine  fires;  this was  approved  by  the  Plenary Session 
held  on  the  20th  of  December  1960. 
At  the  Plenary Session held  on  the  8th of April  1960,  the Mines  Safety  Commis-
sion unanimously  agreed  that  the  problem  had  not  been solved  by  the  drawing  up  of 
these  Recommendations,  which  consisted essentially of directives  for  designing  and 
erecting temporary  stoppings,  and  carrying out  preparatory work  involved. 
They  came  to  the conclusion that  a  large  number  of  experimental  explosions 
would  be  necessary  before  any  conclusions  of  practical value  could  be  drawn  about 
the  resistance of  any  particular materials  or method  of erecting the  temporary 
stoppings. 
They  therefore  agreed that  the  tests should  be  carried out  by  the Versuchs-
grubengesellschaft m.b.H.  Dortmund,  and  that  a  request  for  financial  aid  for  this 
purpose  should  be  made  to  the  High  Authority. 
- The  Versuchsgrubengesellschaft  finished  the  experimental  explosions  and  presented 
their final  report which  appears  as  an  Annex  to  this  present  note,  which  aiso 
contains  the  interim reports. 
- Tne  Working  Parties  examined  this report  in  the  presence  of  the  head  of the 
research  project  and  expressed their agreement  with  the  conclusions  which  had 
been  drawn. 
Although  no  data are yet  available  on  the  behaviour of  plaster stoppings 
subjected to  a  severe explosion occurring in actual mining conditions,  the Work-
ing Parties considered that,  on  the basis of  the  experimental results,  they  could 
present  the  following  report. 
II.  Report  regarding  the erection of  plaster stoppings  for  combating mine  fires. 
- In vjew  of  the  information obtained  from  the  carrying out of  a  test  programme 
on  explosion  proof  fire stoppings, 
- In view  of  the  experience  acquired up  to  the  present  in erecting these  stoppings 
underground after these  tests had  been carried out, 
the  Working Parties  recommend,  as  stoppings  for  sealing off mine  fires,  that plaster 
stoppings should  be  erected whenever it is  possible  and  advantageous  to do  so. 
In all the  conditions  in which  the tests were  carried out,  the  plaster stop-
pings  showed  themselves  superior to  the  sand-bag stoppings which  have  hitherto 
been  used,  on  condition that certain rules are observed when  they  are erected. 
Plaster stoppings  have  the  following  advantages  over sand-bag stoppings: 
- increased safety  for  the  teams  erecting them.  Apart  from  a  group of observers 
of  approximately  two  men,  the  teams  can  remain  up  to 300 metres  away  from  the 
stopping and,  when  circumstances  permit,  even  in the  fresh  airstream, 
- greater strength, 
- a  reduction  in the  time  required  for  building  them  by  the  adoption of  a  method 
which  is largely automated. 
On  the basis of  the tests already carried out  and  the  experience  gained  up  to the 
present,  the  rules  to be  observed when  constructing plaster stoppings  may  be  sum-
marised  as  follows: 326 
1. ·SUPPLIES 
1.1 Materials 
1.11 There  are only  limited possibilities for stocking plaster.  For  this 
reason it is not  recommended  that  a  reserve should be  held. It is 
advisable to obtain information about  the  possibilities of delivery 
and  to make  a  contract ensuring  immediate  delivery  in case  of  emergency. 
Similarly it must  be  ensured  that  loading of the  plaster at the shaft 
and  transport  towards  the  place  from  which it is to be  blown  can  be 
carried out without difficulty. 
It is  recommended  that  a  "supply  line" should  be  set up  and  that this 
should  be  maintained until the stopping is finished. 
1.12 Materials  for  building  the  stopping 
Timbers  and  facing  boards  or  planks  are  required  for  the walls  of  the 
stopping.  This  material is generally available in the mines.  Matting 
consisting of silicate· fibres  on  wire  netting are  needed  for  lining 
these walls  of  planks.  Where  necessary,  brattice cloths or  tarred 
felting  can  be  used. 
1.2 Apparatus 
1.21 Air  reservoirs 
For  blowing  the  plaster,  any  type  of air reservoir suitable for  blowing 
dust-form  products  can  be  used.  For  the  sake of efficiency,  at least 
two  reservoirs of  the  same  type  should be  provided  for  each stopping. 
1.22  Blowing  pipes  - there must  be  an  adequate  number  available.  According 
to the cross-section,  4  to  6  pipes  are  required  for  each stopping;  the 
length of  one  of  these  pipes  must  be  at least equal  to  two-thirds  of 
the  thickness  of the stopping.  It is sufficient if the others are 0.8 
to  1  metre  long.  The  head of  the  blowing  pipe  must  be  constructed in 
accordance with  the  diagram  in Fig.  I.  At  the  back  end,  the  pipes  must 
be  provided with sufficient joints so  that  hoses  may  be  attached 
(usually hoses  type  C,  i.e.  quick-connecting fire hoses  52  mm.  in dia-
meter)  which  are  generally used  for  dust-form products  and water.  Care 
must  be  taken to ensure  that the  annular connection for  the addition 
of water is  fixed  to  the  pipe ejecting the  plaster powder  so  that it 
cannot slip,  otherwise  the  plaster will  not  be  wet  enough.  In  theory 
it is  possible to recover  the  blowing  pipes,  so that  they  may  be  used 
again when  erecting other stoppings.  However,  in dangerous  situations, 
recovery is somewhat  uncertain.  Consequently  the  pipes  required  for · 
each stopping must  be  available,  or it must  be  possible to prepare  them 
rapidly. 
1.23 Lances  for additional water at  the  crown must  be  made  from  pipes with 
connections  as  shown  in Fig.  2.  The  lances,  whose  basic  length is 
1.5 metre,  must  be  provided with extension pieces until the total length 
is equal  to  the  full  thickness  of  the stopping.  The  water lances  can, 
in any  case,  be  recovered,  so  that it is sufficient if there is one 
lance  for  each site on  which  a  stopping is erected. 
1.24 Water-flow meter  (flow approximately  100  litres/min)  and  distributor 
with  3  to  5  branch  pipes  each  equipped with  a  tap. 
1.25 Hoses.  An  adequate  number  of hoses  for  the water,  plaster and  compressed 
a1r  must  be  prepared.  At  least  a  double  line of  type  C  hoses  (fire hoses 
52  mm  in diameter)  must  be  ~aid from  the site of  the stopping up  to  the 
receivers.  Moreover,  the water must  be  taken right up  to the site of  the 
stopping,  where it must  be  distributed between  the various  plaster pipes. 
In order that at each  point  branch  pipes  may  be  fitted to the existing 
air and.water  pipes,  a  device  should be  provided  to  pierce  the  pipes, 
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1.26  The  snuffle  pipes  and,  where  necessary,  stopping  pipes  with covers 
(for  a  man  to  pass  through)  and  other materials  to  be  incorporated 
in the stoppings  must  be  prepared. 
2.  PREPARATIONS 
2.1 At  the site of  the  stopping 
2.11  The  seals  (sealing walls)  must  be  erected as  far as  possible  perpen-
dicular to  the  axis of  the  roadway  and  over its whole  section. 
When  the  height at  the  roadway  crown  is 3  metres  at  the site of  the 
stopping,  the distance  between  the walls  of  the stopping must  be  at 
least  2  meters;  when  the height  is 3.5 metres  the  minimum  distance 
must  be  2.5 meters.  Where  the  crown  is higher,  the interval should be 
equal  to this height.  (These  are  empirical  values  which  may  be  adopted 
directly  for  roadways  with  a  small cross-section.  Practical tests in 
roadways  with  a  large cross-section are  envisaged  to correct or con-
firm  these values.) 
Before  the walls  are erected,  the stopping  pipe  as  well  as  the  other 
elements  to  be  incorporated in the  stopping  (snuffle  pipe,  etc.)  must 
be  put  in place.  The  pipe must  be  placed in  the  lower  part of  the  road-
way,  if possible at a  maximum  height of  70  em.  above  the  level of the 
roadway  floor. 
When  erecting the walls of the stopping,  timber  props  are first set 
and  half-round timbers  or planks  are  fixed  to  them  on  the  inside.  These 
are  nailed so that  the  interval between  them is equal  to  the  plank 
width,  but  in any  case  must  not  exceed  15  em. 
The  lining is also nailed onto  the interior face  of  the stopping.  For 
the  fire side of the stopping,  which  is later to  be  coated  by  means  of 
a  jet of plaster,  it is essential to  use  mats  made  of silicate fibres 
reinforced  by  wire  netting.  On  the  other side,  brattice cloth or roof 
felt will suffice.  Care  must  be  taken to ensure that  the stopping  fi~~ 
tightly at the walls  and  floor  of  the  roadway.  An  opening must  be  left 
for  the  men  working  between  the walls of the stopping so that it can 
be  closed _from  the  outside. 
2.12  When,  during  fire-fighting operation underground,  a  stopping is being 
erected rapidly  in order to prevent  any  risk of explosion or  rap~d 
propagation of  the  fire,  it is not  generally necessary  to key  the walls 
or roof. 
If sufficient time  is available it is advisable to  improve  the  tightness 
and  the  anchoring of the stopping  by  keying  the walls  and,  if possible, 
the  roof at  the site of the  stopping,  at least on  one side.  It may  even 
be  useful  to make  an artificial dome  in the  roadway  roof so as  to en-
sure better wetting  and  good  adhesion of  the  plaster mass  to  the  roof. 
In  roadways  supported  by  brick walling or smooth  concrete  blocks,  holes 
must  be  drilled in the strata;  bars· are  fixed  in these holes  (e.g.  old 
mine-car  axles)  to anchor  the stopping. 
2.13  The  blowing  pipes  must  be  distributed over the whole  section of  the 
roadway.  When  the  floor  is less than 4  metres  wide,  two  pipes  at  a 
height of 1.5 metres  are sufficient in the right- and  left-hand halves 
of the  roadway.  Two  or  three  pipes  are also required under  the  roof. 
One  of these  pipes  must  be  shaped  and  arranged so that it reaches  the 
highest  point of the  crown  (after lagging has  been  removed)  or penetrates 
the artificial dome,  in order to  allow the  plaster to  be  blown  right 
under  the  crown.  Except  for  this  pipe,  which  is  the  last one  from  which 
plaster is blown,  all the  pipes  must  be  arranged horizontally to  prevent 
penetration of the  liquid plaster,  which  could easily cause obstruction. 
On  the  other hand,  it is  recommended  that  they should  be slightly turned 
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In order to  prevent  any  movement  during  the  blowing,  the  pipes  must  be 
solidly anchored.  However,  care must  be  taken  to ensure  that this 
anchoring  can  be  removed  from  the outside so  that the  pipes  can  be 
taken  out when  they  are  no  longer needed. 
2.14  The  water-flow meter  and distributor are attached to  the  existing water 
pipes or to the  new  ones,  so that the meter measures  the total  flow. 
For  a  water consumption of  100 meters  per minute  the  pressure  in the 
water  pipe  mus·t  not  exceed  3  atm.  gauge. 
The  various  blowing  pipes are attached to the  distributor,  one  of the 
branch  pipes  at least being  reserved  for  the  lance.  If there are  not 
sufficient branch  pipes  to serve all the blowing  pipes,  they must  be 
disconnected  and  reconnected during blowing operations,  when  the  lower 
pipes  are  no  longer  being used. 
2.2  The  site of  the air reservoir 
2.21  Reservoir.  As  favourable  a  site as  possible must  be  selected.  Previous 
experience  has  shown  that with  the  equipment at  present used  (e.g. 
Rheinelbe  and  Haarmann  reservoirs)  it is possible,  with  a  compressed-air 
pressure of 4.5 atm.  gauge  to blow  through  a  300-metre  pipe;  the difference 
in level may  be  as  much  as  100 metres. 
Tne  receiver will,  as  far  as  possible,  be  placed  in the  fresh-air stream 
and,  in any  case,  in a  protected place so that the  teams  are  not  directly 
exposed to  the  shock  wave  in the event of  an  explosion.  Provision must 
be  made  for transporting  the  plaster  (approximately  20  - 50  tons will be 
required,  according to  the cross-section of  the  roadway).  It is advisable 
to  provide  points,  or at least  a  siding,  for  the  empty  mine-cars. 
2.22  The  number of compressed-air branch  pipes  should  be  determined  by  the 
numbers  of reservoirs  used. 
2.23  The  unrolling of the  hoses  from  the  reservoirs  to the stopping is done 
during  the  last stage of  preparation.  Care  must  be  taken  to  protect the 
hoses,  as  far  as  possible,  from  damage. 
3.  BLOWING  ON  THE  PLASTER 
3.1  The  plaster 
3.11  It is advisable  to  blow  regularly,  preferably with several  pipes  - at 
least two  - so  that  there is always  one  blowing  pipe  in use  at  the stop-
ping.  The  rules  for  the selected type of air reservoir must  be  followed. 
3.12 Previous  experience  has .shown  that it is advisable  to blow  first of all 
with  the  lower·row of  pipes.  When  these are obstructed by  the  mass  of 
plaster accumulating at their mouths,  the  upper  row  is then used.  The· 
pipes  which  have  become  blocked  up  must  be  withdrawn  from  the  stopping 
as  quickly  as  possible  because,  after a  certain time,  it is no  longer 
possible to  do  so. 
3.13  Finally,  the plaster is blown  through  the  longer  pipe,  which  reaches 
the highest  point  in the  thickness of  the  stopping,  and  which  blows 
into the  roof until the stopping will  absorb  no  more  plaster. 
3.14 The  obstructions in the  hoses  must  be  eliminated quickly,  where  neces-
sary  by  a  replacement  of  the sections which  have  become  clogged.  It is 
advisable to  have  reserve  hoses. 
3.15 Interruptions  in blowing are  to be  avoided  as  far as  possible,  but if 
work  has  to  be  interrupted for  only  a  few  hours'a sufficiently  firm 
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3.2 water 
3.21  The  flow  of water is regulated at  the site of  the  stopping.  Care  must 
be  taken  to cut  off  the water  supply  to  pipes  which  are  not  in use. 
In order to  prevent  frequent  connecting and  disconnecting of  the water 
pipes,  it is  advisable  to connect  as  many  blowing  pipes  as  possible  to 
the water distributor. 
The  supply  of water  must  be  regulated so  that  there is  a  flow  of  50 litres 
of water  during  the  time  required  to  blow  100 kg  of  plaster.  The  water 
must  be  cut off when  the  blowing is interrupted,  so  as  to  prevent·excess 
water  from  forming  channels  along which  wet  plaster could  flow  during 
subsequent  blowing. 
The  total quantity of water  delivered must  be  checked  from  time  to  time 
by  means  of  a  meter  (the meter  reading should  be  noted at  the start of 
the  blowing operations!)  so  that it can  be  compared with  the quantity 
of  plaster blown  during  the  same  period.  500 litres of water  per  ton of 
plaster should  be  aimed at.  Any  shortage of water can  to  some  extent  be 
compensated  for  by  increasing,the  flow  later. 
3.22  The  water  lance  is used  towards  the  end  of  the  blowing  process.  It is 
used  for  injecting water at all points where  the  stopping is not suf-
ficiently  firm  and  where it is still possible  to  introduce  the  lance. 
This  will  be  particularly in the  roof,  but  more  water  may  also  be  needed 
near  the walls.  The  flow  of water  through  the  lance is regulated so  as 
to  prevent  a  large stream of water  flowing  from  the stopping.  When  the 
flow  escaping is excessive,  a  new  hole must  be  drilled.  The  water must 
be  injected both  into  the  front  part  (by  means  of  an  extended lance)  and 
into  the  back  part of  the  stopping. 
3.3  Protection against  dust 
During  blowing,  the  men  working  at  the  receiver and  those  close to  the stop-
ping are  bound,  in certain conditions,  to  be  exposed  to considerable  dust 
nuisance.  This  applies  particularly if the stopping is erected in the  return 
airway  of  a  district affected  by  fire.  For  this  reason it is recommended 
that  the  teams  working  on  the  blowing  as  well  as  the  men  near  the stopping 
itself should always  be  equipped with dust masks  and  goggles,  unless  they 
are wearing  protective apparatus  against  gas  owing  to  the  high  carbon monoxide 
content. 
4.  FINAL  OPERATIONS 
It is not  necessary  to reinforce  the stopping by  strutting.  If the stopping 
itself is not  sufficiently airtight it must  be  reinforced  by  the usual  methods, 
e.g •.  the  introduction.under  pressure of cement  and  stone-dust grout  in the  space 
between  the  stopping and  a  wall  which  should  be  erected  a  short distance  from  the 
stopping. 
X 
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on  the  opening-up of sealed-off fire areas,  and  rules 
applicable thereto. 
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Session of  16.10.64) 
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Following  acceptance,  at its Plenary Session of December  20,  1960,  of  Recom-
mendations  on  the sealing-off of  fires  and  seats of  underground  combustion,  the 
Mines  Safety  Commission  decided  to investigate  further  unresolved  problems  associated 
with  this_ question. 
It instructed the  Working Parties on  Fires  and  Underground  Combustion  and  on 
Rescue  Organization to study 
- the  problem of the  resistance of  a  particular material  and  a  particular method  of 
construction of  the  stoppings  to  be  erected,  and 
- the  problem of  reopening sealed-off fire areas. 
Investigation of  the  first  problem was  concluded with  the submission of  a  report 
and  opinion  to  the Plenary Session of  the  Commission  of April  28,  1964. 
The  problem of  the  reopening of sealed-off fire  areas  was  first discussed  by 
the  Working  Parties at their joint meeting of  December  7,  1961.  After the Delegations 
of  the  Community  countries  and  of the  United  Kingdom  had  supplied sufficient documenta-
tion on  the  methods  adopted  in their countries  for  reopening sealed-off fire areas, 
this material  was  subjected to  a  first examination at the  meeting  of April  13,  1962. 
It was  decided  to entrust  the  analysis of.the documentation  to  an  expert.  On  the basis 
of this  documentation  and  of  an  additional study of relevant source material  from 
countries  other than  the member  countries  of  the  Community  and  the  United  Kingdom, 
this expert  drew  up  a  conspectus  offering a  clear and  detailed comparison  of  the 
various  methods  employed. 
On  the  basis  of this study,  a  sub-committee set up  by  the  Working Parties drafted 
(Doc.  No.  2253/63}  proposals which,  following  detailed examination,  the working  par-
ties now  submit  to the  Commission  in the  form  of general  rules,  which  can  provide 
those  responsible  for  the  reopening of sealed-off districts with  useful  information 
on  the method  to  be  adopted. 
GUIDING  PRINCIPLES 
FOR  THE  REOPENING  OF  SEALED-OFF  FIRE  AREAS 
I.  GENERAL 
Special  reasons  for  reopening  a  district sealed off after a  fire: 
Recovery  of  bodies 
Salvage  of material 
Recovery  of  roadways,  and workings 
Reduction of the·sealed-off area 
Inspection of  the district 
and,  even,  where  necessary 
direct fire-fighting. 
The  following  hazards  can arise  from  reopening  a  sealed-off district: 
Release of  CO,  foul  air and  hot  damp  air 
Explosion of  fire-damp or fire gas,  where  the  fire is not yet extinct 
Recrudescence  of the  fire. 
Recrudescence  of  a  fire  does  not  always  take  place at once,  but  is possible 
even after a  considerable  delay.  This  is,  however,  more  likely in the case of an 
endogenous  fire  than with  one  ignited by  external causes,  and  more  especially as 
a  consequence  of insufficient cooling-off of the  fire areas.  Recrudescence  of the 
fire can  occu~ only  when  fresh air reaches  the seat of the  fire,  so that with all 
operations  involved  in  reopening  a  fire  area it is of  prime  importance  to  inspect 
the  individual air currents constantly;  in addition,  all places suspected of having 338 
been seats of  fire or heatings must  be  ascertained with  the utmost  speed. 
By  its very  n~ture,  the  reopening of  a  district sealed-off  on  account  of 
underground  combustion  or an  open  fire  always  constitutes  a  risk.  Each  case  must 
be  considered  individually;  in view of the numerous  factors  of uncertainty,  it 
is  impossible  to guarantee·success  even if these rules  are  followed;·  the  failure 
of  a  reopening  operation is not  necessarily  an  indication that  the wrong  method 
was  chosen,  but  may  be  a  consequence  of the action of  imponderables  which  could 
not  have  been  foreseen  before operations  began. 
II.  FUNDAMENTAL  RULES 
According  to  the  regulations  in force  in the  individual member  countries, 
sealed off districts may  be  reopened  only after the  competent  authorities  have 
been  notified or  have  given  their permission. 
Before  opening  commences,  gas  samples  must  be  taken  from  the  fire area,  at 
each  stopping  and  from all snuffle pipes;  the  gas  samples  are  then  analysed  and 
the  results assessed  from  the  point of view of  explosion risk and  the state of the 
seat of  the  fire. 
In  addition,  the cooling-off  time  of  the seat of the  fire must  be  taken  into 
account. 
If  possible,  the  sealed-off district should  be  inspected before  any  air is 
circulated or  any  operations are started.  Details  of the method  to be  adopted 
depend  on  the  risks  to be  expected,  e.g.  the risk of the fire  recrudescing  and 
causing  an  explosion of  firedamp  or fire  gas  (fumes). 
Before  opening  commences,  a  plan should  be  drawn  up  jointly with the  Rescue 
Centre. 
This  plan must  cover  the  following  points: 
the method  to  be  adopted, 
nature,  scope  and  order of operations, 
direction and  supervision, 
checking of  the ventilation system  and  of  the  composition of  the  air, 
communications, 
preparation of material, 
evacuation,  prohibition of access  to  and  remanning  of  endangered workings, 
inspection  by  the  Rescue  Team, 
connection  and  disconnection of electrical equipment  and  isolation  from 
the  supply  of electricity, 
opening  and  closing of  the  compressed-air,  water  and methane-drainage  pipe-
line valves, 
re-sealing of  the  fire  area  in emergency. 
X 
X  X 
The  method  to be  adopted  for  reopening sealed-off districts depends  on  the 
presence or otherwise of 
non-explosive mixtures  of  gas  which  remain non-explosive  on  dilution with air, 
mixtures  of  gas  which  may  become  explosive  on  dilution with air,  or 
explosive mixtures  of gas. 339 
Fire areas  may  be  opened at one  point  only or at several points.  In  the 
later case  a  continuous  direct circulation of air is established and  the fire 
area is permeated with  fresh air.  An  examination should  be  made  of the effects 
of the opening of the  area  on  the ventilation system of the  pit as  a  whole  and 
within the  fire area. 
A sealed-off district can  be  reopened  by 
breaching one  or more  stoppings  (with or without  the use  of  an air-lock),  or 
cutting a  new  entry into the fire area. 
Before  opening  a  sealed-off area,  provision should be  made  for  immediate 
reclosure if necessary. 
Stoppings  may  be  opened  only  on  the  instructions of the manager  and  under 
the constant supervision of  personnel  appointed  by  him. 
Workings,  into which  the  opening of  a  stopping may  release  toxic  gases  or 
foul  air,  or where  there is a  risk of explosion,  must  be  evacuated and  put  out 
of bounds  to  personnel  before opening. 
Since  conditions  in the district,  the state of the seat of the  fire  and 
the risk of gas  explosion may  change  during  the  opening operation,  the  compo-
sition of the fire gases  or  fumes  must  be  checked at regular  intervals.  The 
kind  and  number  of  samples  and  the  points at which  they  are to be  taken should 
be  fixed  in advance.  In doing so,  the possibility of gas  accumulations  {1) 
forming  should  be  allowed  for. 
Where  a  stopping is opened  in the  knowledge  that the  fire is not  yet 
extinguished,  or where  the  fire is revived as  a  result,  the  area in question 
must  be  resealed at once if the composition of the fire gases  or  fumes  changes 
in such  a  way  that an explosion hazard might  arise.  With  non-explosive  gas 
mixtures  in the  fire area,  this is necessary  only if extinguishing operations 
seem unlikely to succeed. 
It is the responsibility of the  Rescue  Team  to open  and  inspect fire areas, 
even after they  have  been ventilated. 
On  the  intake side,  breaching of stoppings  need  not  be  carried out  by  the 
Rescue  Team  provided  that  no  gas  hazard is to be  reckoned with. 
When  calling in the  Rescue  Team,  allowance  should be  made  for  the  adverse 
climatic conditions which  are  likely to obtain at any  point where  they  may  be 
employed. 
III.  OPENING  OF  SEALED-OFF  DISTRICTS  CONTAINING  NON-EXPLOSIVE  GAS  MIXTURES 
1.  Opening  on  one  side only 
A sealed-off district containing non-explosive  gas  mixtures  may  be  opened 
on  one side even if the  fire  i~ not  yet extinguished. 
It must  first be  established whether  the  remaining stoppings  and seals 
are sufficiently airtight and  that there is no  risk of releasing fire gases, 
in particular carbon monoxide,  in other parts of the working,  which  may  be 
connected with  the  fire area.  If the stopping to  be  opened is on  the  return 
side,  special attention should  be  paid  to the release of  CO  or of  foul  air. 
The  decision as  to whether  to carry out  the  operations  in the fire area 
without ventilation air or with auxiliary ventilation depends  on  the  purpose 
of the reopening of the area,  the  expected duration of the Rescue  Team's 
operations  and  the  possible hazards  involved.  Auxiliary ventilation is es-
pecially desirable  for  extended operations withiri the fire area. 
(1)  In general,  the  formation of gas  accumulations  is  favoured  by_low air velocities 
and  differences in temperature. 340 
a)  Working  without ventilation air,  especially behind  an airlock,  has  the 
advantage  of eliminating the  risk of  reviving  the  fire  (1). 
b)  If auxiliary ventilation is used,  it should  preferably  be  by  suction.  It 
is advisable  to  isolate the  area ventilated by  an  auxiliary  fan  from  the 
non-ventilated section by  means  of  an  auxiliary stopping if the seat of 
the  fire is situated in the  non-ventilated section. 
2.  Opening  on  two  sides  to establish a  circulation of air round  the fire area 
A fire area containing non-explosive  gas  mixtures  may  be  ventilated only if 
it is likely that the  fire is extinct. 
As  soon  as  ventilation is established,  a  Rescue  Team  wearing  breathing 
apparatus  may  enter the  fire  area to examine  conditions within it and  to ex-
tinguish  any  fires. 
IV.  REOPENING  OF  SEALED-OFF  DISTRICTS  CONTAINING  GAS  MIXTURES  WHICH  MAY  BECOME  EXPLOSIVE 
ON  DILUTION  WITH  AIR 
1.  Opening  on  one  side only 
A fire area containing  gas  mixtures  which  may  become  explosive  on  dilution 
with air may  be  opened  on  one  side even if the fire is not  yet extinguished. 
It is,  however,  essential to  install a  tight airlock in front  of  the  stopping 
to  be  opened,  so  as  to ensure  an  effective air seal. 
It must  first  be  checked whether  the  remaining stoppings  and seals are suf-
ficiently airtight and  that  there is no  risk of  releasing fire  gases,  in particular 
carbon monoxide,  into other parts of the workings  which  may  be  connected with 
the  fire area.  If the  stopping  to  be  opened  is  on  the  return side,  particular 
attention must  be  paid  to the  possibility of releasing CO,  CH4  or  foul  air.  All 
operations  must  be  carried out without ventilation air.  There  must  be  continuous 
sampling  and  evaluation of  the  results of analysis  to  check whether  the  gas 
mixture  remains  non-explosive.  For  extinguishing operations,  see  footnote  (1)  on 
this  page. 
If the size of  the sealed-off area is to  be  reduced,  a  new  explosion-proof 
stopping must  be  erected.  In order to  be  able  to erect this stopping under 
tolerable climatic conditions  and  possibly without wearing  breathing apparatus, 
auxiliary ventilation may  be  provided. 
For  this  purpose,  an  auxiliary stopping must  first be·erected and  sealed in 
inert atmosphere  (2).  The  section of  roadway  thus  recovered must  then  be  ventilated 
by  an  auxiliary  fan  so as  to create  a  suitable climate  for  the  erection of  the 
main  stopping. 
When  starting up  the  auxiliary_ ventilation it must  be. remembered  that the  gas 
mixture  becomes  explosive  on  dilution with air.  It is therefore essential to make 
certain beforehand  that  there  are  no  sources  of ignition  (e.g.  heatings  on  fires) 
in  the workings  to  be ventilated.  To  prevent  any  risk of  ignition by  the auxiliary 
fan,  the  latter should  be  of  the  forcing  type. 
Before starting up  the auxiliary ventilation,  all workings  likely to  be  exposed 
to  the  hazards  of fire gases  or explosions must  first be  evacuated and  access 
thereto prohibited.  Electrical equipment  must  be  cut off  from  the  power  supply. 
In addition,  the ventilation must  be  regulated,  so  that  no  explosive  gas  mixtures 
can  be  released over  long distances.  For  this  purpose,  the  quantity of air circula-
ted should,  if necessary,  be  increased. 
(1)  When  carrying out  extinguishing operations without ventilation air and  under  unfavour-
able climatic conditions,  it is advisable first to set up water sprinklers  and  to  put 
these  into operation only  after the  Rescue  Team  has  left the  fire area. 
(2)  Before  constructing  the main stopping,  it should  be  considered whether  to erect several 
successive auxiliary stoppings,  according  to  the  possible hazards. 341 
2.  Opening  on  two  sides  to establish a  circulation of air round  the fire area 
This  method  of  opening automatically results in the  formation  of  a  through 
air-circuit in  the  open district,  but  not  necessarily  in all air-circuits in 
the  fire area.  The  method  can  be  used  only if there are  no  remaining signs 
of  fire  in  the district.  In addition,  a  period  long  enough  for  the seat of 
the  fire  to  cool  off must  have  elapsed since  the  supposed  time  of extinction. 
If possible,  the  Rescue  Team  should carry out  an  inspection in inert atmo-
sphere.  Failing this,  the results of  the snuffle-pipe tests should be  used  to 
determine  the  condition of  the seat of the  fire.  Furthermore,  it should  be 
considered  in such cases  whether  the method  described  in Section IV.l might 
not  be  preferable. 
In  each case,  it is essential to check  the  likelihood of  a  recrudescence  of 
the  fire  during ventilation,  by  means  of  fire-gas  samples.  Ti1is  is particularly 
important  where  a  fire  area  has  a  much-branched ventilation system. 
Before ventilating the  fire  area,  all workings  exposed  to  the  hazards  of 
fire  gases  or explosions  of fire  gases  or  firedamp  when  the  stopping is opened 
must  be  evacuated.  All  electrical installations in these workings  must  be  cut 
off  from  the  power  supply. 
On  safety  grounds,  it is advisable  to  open  the  return stopping· first.  After 
the  Rescue  Team  has  withdrawn  to less  dangerous  zones,  the  intake stopping 
should  be  opened. 
When  ventilating the  firm  area,  the  quantity of air and  the  content  of  in-
flammable  gases  in the  air-current circulating round  the  fire area,  and  in  the 
current  into which it subsequently  flows,  should  be  checked.  The  two  air 
currents should be  mutually  adjusted  in such  a  manner  as  to ensure  that no 
explosive mixture  of gases  is present  over  long distances after their junction. 
Access  to  the  fire  area  during ventilation is prohibited. 
V.  OPENING  OF  FIRE  AREAS  CONTAINING  EXPLOSIVE  GAS  MIXTURES 
Sealed-off districts may  not  be  reopened,  either on  one  side or on  two  sides, 
if the  presence  of explosive  gas  mixtures  behind  the  stoppings  is established. 
VI.  OPENING  OF  FLOODED  FIRE  AREAS 
The  composition of the air in fire areas  flooded  to extinguish the  fire  must 
be  checked after draining. 
In workings  with solid coal,  allowance  must  be  made  for  the  increased hazard 
of  spontaneous  ignition after drainage. 
Where  fire  areas  have  been  isolated by  local  flooding  instead of  by  stoppings, 
the  rules mentioned  in Sections  I  to V should be  observed insofar as  applicable. 
VII.  REMANNING  OF  FIRE  AREAS 
After ventilating  a  fire area,  workings  may  not  be  manned  until  a  Rescue  Team 
has  established that all workings  are  free  of  noxious  gases. 
If the  fire area is merely  being  reduced  in size,  workings  free  of noxious 
gases  may  be  manned  only  when  the  remainder  of  the  fire-area has  been sealed off 
by  permanent  stoppings. 
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ANNEX  III 345 
Although  there  is close collaboration between  the Directors of  the  Main  Rescue 
Stations within  the  Working Party  on  "Co-ordination of  Mine  Rescue  Organization", 
the  Mines  Safety  Commission  has  concluded  that it can  be  advantageous  in certain 
cases  to  provide  for  the  advice  of experts specially qualified in mine-rescue 
operations  from  other countries  (in the  event of major  accidents). 
To  this  end it is recommended  that  the Directors of  the  Main  Rescue  Stations 
of  the  Community  countries should  have  available  a  list showing: 
- the  location of  the  Main  Mine  Rescue  Station, 
- the  names  of the  Directors  and  their deputies, 
- the official and  private addresses, 
- telephone  and  telex numbers, 
- regional colliery-location maps, 
- a  catalogue of closed-circuit and  other apparatus. 
This  list should always  be  maintained  up  to date. 
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A.  The  Working  Party  on  "Mine  Rescue  Organisation"  has  been instructed by  the 
Safety  Commission  to raise within the  framework  of  the  general discussions  the 
problem  of  communication  links  between  the  rescue  base  and  the rescue  team,  and 
if appropriate  to suggest  improvements;  this instruction was  prompted  by  a  fatal 
accident  which  occurred in the  Ruhr  in 1962  during  rescue activities. 
Based  on  the  then state of affairs in Belgium,  Germa~y,  France  and  the Nether-
lands  - as  established by  a  questionnaire  - the  following  main  points were  listed 
as  being  in the  members
1  view  of particular  importance  to everyone  responsible  for 
rescue  operations,  closing with  a  few  proposals  for  the  improvement  of  the  communi-
cations  equipment. 
B.  All  the  experts  involved in the  discussion of this  problem agreed that  in 
the event  of  deployment  of  a  rescue  team: 
- a  rescue  base  is to be  set up at a  suitable  point  in the  fresh  air-stream, 
and  that at this  point  there should  be  the  person  responsible  for  the  rescue 
team  bein~ deployed  and  for· supervision of  the  rescue  base,  together with 
the  necessa-ry  apparatus,  and  that there should also  be  reserve  teams  nearby. 
- there should  be  a  two-way  communication  link between this base  and  the  head 
of  the  rescue operation and 
a  two-way  communication  link between  this base  and  the  rescue  team  in action. 
I.  Communications  link between  the  rescue base  and  the  head of  the  rescue  operation 
The  general  view  was  that  for  this  link  the  only  possible means  was  telephone 
communication  by  a  connection  from  the rescue  base  to  the colliery telephone 
network. 
II.  Communications  link between  the  rescue  base  and  the  rescue  team  in operation 
This  communications  link is basically considered as  being necessary,  and at 
all events  desirable. 
It is undoubtedly  necessary: 
for  reconnaissance 
- for all activities under difficult conditions  (increased  temperature,  falls 
of  roof,  etc.) •. 
It is desirable  for all stationary operations which  are carried out  under 
normal  climatic conditions  and  in places which  have  been  reconnoitred. 
Two  types  of  communication  link.can  be  used: 
- communication  by  acoustic signals  and 
- telephone  communication. 
Up  to  the  present,  other systems  such  as  radio-telephone  and  other means  have 
not  been  found  to  be  usable. 
1.  Acoustic signalling 
In acoustic signalling a  distinction is made  between 
a)  tapping signals on  sound-conducting substances  (e.g.  pipes)  and 
b)  electro-acoustic signals,  produced  by  means  of  a  source of electric 
current  and  a  conductor. 
With either system the  transmission of  information  proceeds  from  one station 
at  a  time  by  means  of  a  code.  This  code  must  be  simple  (easy  to understand 
and  remember)  and  so  composed  that  the risk of confusion  between signals is 350 
reduced  to  a  minimum. 
This  system is particularly unsuitable  for  important  reconnaissance  or  for 
deployment  of  rescue  teams  under difficult conditions. 
It can  however  provide  good service if no  other means  are avalaible or if 
the  telephone  links  are  bad or  damaged. 
2.  Telephone  communication 
When  mouthpieces  are  in use  telephoning is forbidden.  Up  to  the  present it 
has  only  been  possible to  telephone easily and clearly when  using  a  mask. 
All  the  telephone  equipment  used at the  present is either intrinsically 
safe or explosion-proof. 
In certain countries it is planned  to use  transistor amplifiers  and  loud-
speakers at the  rescue  base. 
It is emphasised that  there is unanimity  among  the countries in using  two-
wire  telephone  leads.  In  no  case would  a  single-wire telephone  lead  be  used 
together with  the earth-return lead. 
Two  different systems  are in use  for  telephone  communication: 
a)  Telephone  system without  continuous  listening/speech link provided with 
calling-up facility 
The  telephones at  the  rescue  base  and with  the  rescue  team  in action both 
have  a  calling-up device.  This  can  be carried on  the  body  or laid down  or 
suspended  near  the  working  point.  This  system is used  in France .and  in the 
Saar  for all rescue  operations,  while  in Belgium,  in the  Ruhr  and  in the 
Netherlands it is used  only  for stationary activity. 
All mine-rescue  personnel  who  telephone  must  wear  a  mask,  and  this must 
be  a  simple  mask  or  a  mask  with  a  "speech disc".  The  view  tends  to  be 
that speech discs  are  no  longer  necessary with  the  new  types  of mask. 
The  transmission of speech is sufficiently comprehensible  and  the risk 
of  a  leak through  the speech disc  is  elimin~ted.  The  telephone  devices 
remain  switched on.  · 
When  the  telephone cable is being laid or  the  rescue  team is changing 
position,  the  telephone  apparatus  is carried either on  the men's  belt 
or in a  carrying case. 
In the Ruhr,  the Saar  and  in Belgium it is possible  for  third persons 
who  are wearing masks  and carrying  a  telephone  to use  the telephone  lead 
from  any  point  by  means  of  a  pricker connection or  a  special device.  This 
problem is still being investigated in Fiance. 
Telephone  communication  can  be  carried out  over  distances  between  1000  and 
10,000 metres  according  to  the  type  of  telephone  used. 
The  telephone  lead is wound  on  drums  and  provided with  plug connections; 
in favourable  circumstances it can be  recovered. 
Special  practice cables are used in training. 
b)  Telephone  system with  continuous  listening/speech connection and without 
calling-up facility 
The  telephone  equipment at the  rescue  base consists of  a  headset which 
is worn  during  the  whole  period of activity and  a  microphone.  The  tele-
phone  equipment  for  the·rescue  team consists also of  the headset,  worn 
by  the  leader of the  team over  one  ear,  and  a  microphone  built in to 
his breathing mask.  This  system is always  used in the  Ruhr,  in Belgium 
and  in the  Netherlands  when  reconnoitring or during  particularly difficult 
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With  tnis system  the  two  users  are  in continuous  listening/speech 
communication;  no  calling-up device  is necessary.  Should  the  team 
leader  - who  is wearing  the  mask  with  the  microphone  - feel  unwell, 
the  apparatus  used  in the  Ruhr  and  in Belgium makes  it possible  for 
any  other member  of  the  rescue  team wearing  a  normal  mask  to make  contact 
with  the  rescue  base  by  using  the  headset  as  microphone  and  speaker. 
As  with  the  system referred to above,  it is possible  for  third  persons 
who  have  a  mask  with  telephone  fitments  to connect  themselves  at  any 
point  to  the  telephone  lead  by  means  of  a  pricker.  A  link can  be  achieved 
over  more  than  2,000 metres. 
The  very  thin telephone  lead is housed  in  a  container like  a  preserving 
tin carried on  the  team  leader's belt.  The  wire  unwinds  automatically 
as  the  man  carrying its advances.  It cannot  be  recovered;  the  light-blue 
colour of the wire  used in the  Ruhr  and  the  Saar makes  it easier to  see 
in the  smokefilled atmosphere  than  the wire  used  in Belgium. 
Special  drums  are  used  during practice,  attached  to  the lid of  the  closed-
circuit oxygen  apparatus.  In this  instance  the  telephone  cable is recovered. 
III.  Special  experience 
a)  The  telephone  system using  the continuous  listening/speech connection has 
been  used  for  more  than  ten years  in the  Ruhr  and  has  proved its value. 
It has  the  disadvantage  from  the  economic  point  of view  that  the  telephone 
cable  cannot  be  recovered. 
b)  In Lorraine  there is the  possibility of connecting  the  rescue  team's  tele-
phone  lines to  the colliery telephone  system.  This  method,  which  has  been 
repeatedly used,  is very satisfactory in use  and  provides  direct speech 
communication  between  the  advancing  rescue  team  and  the head  of the  rescue 
operation at the surface. 
IV.  Instructions,  regulations  and  principles  for  transmission of  information 
In  Belgium  and  in the  Netherlands  there is no  Inspectorate regulation for 
transmission of  information.  In France  the situation is covered  by  internal 
instructions.  In  the  Ruhr  and  in the  Saar  the  regulations  issued by  the  Chief 
Mines  Inspectorate  in Dortmund  or in Saarbrllcken apply. 
Where  there are  regulations,  they all call for  a  communications  link between 
the  rescue  base  and  the  rescue  team  in action. 
v.  Summary 
In all the  Community  countries  the  problem of  a  link between  the  rescue  base 
and  the  rescue  team  in action has  been  faced  and  dealt with  independently  of 
Inspectorate regulations. 
The  measures  adopted are similar in essence. 
The  telephone  link is considered  by  all experts  as  the best means  available 
at present. 
In France  and  in the  Saar,  the  telephone  system without  continuous  listening/ 
speech connection is employed  in all rescue operations,  whether  these  involve 
stationary work  or  reconnaissance. 
In  the  Ruhr,  in Belgium  and  in the Netherlands  this system is used  only  for 
stationary work.  For  reconnaissance operations or work  in particular difficult 
conditions  the  positive continuous  listening/speech connection without calling-up 
facility is preferred. 352 
The  positive continuous  listening/speech connection was  selected by  the coun-
tries named  above  for  work  involving particular risks once  they  had  available 
a  telephone  apparatus  that was  sufficiently reliable in operation.  In  those 
countries  the  experts held the  view that this system gives  greater reliability, 
in spite of the  burden of continuous "listening-out"  both at the  rescue  base 
and  by  the  rescue  team  in action. 
In  the  same  countries,  the  same  system was  not  chosen  for stationary work,  to 
ensure  that  the  team  leader  was  not distracted during his work  and  to give  the 
responsible official at the  rescue  base  more  freedom. 
VI.  Proposals  for  improvement  of  telephone  apparatus 
In very  general  terms,  we  have  available  today  telephone  equipment  which is 
suited to the  requirements  of mine-rescue  operations  and  which  is sufficiently 
reliable. 
Nevertheless,  it remains  true  that  rescue operations  are  always  difficult and 
dangerous  and  that every effort should  be  made  to ease  this work  and  to make  it 
safer. 
The  following  proposals  for  the  improvement  of  telephone  devices  are  put  forward: 
1.  Masks 
Since  only  breathing masks  allow of  telephoning,  efforts should  be  made 
to  improve  them with  regard  to  the  following characteristics: 
Air-tightness,  field of view,  weight,  method  of attachment. 
2.  Tapping  the  telephone  lead 
Pricker  devices  already  available for  thin  telephone  lines.  It would  be 
beneficial to have  other  tapping  devices  developed  for other  types  of cable. 
3.  Weight  and  bulk of the  apparatus,  the cable  drums,  the  cables,  etc. 
should  be  adapted  to  the conditions  of  rescue  operations. 
4.  Amplifiers 
Small,  lightweight  flameproof  amplifiers  should  be  developed,  to ensure 
better comprehension where  the  communications  link is  faulty. 
5.  Radiotelephone  connection 
Development  of  an effective radio-telephone system. 
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In its Report  of  March  1957  the  Conference  on  Safety  in Mines  made  the  fol-
lowing  Recommendation: 
"32.M:  The  development  of  devices  for  testing $haft  guides  should  be  aimed at 
producing apparatus  which  can  be  easily handled  by  the  personnel  examining  the 
shafts. 
This  recommendation  was  intended  to  encourage  the  perfecting of  devices 
(particularly accelerometers)  which  can  then also  be  entrusted to shaftmen 
not specially well  versed in their use." 
(Pages  148/149 of  the  Conference  Report). 
The  Working  Group  on  "Winding  Ropes  and  Shaft Guides"  was  made  responsible  for 
the  investigation of these  problems  by  the Mines  Safety  Commission;  the  Working Party 
began with  a  general  investigation of the use  of accelerometers  for  testing the  opera-
tion of winding  installations. 
The  purpose  of the  present  Report  is: 
- to  bring together  the  information obtained regarding  the various  accelerometers 
used at  the  present  time  in the  Community  countries or being tried out  there, 
- to indicate the  advantages  offered  by  the  use  of such  devices, 
- to  give conclusions  from  the  pres~nt state of  the  part. 
I.  GENERAL 
In its simplest  form  an  accelerometer consists of  a  housing attached to  the 
winding  conveyance.  This  housing contains  a  mass  which  can  move  in a  given direction 
with  respect  to the  housing.  This  mass  is balanced  by  springs,  and its movements 
are  damped  by  a  fluid or  by  a  suitable system of electro-magnets. 
A recording  device  records  a  space/time  diagram of  these  movements  which  are 
dependent  on: 
- changes  in  the  speed  of  the  conveyance  in  the direction being  investigated, 
- the  inertia of  the  mass  referred to, 
- the characteristics of  the  compensating springs  and  the  damping  arrangement. 
In this way  information is obtained regarding  the  movements  undergone  by  that 
part of  the  conveyance  to which  the  accelerometer is attached in a  given direction. 
Several  directions of movement  can  be  investigated by  changing  the setting position 
of  the  apparatus. 
Moreover,  the  accelerometers  in use  generally  have  several measuring devices 
(two  or three),  with  the masses  arFanged at right angles  to each other;  this al-
lows  of making  simultaneous  recordings  of  two  or three  principal directions: 
- at right angles  to  the  axis  of  the  rope, 
- horizontally in the  plane of  the  guides, 
- horizontal  and  at right angles  to  the  plane  of the  guides. 
II.  DEVICES  IN  PRESENT  USE  IN  THE  COMMUNITY  COUNTRIES  OR  UNDER  TRIAL  THERE 
This  covers  the  following  devices: 
- Cambridge  accelerometer, 
- Bochum  Rope-Testing Station accelerometer, 
- A.I.B.  remote,  trace  and  measuring  device  (Association  des  Industriels de 
Belgique), 
- Novotechnik  accelerometer,  under trial in the  Saar mines. 356 
a)  Cambridge  accelerometer 
This  apparatus exists  in various models:  the most  complete  model  is  a  double 
accelerometer which  can measure  the  m0vements: 
- either in one vertical or one  horizontal  direction, 
- or in two  directions at right angles  to  a  horizontal  plane. 
The  principal characteristics of this apparatus  are  as  follows: 
- recording  on  a  cellulose acetate  film  by  the  pressure of ball-point  pen, 
- height  of recording adjustable according  to  the  natural  frequency  of  the 
measuring  devices: 
2  mm  per  gram  for  a  natural  frequency  of  20 cycles/sec 
2  mm  per  20  grams  for  a  natural  frequency  of  70 cycles/sec. 
The  damping  of  the vibratory mass  is provided by  an  electromagnet  (D  ~ 0,2). 
- Transport  of  the  film  by  clockwork mechanism,  which  can  run  for  a  maximum 
of  7  to 8  minutes without  being  rewound  (at  the  lowest  speed of  advance  of 
the  film).  The  speed of  advance  of  the  film is constant  for  a  given  diagram, 
but  can  be  varied between  3  and  20 mm/sec. 
- Possibility of  recording  time  of  some  other signal  by  means  of  a  third 
recorder. 
A special· meter  is used  for  the  time  signal,  and this device  is so  ad-
justed that  a  time  mark  is made  at regular  intervals of 0.1  second with 
a  longer mark  for  each complete  second;  this is done  by  breaking  the 
exciter circuit of  the recorder.  The  current is supplied by  a  separate 
battery. 
- Reading-off  the  diagram  by  means  of  a  magnifying  glass or  a  microscope 
using  a  grid,  or  by  photographic  enlargement. 
b)  The  Two-component  Accelerometer of  the  Bochum  Rope-Testing Station 
The  features  of this apparatus  are  as  follows: 
- possibility  (as with the Cambridge  apparatus)  of  recording  two  movements 
simultaneously either in one vertical  and  one  horizontal direction or  in 
two  directions at right angles  to  a  horizontal  plane, 
- recording  on waxed  paper, 
- paper transport  by  a  clockwork mechanism,  which  can  run  for  9  to  10 minutes 
without  being  rewound. 
The  speed of  advance  of  the  paper is constant at  10 mm/sec  with  an  accuracy 
of ± 1%.  Time  markings  are  therefore not  necessary. 
- Height. of  recording.  The  undamped  model  has  a  natural  frequency  of  20 
cycles/sec;  damping  is provided  by  a  fluid of  D  =  0.6.  A calibration curve 
for exciter frequencies  between  0  and  20 cycle/sec has  been  prepared.  As  an 
indication we  give  the  coordinates of  some  points  on  this curve  below: 
Frequency:  0  cycles/sec  - Excursion 5.1 mm/g 
It  8  II  It  II  5.2 mm/g 
II  8  fl  fl  fl  5.6  mm/g 
"  20  "  "  "  3  mm/g 
- Possibility of recording with  a  third pen  which  marks  the excursion of  a 
depth  indicator every  10 metres.  The  depth meter consists of  a  rubber-tyred 
wheel  set in a  frame  attached to  the  conveyance  and  bearing on  the  front 357 
face  of  the  guide.  The  rotations of  the  wheel  are  transmitted to  the  pen 
via  a  flexible shaft. 
- Possibility of  recording each starting-up movement  of  the  conveyance  by 
means  of  a  fourth  pen operated  by  an  undamped  pendulum. 
- Diagram can  be  read off  by  means  of  a  magnifying glass with a  grid,  or  by 
a  linear scale or  a  slide rule.  These  diagrams  are  thus  directly usable 
without  photographic  enlargements. 
- The  device  works  entirely mechanically  and  needs  no  electric supply. 
c)  The  remote,  trace  arid  measuring  device of the A.I.B. 
The  swinging mass  of the  device  is made  of ferrite,  forming  the  core 
of  a  self-induction core  inserted in a  transistorised transmitter  (one  vi-
brator and  two  amplifiers).  This  transmitter sends  out  waves  along  the  wind-
ing rope  which  transmit  the  movements  so  that  they  are indicated by  means  of 
a  receiver installed in the winding-engine  house.  This  frequency-modulated 
receiver transforms  the  frequency  variations  into voltage variations. 
The  device  can  be  fitted with several vibrating masses  so  that recordings 
can  be  made  either along  the  axis  of  the  rope  or in any  direction vertical 
to  the  rope. 
The  A.I.B.  says  that  the  device is not sensitive to disturbance or to differ-
ent variations  (frequency modulation). 
The  height of  indication is  19  mm/g. 
If the  receiver is set up  near  the  machine,  it is possible  to  record  numerous 
other details:  time  marks,  depth,  switching operations,  etc. 
d)  The  Novotechnik Accelerometer,  at  present under trial in the  Saar 
This  accelerometer supplied  by  the  Novotechnik  Company  in Stuttgart was 
developed  from  a  French  device  (S  F  I  M device)  and  has  the  following  features: 
- Light-point recording  on  bands  of silver bromide  photographic  paper, 
- Advance  of  the chart  by  de  motor, 
- Possibility of  recording simultaneously: 
- 3  diagrams  for  three  different directions, 
- 1  time  mark  per second, 
- depth  indications  e~ery 10 metres  (by  means  of  a  special depth 
indicator developed  by  the  Saar Mines), 
- supply voltage  24  volts. 
III.  ADVANTAGES  EXPECTED  FROM  THE  USE  OF  ACCELEROMETERS  TO  CHECK  THE  OPERATION  OF 
WINDING  INSTALLATIONS 
In actual fact  an  accelerometer records  accelerations or decelerations 
accurately only if the  frequency  of the movements  of its housing is nil or very 
slight.  Where  there are vibrations  the mobile  measu~ing device of the accelero-
meter  tends  to vibrate at its own  natural  frequency,  and it is possible that  the 
vibrations caused  by  several successive blows  may  coincide if they  follow  rapidly. 
The  accelerometer  then acts  as  a  true impact  indicator,  which  can give  a  rough 
indication of the  blows  on  the  basis of  the  amplitude  of  the vibrations  or can 
distinguish between  them  by  magnitude. 358 
This  being said,  the  advantages  which  may  be  expected  from  the  use  of 
accelerometers  can  be  summarised  as  follows: 
a)  Use  in vertical directions 
In this direction the  accelerometer  and  the entire winding  conveyance  are 
carried by  one  and  the  same  movement.  On  the  other hand,  except with very 
rough shaft guides,  the  impacts will generally  not  be  very  heavy  - the  fre-
quency  of  the  movements  will  be  zero  or very  low;  consequently,  the accelera-
tion diagram will record accelerations or decelerations  of  the complete  con-
veyance. 
The  proportionality of the  forces  to  the  accelerations can  be used  to  deduce 
the  changes  of  the  entire system of  dynamic  loading at each  moment  of  time, 
acting in vertical directions  on  the cross-section of  the  bearing  rope  attached 
to  the  conveyance  (or over  the  total cross-sections  of  the  bearing rope  and  the 
balance  rope,  if one  is used). 
This  is  important  for  the  investigation of  the  (static +  dynamic)  total loading 
to which  the  ropes  are  subjected. 
In addition,  the variations  in the .vertical accelerations or decelerations 
during  one  wind  can  be  used  to show  up  the  operating faults  of  the  apparatus, 
particularly: 
- any  disturbances  in an  automatic  winder, 
- the  operator's style of handling  (for manually-operated machines), 
- the  functioning  of  the  braking system. 
A  special case  in which  records  of  the vertical acceleration were  useful  and 
can still be  useful exists when  the  loadings  produced  by  the machine  change 
with  a  certain degree  of  periodicity  (where  steam winders  and  some  winch-type 
winders  are used). 
There  may  therefore occur at certain points  on  a  wind  a  resonance  between  the 
frequency  of these  loadings  and  the vibration frequence  of  the entire -system 
(conveyance  +rope·+ machine  +rope pulleys),  which  result  in heavier  dynamic 
loadings  for  the  rope  and,  among  other things,  very  heavy  transverse oscilla-
tions. 
The  recording of  the  transverse acceleration makes  it possible  to establish 
the  point  on  the  wind  at which  resonance  occurs  and  this can  then  be  remedied 
by  changing  the speed or the masses  of the entire system. 
b)  Utilisation in horizontal  directions 
In  these  directions  the movements  of the  conveyance  sometimes  are  of  low 
frequency;  the  accelerometer will  then  record horizontal accelerations or 
decelerations which  hold  good  for  that  point  on  the  conveyance  to which it 
is attached.  It would  be  difficult to  deduce  the  corresponding ·horizontal 
dynamic  forces  from  this,  since  as  a  rule  the  type  of movement  will not  be 
known. 
It ·is,  nevertheless,  in these  directions  that  the vibrations of the conveyance 
running  in the shaft guides will occur most  frequently.  As  explained above, 
the  accelerometer  then  acts  primarily  as  an  impact  indicatorJ  it locates  the 
irregularities of  the shaft  guides  and  determines  their extent. 
c)  Layout  of the  diagrams 
Using  the diagramsobtained in the various vertical horizontal directions, 
the  normal  personnel  responsible  for shaft supervision can control  the opera-
tion of the winding  installation and  the  correct  functioning  of  the shaft 
guides  qualitatively. 
As  a  general  rule  the  diagrams  of  the horizontal directions are used  for  this 
purpose.  If they  are  prepared at regular intervals of  time,  the state of  the 
shaft guides  can  be  watched  and  points where  there is particular wear  can  be 
located. 359 
There  is no  doubt  that  the  accelerometer will  find its principal use  in 
routine  checks  on  the  equipment  in this connection. 
It must  however  be  noted  that its use  in the vertical direction brings 
further  advantages  which  we  have  listed above,  and  which  are not without 
importance. 
In addition,  the  accelerometer  diagrams  can  be  plotted and  assessed by 
experts  to  investigate certain problems  (compare  above  resonance),  and  in 
particular cases conclusions  can  be  drawn  regarding the  dynamic  loading or 
the extent of  the  impact  blows. 
IV.  CONCLUSIONS 
As  stated above,  the  Conference  on Safety in Mines  in March  1957  recommended 
further  development  of devices  for  checking shaft guide  installations  (in partic-
ular accelerometers),  to achieve easier handling of such  devices  by  the officials 
respansibl~ for  the shaft.  · 
The  study of the  accelerometer has  shown  that this  device  is suitable not 
only  for checking shaft guides,  but  also can give useful  information in checking 
the  operation of  the winding  installations in general  terms. 
Some  of the  accelerometers  briefly described  above  have,. moreover,  features 
which  make  them easier to  use  by  the shaft officials: 
- robustness  and  rapidity of setting up, 
- diagrams  which  can be  directly read off  (i.e. without  photographic 
development  or enlargement), 
- purely mechanical  operation or at the  most  requirement  for  low 
.current sources  (to avoid  the necessity  for extensive  flameproofing 
in ·gassy shafts). 
The  Mine  Safety Commission wishes  the  experiments  of 
accelerometers  to  be  continued on  a  broad basis  and 
hopes  to see  the  use of these  devices  extended.  The 
Commission  does  not,  however,  think it desirable at 
the  present state of the art to prepare  a  recommenda-
tion regarding use  for  the officials entrusted with 
the routine checking of shafts. 
X 
X  X 361 
R  E  P  0  R  T 
of the  Working Party  on  "Winding  Ropes  and Shaft 
Guides"  on  the Electro-magnetic  examination of 
winding  ropes  (investigation,  tests and  assessment). 
(Approved  by  the Mines  Safety Commission  at its 
Plenary Session of  20.7.65) 
ANNEX  VI 363 
Electro-magnetic  investigations of winding  ropes  were  carried out  in MUlheim, 
Waterschei,  Merlebach  and  Bochum  at the  request  of the Mines  Safety Commission  and 
with  the  financial  support of the  High Authority. 
The  present  document  comprises 
A.  a  historical sketch of  the  problem, 
B.  a  report  on  the  present state of  elect~o-magnetic testing techniques, 
c.  an  assessment,  giving  the  Working Party's view. 
A bibliography of source material is included as  an  appendix. 
A.  Conference  Recommendation  and  terms  of reference of  the Mines  Safety  Commission 
In March  1957,  the  Conference  on Safety in Coal  Mines  adopted the  following 
Recommendation:  "Methods  for  testing winding  ropes  in service,  e.g.  electro-
magnetic  rope-testing techniques,  should  be  further  developed  (Conference  Report, 
item 31-M,  page  148). 
At  that  time  the  condition of  a  winding  rope  ip service was  essentially 
assessed  on  the basis  of visual  examination.  By  this means  it was  generally 
possible to detect with  the  nake~ eye  broken wires  on  the surface of  the  rope. 
But  other indications  are also  us~d-to judge  the condition of the  rope;  for 
instance,  the  rope  is examined  over its entire length  to see the  extent of 
rusting or wear  of the external wires,  and  the  looseness  or otherwise of the 
rope  is tested,  as  are  local  changes  in rope  diameter  and  the  length of  lay 
of  each individual strand. 
On  the  other  hand,  the condition in the  interior of  the  rope  is very diffi-
cult  to  judge  by  examination  of  the external appearance.  To  a  certain extent, 
it is possible to obtain  some  idea of  the  intern~! condition by  tapping with 
a  hammer.  In  doubtful  cases  the  examiner  has  the  rope  twisted open or orders 
the  removal  of  a  wire,  to  enable  him  to  examine  this wire  over its entire 
circumference  and  then  to assess  the surface of  one- wire  in the  next  inner 
layer,  which  has  been  revealed  by  the  gap left by  removing  the first wire. 
It is however  possible  to use  these  different,  decidedly  not  very  reliable 
methods  only  at certain places  along  the wire,  and  they  do  not  always  provide 
an  accurate  assessment  of the  rope  over its entire length. 
Winding  ropes  of  simple  construction are more  easily inspected and  assessed 
in this manner,  since after each  length of  lay  a  large  part of  the wires  ap-
pears  at the surface of the  rope  again. 
The  increasing application of  ropes  of complicated construction  (  including 
·different types  of  locked-coil  rope)  brought  about  by  increases  in  the effective 
load carried and  by  the  necessity  to wind  from  greater depths,  cannot  be  assessed 
sufficiently accurately  by  an  i~spection of  the exterior.  Because  there  are  a 
number  of superimposed  layers  of strands  and  the  individual wires  are  arranged 
in several  layers  in each  strand,  by  far  the  greater part of  the wires  remains 
hidden  from  the  examiner's  view. 
These  considerations  led to  the  formulation of the  Recommendation  quoted 
above,  based  by  the  Conference  on  the  following  statement: 
"The  object of  this  Recommendation  is to  promote  the  development  of test methods 
which  can  be  applied  by  rope  inspectors at the  pit and  used  by  them  to make 
assessments.  These  methods  are of  particular importance  for  ropes with internal 
strands,  since in this construction breaks  in  the wires  of internal strands 
cannot  be  detected  by  normal  testing". 
The  Working  Party  on  Winding  Ropes  and  Shaft Guides,  set up  by  the. Mines 
Safety  Commission  on  March  17,  1958,  was  charged with  the  investigation of 
this  problem. 364 
The  investigation began  in the  very first session of this  Wor.king  Party 
on  July  18,  1958  and  continued for  a  period of more  than six years,  the whole 
series of  documents  and  relevant specialist literature being consulted,  as 
well  as  experts  in rope-testing techniques  and  representatives of  rope  manu-
facturers. 
Until  tbe  termination of  the  investigations of  the  Rope-Testing Station in 
Bochum  in September  1964,  the  examination of this  problem can  be  divided into 
three  periods,  viz. 
1.  Investigation of  the current position of electro-magnetic  testing of 
winding  ropes  (1958/1959) 
2.  Comparative  investigations of winding  ropes  in service  (1959) 
3.  Execution·of  the  test  programme  using winding  ropes  withdrawn  from 
service,  at  the  Rope-Testing Station,  Bochum  (1960/1964). 
B.I.  The  state of  the  technique  of electro-magnetic  testing of winding  ropes 
(1958/1959) 
After  a  most  exhaustive  exchange  of views,  with  the aid of various  documents 
made  available  by  members  of  the  Working  Party,  it was  possible  to establish 
the  position at that  time  of electro-magnetic  testing of  ropes. 
In  the coal-producing countries of  the  Community  and  in the United Kingdom, 
there was  already  a  certain body  of  experience with  the  electro-magnetic 
testing of winding  ropes  in service.  In each of  these countries  a  particular 
type  of apparatus  was  in use,  generally being operated by  specially-trained 
experts attached to  a  testing station. 
The  devices  in service in Belgium,  Germany  and  France  may  be  considered as 
the most  highly  developed. 
In Belgium,  the  A.I.B.  ("Belgian  Industrialists•  Association")  had  further 
developed  an  electro-magnetic  testing apparatus  whose  operation could  be  con-
sidered satisfactory  - based on  the series of comparisons  made  up  to that  time 
between  faults  in the  rope  indicated by  the  recording charts  and  those  actually_ 
found  when  the  rope  was  withdrawn  from  use.  In  the  opinion of the A.I.B.,  this 
apparatus  makes  it possible to determine  the estimated loss  in load-carrying 
capacity  (Pin%).  Tests carried out  in Belgium after the withdrawal  of  ropes 
from  service had  shown  that  the  actual  loss  generally  lay  between  P  +  5  and 
p  - 5. 
In Germany,  the  Rope-Testing Station at  Bochum  had  finished  perfecting a 
testing device  which  had  been used since  1930. 
In  France,  the  "French  Industrialists•  Association"  employs  the  Integra-
apparatus. 
In the  opinion of-the experts,  these  two  devices  also  performed  satisfactorily~ 
Difficulties were  encountered  in all three countries  in the interpretation 
of the  diagrams  recorded.  It is in particular very  difficult to distinguish be-
tween different kinds  of  rope  damage  and  consequently it is also difficult to 
determine  precisely whether  the  loss  in load-bearing capacity of  a  rope  is to 
be  attributed to wear,  corrosion or broken wires,  inter alia.  Moreover,  damage 
due  to similar causes  were  differently indicated in the  recorded  diagrams 
according  to whether  the  damage  points were  situated in the  interior of the 
rope  or  on  the surface. 
Initially there were  either no  contacts at all or only  very slight contacts 
between  the various  institutes using these  devices.  It was  the National  Coal 
Board which  for  the first  time  arranged comparative trials,  most  of the  Com-
munity  countries being represented.  The  tests were  carried out  on  two  ropes: 
one  in which various  faults  had  been deliberately simulated  and  a  similar 
fault-free  rope.  The  results of  these trials were  not  always  satisfactory,  but 
they  did  give  some  indications  for  future  trials to  the  rope-testing experts 
familiar with  the different types  of apparatus. 
After this exchange  of views,  which  was  accompanied  by  considerable efforts 
to take  in all the  topical  problems  in this field,  it was  possible to establish 
that at that  time  electro-magnetic  rope  testing could. provide certain indications 
when  the  diagrams  were  interpreted by  experts,  but that it was  not yet  a  tech-
nique  to  be  put  into  the  hands  of the colliery rope-testers. 365 
At  this  point  of  time,  certain experts  did however  hold  the  view that 
the test method consisting of opening  a  rope  at suspected  points  and  re-
moving wires  for  testing ought  to  be  replac~d by  other methods  of  investi-
gation. 
No  agreement  was  reached as  to the utility of mathematical  analysis as  a 
means  of calculating the  loss  in load-bearing capacity of the  ropes. 
B.II.-1.  Comparative  investigations of winding  ropes  in service  (1959) 
It was  unanimously  decided,  that in  the  first  place  the  possibilities and 
limits of application of  the  apparatus  used  at  that  time  should  be  examined, 
although  not all the  members  of  the  Working  Party  had  the  same  confidence  in 
the  development  of the  technique of electro-magnetic  testing of  ropes. 
This  investigation was  to  be  achieved  by  continuing  the  comparative tests 
begun  by  the National  Coal  Board,  but after changing  the  method,  in that, 
for  the  purpose  of  these tests,  ropes  in service were  selected which  had 
genuine  damage  and  faults,  and  which  were  to  be  withdrawn  from  service shortly 
afterward~. 
The  aim  was  to ensure  that  a  relation could  be  established,  as  quickly  as 
possible,  between  the  faults  recorded  in the  diagrams  and  the  faults visible 
to  the  naked  eye  on  the  rope  when  withdrawn  from  service. 
The  above-named  three  testing devices  were  selected for  these tests;  ropes 
of various  types  of construction were  employed  as  test  pieces. 
Tests  were  carried out  on  April  11  and  12,  1959,  at  the  Rosenblumendelle 
Pit in MUlheim  (Germany),  on  April  25,  1959,  at  the Andre  Dumont  Pit at Water-
schei  (Belgium),  on  June  21,  1959,  at  the  Freyming Pit at Merlebach  (France) 
and  on  October 3,  1959,again at  the  Rosenblumendelle Pit; after these  tests 
certain sections of  the  ropes  which  had  been  subjected to  test and  subsequently 
withdrawn  from  service were  compared with the recording charts.  These  comparisons 
were  carried out  on  May  14,  September  7  and October  14,  1959,  in the A.I.B. 
Laboratories  in Brussels,  the  Rope-Testing Station in Lens  and  the  Rope-Testing 
Station in Bochum.  On  November  5,  1959  the results of  these comparative studies 
were  tabled  and  were  exhaustively discussed  by  the  Working  Party. 
During  this operation  the  Working  Party  came  to  the  conclusion that the 
diagrams  recorded  by  the  test apparatus  gave  accurate results only  when  the 
speed of  movement  of  the  rope  under test was  kept  as  nearly  as  possible 
constant  {1).  The  Working  Party also  formed  the  opinion that conclusions with 
regard to the state of the  rope  at  any  time  could  be  drawn  from  differences 
between successive  diagrams. 
In order to assess  the general state of the  rope,  the  diagrams  could  be 
examined  in respect of various criteria;  particular attention might,  e.g.  be 
given  to  the  presence  of strong deflections of  the  recording  pen  - indicating 
broken wires  - or to  the  presence  of less obvious  irregularities  (changes  in 
the  background  noise  level)  - indicating other faults,  such  as  rust,  wear, 
indentations,  etc. 
In each case  both criteria should  be  taken into account. 
In assessing  the  diagrams  for  the first of  these  two  factors,  it was  found 
that  individual  breaks  of external wires  were  clearly indicated.  According  to 
the  depth of  the  point  where  the wire  has  broken in the  body  of  the  rope,  a 
clear indication is possible only if the  number  and  extent of  the  breaks  is 
correspondingly  greater. 
Testing for  the  second  factor,  i.e.  measurement  of changes  in the back-
ground  noise  level  provides qualitatiVe  information about  the state of the 
rope;  nevertheless,  experience  has. shown  that it was  not  possible to deduce 
a  sufficient body  of accurate quantitative data.  Moreover,  assuming  the  sample 
length had  been  properly  marked  (reservation expressed  by  one  of  the experts), 
{1)  To  compensate  for  this shortcoming,  the  Bochum  apparatus  includes  a  device which 
ensures undistorted diagrams  even  when  the  rope  speed is not  constant. 366 
one  of  the  four  tests referred to  above,  with subsequent  opening-up of the 
rope,  showed  a  low  amplitude  of  background  noise  associated with  a  considerable 
loss  in load-bearing capacity.  Thus  the  opposite of what  might  be  expected 
can  occur.  If the  diagrams  obtained by  electro-magnetic tests are  not  care-
fully  interpreted,  dangerous  conclusions  may  be  drawn. 
The  results of  these  comparative  tests allowed  the conclusion to be  drawn 
that  the  technique  of electro-magnetic  testing could not  by  itself give  in-
formation  about  the state of  a  rope,  although  the  rope  spectre could deduce 
certain facts  with  regard  to its state  from  the  tests. 
2.  Tests of  an  apparatus  operating on alternating current 
In order  to  include  in this investigation an  electro-magnetic rope-testing 
apparatus  working  on  low-frequency  alternating current,  there  was  made  avail-
able  to the  Working  Party  for trial purposes  - through  the  intermediary of 
the British Delegation  - the  apparatus  used  in South  Africa  and  known  as  the 
"Phase shifting electro-magnetic  testing unit",  this being arranged after 
sqme  experts  on  the  Working  Party  had  already  taken  part in the trials organ-
ized in England  by  the  National  Coal  Board.  The  apparatus  was  successively 
tested at  the  establishments  of  the Association des  Industriels  de  Belgique, 
the Seilprllfstelle in Bochum  (Bochum  Rope-Testing Station)  and  the Association 
des  Industriels  de  France.  The  members  of  the  Working  Party were  able to be 
present  during  the  tests  in  Bochum. 
The  experience  gained  in these  institutes led,  however,  to  the view that 
this apparatus  did  not  seem suitable for  the  continuous  inspection of winding 
ropes  under  the  operational  conditions  obtaining in Europe  (Doc.  2911/62). 
The  Belgian Delegation submitted  to  the  Working  Party  a  report  - which 
went  into great detail  - on  their theoretical  investigations and  practical 
experience with  this  device  (Doc.  8264/62);  the  French Delegation also sub-
mitted  a  paper  on  this apparatus  and  expressed their views  regarding  the 
theories  developed  by  Messrs.  Harvey  and  KrUger  (Doc.  6759/64). 
B.III.  Execution  of  the  programme  of tests on winding  ropes  withdrawn  from  use  at 
the  Bochum  Rope-Testing Station  (1960-1964) 
The  Working  Party agreed unanimously  that  the solution of certain problems 
which  constantly  came  up  during  the  discussions  had  become  a  matter of  priority, 
if the uncertainties attached  to  the  interpretation of the  recordings  were 
to  be  reduced  and mistakes  to  be  avoided;  these  problems  were: 
The  detection and  identification of  the various  factors  which  affect  the 
load-bearing capacity of  the  rope,  such as  rust,  wear,  identations, 
breakage  of':internal wires,  the crystalline state of  the wires,  the magnetic 
states of  the  rope  during  the  electro-magnetic test. 
The  French  Delegation held  the  view  that unsystematic  individual  tests, 
however  interesting that might  be  taken  in isolation,  were  not  adequate  for 
the  solution of the  problem.  They  are  however  convinced  that  progress  in 
this field could  be  made  by  adopting  the  following  measures: 
The  obtention of  numerous  diagrams  by  different establishments  (A.I.B., 
Bochum  Rope-Testing Station,  A.I.F.  and  all other interested bodies)  using 
various  types  of  rope  construction working  under different conditions; 
The  examination of successive  diagrams  to  determine  developments  in  time; 
The  systematic  comparison  of  these  diagrams  with  samples  of withdrawn 
ropes; 
Finally,  the  assembly  and  publication of  the results. 
The  Belgian Delegation was  of  the  opinion that  a  major step solving the 
problems  of  electro-magneti~ testing of  ropes  could  be  brought  nearer  by 
undertaking  basic research  to  determine  precisely the  conditions  for  rope 
tests,  so  as  to  be  able  to keep  the various  factors  causing wear  or deterio-
ration separate. 367 
They  therefore suggested that this basic  research  be  carried out,  and 
considered  the  achievement of the  following  aims  to  be  important: 
- starting with  the  known  parameters  of electro-magnetism,  basic  theories 
covering  the  electro-magnetic  testing of  ropes  should  be  worked  out, 
with  particular reference  to the selective detection·of each  type  of 
fault; 
- starting with  the  theories  worked  out  in this way,  one  or more  proto-
types  of  testing devices  should  be  built,  of such design that selective 
detection was  most  likely to be  realized and  also,  as  far  as  possible, 
providing for  the  measurement  of  one  or more  types  of deterioration; 
- following  experimental  tests in  the  laboratory,  the  prototype  should  be 
improved  and  adapted  to  the  conditions  governing  experimental  tests at 
a  pit; 
- pithead tests should  then  be  carried out. 
After examining  these  two  proposals,  the  Working  Party  agreed  that  for 
the  time  being  the  practical  investigations should be  continued. 
To  this  end it was  decided  that withdrawn winding  ropes  of various  types 
should  be  tested with  the  same  apparatus  by  the  same  institute.  Once  these 
practical investigations had  been finished  and  their results checked,  the 
proposals  advanced  by  the  Belgian  and  French  Delegations  could  be  re-examined. 
On  April  8,  1960,  the  Mines  Safety Commission  approved  the  programme  of 
tests worked  out  by  the  Working Party  and  recommended  the  High Authority  to 
support  the  programme  financially. 
The  High  Authority  took  cognizance of this  problem  on  June  23,  1960,  and 
approved  financial  support  for  the  following  programme  of  investigations: 
1.  Thirty winding  ropes  of various  types  should  be  made  available  from  different 
Community  countries  in the  space of 6  to 8  months  approximately. 
2.  The  winding  ropes  should  be  tested by  electro-magnetic means  in the  country 
of origin,  shortly before being withdrawn  from  service. 
3.  The  sample sections  (some  three  pieces  each  8  metres  long)  should  be  selected 
on  the  basis of  the  recorded charts. 
4.  The  sample  pieces selected should  be  marked  by  coloured rings  and  by  the 
removal  of  1/2 external wires  at each end. 
5.  After withdrawal  of the  rope,  the  sample  pieces  should  be  cut out.  The 
cuts should  be  made  approximately 0.5 metre  beyond  the  coloured rings  and 
artificially-produced wire  breaks,  so making  the  total sample  length some 
9  metres.  The  ends  should  be  very  tightly  bound  or welded,  to ensure  that 
the  sample  did  not  become  loosened  during transport.  T~e beginning of  each 
sample  piece  should  be  marked  by  a  special marker,  such  as  a  flag or  label. 
6.  The  rope  should  then  be  subjected to electro-magnetic tests once  again, 
with special attention to  the individual sample  lengths,  to  determine  the 
sections of  the  diagram corresponding  to  the  marked  samples. 
7.  The  three sample  pieces  from  the withdrawn  rope  and  a  sample  piece of  the 
same  rope  in new  condition,  as  far  as  possible of  the  same  length,  should 
be sent to  Bochum  (for comparison  purposes). 
8.  Each  sample  piece should  then  be  electro-magnetically tested using  the 
Bochum  testing device  in the  Bochum  Rope-Testing Station. 
9.  A section of  rope  of  approximately  60  em  long  should  be  removed  from  each 
sample  piece  for  the examination of individual wires  (tensile,  bending 
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10.  A further section of  rope  some  4  metres  long should  be  taken  from  each 
sample  pfece  to  be  submitted  to  a  destructive tensile test on  the whole 
piece. 
11.  The  remaining  length of  each sample  piece  should  be  unravelled  and  the 
individual wires  examined. 
12.  Samples  of  ropes  of various constructions were  provided  for  these  tests 
from  Belgium,  Germany  and  France,  after having  been submitted in the 
country  of origin to electro-magnetic  tests. 
13.  The  tests were  carried out  in accordance with  instructions,  although 
delays  arose  because suitable ropes  became  available only  at irregular 
intervals. 
The  results of  the  tests with  the  Bochum  apparatus  were  examined  and 
discussed in detail  for  the  first  time  by  the  members  of  the  Working  Party 
at their sessiqn of  December  17,  1964  (Doc.  6116/64  dated 14.9.64). 
The  Working  Party  noted  that  new  metho~s had  been  used  for  the first 
time  in assessing  the  actual condition of  the  rope,  as  revealed when  it was 
unravelled,  since  no  reliable criteria for this  purpose  already existed. 
Iudividually,  the  results achieved can  be  formulated  as  follows: 
- The  changes  in background  noise  level  are undoubtedly  an  index  of changes 
in the  rope.  When  the  noise  level rises,  this  indicates faults  in the  rope, 
but  their effect on  the  load-carrying capacity of  the  rope will vary. 
- Thus,  e.g.  the strongest signal  is given  by  external  rusting.  Internal 
rusting-of the  same  order of magnitude  gives  rises to  a  weaker  signal,  as 
one  would  expect  from  the  principles of electro-magnetic  testing.  Wear 
gives  a  much  weaker signal than corrosion:  similarly,  internal wear  gives 
an  even weaker  indication than external wear.  Broken wires  give differing 
signals according  to their position and cross-sectional area.  There  are 
even  physical  limits which  govern certain signals  (cf.  Section 3  of  the 
Report  of  the  Bochum  Rope-Testing Station). 
- Since  the  indications signalled for  the various  parameters  such as  corro-
sion,  wear,  indentation  points etc.,  vary  according to their position in 
the  rope,  and  these  two  factors  - type  and  position - are not  known  while 
the  rope  is still in service,  it is not  possible  to make  any  reliable 
deductions with  regard  to  load-carrying capacity  from  increases  in the 
background.noise  level.  There  is thus  no  fixed  relationship between the 
loss  in load-carrying capacity  and  the  noise  level. 
c.  Report  in respect of  the application of electro-magnetic  testing devices  for 
the  non-destructive  testing of winding  ropes  during operation 
1.  The  investigation of  numerous  recordings  obtained with  the various  devices 
for  electro-magnetic  rope  testing and  the  comparison of  these charts with 
the  information yielded  by  unravelling  the  ropes  so tested makes it pos-
sible to conclude  that it is possible,  by  the  use  of these  devices, 
- to locate rapidly major  faults  in the  rope, 
- to detect  broken wires  in many  cases  and 
- to study  the  progress  in time  of changes  in the  rope. 
2.  The  Working  Party  noted,  on  the basis of the results obtained  from  the 
research carried out under their control,  that 
- no  solution can  be  expected  to  the  problem of identifying the individual 
causes of deterioration,  such as  corrosion,  wear,  indentation points etc., 369 
at  the  present  time; 
- no  precise  indication of  the  loss  in load-carrying capacity of the  rope 
can  be  obtained  from  the  recorded charts. 
3.  Consequently,  the  Working  Party is of  the  opinion that  electro-magnetic 
testing is a  useful  aid to the  assessment  of winding  ropes,  although  the 
interpretation and  the  diagrams  is in many  cases  a  difficult matter. 
4.  From  which  they  conclude  that 
- the  test apparatus  should  be  used  only  by  experts,  who  must  be  fully 
aware  of  the  limits  and  shortcomings  of  the method  as well  as  with  the 
type  and  behaviour of  the  various  types  of  rope,  in order  to avoid wrong 
judgments; 
- electro-magnetic  testing cannot  replace,  but  can simply  supplement  the 
usual classical testing methods  such  as visual  inspection,  tapping, 
twisting  the  rope  open  (where  possible),  removal  of  one  wire. 
5.  To  sum  up,  the  Working Party considers  that the electro-magnetic testing 
method  can,  suitably applied  and  in association with  the  traditional 
testing methods,  contribute to  the safety of man-riding in shafts. 
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R  E  P  0  R  T 
on  investigations into the protection of under-
ground electrical· networks against  dangers arising 
from  fires or  firedamp  explosions  (with Recommen-
dations) 
(Approved  by  the Mines  Safety  Commission at its 
Plenary  Session of  27  and  28.4.1964) 
ANNEX  VII 373 
When  the  Mines  Safety  Commission  approved  the draft of  Recommendations  for 
the protection of underground electrical networks  against the risks of electric shock, 
worked  out  by  the  Working  Party  on "Electrification",  at its Session of 8th April  1960, 
it was  pointed out  t~at these electrical networks  must  also be  protected against risks 
arising from  fires or  firedamp  explosions. 
Reference  was  made  to this new  factor  in connection with  a  serious accident 
in Great  Britain,  in which  a  short-circuit in a  cable,  which  released considerable 
quantities of  energy,  had  initiated a  firedamp  explosion,  although the protective 
devices  in the electrical system against  overload and  leakage  had  been tripped. 
The  Mines  Safety  Commission wishes  the  investigation of this problem to 
cover  not  only  underground medium-tension  networks  (as was  the  case  in connection with 
the risk of electric shock)  but  above all to the problems  of using high-tension currents. 
The  investigation of  the protective measures  against fire  and  firedamp  explo-
sion risks applied in several countries,  as well  as  the progress which  has  been made 
in this field in recent  years,  made  it possible  for  the Working  Party to present  sever-
al draft Recommendations  to  the Mines  Safety Commission  regarding  the  protection of 
underground electrical networks  against 
1.  - Dangers arising from  fires 
2.  - Dangers  of  firedamp  explosions. 
In addition,  supplementary Recommendations  were  prepared aimed at reducing  the risk of 
explosions  in pits liable to sudden outbursts of  gas. 
The  Working Party considered it appropriate to precede these  Recommendations 
with  a  series of  definitions,  which  have  in fact  already been  largely presented at the 
beginning of  the  Recommendations  on  the risk of electric shock. 
Definitions 
1.  Network:  Any  system of  current  source,  means  of  transmitting current  and  current-
consuming  apparatus.  Thus  e.g.  the  secondary winding  of  a  transformer  (or 
the  secondary windings,  if several  transformers are present with  secondary 
windings  in parallel)  and  the  components  fed  thereby constitute a  network. 
2.  Voltage:  Effective voltage between  phases  in the  case of  three-phase alternating 
current. 
3.  Designation of the Voltages: 
N.B.  The  following  designations are used solely for  the  purpose  of  the present 
recommendation  and  are without  prejudice to the classifications normally used 
in the  individual countries. 
a)  Weak  tension  (WT)  :  Voltage  range which  may  be  considered safe  (generally 
between 40- 65  V according to country). 
b)  Low  tension  (LT)  :  Voltage  range  for  lighting purpose,  drilling operations, 
telephone  installations etc.  (65- 380 V). 
c)  Medium  tension  (MT)  :  The  normal  voltage  range  for  wo~king equipment  used 
underground with three-phase A.C.  (between  380 and  1;'100 V). 
·.~. 
d)  High  tension  (HT)  :  The  normal  voltage range  for· the primary winding  (between 
1;100 and  12,000 V)  of  the  transformers  supplying the  MT- and  LT-networks. 
4.  Electricai protection of  the cables: 
The  term "electrical protection" of the cable is to be understood to cover 
any  device  intended to break automatically the connection with the power  supply to the 
cable before the  consequences of  any  fault  occurring in the  cable  can  become  dangerous. 
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NOTE:  Experience  gained at  a  Dutch pit with the experimental application of direct 
current  has  led to the following  remarks: 
a)  The  present  Recommendations  refer to alternating current. 
b)  With  some  modifications they also hold  good  for  direct current. 
c)  A similar Report  should  be prepared if direct current  becomes  more widely used. 
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1.  RECOMMENDATIONS  REGARDING  THE  PROTECTION  OF  UNDERGROUND  ELECTRICAL  NETWORKS 
AGAINST  DANGERS  ARISING  FROM  FIRES 
In this draft,  which is based  on  the  same  considerations  and  prepared in 
similar  form  to the  Recommendations  in connection with the  dangers  of electrical shock 
(Doc.  8384/59/4),  three categories of precaution are to  be  defined in respect of fire 
risk;  it is only  by  the simultaneous application of  these precautions that sufficient 
protection for  the underground electrical networks  can  be  guaranteed: 
- The  first order precautions are  intended to avert  the  danger  (preventive measures); 
The  second order precautions are  intended to hinder  any  fault  having serious conse-
quences  (protective measures); 
- The  third order precautions are intervention measures which  have  the  disadvantage 
that  the installations have  to be  switched off:  before applying  the measures  pro-
posed  in these Recommendations,  consideration must  be  given to the  local  dangers 
which  may  arise as  a  result  of  switching off. 
A.- FIRST  ORDER  PRECAUTIONS  AVERTING  DANGER  FROM  FIRE 
1.  An  excessive  degree  of  heating in normal  operation of cables  and  leads  and  of 
plant  components  under  voltage  should  be  prevented  by  the provision of adequate 
conductivity,  allowing  for  the  maximum  loadings  occurring  in operation.  Unfore-
seen  local  beatings,  caused  by  the  loosening  of  terminals  and  connections, 
should be  prevented  by  the use  of  suitable designs  and  by  proper supervision 
as  far  as possible. 
2.  The  possibility of faults  and short-circuits between  leads or  between  leads 
and earth should be  prevented by suitable insulation  or  by  an adequate  gap 
between  the  leads. 
B.- SECOND  ORDER  PRECAUTIONS- Protection against  the effects of  a  heating or  a  fault: 
1.  The  insulations used  in the manufacture  and  installation of electrical machines 
and  cables and  leads should not  undergo  change  as  a  result  of  the heating 
effects during  perio4s of  maximum  operating load. 
2.  The  protective sheaths  for  machines  and  for  cables  and  leads  should as  far  as 
possible be  made  of material which  is flame-resistant  or which  does  not  spread 
fire. 
The  use  of oil as  a  non-conductor  should  be permitted only  in cases where 
appropriate precautions are  taKen  to avoid  any risk to the  personnel  in the 
event  of fire. 
3.  Concentrations of ignitable or  combustible materials and pipes  for  combustible 
gases  should  be sited as  far as possible  from  the electrical equipment. 
C.- THIRD  ORDER  PRECAUTIONS  - Acting  on  the  network 
1  .•  The  networks  should  be automatically protected against  overloads  by  suitably 
selected,  adjusted,  inspected and maintained relays,  switches  or other equiva-
lent devices  (1). 
(1)  The  network is naturally considered as being properly protected if the protective 
device interrupts only  the  supply to the apparatus or  the cable  in which  the 
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2.  The  networks  should  be  automatically protected  (1)  against  short-circuits by 
means  of protective devices  - e.g.  fusible plugs,  circuit-breakers,  etc.  - or 
by  the  combined use  of  these devices,  all these devices to be  capable,  on 
switching off,  of  handling  the  maximum  possible short-circuit current which 
can occur  at  the point where  they  are installed. 
These  devices  should be  chosen and  adjusted according to the  lowest  short-
circuit current which  can occur at the  end  of  the section of  network  which  they 
protect. 
Swit~hes,  relays,  protective devices  against  short-circuits,  etc.  should, 
on  switching  on,  be  able to  cope  w~th the  maximum  short-circuit current which 
can  occur  at  a  point where  they  are installed. 
Should the  power  involved in the short-circuit on  switching off require it, 
the  speed  of  movement  of the  switch contacts should  not  depend  on  the  amount 
of  physical  energy  exerted  by  the operator  in the  case of  hand-operated switch-
gear. 
3.  Measures  must  be  taken to ensure that  as  far  as possible there is effective 
protection against  faults with  low  current  intensity which  would  fail to trip 
the  protective devices  named  above  and  could  cause  dangerous  beatings. 
C 0  M M E  N T  A R  Y 
1.  The  present  Recommendations  regarding protection against  dangers  ar1s1ng  from  fires 
in underground  operation apply  to all voltage categories above  380°  (medium  tension 
and  high  tension as set  out  in the  definitions of  the  present  Report).  These  Recom-
mendations  are  also in principle valid for  lower voltages,  but  do  not  need  to be 
observed  so strictly if the possible fault  current  remains  low. 
2.  To  ensure the  safety of the workmen,  three classes of precaution are  recommended 
here  and it is only  by  simultaneous application of  them that  adequate protection 
of  the  installations can  be  guaranteed.  What  is more,  the distinction drawn  between 
the  three categories is only  based  on  logical  grounds  - to ensure that  nothing 
should  be  overlooked;  this  does  not  however  mean  to  say  that the first order pre-
cautions take  precedence  over  the others.  In  some  instances it could,  in fact, 
happen  that  a  rapid and reliable intervention would  be  quite sufficient.  However, 
working  safety must  not  depend  solely upon  devices whose  method  of  operation has 
been  shown  to  be  unreliable  in practical working  because  of  their  inadequacy  or 
because  they  have  been wrongly  chosen,  or because of  damage  or  neglect. 
A.- FIRST  ORDER  PRECAUTIONS  (preventive measures) 
1.  To  avoid beatings  and  fires  caused by  electrical equipment,  it is above all 
things  necessary that  the various magnitudes  in the  network  (in particular the 
cross-sectional area of  the cables)  are selected so that the  temperature of 
the  leads or of  the  installation only reaches  a  moderate  level even  during the 
heaviest  loadings  in normal  operation  (including starting-up of  the motors), 
these moderate values  being  compatible with the strength of the insulation; 
from  this point of  view it may  on  occasion be  desirable to have  an  increase in 
voltage to reduce  the higher  current intensities and their effects. 
2.  The  permissible current  density  depends  on the  surroundings,  the  design of 
the  equipment,  duration and  frequency  of  operational  loading;  there is thus  no 
general  simple rule to determine  the permissible limits beforehand.  Each  coun-
try does  however  have  regulations which  are  based upon  general  experience; 
(1)  The  network is naturally considered as  being properly protected if the protective 
device  interrupts only the  supply  to the  apparatus  or the cable  in which  the 
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these regulations make  it relatively easy  to determine  for  each  individual 
instance the prerequisite conditions for  the  design of  the  networks,  taking 
these factors  into account. 
Regular  checking of  the  networks  is moreover  advisable.  Sometimes  there is 
a  great  temptation to connect  further  devices to an  already fully-loaded  network, 
the working  times  of  the  new  apparatus perhaps coinciding with that of  the 
existing devices.  In addition,  a  loosened connection  can be  the  cause  of  equally 
severe accidents as  can  an  overload.  The  Recommendations  with  regard to the 
dangers  of beatings must  therefore deal with both the  causes occurring  in nor-
mal  operation  (excessive current  loading)  as  also with unusual  causes  (exces-
sive extent  of  the network,  loosening of connections,  etc.);  in particular the 
use of connections with antiloosening devices is recommended. 
2.  Naturally  the  measures  to prevent  excessive heating  should be  supplemented by 
measures  to prevent  short-circuits;  this is done  by  using suitable insulation 
or  by maintaining  a  proper  distance  between  conductive  components which  may 
have  different potentials,  or  by  extending the air gaps,  or  by  precautions of 
all kinds  to avoid  leakage  currents. 
B.- SECOND  ORDER  PRECAUTIONS  (protective measures) 
1.  To  prevent  any  heating having unpleasant  consequences,  the  corresponding rise 
in temperature must  not  cause  damage  nor  major  changes  to the  insulation;  this 
is the purpose  of the first  Recommendation  here listed.  In this connection it 
must  not  be  forgotten  that  the thermoplastic insulation materials  (PVC  type) 
do  not resist heat  as well  as e.g.  impregnated paper. 
2.  It cannot  be  expected however  that  the material will have  the  same  degree  of 
resistance to heat effects attributable to short-circuits if these are of  long 
duration;  it is in many  cases technically impossible  to use  inorganic or  non-
combustible materials since they may  produce  other dangers  (e.g.  as  a  result of 
the brittleness of these  insulating materials). 
On  the other  hand  the  attempt  can be  made  to make  the material  and  the  cables 
and  leads  flame-resistant,  both against external  influences and  against  fire 
from  short-circuits.  Assuming  that this fire  does  not  last too  long,  it is thus 
insufficient to surround the cables and  apparatus with  a  sheath which  does  not-
spread the fire. 
Oil calls for  special mention.  As  in the  case of  the other  combustible  non-
conductors,  the use  of oil should  be  governed  by  the precautions taken to 
protect  the workmen  in the event  of  a  fire;  this problem has  already been dealt 
with  in detail in connection with oil transformers and oil-filled switchgear 
and will therefore not  be  further  discussed here. 
3.  Finally,  as  far  as possible,  no  combustible materials should  be  stored in the 
vicinity of  the electrical equipment  and there should be  no  pipes carrying 
combustible  gases.  Here  again this can  be  taken only as a  Recommendation  in prin-
ciple;  it is in practice unavoidable  that e.g.  wood  should be  stored near  the 
working-points  and  the  apparatus situated there.  Efforts must  however  be  made 
to restrict these practices as  far  as possible. 
C.- THIRD  ORDER  PRECAUTIONS  (intervention measures) 
The  conventional protective apparatus  tripped·by the current  intensity 
(fuses,  relays,  circuit-breakers,  etc.)  are precisely  intended to ensure that any 
overloads  or  short-circuits which  occur  do  not  last  long  enough  to cause  a  fire. 
1.  Ideally,  to give protection against  overloads,  it would  be  necessary to have 
components which  are able to integrate precisely the variations in loading in 
a  network  or  in a  protected cable.  But,  as has  been  found  in practice,  certain 
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turn out  to be  complicated and unreliable;  the operating conditions underground 
in general call for  the use  of  more  robust  elements,  even if their selection 
or adjustment  makes  it necessary to apply  a  higher  degree of safety precaution. 
2.  The  higher  the short-circuit current rises above  the  normal  loading of the net-
work  (including starting-up of the large motors),  the easier the short-circuits 
are to control.  For  example,  fuses  or magnetic cut-outs are adequate to provide 
a  circuit-breaking system,  provided that their switch-off capacity is sufficient 
to  cope with the maximum  current  intensity possible at  the point  in question. 
In addition the fuses  must  be  so  chosen and  the relays so  adjusted that the 
protection is also provided even  for  the  lowest  possible short-circuit current 
at the  end  of  the cable being protected or,  to express it more  precisely,  the 
protective devices must  be  selected in such  a  manner  that  normal  overloads are 
possible with an  adequate degree of safety,  without  there being  any  danger  of 
heating of  the  fuses  or  an untimely tripping of the relays.  This therefore means 
that appropriate adjustment  of  the protective. devices  tripped by  current  inten-
sity can be  a  very difficult matter,  if the  cross-sectional area of the copper 
lead is too small,  if the cable is too  long  or  the resistance of the current 
source too great.  To  eliminate this eventuality,  it is possible to have  recourse 
to protective devices against  resistance-governed faults,  as provided in para-
graph  C.3. 
The  devices  for  closing the current circuit  (switches  and  relays)  must  in 
addition have  a  high  enough switch-off capacity to eliminate any  possibility 
of  switching-off  not  occurring,  not  only in the  event  of  any  overloads which 
may  occur,  but  also at  maximum  short-circuit current. 
The  hand-operated devices  for  switching  on or off  - switches,  relays,  etc.  -
must  be  designed  so. that the switching  speed  does  not  depend  on  the physical 
energy  exerted by  the operator,  when  dealing with  high  powers.  As  in the pre-
vious case,  this precaution is directed against  failure to switch off in the 
event  of a  short-circuit. 
3.  To  protect  the  network against  disturbances  from  low  current  intensities caused 
either by  a  continuing fault  between phases  or  between phase  and  earth,  or  even 
by  a  partial or  complete  break  in one  phase  (broken  lead,  badly-fastened cable 
clamp,  etc.),  certain precautions should be  taken e.g.  to restrict the extent 
of  loading.of the electrical networks  or to make  it possible to use  automatic 
cut-off devices to the  extent  that these  devices are suitable for  the  determi-
nation of  faults of this type  and  allow of  intervention before these faults 
become  serious. 
This  provision must  naturally not  be applied too strictly; .there is no  such 
thing as  a  completely  insulated electrical network,  and fault currents only 
become  dangerous  one~ they  exceed  a  certain threshold  intensity. 
It should also be  pointed out  that the tripping time  must  be  shorter,  the 
stronger the current  flowing  through  the fault point.  The  reaction time of the 
normal  devices is moreover  generally adequate  from this point  of view  if they 
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2.  RECOMMENDATIONS  ON  THE  PROTECTION  OF  UNDERGROUND  ELECTRICAL  NETWORKS 
AGAINST  DANGERS  ARISING  FROM  FIREDAMP  EXPLOSIONS 
The  following  Recommendations  are  in principle  intended only  for  gassy pits. 
Pits subject  to  sudden outbursts of  gas  are  covered  by  several  supplementary  remarks 
in an  annex. 
Without  prejudice to the precautions proposed  for  protection against  elec-
tric shocks  and  against dangers  arising  from  fires,  a  distinction is drawn  here be-
tween  supplementary precautions of first,  second  and  third order;  it is only  by their 
simultaneous application that  adequate protection of  the underground  networks  can be 
ensured. 
A.- FIRST  ORDER  PRECAUTIONS  - Prevention of accumulations of  firedamp 
1.  Precautions should  be  taken to ensure that the  firedamp  content  at  the point 
where  the electrical equipment  is installed should  remain  below  the threshold 
values  laid down  by  the responsible  Inspectorates. 
2.  Before the  installation of  any  new  electrical equipment  or  before any  exten-
sion of  an  existing installation,  the ventilation conditions at  the site should 
be  checked  in the  sense of  the previous  Recommendations. 
3.  Before any  changes  are  made  in the working  system,  in the ventilation or  in 
the gas-drainage  system which  could cause disturbances  in the vicinity of  elec-
trical equipment,  the responsible official must  examine  in detail the possible 
consequences  of  these measures. 
B.- SECOND  ORDER  PRECAUTIONS  - Protection against  the risk of  ignition 
1.  In gassy workings,  use  should  be  made  only of electrical equipment  and instal-
lations which  have  been permitted or  approved  by  the responsible  Inspectorate, 
and  only under  the conditions laid down  by  them. 
2.  The  electrical equipment  should be  erected,  used,  inspected and  maintained in 
such  a  way  that it remains  flameproof.  It should  be  supplied only  by  cables 
or  leads which  are of  adequate  mechanical  strength bearing in mind  the site 
and use. 
Efforts should  be  made  to avoid  any  damage  to the cables and  leads when  they 
are laid or when  the workings  around  the equipment  are being maintained. 
C.- THIRD  ORDER  PRECAUTIONS  - Cutting off the current 
1.  The  networks  should be  laid out  in such  a  way  that  any  possible fault current 
between phase  and  earth is reduced to a  low  value or rapidly  brok~n. 
2.  Preference should be  given to an  automatic protection device  - either collective 
or selective - against  faults  between  phases  and  against earth faults. 
3.  Precautions  should  be  taken to exclude the risk of accidents to men  when  looking 
for  faults or when  localizing them,  and when  the ·sections of  network  in question 
are switched  on again. 
4.  Leads without  metal  sheathing,  and especially  leads supplying current to moving 
machines  in the workings,  must  be  electrically protected against  internal or 
external short-circuits,  either by  a  screen round  each  individual conductor  or 
surrounding all the conductors,  this screen to bring into action in the event 
of  a  fault  a  protective device  - or  by  the use of equivalent  systems. 380 
5.  If the ·firedamp content·rises above  the threshold values laid down  by  the 
responsible  Inspectorate,  all the affected sections of the network  should be 
switched off.  Appropriate  instructions should be  issued - bearing in mind  the 
local conditions - and in particular,  allowance  should be  made  for  the necessity 
of maintaining in operation certain machines  which  provide ventilation. 
These  sections should be  switched on  again only after it has  been established 
that the  firedamp  content has  dropped below  the prescribed threshold level,  and 
that only  on  the  instructions of  an  expert official. 
C 0  M M E N T A R Y 
To  protect underground  networks against  dangers arising  from  firedamp it is 
above all necessary to prevent  accumulations  of  firedamp  (preventive measures);  should 
a  dangerous  concentration of  firedamp  nevertheless arise,  it is essential to prevent 
any  ignition  (protective measures)  by  the electrical equipment,  and  finally to switch 
off the network before any  risk of  explosion occurs  (intervention measures). 
Here  again we  are dealing with three categories of precaution which  have  to 
be applied in association with  each other and which are additional to the precautions 
proposed in connection with electric shock  and  fires. 
A.- FIRST  ORDER  PRECAUTIONS  (Preventive measures) 
1.  The  prime  purpose is to prevent  any  rise of  the  firedamp  content  in the workings 
in which electrical equipment  is situated.  The  appropriate ventilation or gas-
drainage measures are  in any  case required for  many  other reasons,  but  they 
become  even more vital because of  the use  of electrical equipment,  and it there-
fore  seems  necessary  to  emphasize their  importance  and  to recall that the 
Inspectorate in each country  lays  down  the  maximum  permissible  firedamp  levels 
for workings where electrical equipment  is situated. 
The  precautions  recommended  here particularly refer to the  local danger  of 
accumulations of  firedamp  and  the  frequency  of  checks. 
2.  For  this reason,  any  installation of  new  electrical equipment  or  any  major 
extension of  an electrical installation in gassy pits or in gassy districts  ; 
should be  accompanied  by  a  new  check of the ventilation conditions  in the vicin-
ity of  the electrical equipment,  this check,  to be  made  by  the officials respon-
sible for ventilation. 
3.  Similarly,  in every  case of a  change in the ventilation or the working  ~etbod 
which  might  give rise to a  change  in the  firedamp  concentration in the vicinity 
of the electrical equipment,  these changes  should not  be  carried out without 
thorough reflection and without  taking all the precautions called forJ  all the 
responsible officials,  in particular those responsible  for  the electrical  eq~ip­
ment,  should be  brought  into the discussion of  these precautions. 
B.- SECOND  ORDER  PRECAUTIONS  (Protective measures) 
1.  In districts classified as gassy it is important  that the only  equipment used 
should be  such as gives  no  risk of ignition of  firedamp,  i.e.  only designs 
which are approved or permitted by  the responsible  Inspectorates.  Various types 
of protection can be·used to achieve this  (1);  it is the  Inspectorates'  respon-
sibility to lay down  the field of application and  conditions of application for 
these types of protection. 
(i)  Classified as  "Types of Protection"  in the  International Electro-Technical 
Commission's list. 381 
2.  The  supervision and  maintenance  of  the  equipment  and  the cables and  leads, 
particularly with  regard to risk of  ignition of  firedamp,  is of great  impor-
tance;  it should be  the responsibility solely of precisely-instructed personnel. 
Similarly,  no effort is too great to ensure that  the workmen  who  have  to handle 
electrical equipment  are properly  informed,  in order to avoid  any  impairment  of 
the working life or the operation of the  equipment  by  incorrect or  rough  hand-
ling.  A  long period of patient education is necessary;  such measures undoubtedly 
have  an  economic  value  and  directly influence safety. 
Even  the construction of  the cables used is not  unimportant:  their mechanical 
strength must  be  suited to the special  conditions of underground work.  With 
regard to resistance to blows,  for  example,  it may  be useful  to draw attention 
to the use of  cables with elastic components;  thus it is better to use  the "dry" 
cables than paper-insulated cables with  a  lead outer sheathing,  provided that 
the risk of  any  modification of  the  dry  insulating material  by  heat  is adequately 
restricted. 
C.- THIRD  ORDER  PRECAUTIONS  (Intervention measures) 
These measures  are primarily  intended to eliminate the  causes of ignition 
of  any  possible explosive or combustible mixture  of  gases which  may  arise. 
Since  a  few  milli-joules are sufficient to ignite a  firedamp mixture,  the 
prime  purpose  of  these precautions is to eliminate or reduce  every possible cause of 
spark or arc  formation  or  any  external heating. 
The  precautions therefore consist of: 
a)  protection of the  network  by  means  of the precautions already listed against  the 
risk of electric shocks  and against  dangers arising from fire.  Electrical protec-
tion should above all be  provided for  leads to moving  machines.  However,  apparatus 
working  on  low  voltages  (e.g.  drilling machines)  can often dispense with such pro-
tection. 
b)  Additional precautions with the following aims: 
- Reduction  in the intensity of  any  fault currents which may  occur,  which  can e.g. 
lead to preferring an  insulated star-point  (or  one  earthed via a  limiting resist-
ance)  to an  earthed star-point and  (selective or collective)  insulation super-
vision with  automatic switching-off of a  control device provided only with a 
signal indication or  to exclusive protection against  double  faults.  However,  the 
possible difficulties of restricting faults prevent  excessive strict application 
of tpis rule.  On  occasion the observance of precise instructions by  expert work-
~en ~Y be preferred to tpe use  of this automatic device. 
- Reduction of  the duration of the  fault to the absolute possible minimum,  the 
consequence  of which is that the circuit must  be  broken as quickly as possible, 
requiring the use  of  sensitive and  rapidly-operating protective devices. 
It will however  be  noted that  in a  case of serious damage  (rock falling on 
cables and  leads or on cable inlets,  a  cable cut  by  a  machine,  etc.)  these two 
precautions  do  not  have  the  same  effect.  The  arrangement  of  the  equipment  at  the 
work!ng-point  frequently  makes  the first precaution more  important  than the 
seco~d since dangerous  concentrations of gas  form  more  rarely in the direct vicin-
ity of the equipment; in this case it is even more  necessary  to avoid fairly  large 
faults and their consequences  than to break the circuit very quickly. 
Thus it is preferable - except  for  certain special cases - to use resistant 
and  robust  equipment  (above all if  it only  has  to·. operate rarely)  to protective 
devices which operate rapidly but  are weak  and  too sensitive,  since if one  of 
them became  effective at the wrong  moment  the workmen might  make  it ineffective (1} 
(1)  At  this point there arises the difficulty - indeed the danger  - that the safety 
devices are  inadvertently used simultaneously;  they  should only  be used in fairly 
large  numbers  to the extent that their technical characteristics are improved  and 
above all to the extent that  the discipline of the workmen,  and their specialist 
training is improved,  and their capacity to appreciate the dangers which  they  may 
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or since a  failure might  cause the  intended protection to  drop  out.  Naturally 
attention has  to be  paid to selecting the protective devices with the best  fea-
tures in respect  of  robustness,  rapidity and  sensitivity compatible with the 
technical conditions obtaining. 
- Indication of the  danger,  indeed automatic breaking  of  the  circ~it when  the 
firedamp  content  increases or  when  the ventilation decreases. 
This  precaution is arguable,  since each device  only  checks  one point  and 
any  concentrations  of  firedamp  may  occur  elsewhere.  Until better apparatus is 
developed,  preference must  b~ given  to regular  checking by  the  personnel. 
* 
*  * 
REMARKS  REGARDING  PITS  LIABLE  TO  SUDDEN  OUTBURSTS  OF  GAS 
The  term  sudden  outburst  of  gas is to be  understood  in what  follows  to cover 
a  sudden  and  severe outburst  of  gas which is generally  accompanied  by  the  projection 
of  coal  and  rock. 
The  use  of electricity in pits liable to these  phenomena  or at  such working-
points naturally calls for  certain additional precautions,  since the outbursts are 
severe  and  are in practice difficult to predict.  The  remarks which  follow  are not 
intended to be  an  exhaustive list of  the precautions to be  taken,  but  only  to include 
the  most  important.  Whether  and under  what  conditions  the use  of electrical equipment 
can  be  approved  can  be  judged only  by  the appropriate  Inspectorate  from  case to case. 
These  remarks  apply  to pits subject  to outbursts of  mixed  gases  (C02  and 
CH4)  as  far  as it has  not  been established that  the  released gases are incombustible. 
In the  case  of  incombustible mixtures of  gas,  any  sudden  outbursts which arise can 
only  damage  the' electrical equipment  by  pieces of  rock or  coal which  are projected. 
Generally  a  reinforced mechanical  protection or an  arrangement  of  the devices  and 
cables  and  leads which  eliminates  any  damage will be  sufficient to deal with this risk. 
If we  assume  that  the electrical networks which  may  in certain instances be 
passed  for  use  in pits liable to sudden outbursts of  gas already  meet  the requirements 
of  the  Recommendations  covering protection against electric shocks  and  for  the pre-
vention of  fires  and  firedamp  explosions,  then  the supplementary precautions required 
must  essentially be  directed towards  the  following  three aims: 
- Restriction of  the  danger  that electrical devices  or  live cables  and  leads  can be 
hit  by  projected particles of  coal or·rock. 
- Elimination of  the possibility that gas  clouds with  a  dangerous  content  of  firedamp 
can unsuspectedly  flow  over  live electrical equipment. 
- Strengthening of  the  other electro-technical precautions already  taken. 
1.  Danger  of  damage  by  the particles of coal or  rock  projected by  a  sudden outburst 
The  points at which  there is·a risk of  sudden outbursts are generally well-
known.  To  avoid  any  risk of  the electrical equipment  being  damaged  at these points 
by  the particles of  coal projected,  the  following  measures  can be  taken as appro-
priate: 
Protection by  removal  to  a  greater distance:  The  zones  in which  there is a  danger 
of  projection of particles are  not  electrified. 
- Protection by  baffles:  The  electrical equipment  and,  if required,  the cables and 
leads,  are protected by  baffles or  sheathings which  are strong enough  to resist 
heavy  blows,  or  else they  are set  in niches,  behind packwalls,  etc. 383 
- Protection by  the  design:  The  electrical equipment  is housed  in containers of 
adequate .mechanical  strength,  the cables are protected by  metal  sheathing,  by 
thick elastic  ~heathings or  - in very  dangerous  zones  - by  special  design precau-
tions  (e.g.  double  screening),  so that  they are cut  off as rapidly as possible 
if subjected to heavy  blows  or  too strong tension. 
2.  The  danger  of  clo'Ids  of  firedamp 
The  measures which  come  up  for  consideration here are,  e.g.  strengthening 
of  the ventilation current particularly to reduce  the risk of  accumulations of  gas 
at the site of  electrical equipment,  and  as far  as possible the use  of  remote-indi-
cating methanometers  or remote-indicating apparatus  for  major  disturbances of  ven-
tilation (in particular for  the  formation  of  accumulations);  these devices  should 
be  capable  of  cutting off the  sections of  network  threatened by  these  phenomena, 
before  the  formation  of  a  cloud  of  gas with  a  dangerous  firedamp  content;  the situa-
tion and  arrangement  of  remote-indicating apparatus of this kind  naturally  depends 
on its sensitivity and  on  its speed  of  response. 
Naturally  the  inducer  shots  normally  fired  in pits subject  to  sudden out-
bursts can  only  be  fired after all the  equipment  which  could  be  attained by  the 
gases released during  a  sudden outburst  have  been  switched off.  After this proce-
dure,  the  equipment  may  only  be  switched  on  again when  the air in the vicinity of 
the electrical  apparatus  and  the associated cables  and  leads has  been  checked  and, 
if appropriate,  the  equipment  has  been  inspected to see that it is still in good 
mechanical  condition and  that  the  insulation is sound. 
3.  Supplementary electro-technical measures 
In  this case it is particularly envisaged that  there should be  a  strengthening 
of  the precautions recommended  in.the case of pits not  subject  to sudden outbursts 
but  where  firedamp  is present,  so that  in particular any  fault  currents which might 
occur  are restricted to a  minimum,  efforts  bei~g made  at  the same  time  to ensure 
that  the intensity and  duration of these fault  currents are  reduced.  It is particu-
larly recommended  in this connection that  the  following  steps should  be  taken: 
a)  With  respect  to  th~ earthing of  the  A.C.,  the  use  of  a  star-point earthed via a 
strong  impedance  (1)  should  be  preferred to star-points which  are earthed directly 
or via  a  low  resistance. 
b)  Care  should  be  taken to ensure that  there is an  automatic protection of the net-
work  against all insulation faults,  this protection acting as  rapidly as possible, 
even when  such faults are  formed  by  resistance between phase  and earth;  further-
more,  provision must  be  made  to ensure that operation c.an  be  resumed  only after 
repairs  have  been  finished or after the  damaged  section of the  network  has  been 
cut  out  of  the circuit. 
* 
*  * 
(1)  e.g.  by  using  an  insulation-supervising device. 385 
R  E  P  0  R  T 
on  firedamp-proof  electrical switchgear 
for rated voltages  above  1,100 volts. 
(Approved  by  the Mines  Safety Commission 
at its Plenary Session of 16.10.1964) 
ANNEX  VIII 387 
In  a  resolution adopted  on  December  9,  1958,  on  the elimination of oil  from 
transformers,  condensers  and  other electrical apparatus  installed below  ground,  the 
Mines  Safety  Commission  noted  that  the  use  of  firedamp-proof  oil circuit-breakers 
and  contactors  in  places  where  there  was  a  firedamp  risk could  not  be  dispensed with 
when  working with voltages  above  1,100 v.,  by  reason of  the  advantages  of  these 
devices with  regard  to safety  in gassy  conditions. 
The  Commission  therefore felt that,  with  a  view  to eliminating the  dangers 
arising  from  the  presence of oil,  research should  be  conducted  for  the  development 
of small-oil-volume or oil-less high-tension circuit-breakers and  contactors  incor-
porating  the  properties required  for  their safe use  in gassy workings.  To  this end, 
it recommended  that  a  detailed study  be  made  of  the  greater degree  of safety obtain-
able  by  making  a  flameproof  casing compulsory  for  those  components  which  normally 
emit  sparks  and  by  insisting on  an  "increased safety''  type  of  design for  the  remainder 
of the  equipment.  · 
After detailed study  the  Working  Party  on Electricity can  report ,that research 
is in progress  in the various  Community  countries  for  the  development  of small-oil-
volume  or oil-less high-tension circuit-breakers  and  contactors  incorporating the 
properties required  for  their safe use  in gassy  workings. 
This  memorandum  reviews  the  present state of  the various  techniques  applied 
for  this  purpose,  taking  into account  that  some  of  these  are still in the course 
of development. 
MEMORANDUM  ON  FIREDAMP-PROOF  ELECTRICAL  SWITCHGEAR 
FOR  RATED  VOLTAGES  IN  EXCESS  OF  1,100 VOLTS 
I.  SUMMARY  OF  CERTAIN  FUNDAMENTAL  CONCEPTS 
1.  Definition 
A "circuit-breaker" is a  switch which  automatically cuts off an electric 
circuit  from  its source  of supply  in the  event  of certain faults  occurring, 
e.g.  in particular,  a  short-circuit.  It is a  protective device. 
The  actuating  (or control}  mechanism of  a  circuit-breaker operates so that 
on  closing it s~ores up  a  certain quantity  of  energy. 
The  circuit-breaker is opened  quickly  by  means  of  a  latch or trip when  this 
energy  is released. 
A contactor is a  switch  for  making  and  breaking an electric circuit.  It is  an 
operating device. 
In general,  contactors are operated electro-magnetically. 
The  protective and  operating  functions  may  be  combined  in a  single unit, 
known  as  a  contactor circuit-breaker  (automatic  tripping contactor). 
2.  Extinction of arcs 
When  a  circuit through which  a  current is flowing  is broken,  an  arc is formed. 
In the  case of  a  short-circuit,  the current generally  lags behind  the voltage 
in phase. 
In other words,  as  current falls to zero,  voltage  approaches its peak. 
To  achieve  an effective break,  a  dielectric strength greater than their 
potential difference must  be  established between  the  two  parting contacts. 
There  are  two  methods  of  achieving this result  : 388 
(a)  Elongation of  the arc,  which  then  behaves  as  a  constantly-increasing 
resistance  placed  between  the  poles.  The  elongation is  produced  by 
combining  magnetic  blow-out  and  the  increase  in  temperature with various 
devices  designed  to  break up  and  cool  the arc.  This  method  of breaking 
the circuit is known  as  the  "high arc-resistance method". 
(b)  With  alternating current,  as  the current falls to zero,  re-ignition of 
the  arc  is opposed  by  a  dielectric barrier whose  strength depends  on  the 
speed at which  the  contacts  separate  and  the  action of  a  liquid or  gaseous 
de-ionizing  agent  (oil,  water or air).  This  method  of  breaking  the circuit 
is  known  as  the  "low arc-resistance method". 
3.  Breaking-capacity of  a  circuit-breaker 
The  breaking-capacity is expressed  by  the highest current which  can  be  broken 
at  a  given  recovery-voltage without  damage  or excessive  external effect. 
The  rated breaking-capacity corresponds with  a  recovery-voltage equal  to rated 
voltage. 
II.  BREAKING  IN  OIL  - OIL-IMMERSED  CIRCUIT-BREAKERS 
1.  Breaking  in oil 
When  subjected to  an  arc,  the oil decomposes,  releasing carbon  and  gases 
(hydrocarbons  and  hydrogen). 
A  bubble  of  gas  under  pressure  forms  in  the oil around  the  arc.  Within  the 
confines  of  this  bubble,  the  liquid wall  gives off insulating gases,  while  the 
arc  current maintains  an  ionized conducting emission which  stops each  time  the 
the current  falls  to zero.  Heat  and  ion  exchange  phenomena  occur within  the 
turbulent  gaseous  mass,  resulting in  the  eventual restoration of  the  dielectric 
strength of  the  medium. 
At  a  given speed of separation of  the contacts,  the quality of  the  break  depends 
on  the  effectiveness of  the  de-ionizing process.  Resear~h in this  field has 
culminated in the  development  of arc-control  chambers  (also known  as  turbulence 
chambers). 
The  technique  of arc-control  chambers,  first applied  to  the multipole single-
tank circuit-breaker has  led to the construction of single-pole circuit-breakers 
in separate  tanks  (1). 
In  the single-tank circuit-breaker,  the oil ensures 
- the extinction of arcs  (de-ionizing fluid)  and 
- insulation both  between  phases  and  between  phases  and  earth. 
The  relatively  large volume  of oil is required more  for  the  second  purpose 
(insulation)  than  for  the  first  (extinction). 
The  single-tank unit is usually  known  as  the  "large oil-volume"  type,  although 
this  volume  depends  on  the  type  of unit  and its breaking-capacity.  For  normal 
breaking-voltages  and capacities,  the  volume  of oil is about  30-40 litres.  In 
some  recent circuit-breakers,  the casing  and  the  tank  are  made  of  insulating 
material,  and  the  amount  of oil is very  small  (about  10 litres). 
However,  in their  present  form,  these units cannot  be  used  in gassy workings. 
With  the single-pole circuit-breaker,  insulation between  phases  and  between 
phases  and  earth is effected by  solid insulators.  Each  tank contains  the  rela~ 
tively small  volume  of oil  (2-3  litres)  necessary  for  extinction. 
The  separate  tank unit  is generally  known  as  the  "small-oil volume"  type  (2). 
(1)  The  break  is said to  be  "free" ·if there is no  arc-control  chamber  and  "controlled" 
if the  contrary is the  case. 
(2)  In Germany  the  upper  limit of  "small oil-volume" units is 15 litres per unit. 389 
2.  Single-tank oil-circuit breaker  (30-40 litres of oil) 
The  metal  casing comprises  an oil tank  in which  the contact section of  the 
circuit-breaker and  part of  the control mechanism  (lock)  are  immersed. 
The  moving  part has  a  conducting arch  for  each  phase,  which  makes  or breaks 
the  connection  between  a  fixed  "input"  and  "output". 
The  advantage  of this arrangement  is that  the  arc  path  lengthens at  twice 
the  speed of  the  movement  of the arches. 
As  stated above,  each  arch  path  may  be  provided with  an  arc-control  chamber 
made  of  pressure-resistant insulating material.  Thus,  when  the circuit-breaker 
opens,  the_pressure is confined to the  chambers,  with  no  perceptible effect 
on  the  tank  as  a  whole. 
The  single-tank oil circuit breaker is in widespread use.  It has  gained  from 
improvements  in circuit-breaking technique  and  from  developments  in control 
mechanisms;  it is simple  and  robust. 
The  flameproof  version of this circuit-breaker retains all its specific ad-
vantages. 
N.B.:  Firedamp  protection of  the single-tank circuit-breaker is  ensured 
- in  some  countries  by  the exclusive use  of  pressure-resistant casings, 
- in other countries,  by  the  extinguishing  property of  the oil  (1) 
The  advantage  of  these  designs  is that  the switch,  the mechanism  and  the 
direct-protective relays  are extremely solidly housed  and  are totally or 
partially oil-immersed. 
With  indirect electrical  protection and  supplementary operating,  protection 
and  control circuits,  flameproof  casings  have  to  be  used  and  part of the 
control  mechanism  loses  the  advantage  of  lub~ic~tion. 
3.  The  "small oil-volume"  separate-tank circuit-breaker 
As  stated,  this  type  has  a  tank  of  insulating material  for  each  phase,  forming 
an  arc-control  chamber  containing the contacts,  which  are oil-immersed. 
It is  a  single-contact switch,  the contact being made  by  a  moving  rod  and  a 
fixed  "tulip" contact connected  to  the circuit-breaker "input"  and  "output" 
respectively. 
The  break  takes  place  in oil according  to  the  process  described  in II.l. 
The  speed of elongation of the  arc  is equal  to that of  the  movement  of  the 
moving  element. 
The  actuating mechanism,  similar in principle to that of single-tank appara-
tus,  is not  incorporated in the  switch.  It is housed  in a  separate casing 
and  operates  the moving  element via  a  cranked  link-rod. 
The  electrical efficiency of this  type  of circuit-breaker is similar to that 
of  the arc-control  chamber sirigle-tank variety,  and it offers the  same  degree 
of  protection and reliability. 
Other  things  being equal,  the overall  dimensions  of  the separate  tank circuit-
breaker are not  greater than  those  of the single-tank type. 
In  theory,  the control mechanism  (lock)  is less well  protected.  But  it is 
easily accessible,  and  can  therefore  be  easily maintained  and  inspected. 
Some  older types  may  have  seemed  fragile  and  easily  damaged,  but  nowadays 
they  are  simple  and  of  robust  construction. 
(1)  This distinction emerged  from  tests carried out  in the  Netherlands.  Experiments 
on  a  circuit-breaker showed  that  the unit  remained  flameproof  irrespective of 
spaces  between  the joints  provided sufficient extinguishing oil prevented igni-
tion of  the  hydrocarbon/hydrogen mixture  by  the  breaking arcs.  Further,  sub-
committee  31  E  of  the  International Electrotechnical  Commission  has  drawn  up  a  set 
of  recommendations  for  the  use  of oil-immersed apparatus  in an  explosive  atmos-
phere. 390 
It might  have  been  thought  that the  carbon  released  on  arcing could  pollute 
the oil,  thus  affecting the efficiency of the switch.  Experience  has  shown 
these  fears  to be  unfounded.  The  carbon collects at  the  bottom of  the  tanks, 
and  can  be.removed  by  periodic drainage.  Further,  contrary to the  theoretical 
possibilities with  a  single-tank circuit-breaker,  the  carbon cannot  form 
conducting  paths  between  phases. 
The  sealed construction has  proved  to be  effective in dusty  and  damp  surro~n-
dings.  · 
In addition,  the  reduced  volume  of oil makes  for  greater fire  protection. 
The  firedamp-proof  construction does  not affect the  performance  of  the circuit-
breaker. 
In the  German  version,  protection against  firedamp  is obtained by  the  simul-
taneous  use  of  three methods  of  protection. 
For  the  components  which  normally  cause sparking: 
''o"  protection  (1), (oil-filled casings  i.e.  oil-immersed)  for  the main 
circuit-breaker contacts; 
"d"  protection  (2),  (pressure-resistant,  flameproof  casings)  for  the 
auxiliary contacts  and relays. 
The  remaining  parts of  the unit  have  "e"  protection  (3),  as  defined  by  a 
decision of  the  International  Electrotechnic~l Commission.  This  Commission 
(sub-committee  31  C)  is at  present studying  recommendations  on this  type 
of construction. 
The  results  for  the  complete unit may  be 
- a  saving  in weight  and  cost  over certain flameproof  designs  ("d"  protection) 
(2); 
- facilities  for  fitting additional operating,  protection and  control units 
and  circuits. 
III.  BREAKING  IN  WATER  - WATER-CIRCUIT  BREAKERS 
1.  Breaking  in water 
This  takes  place according  to the  process  known  as  the  "low arc-resistance" 
process. 
In  a  container filled with water  (4),  the  arc  current  flows  through  a  highly-
ionized column  of  hydrogen;  heat effect causes  the  liquid to heat  and  vaporize 
and  to  decompose  into a  mixture  of  hydrogen  and  oxygen. 
Various  devices  employ  increased pressure,  expansion  and  turbulence to de-
ionize  the  arc-gap.and effect cooling. 
As  with  oil-immersed units,  the  break  takes  place  in pressure-resistant cham-
bers. 
On  termination of  the  break,  the moving  element  of the  contact is out of the 
water,  which  is an  extinguishing medium  but  not  an  insulator. 
2.  The  water circuit-breaker 
The  circuit-breaker comprises  arc ·tanks  made  of  insulating,  pressure-resistant 
material  and  mounted  on  supporting struts. 
In its general  layout,  the unit·: is very similar to the  "small oil-volume" 
separate-tank circuit-breaker. 
(1)  "o"  protection - Oelkapselung. 
(2)  "d"  protection - druckfeste  Kapselung. 
(3)  "e" protection- erh6hte Sicherheit  (increased safety). 
(4)  i.e. water containing certain 4dditives  to  prevent  the  fluid  becoming  more 
conductive. 391 
The  attraction of  the water circuit-breaker lies in the use  of  a  non-combus-
tible extinguishing medium  (1) 
Firedamp-proof construction,  which  has  been in use  for  many  years  in Germany 
but  was  1ntroduced in France  more  recently,  presents  no  difficulties.  With 
the same  advantages,  it makes  use  of  two  of  the methods  of  protection used 
in the  "small oil-volume" unit  (II.3) 
IV.  BREAKING  IN  A GASEOUS  FLUID- INERT-GAS  CIRCUIT-BREAKERS 
1.  Breaking  in inert gas 
a)  There is a  method of  low  arc-resistance circuit breaking whereby  an 
active material releases  a  large volume  of inert gas  on  being subjected 
to an  arc.  By  suitable arrangement  of  the arc  chambers,  the  gas,  which is 
at first compressed,  expands  and  extinguishes  the arc. 
This  process  has  been  the subject of experiment  in various countries  (1) 
and  has  been developed  industrially in Germany. 
b)  A unit has  recently  become  available  in France  in which  the  break  takes 
place at  low  arc-resistance in sulphur hexafluoride  (SF6).  This  is a 
heavy,  inert gas,  and  is an  arc extinguisher.  The  arc  chambers  are 
arranged so that when  the  contacts separate,  the  gas  is compressed  and 
then  blown  on  to  th~ arc;  and 
an  insulator.  The  gas,  which  is of high dielectric strength,  insulates 
live components  from  one  another  and  from  the  tank containing  them. 
2.  Inert-gas circuit-breakers 
a)  This  type  of unit,  which_  uses  active material,  is often known  as  a  hard-
gas  circuit-breaker.  It is similar in design  to  the  separate-tan~ units 
described in II.3  and  III.2. 
The  use  of a  non-inflammable  gas  in the  arc  gaps  makes  for greater fire 
protection. 
In the  firedamp-proof  version,  the unit made  in Germany  uses  two  of the 
methods  of  protection already described:  pressure-resistant casings  ("d" 
protection)  and  "increased safety"  ("e"  protection). 
An  advantage  is that,  when  breaking a  circuit,  any  firedamp  in the  arc 
gaps  is diluted by  a  large volume of non-inflammable  gas. 
b)  The  sulphur hexafluoride unit  is in the  form  of  a  parallelipipedic tank 
encl·osing  the  arc  chambers  and  part of the switch  ~echanism.  The  tank  is 
sealed and  filled with  gas  under  pressure  (3.3  atm.  gauge). 
The  control mechanism  (lock)  is mounted  on  the  front  of  the  tank  of which 
it forms  an  integral part. 
The  use  of  a  non-inflammable  gas  for  arc extinction makes  for  greater 
fire  protection. 
In  the  firedamp-proof  version  (of  French manufacture),  the entire circuit-
breaker  (tank  and  mechanism)  is housed  in a  pressure-resistant casing 
("d":protection). 
The  presence  in the circuit-breaker tank of  a  gas  under  pressure  prevents 
the entry of  firedamp. 
The  circuit is therefore broken  in a  non-inflammable medium. 
This  important  feature necessitates continuous  checking of the  gas  pres-
sure  in the  housing  (and  disconnection  from  the  input side in the event 
of  leakage). 
{1)  In France,  this system is frowned  upon  on  account of the  instability of the 
gas-producing material,  which wears  unevenly  and  sometimes  very rapidly. 392 
V.  BREAKING  IN  AIR- AIRBREAK  CIRCUIT-BREAKER 
1.  Bre~king in air 
a)  Under  this heading  we  may  include  the  "low arc-resistance"  breaking 
technique  (I  - 2b)  whereby  a  jet of compressed air is injected as  a 
contact opens,  blowing  out  the  arc. 
- With  the  "air-blast" or  "pneumatj,c"  apparatus,  the air is compressed 
by  an  auxiliary compressor. 
With  the  "self-compressing"  type unit,  the air is compressed  by  the 
switch itself as  its opening movement  commences. 
·b)  Circuit-breaking in air,  or  "dry" circuit-breaking,  normally signifies 
a  high  arc-resistance break,  the  principle of which  was  summarized  in 
I  - 2a. 
- This  method  of circuit-breaking is normal  for  applications  below 1,100 
volts.  Its use at higher voltages  has  been  the object of  research,  in an 
attempt  to achieve sufficient elongation of  the  arc within  a  comparatively 
restricted space.  Improvements  in magnetic  blow-out  techniques  and especially 
in the  design  of arc  chambers  (of special refractory materials)  have  culmi-
nated in the  achievement  of this aim. 
2.  Airbreak circuit-breakers 
a)  Low  arc-resistance breaking 
1.  The  pneumatic  circuit-breaker 
This  type  of unit,  generally used  only  for  heavy-duty  surface  HT  installa-
tions,  has  two  disadvantages: 
- it requires  an  auxiliary  source  of  dry,  clean compressed air; 
- it causes significant voltage surges ·on  opening. 
The  pneumatic  circuit-breaker is sometimes  used in fixed underground 
installations,  but  there is no  firedamp-proof  version. 
2.  The  "self-compressing" circuit-breaker 
The  switching section of  the unit  is similar to that of inert-gas units 
(IV  2  a/b). 
The  single-pole arc  chambers  are  arranged so that when  the  moving  element 
opens,  the air is compressed  and  is then  blown  on  to the arcs. 
For  various  reasons,  in particular the  low  compression ratio of  the  blowing 
air,  the breaking-capacity of  the  switch is always  limited. 
For moderate  rated service currents,  this defect is remedied  by  combining 
high-rupturing capacity  fuses  with  the switch.  These  eliminate short-
circuit currents. 
(The .fuses  include  a  device  which strikes the  latch of the  lock when  they 
melt  and  causes  the switch to open). 
The  rated service currents are controlled by  relays which trip the  mecha-
nism in the  event of overload. 
The  use  of air as  the arc-extinguishing medium  and  of "enclosed"  fuse 
elements  surrounded  by  inorganic materials makes  for  greater fire protec-
tion,  but  in this case  particular attention must  be  paid  to the  possibil-
~of  the circuit being  broken  by  shorts in circuit with high resistance. 
In  one  firedamp-proof  version made  in Belgium  the entire unit is housed 
in a  pressure-resistant casing  ("d"  protection). 
3.  Combination of isolator and  fuse 
The  combination of  fuses  with  an  isolator also makes it possible to provide 
short-circuit protection for  those  parts of the  HT  system which  do  not 
have  to withstand overloads  and  to transmit heavy  loads  (e.g.  small trans-
formers  whose  secondaries  supply  lighting circuits or remote-control 393 
systems  for staple-shaft winch motors). 
In  the  firedamp-proof version,  the  fuses  are  mounted  in a  pressure-
resistant casing.  They  may  also be  fitted  on the moving  pole  pieces 
so  that  ~n arc can only  occur  inside  the casing.  In Germany,  the  re-
maining  parts of the  isolator are made  to  "e"  protection. 
This  type  of unit  thus  uses  no  inflammable  extinguishing medium. 
b)  High-arc-resistance breaking 
The  air-break circuit-breaker  (in the  normal  sense of  the  term) 
The  airbreak circuit-breaker is a  multipole unit of American origin with 
various  devices  to extinguish the  arc  by  elongation,  splitting and  cool-
ing. 
It is made  for circuit-breaking capacities  up  to  500  MVA  at 5  kV. 
No  servicing is required for this  type  of unit as  regards  the extinguish-
ing medium:  it is an  effective rival  to  the conventional  type  of circuit-
breaker. 
In  the  firedamp-proof version,  the unit,  at  present of multipole  design, 
is enclosed  in a  pressure-resistant casing  ("d"  protection). 
Difficulties arise,  however,  when  it is used  in an  inflammable  atmosphere: 
1.  General  tests carried out  in France  have  shown  that  the  presence  of 
firedamp  in the  enclosure may  affect the  quality of  the  breakr 
The  extent of this  phenomenon is·a little-understood function  of various 
parameters  (inflammable-gas  content,  operating voltage,  power  used). 
2.  Within certain limits of gas  content,  varyinr, according  to  the  design 
of  the  unit,  persistence of  the current  and  ignition upstream of the 
arc  chambers  have  bee~ observed.  These  phenomena,  arising only at 
rated voltages  above3,000 volts, may  be  explained  by  a  drop  in dielec-
tric strength within  the  enclosure;  the  flashover voltage between 
phases  and  between  phases  and  earth is reduced  and  may  cause  general 
ignition. 
This  problem  is not  insoluble.  In  France  in particular,  modifications 
to  the  equipment  (layout,  interposition of screens)  can  reduce  the 
risk of  ignition by  lengthening  the  leakage  paths;  experiments  with 
single-pole,  flameproof,  insulating arc  chambers  have  given encouraging 
results as  regards  performance  and .space-saving. 
VI.  CONTACTORS 
The  usual  function of  a·contacto~ is to switch on  the starting current  (1)  and 
cut off the operating current of  the circuit or equipment,  which it governs. 
The  service of  a  contactor is determined  by  the  number  of switching operations 
it performs:  if the rate of working  is high,  service is intensive. 
In  these circumstances,  breaking in air is recommended,  since repeated arcing 
in a  dielectric such  as oil quickly  impairs  its properties  (decomposition,  pol-
lution with carbon). 
We  have  already  discussed the extinction of arcs  in air  (V  l.b).  When  this 
technique  is applied to the  contactor~  difficulties arise  from 
- the  service conditions  (duty,  damp  atmosphere), 
intensive service in a  confined airspace,  resulting in ionization of the 
extinction chambers  and  the  release of oxidizing gases  (oxides  of  nitrogen 
and  ozone). 
(1)  Starting current of a  motor. 394 
Ionization and  oxidation impair  the quality of the  breaks  and  the  operation of 
the contactor. 
These  difficulties may  be  an  obstacle to the use  of  a  contactor in an  inflammable 
atmosphere.  The  remarks  on this subject in the section on  "dry" circuit-breakers 
(V.2)  apply  also to contactors. 
The  problem of circuit-breaking in air containing firedamp  is the  same  for both 
circuit-breakers  and  contactors.  The  solutions at present being studied theo-
retically and  experimentally  are  very  similar in both cases. 
V  1 I.  THE  l>OSI liON.  I~  T&E  t.u.MMU.N i:TY  COUNTRIES 
GERMANY 
The  single-tank type unit is satisfactory if used within the  limits of its 
breaking-capacity  (for safety this is reduced  to  75%  of  rated value,  if the 
circuit-breaker is of  firedamp-proof  construction). 
The  rapid  advance  of mechanization with  powerful  machines  has  necessitated a 
considerable  increase  in short-circuit capacities. 
For  the  corresponding breaking-capacities,  the single-tank type  unit takes  up 
a  great deal  of  space  and contains  a  large volume  of oil. 
On  the other hand,  separate-tank single-pole circuit-breakers using  a  small 
volume  of oil or water  or inert gas  guarantee  the  required breaking-capacity 
while maintaining acceptable  dimensions.  In German  collieries,  practically 
all new  installations employ  small  oil-volume  or oil-less circuit-breakers. 
In  firedamp-proof  designs,  industrial ·application of such units. is facilitated 
by  the  use  of  "e" protection  (increased safety),  permitted in Germany  for  non-
sparking components. 
·BELGIUM 
The  single-tank type unit  (30-40 litres of oil)  is everywhere  considered satis-
factory  and  has  never caused accidents  or  incidents. 
Administrative regulations  require  the  firedamp-proof  version to be  enclosed 
in a  pressure-resistant casing. 
Water circuit-breakers are  not  yet  authorized  for  workings  where  firedamp  may 
accumulate. 
Some  collieries use  pneumatic  (air-blast)  circuit-breakers at the air intakes. 
A  few  airbreak circuit-breakers exist  in  firedamp-proof  versions. 
"E"  protection is not yet authorized. 
FRANCE 
The  single-tank type unit  (30-40 litres of oil)  gives satisfactory results  (for 
intake  ai~ways,  tests have  been carried out with  flue-gas  absorbing devices). 
In  firedamp-proof  versions,  the various  available  types  of single-tank units 
are rarely used. 
Preference  has  generally  been  given to airbreak circuit-breakers,  which  are in 
process  of  rapid technical  devel·opment. 
A recently  developed circuit-breaker uses  "e"  protection,  although this is only 
allowed as  an  exception. 
Finally,  an  inert-gas circuit-breaker using sulphur hexafluoride  (SF6)  enclosed 
in a  pressure-resistant housing has  just been  brought out. 
ITALY 
Units with  pressure-resistant casings  for voltages  exceeding 1,100 volts are not 
used  in coal-mines,  where  such voltages are  not  normally  used. 395 
NETHERLANDS 
The  single  t8.nk-type  unit  (30-40 litres of oil)  has  been  in use  for  many  years. 
Experience  in  co~lieries has  been  entirely satisfactory. 
The  single-tank circuit-breaker  (30-40 litres of oil) exists in  a  firedamp-proof 
version with  a  casing resistant to  a  given  pressure under specified conditions 
of breaking-capacity  and  with  a  specified level of oil above  the contacts. 
"e"  protection is not  yet  permitted in  places where  there  is an  explosion risk 
from  a  mixture  of air and  firedamp. 
VIII.  SUMMARY 
A  review  of  the  techniques  and  types  of circuit-breaking switchgear usable  in 
atmosphere  containing firedamp  at voltages  above  1,100 volts  shows  that at 
present  the  following  equipment  may  be  used: 
1.  Circuit-breakers 
Single- or separate-tank oil circuit-breakers 
a)  water circuit-breakers, 
b)  inert-gas circuit-breakers,  which  have  existed in Germany  in the  hard-gas 
version  for  some  time,  and  which  have  recently  appeared  in France  in the 
sulphur hexafluoride design, 
c)  airbreak circuit-breakers. 
In  the  latter case,  application in gassy workings  may  raise certain prob-
lems  whieh  are being investigated. 
These  circuit-breakers  may  be 
- of high  arc-resistance, 
- of the  ,  .. self-compressing"  type  combined  with  high  breaking-capacity 
fuses.  This  combination  requires  particular attention to  the  breaking 
conditions  for short-circuits in circuits with  high  resistance. 
For  switchgear  not  subject  to overloads,  replacement 6f  the circuit-
breaker  by  an  isolator also combined with  fuses  is sometimes  sufficient. 
2.  With  contactors,  the  same  methods  can theoretically be  adopted,  but it ~s 
difficult to avoid airbreak switching where  intensive service is required. 
There  is thus still a  problem as  regards  their use  in gassy  workings.  Research 
should  be  continued,  since oil is still generally  used  in this case. 
IX.  CONCLUSION 
Modern circuit-breaker teehnique  for voltages  above  1,100 volts is tending 
generally  to reduce  the  volume  of oil used or eliminate it altogether. 
For  this  reason separate  pole circuit-breakers of  the  oil~less or small  oil-volume 
types  are  being  progressively  introduced in most  countries,  at  least for  new  in-
stallations. 
Tests with  these circuit-breakers  have  demonstrated  their excellent working safety 
in atmospheres  containing  firedamp.  · 
However,  tests on  modern  single-tank type  circuit-breakers containing 30-40 litres 
of oil have  also shown  that this  type. of unit offers  excell~nt protection in the 
presence of  firedamp,  with  no  particular danger of combustion if correctly chosen 
and  installed. 
For contactors  for  intensive service at voltages  above  1,100 volts,  it is  impossible 
to eliminate  the  use  of oil in  flameproof  designs. 
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on  the  problem of  heat  transmission in an  insulated conductor 
(by  Monsieur  COEUILLET,  Charbonnages  de  France) 
ANNEX  IX 399 
We  start with  a  long  cable  (length  1)  the conductors  in which  have  the initial 
temperature  00  and  are satisfactorily insulated,  so that there is no  loss of heat  (1). 
In  such  a  simplified case the  laws  of  heat  transmission  show  that when  one  end  of  a 
cable is heated the temperatures occurring at  the other  end are  too high. 
Let  us  now  assume  that at  the  moment  t  = 0  the abscissa end  x  = 0  of  the 
conductor  is suddenly  raised to temperature e1  and  we  seek  to obtain the relationship: 
e = f  (x,  t) 
from which  we  can  determine  the temperature of  the  conductor  at  a  point  M on  the 
abscissa x,  supposing that  the  transmission of  heat  is purely  by  conduction. 
This is the classical problem of  the  "heat  shock". 
On  grounds  of  symmetry  the surfaces of  equal warmth  form  rectilinear sec-
tions  and  the  flow  lines  form  straight lines. 
In continuous  operation the intensity of  the  heat  flow  (the  amount  of  heat 
flowing  through  a  unit  of  area)  will correspond  to the  following  formula  in magnitude 
and  sign: 
q 
(A  heat  conductivity  index). 
For  interrupted operation we  shall take it that the speed  of conduction of 
heat  is proportional to the  change  in the  heat  flow  between  two  points. 
In  one unit  of  section this speed of  heat  transmission is 
where  C  is the specific heat  and~ the specific weight. 
This gives us: 
From which  we  obtain: 
6e  cwv 
with 
- _2_q_  ox 
a  A. 
cw 
From  integration we  get: 
X 
2  J  2\/at  (1-- e 
VXo 
(a  =  heat conductivity 
index) 
(1) 
(1)  This  assumption is permissible,  since the heat  conductivity of  copper is 1,000 
to  2,000 times higher  than that of  normal  insulating material  (e.g.  rubber). 400 
The  numerical  values  of  the Gaussian  integral can  be  found  in all probability 
tables. 
We  substitute: 
G 
X 
_2 j2Vat 
~0 
e  (2) 
Using  formula  (2)  it is possible to calculate the  temperature  of  the copper 
at every point  and  at  any  moment;  in particular we  obtain: 
A  330  kcal/h/m °C 
c  0.1  kcai/kg oc 
w  8,600  kg/m  3 
and  consequently: 
a  0.38  m2/h  ( \(;. =  o. 62) 
It should.be noted that we  should obtain for  the  insulated material  a 
diffusion capacity  60 to  100 times weaker  than is justified by  the simplifications 
we  have  adopted. 
1.  First of all we  calculate the ratio between  x  and t, which determines  the begin-
ning  of  heating: 
It is given by:  e 
and  consequently  by:  G  1 
From this we  can deduce: 
X 
Mt 
2 
or: 
xis hardly-distinguishable  from  2.5 ~  (3) 
where  x  is expressed in metres. 
As  can  be  seen,  the heat  is transmitted relatively slowly  since heating 
at  a  distance of  10 metres  begins  only after  16  hours. 
In practice the  fire causing the heating would  have  damaged  the  cable 
very  much  earlier. 
In most  pit fires therefore it is not  the copper  in the cable  leads which 
act as  a  dangerous  heat  carrier. 
2.  Let  us  assume  that at e  = 150°C  the insulating material is destroyed and  the 
initial internal temperature of  the  cable conductors is at about  50°C. 
Finally we  suppose that  the cable  end is raised by  the fire to e1  = 750°C 
(order of magnitude  of  the  maximum  temperatures  observed at Tremonia): Formula  (2)  then runs: 
and  gives us: 
G 
600 
G  =  700 
X 
401 
e 
0.86 
From  this we  can  deduce: 
2\Art 
is hardly distinguishable  from  1 
and  x  is hardly distinguishable  from  1.34 ~ 
(4) 
(5) 
It is therefore clear that  more  than 50 hours would  be  necessary to destroy 
the  insulated material  over  a  length of  10 metres. 
The  propagation of  the  heat  by  conduction  in the  copper  consequently  pro-
ceeds relatively slowly;  even errors in the  above  calculations resulting  from  the 
inaccuracy  of  certain physical  constants  do  not  change  anything  in this  fundamental 
statement. 
The  slowness  of  conduction of  the heat  is without  doubt  attributable to the 
fact  that it is very difficult to raise the internal vibration energy of  the crystals. 
It should moreover  be  remembered  that  in all metals  the ratio between  heat  conductivity 
and  electrical conductivity is relatively constant. 
Viewed  as  a  whole,  the  heating of  the  conductors  in an electric cable  can 
be  said to constitute no  danger  of  fire in practice if the  heat  source is external 
to the cable.  The  problem naturally changes if the heating of  the  conductor  is due 
to the Joule effect. 
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General 
Before the Working  Party  began its actual work,  it firstly prepared  a  survey 
of  the  appropriate regulations  in the coal-producing countries of the  Community  and 
the indications contained  in the specialist literature.  The  Working  Party then took 
note ·Of  measures  taken in some  mine  workings  to cool  the air at  the working-points. 
After this preliminary  information work  the  Working  Party  examined  the 
question on  how  working safety at hot working-points  could  be  increased and  the wor-
kers'  health protected in the  coal-producing countries  of  the  Community. 
It was  agreed that  these discussions  should  not  start  from  the regulations 
in force  in the  Community  countries,  but  from  the objective facts which  could  provide 
criteria such  as e.g.  the medical  observations  and  operational conditions obtaining 
at the moment. 
The  Working  Party's view  was  that their discussions  must  start from  the 
concept  of  "climate"  and  not  from  that  of  "temperature",  since the  latter is normally 
understood to mean  the  dry-bulb  temperature. 
As  against  this the  concept  of  "climate"  is more  comprehensive  and  takes 
into account  a  series of  factors  of which  the  more  important  are:  dry-bulb temperature, 
wet-bulb  temperature,  air velocity  and  radiation.  This  latter factor  can  however  be 
left aside  in coal-mining. 
The  Working-Party wanted to study  the  problems  solely  from  the practical 
point  of view.  In  several countries and  in different branches  of  industry these  prob-
lems  have  received detailed scientific investigation. 
The  results of  these  investigations are,  it is true,  not  final,  but  they  do 
allow  of  certain practical conclusions,  subject  to subsequent  check. 
There  has  been an  increasing tendency  in different countries to take special 
measures,  in particular by  reason of  the  increasing depth of working. 
The  Working  Party unanimously  agree that  the issuing of  a  first series of 
practical measures  could  not  wait  until the final  results of all the  scientific investi-
gations,  some  of  them  supported  by  the High  Authority,  were available. 
The  Working  Party  consisting of experts  from  the  mining  industries of  Commu-
nity countries decided to proceed carefully so that  there should  be  no  clash between 
the practical  and scientific studies. 
For  this reason medical  experts  ~ere co-opted.  The  Working  Party were  thus 
able to call upon  the wide  experience ·and  comprehensive specialist knowledge  of these 
experts,  among  whom  were  the delegates  and rapporteurs of  the  "Research  Committee  for 
Industrial Health and Medicine"  for  work  in high  temperatures. 
Once  the  Working  Party  had  obtained  a  general  view  of the points requiring 
attention,  an  editorial committee was  charged with  formulating  the individual points 
and bringing  them  together  in a  Recommendation. 
The  Draft  proposed by  the editorial committee  was  then discussed by  the 
Working  Party.  The  medical  experts were  also present  during this discussion. 
The  result  of this latter discussion in set out  in the attached  Recommenda-
tion,  which  is still very  limited in its present  form  since it represents only  a  first 
step into a  difficult  and  complicated field. 
Naturally there are still a  number  of unanswered questions which  can and 
must  be  solved •.  In dealing with  these problems,  medical  experts will naturally be 
co-opted or  consulted very  readily. 406 
It should be  pointed out  in this connection that the Working  Party will see 
whether  investigations could be  recommended  in which  the doctors  belonging  to the 
"Research  Committee  for  Industrial Health  and  Medicine"  or  the Working  Party  "Work  in 
hot  conditions"  could  collaborate. 
Point  1:  Measurement  method 
Once  the Working  Party had  decided to start  from  the  concept  of  "climate", 
this automatically raised the question of  the method  to be  used to determine  the 
climate  and  the manner  in which  the  importance  of  the  figures  quoted  in the  Recommen-
dation  should  be  explained. 
The  difficulty of  making  a  selection in this matter  can  be  clearly  shown  by 
the  fact  that  there are at present  some  77  proposals  for  determination of  climate.  It 
should also be pointed out  that each method  has  certain disadvantages  and  shortcomings. 
It should be  said in this connection that  the selection made  naturally does  not  imply 
a  judgment  of  the value of  the  method. 
Each  country is free  to choose  its own  method  provided that  comparability 
of  the  basic data is assured. 
It is therefore  not  envisaged that  the  method  selected will  be  recommended 
for  use  in each country. 
It was  therefore decided ta take  the  American  effective temperature  as  a 
basis for  the  restricted  obj~ctives of  the Working  Party,  and  so  long as there is  no 
call for  any  changes  to be  made  because  of  the  introduction of  a  better physiological 
index  of  climate. 
A note was  taken  of  expert  reports which  made  it clear that  the American 
method  is the  best  known.  This  is also true of  the  correction factors  which  must  be 
applied to  any  given effective temperature. 
It was  moreover  emphasized that  the selected method  had  to be  practical with 
an  eye  to the conditions obtaining underground.  The  American  method  fulfils this re-
quirement. 
Some  members  of  the  Working  Party raised certain objections to the  choice 
of the  American  effective temperature.  Some  of  the objections to the  American  effec-
tive temperature  concerned the  investigations  on which  the  method  is said to be  based. 
It was  stated that  the  method  was  based  on  the  investigation of  men  at rest  and also 
on  the concept  of  "feeling well".  This  was  said to make  it difficult to draw  conclu-
sions with regard to the application to men  at work.  In addition,  the method was  also 
said to be  based  on  the concept  of  "transition comparison",  which  involves people who 
have  moved  from  one  set  of  conditions to another  comparing their subjective reactions. 
To  these objections it was  replied that  a  number  of experts  had  not  simply 
adopted the  American  nomograms  and  conclusions but  had  carried out  numerous  investiga-
tions  on  the subject,  and  had  confirmed the  values. 
These  investigations were  said to be  based  not  only  on  a short stay in hot sur-
roundings,  but  also on  a  long  stay.  They  had  been carried out with  men  at rest as well 
~s at work.  In particular,  investigations had  been carried out  in faces  under  conti~­
uous  medical  supervision  and  the various  temperatures  and  humidity  values  had  been 
measured.  It was  said that  in these  investigations  a  whole  series of  observations  on 
the  thermal  equilibrium of  the  experimental  persons  had  been  made. 
To  make  due  allowance  for  a  number  of objections,  it was  decided to add 
Point  1.4: 
"The  investigations regarding  the  s~itability and  the  correctness of  the various 
climatic indices should  be  continued". 407 
There  are  two  nomograms  for  determining  the  American effective temperature, 
one  for  unclothed persons  (basic scale)  and  the other  for  normally-clothed persons 
(normal  scale). 
Since the workers  occupied in the climatic conditions  in question  do  not 
wear  much  clothing,  the first  nomogram  should be  used.  This  is to be  made  clear by 
the addition of  the words  "basic scale". 
Points  2  and  3:  The  two  climatic limits 
The  problem which arises in working  or  rema1n1ng at hot  working-points 
affects the  maintenance  of  the  thermal  equilibrium of  the  men  working  or  remaining 
at  such points. 
If the effective temperature  reaches  a  given  level,  there is the risk that 
the workers  cannot  maintain equilibrium even at rest  and  a  progressive rise in temper-
ature thus  takes place;  in severe cases this could  lead to collapse and  consequently 
to severe  damage  to health.  In these climatic conditions it is not  sufficient to pro-
vide rest periods during  the working  time,  since  such  periods  can  hardly assist the 
workers  to recover their thermal  equilibrium. 
However,  this equilibrium can  be  maintained  from  threshold  lying below  this 
maximum  effective temperature if particular precautions  depending  on  the degree  of 
laboriousness of the work  are  taken,  such  precautions making it possible  for  the work-
men  to dissipate the excess"of heat  they  have  accumulated  and,  if appropriate,  to reduce 
the energy  they  exert  and  thus  reduce  the  excess  of  heat. 
The  Working  Party decided  on  the basis of the  above  considerations to lay 
down  as  a  matter of principle two  limits for  the effective temperature: 
a)  a  threshold  above  which work,  and  even  location at working-points  must  be  forbidden 
for  health and  safety reasons  (Point  2); 
b)  a  lower  limit,  above  which  work  can  be  carried out  only  provided particular meas-
ures are taken  (Point  3). 
The  limit mentioned  under  a)  can  have  very widely  varying  values according 
to whether  the basis taken is purely scientific or  is rather practical. 
From  a  purely scientific point  of  view  a  performance  of work  at consider-
ably  higher  temperatures  may  seem possible.  Any  provision based  exclusively on  these 
criteria will  however  hardly  be  of  any  practical value  for  the management,  since the 
conditions untler  which work  is carried out  in very hot  conditions cannot  be  made  com-
patible with  the requirements  of work  in a  mine.  Provisions  of this kind would  there-
fore  have  bad psychological  effects~ 
In all hot  working-points where  men  are permitted to work  or to remain,  the 
fundamental  question arises as to whether it is better to reduce  the working  time  of 
the men  stationed there or ,to reduce the physical effort  demanded  of  them. 
From  the scientific viewpoint  the reduction of  energy  expenditure is un-
doubtedly  the best.  In practice however it is difficult  to measure  and to regulate 
the energy  exerted at a  hot  working-point  or  indeed at  any  other working-point.  This 
exertion of  energy  can moreover  vary  very widely  among  the  individual men  carrying 
out  the same  work. 
The  Working  Party consider that  limitation of  the daily working  time is an 
indirect but practical means  of  avoiding excessive energy  expenditure and  the dangers 
resulting therefrom in hot working-points.  However,  it is not  sufficient  simply to 
restrict working  time.  Consequently,  an additional provision was  made  in an  attempt 
to limit  the energy expenditure  of  the  men  working  in these climatic conditions. 
Attention must  also be  drawn  to the  important  task to be  carried out  by  the 
responsible doctors.  The  medical  inspections,  periodical  examinations  and  medical 
checks are naturally directed  towards  careful selection of the workers to avoid  any 
dan~er to their health or  any  reduction of working safety. In addition to this,  the responsible  Inspectorate can  lay  down  a  series of 
conditions,  in connection with  some  of which  the responsible doctors  may  be  called in 
to advise.  These  measures  also are  intended to eliminate as  far  as possible any  threat 
to the  safety or  health of  the  workmen. 
Point  2:  Fixing  a  maximum  climatic value 
As  already pointed out,  it may  seem possible  from  a  purely scientific point 
of  view  to work  at relatively high  temperatures.  The  Working  Party was  however  prima-
rily bound  by  the practical problems  in the mining  industry  and  had  at the same  time 
to take  account  of  safety in work  and protection of  the workers'  health. 
The  maximum  value  of  32° eff  A  (basic scale)  named  in Point  2  was  deliberately 
chosen to allow  a  margin  of  safety.  This point  sets a  scale for  the permitted physiolog-
ical  load,  which itself allows  of  a  wide  range  of variation. 
In  two  instances it is possible to make  exceptions  from  the  general  ban  on 
work  or  location in an effective temperature  of  more  than 32° eff A  (basic scale). 
The  first case  in an  exception which  is foreseeable  and  for which written 
permission  from  the  responsible  Inspectorate is required  (compare  Points  2.3.1 to 
2.3.3). 
The  other case is an  exception by  reason of  great  danger  or special circum-
stances  (compare  Point  2.4)'.  The  responsible  Inspectorate  should  be  informed  imme-
diately  (2.4.1),  and  the work  is to  be  carried out  as quickly  as possible  (2.4.2) 
under  the  conditions  laid down  in 2.3.1 to  2.3.4. 
ln,the latter instance,  the work  envisaged is that which  must  at all costs 
be  carried out  immediately,  without waiting  for  formal  permission to be  given. 
Point.2.3.3 was  deliberately formulated  in this way  to give the responsible 
Inspectorate  the possibility of  issuing regulations with  regard to the duration of 
rest  periods  and  the climate in which  these periods were  to be  spent,  separately for 
each  individual  case  and  allowing  for  the climatic range  in which  the work  had to  be 
carried out. 
This  must  be  done  in each  case in agreement with  the responsible  doctor. 
The  Working  Party .and  the co-opted experts discussed at  length the age  lim-
its of  40  and  45  years set out  in Point  2.3.4.  There  was  unanimity  that men  above 
45  must  be  forbidden to work  in these conditions.  As  medical statistics have  shown, 
the  incidence  of  heart  and circulatory diseases rises in persons  above  40 years  of 
age.  Consequently,  such persons should preferably  not  be  put to work.at  such working-
points.  In broad general  terms  persons  above  40 years  of  age  should not  be  set to 
work  in such  conditions.  The  view  was  that it would  go  too far  to lay down  a  general 
ban  on work,  since the men  in question were  acclimatized and  had  previously undergone 
medical  examination.  The  proposal to forbid  workmen  below  21  being  put  on  such work 
was  unanimously  accepted. 
Point  3:  Climatic range  between 32° eff  A and  28° eff A  (basic scale) 
As  already stated,  it was  decided to lay  down  another  limit value  - in addi-
tion to the maximum  value  - above which work  could  be carried out  only provided cer-
tain precautionary steps were  taken.  There  are therefore  two  limits laid down,  an 
upper  limit and  a  lower  one.  Since,  as stated under  2,  there is a  general ban  on work 
and  location in these conditions  above  32° eff  A,  it is logical that  the upper  level 
should be  at 32° eff A. 
The  Working Party  had  a  detailed discussion on the selection of  the  lower 
limit. 
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The  medical  representatives stated in this connection that  the present state 
of  knowledge  did  not  permit  of  saying precisely beyond  what  limit  damage  to the work-
ers'  health must  be  expected to occur.  The  limit could be  higher  or  lower  and  this 
held  good  even  for  selected and  acclimatized persons.  It was  said that  a  further  factor 
was  whether  th~ men  had  had  a  sufficient period of rest  between  two  shifts,  and  what 
they  had  done  in that  intervening period. 
Investigations  had  shown  that  the performance  of  acclimatized workers  in 
large stonedrifts dropped off  by  20 % at  28° eff A.  The  explanation of this might  be 
that  the  men  reduced their performance  to avoid  damage  to their health. 
It also had to be  borne  in mind  in this connection that  the workmen  in the 
Community  countries generally work  up  to pensionable  age,  and  that this is not  true 
in certain non-European countries. 
Apart  from  the medical  aspect,  the  safety aspect  also influenced the deter-
mination  of this limit.  The  Working Party agreed unanimously  that the limit must 
be  fixed  in such  a  way  that  the  safety of  the workmen  was  not  interfered with. 
It was  therefore  necessary to provide as  large  a  safety margin as possible 
so  as  to ensure that  any  such  bad effects  on  safety were  eliminated. 
In  the  light of  the  foregoing  considerations it was  decided to fix this 
limit at  28° eff  A  (basic scale). 
This  gave  the definition of  a  climatic range  in which  special precautions 
had to be  taken  for  the  men  employed  on work  there. 
These  are either measures which  refer to the entire climatic range  or  meas-
ures which  apply  to given  sections of  the climatic range,  namely  for  the sections 30 
to 320 eff A  (basic scale)  and  28  to 30° eff A  (basic scale). 
In the  case of  the entire climatic range,  what  applies is that the  men  to 
be  employed  there have  to undergo  a  suitable medical  inspection beforehand  and  can 
only  be  set to work  in that climatic range  when  they  have  been medically passed to 
do  so. 
Special attention must  be  given to several points in carrying out  this medi-
cal examination. 
In addition persons  who  are continually  employed  in this climatic range  must 
undergo  medical  examination at  regular intervals,  at  least  once  a  year. 
Point  3.1.3 contains particular provisions for  the duration of stay  in the 
climatic range  above  30° eff A up  to 32° eff  A  (basic scale)  or  in the  range  above 
28° eff  A up  to 30° eff A  (basic scale). 
In addition to restricting the duration of  stay,  which  may  have  an effect 
on the length of working  time  of  the workers  in these climatic ranges,  point 3.1.4 
contains  a  special provision regarding the method  of  payment  to be  applied.  Among 
other things,  this provision calls for  a  method  of  payment  adjusted to the working 
conditions.  The  purpose of this provision is to limit the expenditure of physical 
energy  by  the workmen. 
It was  originally intended to introduce  a  ban  on  piecework or  on  man-and-
mate  arrangements.  However,  by  reason of  the  fact  that the work  of  the  Working  Party 
"Effective Methods  of  Payment  on  Safety"  had  not  progressed far  enough to reach  con-
clusions,  it was  considered premature  to introduce bans  of this kind. 
In  fixing the shift time,  the  limitation of  the duration of  stay to 5  (or 
6  hours)  - as provided  in Point 3.1.3 -must be  borne  in mind. 
In practice,  the shift time  is reduced  in several  Community  countries for 
men  who  work under  the  same  or  similar conditions.  Apart  from  the restriction of  the 
expenditure of  energy,  the  purpose of this measure  to give these workmen  the possibility 410 
of moving  into normal  climatic conditions earlier and  for  longer periods than others, 
so that they  may  get up  their strength again and  avoid any  damage  to their health. 
To  allow .the responsible  Inspectorates to take the  necessary  measures  in 
good  time,  it was  provided in Point 3.1.2 that  they  must  be  informed  in writing as 
soon as the effective temperature at  a  working-point  exceeds  28° eff A (basic scale). 
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1.  BASIC  PRINCIPLES 
1.1 As  long as the  introduction of  a  better physiological  index  of climate does 
not  appear to make  a  change  necessary,  the basis taken will be  the American 
effective temperature  0  eff A  (basic scalei/ This is an  integrated climatic 
value  derived  from  dry-bulb  temperature  (6 ·ct)~  wet-bulb  temperature  (OCf)  and 
air velocity  {m/s). 
However,  any  air velocities over  3  m/s  should be  treated as  though  only 
3  m/s  in determining the  American  effective temperature. 
1.2  In so far  as  individual countries have  other temperature regulations,  tempera-
ture should  be  indicated in such  a  way  that  a  comparison is possible on the 
basis indicated in para 1.1,  without  the  present  Recommendation  calling for  a 
standardized measurement  method. 
1.3  The  legal or wages tariff provisions  covering temperature which  are in force 
in the  individual countries were  not  used  by  the responsible  body  as the start-
ing point  for  determination of climatic limits,  and  they  used  only  medical  and 
mining  factors. 
The  climatic limits established in this way  should  however  be  considered as 
maximum  values  in the  individual countries.  Better climatic values  for  the 
workers  in the  individual countries remain unaffected. 
1.4 Further  investigations into the suitability and  correctness of  the various 
climatic indices are to be  carried out. 
2.  ESTABLISHMENT  OF  AN  UPPER  CLIMATIC  VALUE 
2.1 Medical  observations  have  shown  that unfavourable  climatic values can  lead to 
permanent  damage  to health and  to ill-considered actions on the part  of  the 
worker,  resulting in threats to his  own  safety and  to the safety of his work-
mates. 
An  upper  climatic limit is laid down  to avoid this state of affairs. 
2.2 It is forbidden  to work  or to remain at working points when  the  temperature is 
above  32° eff A  (basic scale)  except  in the  cases mentioned in paras.  2.3  and 
2.4. 
2.3  An  exception can  be  made  to the  ban  on working  and  remaining  in temperatures 
above  32° eff A  (basic scale)  if the responsible  Inspectorate has  given per-
mission and  the workers  in question have  been medically  examined  beforehand. 
The  following conditions must  then  be  fulfilled: 
2.3.1 The  responsible  Inspectorate may  give the working  permit  only  for  a  stated 
time  and  for  stated working  operations. 
2.3.2 The  work  must  be  carried out  under  medical  supervision.  Guiding  lines 
should be  drawn  up  for this medical  supervision and  for  the examination 
mentioned under  2.3,  with the co-operation of medical  experts. 
2.3.3 Work  must  not  be carried out  for  longer  than one  hour without  a  break.  A 
rest period of suitable length in better climatic conditions should then 
be  arranged. 
The  duration of uninterrupted working  time  and  the duration and  frequency 
of the rest periods,  together with the climatic conditions in which  the 
latter are spent,  and all other necessary regulations,  should be  laid 
down  individually in writing by  the  Inspectorate  in association with the 
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2.3.4 Acclimatized persons  should be selected.  No  one  above  40 years  of age 
should  be  put  on  this work.  Persons  below  21  or  above  45  of age  should 
not  be  employed  • 
. 2.4  A  further  exception can  be  made  to the ban  on working  or  rema~ning in tempera-
tures above  32° eff A  (basic scale)  if danger  threatens or  special circumstances 
arise which  require  immediate  intervention. 
In this case,  however: 
2.4.1  The  responsible  Inspectorate  and  the  responsible doctor  must  be  immedi-
ately  informed, 
2.4.2 The  work  must  be carried out  as quickly as possible under  the conditions 
laid out  in 2.3.1 to 2.3.4. 
3.  CLIMATIC  RANGE  BETWEEN  32° eff  A  and  280 eff A  (basic scale) 
3.1  For  climatic conditions directly under  the maximum  limit set out  in paragraph 
2.2,  there is laid  down  a  range  in which  work  must  be  subject  to certain pre-
cautionary  measures. 
These  special precautions represent  an  intermediate stage between work  in 
normal  circumstances  and  the  ban  on work  or staying at points where  the upper 
limit has  been  exceeded. 
The  following  requirements  apply to the climatic  range  between  320 eff A 
and  28° eff  A  (basic scale): 
3.1.1  In this climatic range,  the only  persons who  may  be  employed are  those 
who  have  been  found  suitable after medical  examination. 
This  examination must  pay particular attention to the heart  and  the cir-
culatory system. 
Men  who  are permanently  employed  in this climatic range  should be  exam-
ined medically  once  a  year. 
In addition the  following  requirements  apply: 
3.1.2 As  soon as  the working-point  reaches  a  temperature  exceeding  280 eff A 
(basic scale),  the  responsible  Inspectorate  should be  informed  in writing 
on  each  occasion. 
3.1.3 The  duration of  stay in the climatic range  between 30° eff A  and 32° eff A 
(basic scale)  is restricted to  5  hours,  and  the climatic range  from 
28° eff A  to 32° eff A  (basic scale)  to 6  hours. 
3.1.4  In order to avoid  any  physical overloading,  the  system of  payment  employed 
in respect  of work  in the climatic range  between  280 eff A  and  32° eff A 
(basic scale)  should  be  one  suitable for  these conditions. 
3.1.5 The  requirements set out  in paragraphs 3.1.3 to 3.1.4 apply  to all persons 
who  in any  one  shift  have  to work  for  more  than half the duration of that 
shift in one  of  the climatic ranges  listed. 415 
R  E  P  0  R  T 
on  the psychological  and  sociological factors 
affecting safety  (1) 
(Approved  by  the Mines  Safety Commission  at its 
Plenary Session of  the  14  and  15.2.1966) 
(1)  See  Annex  XIII,  page  425  of the present Report. 
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General  remarks 
Two  prerequisite conditions are necessary  to ensure working  safety: 
- as. far  as possible the working-place  must  be  free  of risk; 
- the  manner  in which  the work  is carried out  and  behaviour  during this work  must  be 
such  as  to avoid any  dangers which  might  exist in spite of  the precautions taken at 
the working-place  in line with the principles set out  above. 
To  this end it is necessary: 
a)  to study beforehand  - as  far as possible  - all dangers which  can arise when  working 
in the particular conditions  obt~inins; this preliminary  investigation is the  only 
thing which  makes  it possible to check  in good  time all the precautions to be  taken 
by  those responsible  for  the organization of  work; 
b)  to bring to the  notice of all persons who  might  be  threatened  by  such  dangers  during 
their work  the  dangers which  might  possibly arise  from  the working  conditions ob-
taining; 
c)  to instruct the workmen  in the  manner  in which  the work  is to be  carried out  so 
that these  dangers  can  be  avoided without  their causing risk to  themselves  or  to 
their workmates; 
d)  to  ensure that  the work  is in fact  carried out  in accordance with the instructions 
given. 
All  these precautions should create a  safety  "atmosphere"  and  should contrib-
ute  to convincing  those  concerned that  a  concern  for  productivity is compatible with 
efforts to ensure safety. 
I.- MEASURES  WHICH  MAKE  IT  POSSIBLE  FOR  THE  WORKMEN  TO  RECOGNIZE  THE  DANGERS  AND  TO 
CARRY  OUT  THEIR  WORK  IN  SUCH  A  WAY  THAT  THESE  DANGERS  ARE  AVOIDED 
A.- Recognizing the dangers 
This  task is the responsibility of  the  mineowners,  the  management  officials 
and  the supervisory officials  (1). 
1.  Before starting work  in a  district,  a  section of  the working  or  a  working 
point  (2)  and  before  any  planned major  change  in the manpower  deployment 
or  in working conditions,  it is essential to check all the safety precau-
tions;  before work  is begun,  each district,  each section of  a  working  or 
working-point  should be  covered  by  an  investigation of  the safety precau-
tions to be  taken;  this does  not  apply  only  to the collective large-scale 
precautions  - which  in practice belong  ~n the working  regulations - but 
also covera the  individual precautions for  safety of work;  this investiga-
tion into the safety conditions is an essential complement  to the  investi-
gation of  the technical  and  economic  conditions of the work  which  is being 
planned. 
2.  During  the work,  there should  be  continuous supervision of  the safety condi-
tions. 
(1)  The  definition of  the concepts  "management  official" and  "supervisory official" 
differs  from  one  country to another.  To  understand the  text which  follows  and  to 
apply  the Recommendations  attached as  an  Annex,  it should be  taken that management 
and  supervisory officials cover at  least all those who  do  not  take part  in the 
execution of  the work  but are responsible to supervise the activities and  behav-
iour of the other workmen  in this work,  and who  have  the right,  if required,  to 
take sanctions in the event  of contravention of the  instructions issued. 
(2)  These  concepts are taken to cover  a  working unit which  forms  an entity and is 
covered  by  instructions from  one  responsible official with respect to mine  safety. 419 
Regular  reports should be  prepared on 
a)  changes  in working conditions, 
b)  accidents or other  incidents, 
c)  dangerous  situations encountered during work. 
The  data thus collected in these reports should  be  systematically assessed 
so that  - with full  knowledge  of  the  circumstances  - it should  be  possible 
to draw  statistical conclusions  and  the  maximum  amount  of useful  informa-
tion for  the preparation of  recommended  precautions for  similar cases. 
3.  On  the basis of  the information assembled  in this manner  during work  in a 
district,  a  sect~on of  a  working  or  a  working-point it is advisable,  once 
the work  is concluded,  to prepare a  report  of  experience  showing  the win-
ning  system applied,  the  dangers which  arose  and  the measures  taken to 
eliminate them,  as well  as the accidents,  incidents and  dangerous  situa-
tions which  arose  during this work. 
X 
X  X 
Some  members  held the  view  that this record should  include  a  comparison of 
the results in respect  of  safety  for  the district,  section of  a  working  or 
working-point  in question with the  economic  results obtained  (e.g.  output, 
o.m.s.,  costs). 
Without  making-the preparation of this record  a  general  rule,  other members 
would  prefer the  comparison  between the safety and  economic  aspects to be 
made  as often as the enterprise is in a  position to do  so,  but  on  condition 
that  the comparison  should not  lead to subordinating the  safety aspect  to 
that of  economics. 
B.- Making  known  the  dangers to all concerned 
Before starting work  in a  district,  a  section of a  working or a  working-
point  or in the event  of  a  major  change  in the operating conditions,  it is 
desirable - after previous  investigation of  any  dangers which  may  arise and 
the precautions to be  taken - to arrange  a  discussion between representatives 
of  the  management,  the officials and  members  of  the safety service as well as 
the workers  concerned  or their representatives,  in order  to inform each  indi-
vidual with regard to the position,  to discuss the work  in detail and to 
settle upon  the most  suitable method  of work  for  these operations.  This meth-
od of work  should be  announced  to the workers  concerned  by  the best  means 
available for  the purpose. 
During  the execution of  the·work,  the management  or the officials should 
refer to the regulations and  instructions to be  observed as often as  neces-
sary,  to guard against  the danger  of  over-familiarity. 
If observations made  during the work  show  it to be  necessary to issue new 
safety instructions,  these  should  be  brought  to the  notice of every worker 
concerned. 
It is also advisable to ensure that reports made  by  each  of the workmen 
regarding dangerous  situations which arise during the work  should be  brought 
to the notice of  the management  officials.  These  reports are not  only essen-
tial for  the investigation of  the safety precautions which  have  to be  taken 
immediately,  but  also because they  make  it possible for  the  management  offi-
cials to draw  general conclusion for practical operations,  and  above all serve 
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c.- Instruction in the  manner  in which  the work is to be carried out without  danger 
Preliminary  remarks 
This  is essentially vocational training. 
From  this point  of  view  the  Conference  on  Safety  in Coalmines  had  already 
issued  a  series of  Recommendations  which  have  been  accepted  by  all the  Govern-
ments. 
These  Recommendations  refer both  to the objectives of vocational training 
and  to the  conditions under which  the training must  be carried out. 
Their  implementation represents  a  major  contribution to realizing the  ob-
jective which  the  Working  Party  have  set itself. 
1.  Every  underground worker  must  have: 
- a  general  training as  an underground worker; 
- a  special training for  the work  to which  he  is to be  assigned; 
- the  necessary  supplementary  training to cover  the  special working  condi-
tions at  the point where  he will work. 
2.  This  training will only  achieve its objective if the workman  actually 
carries out  the work  for  which  he  was  trained under  the  conditions envi-
saged,  and  that  he  does  in fact  continue this work under  the  same  condi-
tions,  or  - should there be  a  change  in the work  or  in the working  condi-
tions  ~ he  has  had  the  necessary  supplementary  training. 
3.  Instruction in safety precautions is to be  considered as  a  part of  voca-
tional training.  This training in respect  of  safety should  serve,  among 
other  things,  to convince  the personnel  that observance  of  safety regula-
tions  and  concern with productivity are  completely  compatible. 
4.  The  persons  entrusted with this training must  be  numerous  enough  and  must 
have  available  the  necessary  means  and  time  to carry out  their task cor-
rectly. 
D.- Supervision of  the  manner  in which  the work  is carried out  in respect  of  safety 
The  supervision,  not  only  of production,  but  also of  the  observance  of 
safety regulations is the responsibility of the  management  and  supervisory 
officials. 
Emphasis  must  be  laid on their complete responsibility  in this connection. 
In addition to this supervision,  it seems  necessary to take  further  measures 
which  are particularly intended to ensure that  the manner  in which  the work 
is carried out  meets  the  safety requirements. 
These  other measures  should simultaneously  be  checked with  the other means 
which  have  to be used,  to ensure that  everyone  concerned is taking  a  proper 
part  in the efforts to achieve  a  maximum  level  of  safety. 
II.- TRAINING  THE  MANAGEMENT  AND  SUPERVISORY  OFFICIALS  IN  RESPECT  OF  SAFETY  PROBLEMS 
Preliminary remarks 
1.  To  ensure  the  necessary training of the officials and to guarantee that  they 
carry out  their task in detail as it has  been  made  known  to them,  it is advis-
able to take  steps to ensure that the officials do  not  change  post  frequently. 421 
2.  The  supervision,  which  must  be  exercised with authority,  should  in its every-
day  action seek to perfect  the training and  education of  the workmen  on  the 
basis of  daily  experience,  and  should give rise to fines  or penalties only  in 
very  serious cases. 
3.  The  officials must  understand clearly that  they  are  fully  responsible  for  the 
execution and  supervision of  the work.  Nothing  can take away  from  this respon-
sibility,  not  even  any  safety service which  may  be  in existence or  the presence 
of  self-protection assistants. 
4.  There  are various ways in which  men  can reach  the  post  of official.  Workers  can 
rise to this position from practical operations,  e.g.  young  workers after a 
minimum  period of practical work  and  after attending technical school.  Others 
can also take  on  the responsibilities of officials,  after the termination of  a 
vocational  or  technical  training course  - even  perhaps at  a  higher  level. 
There  are special  factors  to be  borne  in mind  in the training of  these dif-
ferent  groups  of  persons;  thus,  in particular,  for  officials who  have  "risen from 
the ranks"  and  who  normally  have  an  extensive practical knowledge  of  working 
methods,  the main  emphasis  should  be  placed  on  imparting  a  theoretical  and  a  general 
level  of  education. 
It is equally appropriate to distinguish several  stages in the hierarchy  of 
the officials - management  and  supervisory  - and  to suit the vocational training 
to the  special requirements  of  each  of  these stages.  The  transition from  one  stage 
to another  should  be  possible for  a  given  person only  once  he  has  actually proved 
to have  the  required knowledge  and  skill. 
A.- Basic principles for  vocational training of  management  officials and  super-
visory officials 
1.  The  principles laid down  in chapter  1  for  the workers  also apply  to the 
management  and  supervisory officials.  These  latter must  be  given  a  general 
education corresponding to the  special features  of their tasks and  respon-
sibilities,  and  in particular an  adequate  knowledge  of  the  saf~ty regula-
tions,  of  the  safety precautions to be  taken  and  the·available safety 
equipment  and its use. 
2.  They  must  in addition have  an  adequate  knowledge  of  the  special  instructions 
to the  different  vocational  groups whose  work  they  called upon  to supervise, 
and  the special instructions for  the exercise of  these activities at  the 
working-points  for which  they are responsible. 
3.  The  management  officials and  supervisory officials must  also be able to 
point  out  in a  suitable way  to the workers  under  their orders the  dangers 
associated with their work,  and  to instruct  them as to  how  best  to carry 
out  the work  in order to avoid  these  dangers. 
4.  They  should also be  trained in  how  to issue  instructions  in practice. 
5.  Special attention must  be paid to the  further  training of all management 
and  supervisory officials,  so that their state of  training is always  main-
tained at a  level appropriate to the  development  of  the  technical processes 
in use,  the operating  conditions and working  safety. 
6.  They  must  finally  not  only justify the execution of their responsibilities 
and  report  thereon,  but  also give reports  on  accidents  and all other notable 
incidents which  have  occurred during  the working  period at the points for 
which  they are responsible. 
With  respect  to accidents,  this calls for  the  following  information: 
- correct presentation of  the reports, 
- the assessment  of  the  data  in these reports, 
- the establishment  of  the  causes, 
- the proposal  of  means  to avoid  such  accidents. 422 
B.- Training the staff responsible  for  preparing the  accident  reports;  the  form 
sheets to be  used  for  this purpose 
1.  To  make  it possible to work  out  suitable measures  to avoid  the repetition 
of  such accidents the accident reports must  give all the  necessary  informa-
tion,  taking  into account  all the appropriate  human  and  technical  factors, 
and  in particular: 
- the  circumstances, 
- the  consequences  of the accident, 
- the causes 
- the precautions proposed to avoid similar accidents. 
2.  Each  of  these  items  of  information must  be  capable of  formulation  as  an 
answer  to a  clear and precise question. 
3.  The  breakdown  and  layout·of  the  form  used  for  such  a  report  must  indicate 
clearly what  the answers  from  each  of  the personnel  should cover  in respect 
of  the preparation of the accident  report.  In addition,  there must  be  suf-
ficient  room  for  supplementary  remarks  or sketches,  which  should  be  added 
if appropriate. 
4.  It is advisable  that  each  of  these workers  should be  informed of  the  impor-
tance  of  each  question and  of  the  manner  in which  correct  answers  should 
be  given.  This  information must  make  it possible  for  him  to characterize 
clearly the  causes of  the  different accidents according to the classifica-
tion on which  the  report  is based.  It is advisable to  draw  their attention 
to the  consequences  of  failure to  answer  or  inaccuracy  in answering. 
5.  Systematic attention should be  paid to ensure that  the  answers  are  complete, 
careful,  and precise. 
6.  It is advisable to give  a  guarantee to the officials charged with  the pre-
paration of these reports that  the  reports are used  for  no  other purpose 
than  the prevention of  accidents. 
7.  These  reports are to be used  as  a  basis  for  the regular preparation of 
reports and  experience  for  each district,  section of  a  working  or working-
point  (see  above  1-A-2).  They  can also serve as  the basis  for  a  series of 
suitable measures  to stir up  a  spirit of  competitivity and  to achieve  the 
co~operation of all those  concerned  to increase working  safety. 
c.- Nomination  and  promotion of  management  officials and  supervisory personnel 
It is indispensable  for  the  achievement  of  genuine  safety in underground 
work that  there should be  a  sufficient  number  of  supervisory personnel with 
the appropriate skills for  the  technical  problems  and  for  those of safety, 
combined with  a  complete understanding of  their responsibility in these  two 
fields;  it is equally essential to have  management  officials who  meet  the  same 
standards.  The  responsibility  for  the selection of these officials is consid-
ered by  some  members  of  the Working  Party  to fall primarily on  the  employer; 
other members  of  the  Working  Party hold  the  view  that the employer  is the sole 
responsible person. 
To  ensure  a  selection which  promises  good results,  the  minimum  requirements 
for  promotion to one  of these posts or  promotion within one  of  these fields 
of·activity should be  laid down  beforehand,  and  these appointments or  promo-
tions must  be  subject  to the production of  satisfactory reports. 
In various countries certain methods  are  in use,  which  allow the responsible 
Inspectorate actually to check the knowledge  and skill of  any  candidate  for  a 
supervisory post,  a  management  officials'  post  or  for  promotion within one  of 
these fields  - both  from  the  human  and vocational points of  view  - so as to 
make  sure that the knowledge  and skill of the candidate fulfils the require-
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In  some  countries proposals  for  appointment  and  promotion must,  under  current 
regulations,  previously  be  submitted to the responsible  Inspectorate,  with an 
indication of the supervisory responsibilities and the field in which  they are 
to be  exercised.  The  final  appointment  to the post  can be  made  only with the 
agreement  of the responsible  Inspectorate. 
In other countries,  all that is done  is to inform the responsible  Inspectorate 
beforehand,  with  an adequate  degree  of  information about  the responsibilities 
of the person·under consideration and  the  field in which  these responsibili-
ties are to be  exercised.  This  makes  it possible for  the  Inspectorate to check 
whether  the  candidate has  the  required qualifications.  The  fact  that  they  are 
informed in this way  enables the  Inspectorate to raise objections which  may 
prevent  the appointment  being  made. 
In  some  countries the  employer  has  a  completely  free  hand  in the selection 
of his staff and  the  responsible  Inspectorate  intervenes only if there is 
neglect  in the application of  the safety precautions. 
Without  coming  down  in favour  of  one  or  the other of these methods,  minimum 
requirements  should be  laid down  for  a  process  by  which  the responsible  Inspec-
torate can  check  - both  from  the  human  and  from  the vocational points of view  -
the knowledge  and skills of all the supervisory  or  management  officials,  either 
when  appointments  or  promotions  are being made,  or  subsequently if there has 
been  a  case of failure. 
III.- SUITABILITY  OF  PSYCHO-TECHNICAL  EXAMINATION 
Psycho-technical  examinations are a  useful  technique which,  when  used to-
gether with other information  (e.g.  from  medical  examinations  and  reports on  the 
vocational skills of the candidate),  are suitable for  providing the  management  or 
their representatives with the best  information on  the basis of which to make 
their decisions  regarding the placing of  a  worker,  his assignment  to particular 
special work  or his promotion to a  supervisory post. 
A.- At  the moment  of assigning  a  man  to a  post,  the relatively simple  psycho-
technical  examination is intended to help in the  determination of  the general 
intellectual level of  the candidate,  so that  those who  fall  below  a  certain 
minimum  level  in this respect  can  be excluded. 
1.  Practical observations have  shown  the exceptional  danger of accidents which 
arise·  from  the  employment  underground  of persons whose  intellectual level 
is below  this limit,  since the  incidence of  accidents is much  higher  than 
the average  in this ·category.  Without  wishing  to make  use  of  a  psycho-
technical  examination before  each  assignment  and  in every  case,  it is,  how-
ever,  consequently advisable to use  these psycho-technical examinations  as 
far as possible. 
2.  Psycho-technical examination prior to the assignment  is an  examination  for 
selection,  the sole purpose  of which  is to determine whether  the candidate 
has sufficient skills to exercise  a  particular activity immediately  or 
after  some  lapse of  time. 
3.  In view  of  the constantly-increasing complexity  of  m1n1ng  activities, it 
would  be  advantageous  to carry out  this selection prior to assignment with 
an  eye  to the exercise of  a  particular activity. 
B.- 1.  It is essential that workers who  are  intended to be used  on particular 
working  operations which  involve  a  special degree of responsibility with 
regard to  collectiv~ safety or which call for  a  particular level of intel-
lect or personality,  should in every  instance be  subjected to a  special 
psycho-technical examination which  can  show  wether  they possess the charac-
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2.  The  responsible  Inspectorate should precisely define  - in association 
with  the representatives of  the employers  and  of the  employees  and  as  soon 
as possible - the work  for  which  these special examinations are to be 
prescribed.  To  this  end,  there should  be  prepared and  kept  up  to date  a 
list of  those working  operations in connection with which it has  been  shown 
by  experience  that it is particularly valuable to prescribe  such  examina-
tions,  and  that it is possible to carry them out  in practice. 
This  applies,  e.g.  to: 
- locomotive  drivers, 
- onsetters, 
winding  enginemen, 
- foremen  shotfirers or shotfirers, 
- haulage  supervisors, 
- supervisory officials, 
c.- 1.  Workers  who  are  intended  for  promotion to supervisory posts must  be  sub-
jected to suitable psycho-technical examination. 
2.  The  psycho-technical examinations which  are carried out  in connection with 
assignment  to particular work  or to promotion to supervisory posts should 
as  far  as possible  cover  the vocational  specialization of the workers 
concerned,  i.e.  the test  should contribute to determining  the activities 
for  which  the worker  is best  suited by  reason  of his capabilities. 
D.- Basic principles fcl  carrying out  the various  examinations  mentioned  above 
1.  The  management  must  lay  down  the criteria which  must  be  met  by  the  candi-
date  on  assignment  or  on  subsequent  re-assignment. 
In  the case  of particular occupations,  the psychologist  should also be  in 
a  position to establish these criteria in the  light of  experience based 
on  the  examination of workers who  have  carried on  these  occupations  for  a 
certain period of  time. 
2.  The  psychologist  must  have  an  adequate  knowledge  of  the activities carried 
out  by  the  candidate  and  the conditions  in which  these activities are 
performed. 
3.  The  psychologist's assessment  is valid for  a  limited period only. 
4.  It is necessary to have  regular reports  from  the direct  superiors of the 
workers who  have  already  been  subjected to psycho-technical  examination, 
and  these continuing reports should be  compared with the earlier psycho-
logist's assessments. 
5.  It is essential that the preparation and presentation of  these records 
should be  organized systematically,  to achieve  a  sufficient degree  of 
objectivity and  a  valid comparison with the psychologist's assessment. 
Care  should be  paid to ensuring that  the regular assessments  take into 
account  all the  factors which  characterize the vocational behaviour of  a 
worker,  whereas  the  psychological  assessment  is based  on  only  a  restricted 
number  of  specific factors. 
The  regular assessments  can therefore not  simply  be  restricted to a  summary, 
general  assessment  of  the vocational behaviour of each worker.  They  must 
in particular contain answers to a  certain number  of particular questions 
regarding the  vocational  behaviour  of  the person being  examined. 
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ANNEX  XIII 
R  E  C 0  M M E  N D A T  I  0  N 
on  the psychological and  sociological factors affecting safetv  (1) 
(Approved by  the Mines  Safety Commission at its Plenary Session 
of 14th and 15th/2/66) 
(1)  See  Annex  XII,  Page  415,  of the present  Report, 427 
1.  Measures  which  make  it possible  for  the workmen  to recognize the dangers  and  to 
carry out their work  in such  a  way  that  these  dangers  are avoided 
1.1 Recognizing  the  dangers 
1.1.1 Before  starting work  in a  district,  a  section of  a  working  or  a  working-
point  and  before  any  planned major  change  in the  manpower  deployment  or 
in working conditions,  it is essential to  check all the safety precautions. 
1.1.2 During  the work.  regular reports must  be  prepared  on  the basis of  the 
safety conditions which  have  to  be  observed under  continuous supervision, 
on  the  following  points: 
a)  Changes  in operating conditions, 
b)  Accidents  or  incidents, 
c)  Dangerous  situations encountered during work. 
The  data  brought  together  in these reports must  be  systematically assessed, 
with  a  view  to  improving  or adapting the  safety precautions in force. 
After  the work  has  been  finished,  the data  assembled  on the basis of  expe-
rience  should  be  used to prepare  a  report  of experience which  should at 
least  include information regarding the winning  method  used,  the  dangers 
which  arose  and  the precautions taken to deal  therewith,  together with 
the accidents,  incidents and  dangerous  situations which  occurred during 
the working  operations. 
1.2 Making  known  the  dangers  to all concerned 
1.2.1 Before starting work  in a  district,  a  section of  a  working  or  a  working-
point  or  in the  event  of  a  major  change  in the operating conditions,  it 
is desirable to arrange  a  discussion  between representatives of  the 
management,  the officials and  members  of  the safety service as well  as 
the workers  concerned  al~ their representatives,  in order: 
- to  inform each  individual with regard to the work  envisaged; 
- to discuss  in detail the work  to be  carried out; 
- to settle upon  the method  of work. 
1.2.2 The workers  concerned  should  be  informed of  the method  of work  chosen. 
1.2.3  During  the execution of  the work,  the  management  or  the official should 
refer to the  regulations and  instructions to be  observed as often as 
necessary. 
1.2.4 If it is necessary  to issue  new  safety instructions,  these  should  be 
brought  to the  notice of  every worker  concerned. 
1.2.5 Reports  made  by  each  of  the workmen  regarding  dangerous  situations which 
arise during  the work  should  be  brought  to the notice of  the management 
officials. 
1.3  Instruction in the  manner  in which  the work  is to be  carried out without  danger 
1.3.1 Every  worker  assigned to underground work  must  be  able to show  that  he  has: 
- a  general  training as  an underground worker; 
- a  special training for  the work to which  he  is to be  assigned; 
- the  necessary  supplementary  training to cover  the  special working  condi-
tions at the point where  he will work. 428 
1.3.2 Should there be  a  change  in the work  or in the working  conditions,  the 
necessary  supplementary training must  be  provided. 
1.3.3  Instruction in safety precautions is to be  considered as  a  part  of  voca-
tional training. 
1.4 Supervision of  the  manner  in which  the work  is carried out  in respect  of  safety 
1.4.1 During  the work  the safety conditions must  be  subject  to continual  super-
vision. 
1.4.2 The  duty  to see.that safety regulations are  observed,  and  the responsi-
bilities resulting  from this duty,  fall upon  the management  and  super-
visory officials. 
1.4.3  The  supervision,  which  must  be  exercised with authority,  should in its 
every-day action seek to perfect the training and education of  the work-
men  on  the basis of daily experience,  and  should give rise to fines  or 
penalties only  in very  serious or  repeated cases of  infringement. 
2.  Training the management  and  supervisory officials in respect  of safety problems 
2.1  General 
2.1.1  Steps must  be  taken to ensure that the officials do  not  change  posts 
frequently. 
2.1.2 The  vocational  training should  be  adapted to the particular features of 
the official's task and his responsibility,  and  in particular,  to the 
requirements  of  his place  in the  hierarchy  of  management  officials and 
supervisory  personnel. 
2.1.3  The  transition from  one  stage to another  should be  possible for  a  given 
person  only  once  he  has  actually proved to  have  the required knowledge 
and  skill. 
2.2 Basic principles for  vocational training and  management  and  supervisory officials 
2.2.1 The  management  officials and  supervisory personnel  must  have  an  adequate 
knowledge  of: 
- the safety regulations, 
- the safety precautions to be  taken, 
- the available safety equipment  and its use, 
- special instructions in force  for  the different vocational  groups whose 
work  they are called upon  to supervise,  and  the special instructions 
for  the exercise of  these activities at  the working-points  for which 
they are responsible. 
2.2.2 The  management  officials and  supervisory officials must  be  able: 
- to point  out  in a  suitable way  to the workers  under their orders the 
dangers  as~ociated with their work; 
- to instruct these workers  as to how  best  to carry out  the work  in order 
to avoid  these dangers. 
2.2.3  The  management  and  supervisory officials should  be  trained in how  to issue 
instructions in practice. 
2.2.4  Special attention must  be paid to the further  training of all management 
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2.2.5 The  management  officials and  supervisory personnel  must  both 
- account  for  the  execution of their work  and  report  thereon, 
- and  report  on all accidents  and  other notable incidents which  have 
occurr~d during  the working period at the points for  which  they are 
responsible. 
2.2.6 The  management  staff and  supervisory personnel  must  be  able: 
- to present  accident  reports correctly; 
- to assess the  data in these reports; 
- to establish the  causes of the accidents; 
to propose  means  to avoid  such accidents.  They  must  receive the train-
ing necessary to this end. 
2.3  Staff responsible  for  training 
2.3.1  The  staff responsible  for  the training activities set out  on paras 1.3 
and  2  must  be  numerous  enough  and  must  have available the necessary  means 
and  time to carry out  their task correctly. 
2.4  Preparation of  the accident report;  training the staff responsible for  filling 
in these reports 
2.4.1  The  accident  report  must  give all necessary  information,  taking into 
account  all the appropriate  human  and  technical factors,  in particular: 
- the circumstances 
- the  consequences  of  the  accident 
- the causes 
- the precautions proposed to avoid  similar accidents. 
2.4.2  Each  of  these  items  and  information listed under  point  2.3.1  must  be 
capable of  formulation as  an  answer  to a  clear and precise question. 
2.4.3  The  b!eakdown  and  layout  of the  form  used  for  the accident  reports must 
clearly show  which  questions  have  to be answered  by  each of the personnel 
contributing to the preparation of  the reports. 
2.4.4 There  must  be  sufficient  room  on  the  form  for  supplementary  remarks  or 
sketches. 
2.4.5  Each  of  the workers contributing to the preparation of  the report  must 
be  informed with regard to: 
- the  importance of  each question, 
- the  importance  of  corr~ct answers  to the  questions. 
2.4.6  Instructions based  on practical examples  should  be used to draw  the atten-
tion of  these employees  to the consequences  of  neglectful,  thoughtless or 
unclear answers  to the  questions. 
2.4.7 Systematic attention should  be  paid to ensure that  the  answers  are com-
plete,  careful and precise. 
2.4.8  The  accident reports referred to in the  foregoing  chapter are used  only 
for  the prevention of accidents. 
2.5 Appointment  and  promotion of management  officials and  supervisory personnel 
2.5.1 Care  should be  taken to ensure that  there is available an  adequate  number 
of  management  and  supervisory officials possessed of  the requisite skills 
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2.5.2 The  selection of  these officials is the responsibility of  the  employer, 
who  must  at  least inform the responsible  Inspectorate of  the  persons 
entrusted with  supervision of  working  operations,  together with the  nec-
essary data justifying the selection. 
2.5.3  To  ensure  a  selection which  promises  success,  there should be  laid down 
the  minimum  requirements  for  appointment  to  a  post  in one  of  these cate-
gories,  either by  direct  appointment  or  by  promotion,  together with the 
certificates etc.  on which  this appointment  depends. 
2.5.4  The  responsible  Inspectorate should be  in a  position to check the knowl-
edg~ and skills of  the  manag~ment and supervisory officials - both  from 
the  human  and specialist points of  view  - should the  Inspectorate consider 
it necessary,  at  least  in the  case  of  a  major  failure  or of  repeated 
failures. 
3.  Utility of  psycho-technical  examinations 
3.1  On  assignment 
3.1.1 It is recommended  that  the application of  a  relatively simple  psycho-
technical examination upon  assignment  should be  developed as  far  as pos-
sible,  in order to: 
- determine  the  general  intellectual level  of  the candidate; 
- ·to exclude  those candidates whose  intellectual level  lies below  a 
pre~determined minimum. 
3.2 Before the exercise of  specific activity 
3.2.1  In every  instance the workmen  who  are  made  responsible  for  the  execution 
of particular working  operations 
- with which  there is associated  a  particular responsibility in respect 
of collective safety or 
- which call for  particular intellectual or personality characteristics 
should  be  subjected to  a  special psycho-technical examination to determine 
whether  they  have  the capacities required for  this activity. 
3.2.2 The  responsible  Inspectorate must,  in  collabo~ation with the  representa-
tives of the  employers  and  employees,  keep  up  to date  the list of work 
for  which  these special examinations are to be  prescribed and to this 
end  should list the  functions  which  have  been  shown  by  experience to call 
for  such tests and  for  which  such tests can in practice be  carried out. 
3.3 Before  any  promotion  of  a  worker  to the post  of  an official 
3.3.1 Before the promotion of  any  workma~ to the post  of  an official a  suitable 
psycho-technical  examination should  be carried out. 
3.4 Principles underlying the various psycho-technical  examination 
3.4.1 The  psycho-technical  examina~ions listed under  3.2 and 3.3  shoul~ as  far 
as  ~ossible aid the vocational specialization of the worker  in question. 
3.4.2 The  management  must  lay  down  the criteria which  have  to be  met  by  the 
candidate on  assignment  or  later when  directed to special tasks,  and 
should be  advised by  psychologists when  so doing. 
3.4.3  The  psychologists'  assessment  should be  valid only  for  a  restricted period 
and  must  be  compared with the assessments of  the vocational behaviour  of 
the person in question. 
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ANNEX  XIV 
DECISION  (1) 
OF  9TH  JULY,  1957 
CONCERNING  THE  TERMS  OF  REFERENCE  AND  RULES 
OF  PROCEDURE  OF  THE  MINES  SAFETY  COMMISSION 
(1)  See  "Journal official de  la Communaute  europeenne  du  charbon et de  l'acier" 
no.  28  of the 31st August  1957. 433 
DECISION 
of 9th July,  1957 
concerning the  terms  of reference  and  rules 
of procedure  of  the  mines  safety commission 
Having  taken  note  of  the  Recommendations  adopted  by  the  Conference  on 
Safety  in Coalmines  and of the proposals submitted  by  the High  Authority  in 
connection with the  Conference's final Report,  which afford a  working basis 
for  the  improvement  of  safety in coalmines,  and 
having  regard to their Decisions at  the Council's 36th and  42nd  sessions 
on  September  6,  and  May  10,  1957,  setting up  the  Mines  Safety  Commission, 
THE  REPRESENTATIVES  OF  THE  GOVERNMENTS  OF  THE  MEMBER  STATES  MEETING  AT 
THE  SPECIAL  COUNCIL  OF  MINISTERS, 
- hereby  lay  down  that  the terms  of  reference  of  the aforesaid Commission 
shall be  as  follows: 
1.  The  Commission  shall follow  developments  regarding safety in coalmines,  including 
those  regarding the safety regulations instituted by  the public authorities,  and 
assemble  the  necessary  information concerning progress and practical results ob-
tained,  more  especially in the matter of accident  prevention. 
To  secure  the necessary  information,  the Commission  shall apply  to the 
Governments  concerned. 
The  Commission  shall evaluate the  information in its possession and  submit 
to the  Governments  proposals  for  the  improvement  of  safety in coalmines. 
2.  The  Commission shall help the High  Authority to work  out  a  method  of  compiling 
intercomparable accident statistics. 
3.  The  Commission  shall ensure the  prompt  forwarding  to the quarters directly concerned 
(including in particular mines  inspectorates and  employers'  and workers'  associa-
tions)  of  relevant  information assembled  by  it. 
4.  The  Commission  shall ascertain,  by  regular contact with the Governments.  what  action 
is being taken to implement  the proposals of the  Conference  on  Safety in Coalmines, 
and  such  proposals as it may  itself draw  up. 
5.  The  Commission  shall propose  such study  and  research as it deems  most  indicated for 
the  improvement  of safety,  with notes as to the way  in which  these can best  be  ef~ 
fected. 
6.  The  Commission  shall facilitate the  exchange  of  information and  experience  among 
persons  responsible  for safety matters,  and  propose appropriate  measures  for this 
purpose  (e.g.  organization of  study sessions,  establishment  of  documentation ser-
vices). 
7.  The  Commission shall propose appropriate measures  for  ensuring the  necessary  liaison 
among  the rescue services of the  Community  countries., 
8.  The  Commission shall submit  annually to the  Council  of Ministers  and  the  High  Author-
ity a  Report  on its activities and  on  developments  regarding safety in coalmines 
in the different  member  States.  In this connection,  it shall in particular examine 
the statistics compiled  on accidents and  incidents in coalmines. 434 
- The  Representatives of  the  Governments  further  lay  down  that the rules of pro-
cedure  of  the  Commission  shall be  those set forth  in the Annex  to the present 
Decision. 
- The  Representatives  of  the  Governments trust that  the  High  Authority will 
arrange  for· the  Commission  to start work at the earliest possible moment. 
This  Decision was  adopted  by  the  Council at its forty-fourth session, 
on  July 9,  1957. 
(ANNEX) 
R~les of procedure 
For  the  Council, 
(sgd.}  J.  REY 
President. 
of  the  Mines  Safety  Commission 
CHAIRMAN 
Article  1 
The  Chairman of  the  Mines  Safety  Commission  shall be  a  Member  of  the High 
Authority  of  the  European  Coal  and  Steel  Community. 
Article  2 
The  Chairman shall conduct  the work  of  the  Commission  in accordance with 
these Rules  of Procedure. 
MEMBERS 
Article 3 
The  Commission  shall consist  of  24  members  appointed by  the Governments; 
each  country shall have  four  members,  of whom  two  shall be  representatives of that 
country's Governments,  one  of  the  employers  and  one  of  the workers. 
Each  Government  shall send  in writing to the  Chairman  a  nominal  roll of  the 
members  appointed  by it.  It shall notify  the  Ch~irman of all changes  in this. 
Each  Government  may  appoint  for  any  particular meeting  of  the  Commission 
one  or  two  advisers,  whose  names  it shall send to the  Chairman. 
I.L.O.  PARTICIPATION 
Article 4 
Representatives  of  the  International  Labour  Organization shall be  invited 
to attend the  proceedings  of  the  Commission  in a  consultative capacity. 435 
U.K.  PARTICIPATION 
Article 5 
Delegates appointed  by  the  Government  of  the United  Kingdom  may  attend the 
proceedings  of  the  Commission  as observers. 
ORGANIZATION 
{a)  Restricted Committee 
Article 6 
A Restricted Committee shall be  set up,  to consist  of Governments'  repre-
sentatives on  the  Commission. 
Article  7 
The  Chairman  of  the  Commission  shall act  as  Chairman of  the Restricted 
Committee. 
Article 8 
The  function  of  the Restricted Committee  shall be  to ensure  permanent  liaison 
among  the  Governments  of  the  member  States and  between  them  and  the  Commission,  more 
especially for  the purpose  of  exchanging relevant  information.  The  Restricted Committee 
shall  see to the preparation of  the  Commission's activities. 
Article 9 
The  Restr~cted Committee  shall  be  convened  by  the  Chairman. 
The  Chairman shall be  required to convene it when  asked to do  so  by  the 
representatives of  three or more  Governments. 
{b)  Working  Parties 
Article  10 
The  Commission of the Restricted Committee  may  set up working parties of 
experts to consider specific technical matters. 
Article  11 
The  working parties shall decide their own  modus  operandi. 
Article  12 
·The  Restricted  Committee  shall be  given reports by  the working parties on 
the results of  their proceedings,  which it shall  submit  to the  Commission with the 
comments  of its members. 
In  the  event  of  differences of  opinion within the working parties,  the views 
expressed shall be  given,  together with the  names  of  those expressing  them. 436 
SECRETARIAT 
Article 13 
The  High  Authority shall be responsible for  the secretarial arrangements  in 
connection with the work  of the  Commission,  the Restricted Committee  and the working 
parties. 
These  arrangements shall be  under  the  charge of  a  High  Authority staff member 
appointed to act  as  Secretary. 
All  documents  shall be  in the  four  official languages  of  the  Community. 
WORKING  PROCEDURE 
Article 14 
The  Chairman shall fix the  agenda  and  the dates of  meetings after consulta-
tion with the  members  of  the Restricted Committee. 
Article  15 
The  Chairman shall allow to speak any  member  of  the  Commission,  represent-
ative of  the  International  Labour  Organization or  United  Kingdom  observer asking  to 
do  so. 
The  Chairman  may  allow advisers to speak. 
Article 16 
The  members  of  the High Authority shall have  the  right to attend meetings 
of  the  Commission  and  of  the Restricted Committee,  and  to speak there. 
The  Chairman  may  bring with  him  advisers,  whom  he  may  allow to speak. 
Article  17 
Where  the Commission  or  the Restricted Committee  deems  it desirable to 
obtain information concerning the various aspects of safety in coalmines,  it shall 
request  this from  the Governments  of  the  member  States. 
Article  18 
Sixteen members  shall constitute a  quorum.  Conclusions shall be  adopted  by 
majority  of  the members  present. 
Proposals  by  the  Commission under  1,3 of its terms of reference shall,  how-
ever,  require  a  vote  in favour  by  two-thirds of'the members  present,  and  by  not  less 
than thirteen members  in all. 
Any  dissenting opinions shall be  brought  to the attention of  the Governments 
should the  members  expressing  them  so request. 
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ANNEX  XV 
DECISION  (1) 
OF  11TH  MARCH,  1965 
OF  THE  REPRESENTATIVES  OF  THE  GOVERNMENTS 
OF  THE  MEMBER  STATES  ASSEMBLED  IN  THE  SPECIAL 
COUNCIL  OF  MINISTERS  TO  MODIFY  THE  DECISION 
OF  9TH  JULY  1957 
CONCERNING  THE  TERMS  OF  REFERENCE  AND  RULES 
OF  PROCEDURE  OF  THE  MINES  SAFETY  COMMISSION 
(1)  See  "Journal officiel de  la Communaute  europeenne  du  charbon et  de  l'acier" 
no.  46  of  22nd  March  1965. 439 
DECISION 
of  11th March,  1965 
of  the  Representatives of  the  Governments 
of  the  Member  States assembled  in the  Special 
Council  of Ministers to modify  the  decision 
of 9th July  1957 
concerning  the  terms  of  reference  and  rules 
of procedure of  the  Mines  Safety  Commission 
THE  REPRESENTATIVES  OF  THE  GOVERNMENTS  OF  THE  MEMBER  STATES  ASSEMBLED 
IN  THE  SPECIAL  COUNCIL  OF  MINISTERS  -
having  regard to the decision of  9th July  1957  regarding the  terms  of 
reference and  rules of  procedure of  the Mines  Safety  Commission,  and 
having  regard to the  High  Authority's proposal  of  7th January  1964, 
and 
seeing that  this decision in no  way  affects Article  118  of the Treaty 
setting up  the  European  Economic  Community  -
DECIDE: 
Article  1 
The  terms  of  reference of the Mines  Safety  Commission  laid down  by  the  deci-
sion of  9th July  1957  are  replaced by  the provisions in the annex. 
Article 2 
The  provisions of Article 17  of  the rules of procedure  annexed to the  Decision 
of 9th July  1957 are replaced  by  the  following  provisions: 
"Should  the Mines  Safety Commission  or  the Restricted Committee  consider it 
desirable to receiv.e  information regarding the various  fields  for  which it is respon-
sible,  it shall apply to the Governments  of the  member  States." 
This  decision was  adopted  by  the  Council  at its one-hundredth session,  on 
11th March  1965. 
For the Council 
(sgdJ M.  Maurice-Bokanowski 
President 
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(ANNEX) 
Terms  of  reference  for  the  Mines  Safety  Commission 
1.  The  Commission  shall follow  developments  regarding safety and  measures to avoid at 
working-points  conditions which  represent  a  danger  to health in coalmines,  includ-
ing to this end  the safety regulations instituted by  the public authorities and 
assemble  the  necessary  information concerning progress and practical results ob-
tained. 
To  secure the  necessary  information,  the  Commission shall apply  to the 
Governments  concerned. 
The  Commission  shall evaluate the  information in its possession and  submit 
to the  Governments  proposals  for  the  improvement  of safety and  healthy  conditions 
in coalmines. 
2.  The  Commission  shall help the  High  Authority to work  out  a  method  of  compiling 
intercomparable statistics on  accidents and  damage  to health attributable to voca-
tional activities in coalmines.  · 
3.  The  Commission shall ensure the  prompt  forwarding  to the quarters directly concerned 
(including  in particular mines  inspectorates and  employers'  and workers'  associa-
tions)  of  relevant  information assembled  by it. 
·4.  The  Commission shall ascertain,  by  regular contact with  the Governments,  what  action 
is being taken to  implement  the  proposals  of the  Conference  on  Safety in Coalmines, 
and  such proposals  as it may  itself draw  up. 
5.  The  Commission  shall propose  such  study  and research as it deems  most  indicated for 
the  improvement  of  safety,  and  of  healthy working conditions  in coalmines,  with 
notes  as  to the  way  in which  these  can  be  effected. 
6.  The  Commission  shall facilitate the exchange  of  information and  experience  among 
persons  responsible  for  safety matters  and  the maintenance  of  healthy working  condi-
tions,  and  propose  appropriate  measures  for  this purpose  (e.g.  organization of 
study  sessions,  establishment  of  documentation services). 
7.  The  Commission  shall propose appropriate measures  for  ensuring the  necessary liai-
son  among  the  r~scue services of  the  Community  countries. 
8.  The  Commission shall submit  annually  to the  Council  of Ministers  and  the  High 
Authority  a  Report  on  its activities and  on  developments  regarding safety and  pro-
tection of  health in coalmines  in the different  member  States.  In this connection, 
it shall in particular examine  the statistics compiled  in these fields. Composition of  the Safety Commission, 
the  Working  Parties  and  Sub-Committees, 
and their meetings 
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A.- MINES  SAFETY  COMMISSION 
a)  Composition 
FEDERAL  REPUBLIC  OF  GERMANY 
Government  representatives 
Regierungsdirektor w.  SCHNASE,  Referat  III  A 1,  Bundesministerium fUr  Wirtschaft, 
5300 Bonn, 
Ministerialdirigent Dr.-Ing.  K.  HELLER,  Ministerium fUr  Wirtschaft,  Mittelstand und 
Verkehr  des  Landes  Nordrhein-Westfalen,  4  DUsseldorf,  Haroldstr.  4 
Employers'  representatives 
Dr.-Ing.  F.  BENTHAUS,  Bergassessor a.D.,  Steinkohlenbergbauverein,  43  Essen, 
Friedrichstr.  2 
Workers'  representatives 
E.  STEBEL,  Leiter des  Sachgebietes Arbeitsschutz,  IG-Bergbau  und  Energie,  4630 Bochum, 
Alte Hattingerstr.  19 
Technical  advisers 
Ministerialrat  w.  LATTEN,  Ministerium fUr  Wirtschaft,  Mittelstand und  Verkehr  des 
Landes  Nordrhein-Westfalen,  4  DUsseldorf,  Haroldstr.  4 
Oberbergamtsdirektor  K.  HUBNER,  Leiter der Unterabteilung Montanwirtschaft,  Ministe-
rium fUr  Wirtschaft,  Verkehr  und  Landwirtschaft,  6600 SaarbrUcken,  Hardenbergstr.  8 
BELGIUM 
Gouvernment  representatives 
A.  VANDENHEUVEL,  Directeur general des  mines,  Ministere  des affaires economiques, 
6-8,  rue  de  la Science,  Bruxelles 
G.  LOGELAIN,  Inspecteur general des  mines,  Ministere des  affaires economiques, 
6-8,  rue de  la Science,  Bruxelles 
Employers'  representatives 
A.  HAUSMAN,  Directeur du Coordinatiecentrum Reddingswezen  van  bet  Kempische  Steen-
kolenbekken,  Kempische  Steenweg 555,  Kiewit  - Hasselt 
Workers'  representatives 
L.  THOMAS,  Secretaire national de  la Centrale syndicale des travailleurs des  usines 
de Belgique,  16,  impasse  Pirnay,  Grace-Berleur 
Technical  advisers 
L.  BOULET,  Directeur general du Fonds  national de retraite des  ouvriers mineurs, 
Ministere du travail et  de  la prevoyance sociale,  6,. place Stephanie,  Bruxelles 
M.  THOMASSEN,  President  national de  la Centrale des  francs-mineurs,  145,  rue Belliard, 
Bruxelles 446 
FRANCE 
Government  representatives 
J.· N.  PROUST,  Ingenieur  en  chef  des  mines,  Ministere  de  l'industrie,  97,  rue  de Gre-
nelle,  Paris  7e 
A.  REBIERE,  Ingenieur  en  chef,  chef  du  Service de  !'hygiene et  de  la securite  dans 
les  mines,  Direction des  mines,  Ministere  de  l'industrie,  97,  rue  de  Grenelle, 
Paris  7e 
Employers'  representatives 
.N.  BERNARD,  Directeur.general des  services  techniques  et  sociaux  des  Charbonnages  de 
France,  9,  avenue  Percier,  Paris  8e 
Workers'  representatives 
L.  CHAUVEAU,  Federation nationale  des  syndicats chretiens  des  mineurs,  8,  rue  de 
Navarre,  Paris  5e 
Technical  advisers 
J.  POREBSKI,  247,  bd.  de  la Victoire,  Annequin  (Pas-de-Calais) 
ITALY 
Government  representatives 
Dott.  Consigliere  B.  COLUCCI,  Direzione  generale  dell'emigrazione,  Ministero degli 
affari esteri,  Roma 
Ing.  Giovanni  GIROLAMI,  Ispettore generale delle miniere,  Ministero dell'industria 
e  commercia,  via  Veneto  33,  Roma 
Employers'  representatives 
Prof.  M.  CARTA,  Istituto arte mineraria,  Piazza d'Armi,  Cagliari  (Sardegna) 
Workers'  representatives 
Dott.  G.  CRAVIOTTO,  Segretario generale della Libera federazione  italiana lavoratori 
industrie estrattiva,  via  Isonzo  42,  Roma 
Technical  advisers 
Dott.  c.  MICHELAZZI,  Ispettore generale  del  Ministero del  lavoro  e  della previdenza 
sociale,  via Flavia 6,  Roma 
LUXEMBOURG 
Government  representatives 
A.  SCHUSTER,  Ingenieur-directeur  du  travail et  des  mines,  Inspection  du travail et 
des  mines,  19,  av.  Gaston  Diderich,  Luxembourg 
Employers'  representatives 
A.  RAUS,  Directeur  a  l'A.R.B.E.D.,  Luxembourg 
Workers'  representatives 
N.  PASCOLINI,  President  de  la delegation ouvriere  d'Arbed-Mines,  90,  rue  des Fleurs, 
Schiff  lange 447 
NETHERLANDS 
Government  representatives 
Ir.  A.H.W.  MARTENS,  Inspecteur-generaal der  Mijnen,  Staatstoezicht  op  de  Mijnen, 
Apollolaan  9,  Heerlen  (L.) 
Drs.  D.C.  VANDER  HOOFT,  Hoofd  van  de Directie  Mijnwezen,  Ministerie  van  Economische 
Zaken,  Bezuidenhoutseweg 30,  's-Gravenhage 
Employers'  representatives 
Ir.  G.B.  DEBETS,  Directeur,  Oranje-Nassau  Mijnen,  Heerlen  (L.) 
Workers'  representatives 
J.  PALMEN,  Secretaris  van  de  Nederlandse  Katholieke  Mijnwerkersbond,  Schinkelstraat  13, 
Heerlen  (L.) 
Technical  advisers 
H.L.  GROND,  Katholieke Vereniging  van  Mijnbeambten,  Schelsberg 202,  Heerlerheide  (L.) 
UNITED  KINGDOM 
Government  representatives 
A.M.  RAKE,  C.B.E.,  Under-Secretary,  Safety  and  Health Division of  the Ministry  of 
Power,  7  Millbank,  Thames  House  South,  London  S.W.  1 
H.S.  STEPHENSON,  Chief  Inspector  of  Mines,  Ministry  of  Power,  7  Millbank,  Thames 
House,  London  S.W.  1 
Employers'  representatives 
Dr.  H.L.  WILLET,  Deputy  Director-General of  Production,  National Coal  Board,  Hobart 
House,  Grosvenor  Place,  London  S.W.l 
Workers'  representatives 
s.  BULLOUGH,  Vice-President  of  the National  Union  of  Mineworkers,  c/o Miners'  Offices, 
Barnsley  I  Yorkshire 
INTERNATIONAL  LABOUR  ORGANIZATION,  GENEVA 
- A  representative  of  the  International Labour  Office  as  an  observer. 
b)  Sessions  of  the  Mines  Safety Commission 
1.  23rd  June  1961 
2.  12th  December  1961 
3.  26th  March  1962 
4.  27th  November  1962 
5.  18th  and  19th July  1963 
6.  11th October  1963 
7.  27th  and  28th April  1964 
8.  16th October  1964 
9.  11th December  1964 
10.  19th  and  20th  July  1965 
11.  14th  and  15th February  1966 
12.  5th  and  6th May  1966 448 
B.- RESTRICTED  COMMITTEE 
a)  Composition 
The  Restricted Committee  consists of  the Government  representatives  on  The  Mines 
Safety Committee. 
b)  Sessions of  the Restricted Committee 
1.  30th May  1961 
2.  30th November  1961 
3.  2nd  March  1962 
4.  26th March  1962 
5.  30th October  1962 
6.  26th November  1962 
7.  27th  and  28th May  1963 
s.  11th July  1963 
9.  lOth  and  11th September  1963 
10.  18th November  1963 
11.  14th April  1964 
12.  2nd October  1964 
13.  15th October  1964 
14.  lOth  December  1964 
15.  5th and 6th July  1965 
16.  24th January  1966 
17.  25th April  1966 449 
C.- WORKING  PARTIES  ON  TECHNICAL  PROBLEMS 
I. Working Party on "Electricity" 
a)  Composition 
GERMANY 
Oberbergamtsdirektor G.  EPPING,  Oberbergamt,  4600 Dortmund,  Goebenstr.  25-27 
BELGIUM 
G.  LOGELAIN  (1),  Inspecteur general des  mines,  Ministere des affaires economiques, 
6-8,  rue  de  la Science,  Bruxelles 
R.  STENUIT,  Directeur divisionnaire a !'Administration des  mines,  6-8,  rue  de  la 
Science,  Bruxelles 
G.J.A.  COOLS,  Directeur divisionnaire a !'Administration des  mines,  6-8,  rue  de  la 
Science,  Bruxelles 
H.  GOBBE,  Chef  de  service a  la division c4blerie des  A.C.E.C.,  Charleroi 
FRANCE 
R.  COEUILLET,  Ingenieur  en chef  au service exploitation des Charbonnages  de  France, 
9,  avenue  Percier,  Paris 8e 
P.  FLINOIS,  Houilleres du  Bassin du  Nord  et  du Pas-de-Calais,  Service technique du 
fond,  20,  rue des  Minimes,  Douai/Nord 
M.  OSTY,  Directeur technique  a  la Societe industrielle de  liaisons electriques, 
64bis,  rue  de  Monceau,  Paris 8e 
F.  VIN,  Ingenieur  au CERCHAR,  Verneuil-en-Halatte  (Oise) 
Y.  EYRAUD,  Chef  du  laboratoire  d'etud~s generales des Clbles de  Lyon,  170,  avenue 
J ean.-J.aures,  Lyon  (RhOne) 
ITALY 
Dott.  Ing.  L.VENTRELLA,  Direttore dell'Istituto italiano del marchio di qualita per 
i  materiali  e  le apparecchiature elettrotecniche,  via Misurata 61,  Milano 
LUXEMBOURG 
E.  MULLER,  Ingenieur des mines  a  !'Administration des  mines  luxembourgeoises  de 
l'A.R.B.E.D.,  Esch-sur-Alzette 
(1)  As  representative of the Restricted Committee. 450 
NETHERLANDS 
Ir.  E.A.R.  HOEFNAGELS,  Inspecteur der  Mijnen,  Staatstoezicht  op  de  Mijnen,  Apollolaan 9, 
Heerlen  (L.) 
Ir.  W.P.A.J.  KEMPEN,  Elektrotechnisch Adviseur  van  de  Mijnbedrijven,  p/a Staatsmijn 
Emma,  Hoensbroek 
Ir.  F.  GOEDBLOED,  Nederlartdse Kabelfabriek,  Delft 
Ir.  W.L.  BAER,  N.V.  Hollandse  Draad- en Kabelfabriek,  Amsterdam 
UNITED  KINGDOM 
D.E.  FOX,  H.M.  Principal Electrical  Inspector  of  Mines  and Quarries,  Thames  House, 
South  Millbank,  London  S.W.  1 
b)  Sessions of  the Working  Party  on  "Electrification"  and its sub-committee 
1. 
2. 
3. 
4. 
5. 
6. 
7. 
8. 
9. 
10. 
11. 
12. 
13. 
14. 
15. 
16. 
17. 
18. 
19. 
20. 
21. 
22. 
23. 
24. 
25. 
26. 
27. 
28. 
29. 
30. 
31. 
16th January  1961 
17th January  1961 
21st  February  1961 
28th February  1961 
29th March  1961 
12th May  1961 
21st  September  1961 
15th November  1961  (Charleroi) 
24th  January  1962 
24th  May  1962 
19th July  1962 
20th,  21st  and  22nd  September  1962  (Milan) 
18th December  1962 
28th January  1963 
30th April  1963 
19th June  1963  (Liege-Herstal) 
19th and  20th September  1963  (Essen  and Heerlen) 
21st  November  1963 
9th January  1964 
30th  and  31st  January  1964  (Verneuil) 
21st February  1964 
5th March  1964 
lOth September  1964 
7th January  1965 
11th March  1965 
4th  and  5th May  1965  (Buxton  and Newcastle) 
1st October  1965 
16th December  1965 
17th February  1966 
21st April  1966 
8th June  1966 451 
II.  Working  Party  on  "Mine  fires  and  beatings" 
a)  Composition 
GERMANY 
Ministerialrat  W.  LATTEN  {1),  Ministerium fUr  Wirtschaft,  Mittelstand und  Verkehr, 
Land  Nordrhein-Westfalen,  4000 DUsseldorf,  Haroldstr.  4 
Dipl.  Ing.  E.  BREDENBRUCH,  Leiter der  ~auptstelle fUr  das  Grubenrettungswesen des 
Steinkohlenbergbauvereins,  4300 Essen-Kray,  Schonscheidtstr.  28 
Dipl.  Ing.  A.  SCHEWE,  Technischer  Leiter der Hauptstelle  fUr  das Grubenrettungswesen 
des  Steinkohlenbergbauvereins,  4300  Essen-Kray,  Schonscheidtstr.  28 
BELGIUM 
A.  VANDENHEUVEL,  Directeur general  des  mines,  Ministere des  affaires economiques, 
6-8,  rue  de  la Science,  Bruxelles 
G.  LOGELAIN,  Inspecteur general des  mines,  Ministere des  affaires economiques, 
6-8,  rue  de  la Science,  Bruxelles 
R.  STENUIT,  Directeur divisionnaire  a  I' Administration des  mines,  6-8,  rue  de  la 
Science,  Bruxelles 
FRANCE 
G.  CHAMPAGNAC,  Directeur aux  houilleres du  bassin de  Lorraine,  Merlebach  (Moselle) 
J.  CRETIN,  Ingenieur divisionnaire,  poste central de  secours Belle-Roche,  Merlebach 
(Moselle) 
H.  MORIN,  Ingenieur  en  chef,  chef  des  services generaux  du  fond  aux  houilleres des 
Cevennes,  Ales  (Gard) 
LUXEMBOURG 
A.  SCHUSTER,  Directeur de  l'Inspection du  travail et des  mines,  19,  avenue  Gaston 
Diderich,  Luxembourg 
M.  LEINEWEBER,  ContrOleur  au  service de  l'Inspection du  travail et  des  mines, 
108a,  rue  du  Stade,  Niedercorn 
ITALY 
Ing.  V.  BUSONERO,  Direttore miniera,  societa Carbosarda,  Carbonia  (Cagliari) 
Dott.  Ing.  A.  PELLATI,  via E.  Gianturco 1,  Roma 
(1)  As  representative of  the Restricted Committee. 452 
NETHERLANDS 
Ir.  D.J.  KNUTTEL,  hoofdinspecteur der mijnen,  Staatstoezicht  op  de  Mijnen, 
Apollolaan 9,  Heerlen  (L.)  · 
Prof.  Dr.  W.  MAAS,  chef  van  de Veiligheidsdienst der Staatsmijnen in Limburg, 
van  der  Maesenstraat  2,  Heerlen  (L.) 
UNITED  KINGDOM 
R.  BELL,  National  Coal  Board,  Production department,  Hobart  House,  Grosvenor  place, 
London  s.w.  1 
b)  Sessions of  the Workin  Party  on  "Mine  fires  and beatings"  (Jointly with the 
Working  Party on  Rescue  organization' 
1. 
2. 
3. 
4. 
5. 
6. 
7. 
8. 
9. 
10. 
11. 
12. 
13. 
14. 
29th  June  1961 
7th December  1961 
28th February  and 
1st March  1962 
13th April  1962 
(Hauptstelle  fUr  ~as Grubenrettungswesen, 
Essen-Kray) 
29th May  1962  (Jointly with  the Directors of the 
Research Stations) 
18th December  1962 
19th April  1963 
21st  May  1963  (Coordinatiecentrum Reddingswezen,  Hasselt) 
28th October  1963 
lOth  December  1963 
13th July  1964 
19th November  1964 
20th May  1965 
16th September  1965 
la)  Sub-Committee  on "Practical problems with shaft fires at great depth" 
GERMANY 
Dipl.  Ing.  K.  GRUMBRECHT,  Abteilungsleiter,  Versuchsgrubengesellschaft  mbH, 
4600 Dortmund,  Tremoniastr.  13 
Dipl.  Ing.  A.  SCHEWE  (Prasident/pr~sident), Technischer Leiter der Hauptstelle fUr 
das  Grubenrettungswesen des Steinkoh1enbergbauvereins,  4300 Essen-Kray,  Schonscheidt-
str.  28 
BELGIUM 
L.  DE  CONINCK,  directeur du  Centre national belge de  coordination des centrales de 
sauvetage,  17,  rue Puissant,  Charleroi 
A.  HAUSMAN,  directeur du  Coordinatiecentrum Reddingswezen,  555,  Kempische  Steenweg, 
Hasselt 453 
R.  STENUIT,  directeur divisionnaire a !'Administration des mines,  6-8,  rue de  la 
Science,  Bruxelles 
FRANCE 
J.  CRETIN,  ingenieur divisionnaire,  paste central de secours Belle-Roche,  Merlebach 
(Moselle) 
NETHERLANDS 
Ir. D.J.  KNUTTEL,  hoofdinspecteur der mijnen,  Staatstoezicht  op  de  Mijnen,  Apollolaan 9, 
Heerlen  (L.) 
lb)  Sessions of  the Sub-Committee 
1.  20th June  1962 
2.  lOth July  1962 
3.  18th July  1962 
4.  28th August  1962 
2a)  Sub-Committee  on "Theoretical  problems with shaft fires at great  depth" 
GERMANY 
Dr.-Ing.  K.  RENNER,  Forschungsstelle fUr  Grubenbewetterung,  4300 Essen-Kray,  Dort-
munderstr.  151 
Dr.-Ing.  W.  SCHMIDT,  PrUfstelle fUr  Grubenbewetterung,  4630 Bochum,  Hernerstr.  45 
Dipl.  Ing.  A.  SCHEWE,  Technischer Leiter der Hauptstelle fUr  das Grubenrettungswesen 
des  Steinkohlenbergbauvereins,  4300 Essen-Kray,  Schonscheidtstr.  28 
BELGIUM 
R.  STENUIT  (Prasident/president),  directeur divisionnaire a !'Administration des 
mines,  6-8,  rue de  la Science,  Bruxelles 
J.  BRACKE,  ingenieur principal divisionnaire,  Institut national des mines,  60,  rue 
Grande,  Plturages 
J.  PATIGNY,  ingenieur divisionnaire,  Institut  d'hygi~ne des  mines,  Havermarkt, 
Hasselt 
H.  CALLUT,  directeur et  ingenieur  e_n  chef a l'Institut national des  mines,  60,  rue 
Grande,  Plturages 
FRANCE 
R.  LOISON,  directeur au  CERCHAR,  35,  rue  Saint-Dominique,  Paris 7e 454 
J.  CRETIN,  ingenieur divisionnaire,  poste central de secours,  Belle-Roche,  Merlebach 
(Moselle) 
NETHERLANDS 
Dr.  w.  DE  BRAAF,  directeur  van  het  Centraal Proefstation der Staatsmijnen, 
Treebeek  (L.) 
Prof.  Dr.  W.  MAAS,  chef  van  de Veiligheidsdienst  der Staatsmijnen in  Limburg,  van der 
Maesenstraat  2,  Heerlen 
UNITED  KINGDOM 
Dr.  H.S.  EISNER,  Ministry  of  Power,  Safety  in  Mines  Research Establishment,  Harpur 
Hill,  Buxton  (Derbyshire) 
2b)  Sessions of  the Sub-Committees 
1. 
2. 
3. 
4. 
5th September  1962 
14th November  1962 
28th November  1962 
13th January  1966 
2c)  Joint sessions  of  the  two  Sub-Committees 
1.  lOth January  1964  (Versuchsgrube 
2.  5th February  1964 
3.  19th February  1964  (Versuchsgrube 
4.  4th March  1964  (Verschusgrube  in 
5.  7th April  1964  (Versuchsgrube  in 
6.  24th April  1964  (Versuchsgrube  in 
7.  1st and  2nd February  1965 
8.  9th March  1965 
9.  26th March  1965 
10.  13th April  1965 
11.  30th April  1965 
12.  1st June  1965 
3a)  Sub-Committee  on  "Opening-up of fire zones" 
GERMANY 
in  Dortmund) 
in Dortmund) 
Dortmund) 
Dortmund) 
Dortmund) 
Dipl.  Ing.  A.  SCHEWE,  Technischer Leiter der Hauptstelle fUr  das Grubenrettungswesen 
des  Steinkohlenbergbauvereins,  4300 Essen-Kray,  Schonscheidtstr.  28 
Dipl.  Ing.  K.  GRUMBRECHT,  Abteilungsleiter,  Versuchsgrubengesellschaft  mbH, 
4600 Dortmund,  Tremoniastr.  13 
Dipl.  Ing.  R.  MUELLER,  Betriebsdirektor,  Hauptstelle fUr  das Grubenrettungswesen, 
6605  Friedrichsthal  (Saar) 455 
BELGIUM 
G.  LOGELAIN  (Prasiden.t/president),  inspecteur general des  mines,  Ministere des affaires 
economiques,  6-8,  rue  de  la Science,  Bruxelles 
L.  DE  CONINCK,  directeur du  Centre de  coordination des  centrales de  sauvetage,  17,  rue 
Puissant,  Charleroi 
A.  HAUSMAN,  directeur du  Centre  de  coordination des moyens  de  sauvetage de  Campine, 
555,  Kempische  Steenweg,  Hasselt 
FRANCE 
J.  CRETIN,  ingenieur divisionnaire,  poste central de  secours,  Belle-Roche,  Merlebach 
(Moselle) 
R.  GRISARD,  ingenieur des  mines,  Charbonnages  de  France,  9,  avenue  Percier, •Paris  Be 
UNITED  KINGDOM 
W.A.  WOOD,  Director of Safety,  National  Coal  Board,  Hobart  House,  Grosvenor  Place, 
London  S.W.  1 
3b)  Sessions of  the  Sub-Committee 
1. 
2. 
3. 
7th February  1964 
16th March  1964 
11th  June  1964 
4a)  Group  of  experts  on  "Fire-resistant fluids" 
GERMANY 
Dipl.  Ing.  E.  BREDENBRUCH.  (Prasident/president),  Leiter der Hauptstelle fUr  das Gru-
benrettungswesen des  Steinkohlenbergbauvereins,  4300 Essen-Kray,  Schonscheidtstr.  28 
Dr.  chem.  H.W.  THOENES,  Hauptabteilungsleiter,  Technischer Uberwachungsverein e.v., 
4300 Essen,  Steubenstr.  53 
Dipl.  Ing.  K.  GRUMBRECHT,  Abteilungsleiter,  Versuchsgrubengesellschaft  mbH, 
4600 Dortmund,  Tremoniastr.  13 
Prof.  Dr.  med.  MALORNY,  Direktor des  Pharmakologischen Instituts der Universitat 
Hamburg,  2000 Hamburg 
Dr.  med.  habil.  PRIMAVESI,  Oberarzt,  Hygiene-Institut  des  Ruhrgebietes,  4650 Geisen-
kirchen,  Rotthauserstr.  19 
Dr.  med.  BENTHE,  Dozent,  Pharmakologisches  Institut der Universitat  Hamburg, 
2000 Hamburg 
Dr.  phil.  H.  ZIMMERMANN,  Hygiene-Institut  des  Ruhrgebietes,  4650 Gelsenkirchen, 
Rotthauserstr.  19 456 
BELGIUM 
E.  DEMELENNE,  administrateur-directeur de  l'Institut national des mines,  60,  rue 
Grande,  Piturages 
G.A.  NENQUIN,  ingenieur divisionnaire,  Institut national des mines,  60,  rue Grande, 
P!turages 
J.  BRACKE,  ingenieur principal divisionnaire,  Institut national des  mines,  60,  rue 
Grande,  Ptturages 
Docteur J.  CRISPOUX,  2,  rue Potresse,  Wasmes 
FRANCE 
R.  LEFEVRE,  ingenieur des mines,  3,  rue  Louis  Rolland,  Montrouge  (Seine) 
G.  BLANPAIN,  ingenieur au  Centre d'etudes et  recherches  des  Charbonnages  de France, 
Verneuil-en-Halatte  (Oise) 
Docteur J.J.  JARRY,  medecin-chef  des  Charbonnages  de  France,  9,  ave~ue Percier, 
Paris  Be 
Docteur  C.  CLAEYS,  Centre d'etudes medicales minieres,  Centre Faivre d'Arcier, 
Sin-le-Noble  (Nord) 
·NETHERLANDS 
H.  ITALIE,  Arts,  inspecteur der mijnen,  Staatstoezicht der  Mijnen,  Apollolaan 9, 
Heerlen  (L.) 
4b)  Sessions of  the Sub-Committee 
1. 
2. 
3. 
4. 
5. 
6. 
7. 
8. 
9. 
10. 
11. 
12. 
13. 
14. 
15. 
16. 
17. 
18. 
19. 
20. 
21. 
22. 
23. 
24. 
25. 
26. 
27. 
28. 
23rd February  1961 
21st April  1961 
21st  June  1961 
17th July  1961 
25th September  1961  (Institut National  des  Mines,  Plturages) 
26th September  1961  (Technischer Ueberwachungverein,  Essen) 
5th and 6th December  1961  (Laboratoire  des Lubrifiants, 
Sin-le-Noble) 
22nd  December  1961  (Institut National  des Mines,  Plturages) 
5th July  1962 
23rd August  1962 
17th September  1962 
6th December  1962 
8th and  9th January  1963 
12th and  13th February  1963 
27th February  1963 
7th and 8th March  1963 
26th April  1963 
lOth June  1963 
16th and  17th July  1963 
6th and 7th August  1963  (Versuchsgrubengesellschaft m.b.H.,  Dortmund) 
3rd and 4th September  1963 
17th and  18th October  1963  (Pharmalologisches  Institut,  Hamburg) 
22nd October  1963  (Versuchsgrubengesellschaft m.b.H.,  Dortmund) 
5th and 6th December  1963 
24th and  25th February  1964 
29th and  30th April  1964 
6th May  1964  (Laboratoire  des Lubrifiants,  Sin-le-Noble) 
22nd  May  1964  (Institut National  des  Mines,  Plturages) 29. 
30. 
31. 
32. 
33. 
34. 
35. 
36. 
37. 
38. 
39. 
40. 
41. 
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2nd  June  1964  (Versuchsgrubengesellschaft m.b.H.,  Dortmund) 
1st July  1964 
11th November  1964 
15th. and'l6th February  1965  (Versuchsgrubengesellschaft,  m.b.H., 
Dortmund) 
31st  March  1965 
1st April  1965  (Institut National  des  Mines,  P~turages) 
30th April  1965  (Versuchsgrubengesellschaft,  m.b.H.,  Dortmund) 
17th September  1965 
25th  and  26th November  1965 
27th January  1966 
24th February  1966 
28th March  1966 
1st June  1966 
5a)  Sub-Committee  "Mine  ventilation" 
GERMANY 
Dipl.  Berging.  W.  BOTH,  Hauptstelle fUr  das Grubenrettungswesen des  Steinkohlenberg-
bauvereins,  4300  Essen-Kray,  Schonscheidtstr.  28 
Dr.  rer.  nat.  W.  SCHMIDT,  PrUfstelle  fUr  Grubenbewetterung,  4630 Bochum,  Hernerstr.  45 
Dr.-Ing.  R.  GREUER,  Forschungsstelle  fUr  Grubenbewetterung,  4300 Essen-Kray,  Dort-
munderstr.  151 
BELGIUM 
R.  STENUIT,  directeur divisionnaire a !'Administration des  mines,  6-8,  rue  de  la 
Science,  Bruxelles 
J.  PATIGNY,  ingenieur divisionnaire,  Institut d'hygiene  des  mines,  Havermarkt,  Hasselt 
FRANCE 
G.  CHAMPAGNAC  (Prasident/president),  directeur aux  houilleres du  bassin de  Lorraine, 
direction des etudes et des  travaux neufs,  Merlebach  (Moselle) 
J.  CRETIN,  ingenieur divisionnaire,  poste central de  secours,  Belle-Roche,  Merlebach 
(Moselle) 
E.  SIMODE,  ingenieur divisionnaire,  houilleres du  bassin de  Lorraine,  direction des 
etudes et  des  travaux neufs,  Petite Rosselle  (Moselle) 
NETHERLANDS 
Prof.  Dr.  W.  MAAS,  chef  van  de Veiligheidsdienst  der Staatsmijnen in Limburg,  van der 
Maesenstraat  2,  Heerlen  (L.) 
5b)  Sessions of  the  Sub-Committee 
1. 
2. 
24th January  1961 
20th April  1961 458 
3.  15th November  1961 
4.  7th and  8th February  1962 
5.  16th May  1962 
6.  25th June  1962 
7.  4th September  1962 
8.  25th September  1962 
9.  6th February  1963 
10.  14th June  1963 
11.  21st June  1963 
12.  2nd  and  3rd October  1963 
13.  13th December  1963 
14.  24th January  1964 
15.  8th April  1964 
16.  27th May  1964 
17.  22nd June  1964 
18.  18th November  1964 
19.  8th and  9th January  1965 
20.  17th February  1965 
21.  7th May  1965 
22.  14th June  1965 
23.  23rd September  1965 
24.  19th and  20th October  1965 
25.  9th  December  1965 
26.  26th January  1966 
27.  9th March  1966 
28.  4th May  1966 
29.  18th May  1966 
30.  22nd  June  1966 
III.  Working  Party  on  "Mine  rescue  organization" 
a)  Composition 
GERMANY 
Ministerialrat  w.  LATTEN  (1),  Ministerium fUr  Wirtschaft,  Mittelstand und  Verkehr, 
Land  Nordrhein-Westfalen,  4000 DUsseldorf,  Haroldstr.  4 
Dipl.  Ing.  E.  BREDENBRUCH,  Leiter der Hauptstelle fUr  das Grubenrettungswesen des 
Steinkohlenbergbauvereins,  4300 Essen-Kray,  Schonscheidtstr.  28 
A.  VAN  GEMBER,  Erster Bergrat  a.D.,  Direktor der Grubensicherheitsabteilung der Saar-
bergwerke  AG,  6600 SaarbrUcken,  Triererstr.  1 
Dipl.  Ing.  A.  SCHEWE,  Technischer Leiter der Hauptstelle fUr  das  Grubenre~tungswesen 
des  Steinkohlenbergbauvereins,  4300 Essen-Kray,  Schonscheidtstr.  28 
BELGIUM 
L.  DE  CONINCK,  directeur du  Centre de  coordination des centrales de  sauvetage,  1~ rue 
Puissant,  Charleroi 
A.  HAUSMAN,  directeur du  Centre  de  coordination des moyens  de sauvetage de  Campine, 
555,  Kempische  Steenweg,  Hasselt 
(1)  As  representative of  the Restricted Committee. 459 
FRANCE 
R.  GRISARD,  ingenieu~ des  mines,  Charbonnages  de  France,  99,  avenue  Percier,  Paris  Be 
C.  ROGEZ,  directeur du  poste central de  secours des  mines  du  Nord  et  du Pas-de-Calais, 
rue  du  Bois,  Lens  (Pas-de-Calais) 
ITALY 
Dott.  Ing.  G.  CARTA,  direttore generale della Carbonifera sarda  con  sede  in Carbonia, 
via Napoli  11,  Carbonia  (Cagliari) 
Ing.  G.  GHIANI,  Carbonifera  sarda con  sede in Carbonia,  via Napoli  11,  Carbonia 
(Cagliari) 
LUXEMBOURG 
A.  RAUS,  directeur a  l'A.R.B.E.D.,  Luxembourg 
R.  MAYER,  ingenieur des  mines  a  l'A.R.B.E.D.,  Esch-sur-Alzette,  Aloys  Kayserstr.  22, 
NETHERLANDS 
Ir. F.A.F.  SIEVERS,  chef  van  de  Veiligheidsdienst,  Oranje-Nassau Mijnen,  Heerlen  (L.) 
Prof.  Dr.  W.  MAAS,  chef  van  de Veiligheidsdienst  der Staatsmijnen in Limburg, 
Heerlen  (L.) 
UNITED  KINGDOM 
W.A.  WOOD,  Director of Safety,  National  Coal  Board,  Hobart  House,  Grosvenor  Place, 
London  S.W.l 
b)  Sessions of  the Working  Party 
1. 
2. 
3. 
4. 
5. 
6. 
7. 
8. 
9. 
10. 
11. 
12. 
13. 
14. 
15. 
28th July  1961 
lOth October  1961 
8th February  1962 
12th April  1962 
23rd May  1962  (with medical  experts at la Centrale  de  Sauvetage a 
FrAmeries 
3rd July  1962  (with medical  experts) 
29th September  1962  (with medical  experts) 
26th March  1963 
6th June  1963 
11th December  1963 
28th February  1964  (Coordinatiecentrum Reddingswezen,  Hasselt) 
lOth November  1964 
30th June  1965 
3rd September  1965 
7th and 8th October  1965  (Institut Physiologique,  Liege  -
Coordinatiecentrum Reddingswesen, 
Hasselt) 16 0 
17. 
14th January  1966 
25th February  1966 
460 
IV.  Working  Party  "Winding ropes  and shaft guides" 
a)  Composition 
GERMANY 
Dipl.  Ing.  K.  DUWELL,  Leiter der SeilprUfstelle der Westfalischen Berggewerkschafts-
kasse,  4630 Bochum,  Dinnendahlstr.  9 
Dr.-Ing.  R.  MEEBOLD,  Direktor der SeilprUfstelle der  Saarbergwerke  AG,  6600 SaarbrUcker 
Triererstr.  1 
Dipl.  Ing.  H.  GRUPE,  Seilprllfstelle der Westfalischen.Berggewerkschaftskasse,  4630 
Bochum,  Dinnendahlstr.  9 
BELGIUM 
G.  LOGELAIN,  inspecteur  general a  !'Administration des  mines,  Ministere des affaires 
economiques,  6-8,  rue  de  la Science,  Bruxelles 
R.  STENUIT,  directeur divisionnaire a !'Administration des  mines,  6-8,  rue  de  la 
Science,  Bruxelles 
J.  STREBELLE,  directeur,  association des  industriels de  Belgique  (A.I.B.),  29,  rue 
A.  Drouard,  Bruxelles 
FRANCE 
P.  TEISSIER,  ingenieur  en  chef,  service exploitation des  Charbonnages  de France, 
9,  avenue  Percier,  Paris  8e· 
c.  ROGEZ,  directeur du  poste central de  secours,  Nord  et  Pas-de-Calais,  rue du  Bois, 
Lens  (Nord) 
M.P.  SIDO,  directeur de  !'association des  industrials de  France,  10,  rue  de  Calais, 
Paris 9e 
A.  BURGUN,  ingenieur a !'association des  industrials de  France,  10,  rue de  Calais, 
Paris 9e 
ITALY 
Prof.  Dott.-Ing.  c.  MORTARINO,  istituto di  meccanica applicata del politecnico di 
Torino,  24,  corso Duca  degli  Abruzzi,  Torino 
Prof.  Dott.-Ing.  L.  STRAGIOTTI,  direttore dell'istituto di arte mineraria del poli-
tecnico di Torino,  via s. Quintino 42,  Torino 461 
LUXEMBOURG 
E.  MULLER,  ingenieur .des  mines  a la division des  mines  luxembourgeoises a  l'A.R.B.E.D., 
Esch-sur-Alzette 
NETHERLANDS 
Ir.  A.H.W.  MARTENS  (1),  inspecteur-generaal der mijnen,  Staatstoezicht  op  de  Mijnen, 
Apollolaan  9,  Heerlen  (L.) 
Ir. J.A.R.  HOEFNAGELS,  inspecteur der mijnen,  Staatstoezicht  op  de  Mijnen,  Apollo-
laan 9,  Heerlen  (L.) 
Ir.  SMULDERS,  Laura  en Vereeniging,  Eygelshoven  (L.) 
Ir.  VAN  BLARICUM,  Staatstoezicht  op  de  Mijnen,  Apollolaan  9,  Heerlen  (L.) 
UNITED  KINGDOM 
G.K.  GREENOUGH,  Head,  Mechanical  Engineering Section,  Ministry  of  Power,  Safety  in 
Mines,  Research  Establishment,  Red  Hill,  Off  Broad  Lane,  Sheffield 3 
b)  Sessions  of  the  Working  Party 
1.  25th January  1961 
2.  21st  November  1961 
3.  26th  and  27th February  1962  (SeilprUfstelle,  Bochum) 
4.  17th December  1964 
5.  23rd February  1965 
6.  5th April  1965 
7.  15th October  1965 
V.  Working  Party on  "Inflammable  dusts" 
a)  Composition 
GERMANY 
Oberbergamtsdirektor  K.  HUEBNER,  ·Leiter der Unterabteilung Montanwirtschaft  des  Mini-
steriums  fUr  Wirtschaft,  Verkehr  und  Landwirtschaft  des  Saarlandes,  6600 Saarbrilcken, 
Hardenbergstr. 
Dipl.  Ing.  E.  BREDENBRUCH,  Leiter der Hauptstelle fUr  das Grubenrettungswesen, 
4300 Essen-Kray,  Dortmunderstr.  209 
Dr.-Ing.  A.  STEFFENHAGEN,  GeschaftsfUhrer der Versuchsgrubengesellschaft  mbH, 
4600 Dortmund,  Tremoniastr.  13 
K.  KRAEMER,  Industriegewerkschaft  Bergbau  und  Energie,  4630 Bochum,  Alte  H~ttinger­
str.  19 
(1)  As  representative of  the Restricted Committee. 462 
BELGIUM 
A.  VANDENHEUVEL,  directeur general des  mines,  Ministere des  affaires economiques, 
6~8,  rue  de  la Science,  Bruxelles 
E.  DE~ffiLENNE,  administrateur directeur  de  l'Institut national des  mines,  60,  rue 
Grande,  P~turages 
A.  HAUSMAN,  directeur  du  centre de  coordination des  moyens  de  sauvetage  de  Campine, 
555,  Kempische  Steenweg,  Hasselt 
FRANCE 
G.  SCHNEIDER  (1),  ingenieur general des  mines,  Ministere  de  l'industrie et  du  commerce, 
97,  rue  de Grenelle,  Paris  7e 
A.  REBIERE,  chef  du  service hygiene et  securite miniere a  la direction des  mines, 
Ministere  de  l'industrie et  du  commerce,  97,  rue  de Grenelle,  Paris  7e 
R.  LOISON,  directeur des  groupes  de  recherches  CERCHAR,  35,  rue Saint-Dominique, 
Paris  7e 
F.  REY,  chef  du  service de  !'exploitation des  Charbonnages  de  France,  9,  avenue 
Percier,  Paris  8e 
L.  CHAUVEAU,  Federation nationale des  syndicats chretiens des  mineurs,  8,  rue  de 
Navarre,  Paris  7e 
. J.  POREBSKI,  Federation nationale de  la force  ouvriere des  mineurs,  247,  bd.  de  la 
Victoire,  Annequin  (Pas-de-Calais) 
ITALY 
Ing.  G.  GIROLAMI,  ispettore generale delle miniere,  Ministero dell'industria e  commer-
cia,  via Veneto 33,  Roma 
NETHERLANDS 
Ir. D.J.  KNUTTEL,  hoofdinspecteur der  mijnen,  Staatstoezicht  op  de  Mijnen,  Apollo-
laan 9,  Heerlen  (L.) 
Prof.  Dr.  W.  MAAS,  chef  van  de Veiligheidsdienst  der Staatsmijnen in Limburg,  van der 
Maesenstraat  2,  Heerlen 
UNITED  KINGDOM 
Dr.  H.L.  WILLETT·,  National  Coal  Board,  Hobart  House,  Grosvenor  Place,  London s.w.  1 
G.  HOYLE,  Deputy  Chief  Inspector  of  Mines  and Quarries,  Ministry of  Power,  Thames 
House  South,  Millbank,  London s.w.  1 
Dr.  D.W.  WOODHEAD,  Safety  in Mines  Research  Establishment,  Field Laboratories,  Harpur 
Hill,  Buxton  (Derbyshire) 
(1)  As  representative of the Restricted Committee. 463 
b)  Sessions of  the Working  Party  and its Sub-Committees 
1. 
2. 
3. 
4. 
2nd  and  3rd February  1966 
17th February  1966 
18th March  1966 
16th June  1966 
VI.  High  Authority competition  for  improved mine  safety equipment 
a)  Composition 
GERMANY 
Ministeria1rat  W.  LATTEN,  Ministerium fUr  Wirtschaft,  Mitte1stand  und  Verkehr  des 
Landes  Nordrhein-Westfa1en,  DUsseldorf,  Haro1dstr.  4 
Prof.  Dr.-Ing.  E.  LINSEL,  Leiter der Forschungsste1le  fUr  Grubenbewetterung,  Essen-
Kray,  Dortmunderstr.  151 
Dip1.  Ing.  E.  BREDENBRUCH,  Leiter der Hauptstel1e  fUr  das  Grubenrettungswesen,  Essen-
Kray,  Schonscheidtstr.  28 
FRANCE 
R.  CHERADAME  (Prasident/president),  directeur general  au  CERCHAR,  35,  rue Saint-
Dominique,  Paris  7e 
A.  REBIERE,  chef  du  service hygiene et  securite,  Direction des  mines,  Ministere  de 
l'industrie et  du  commerce,  97,  rue  de Grene11e,  Paris  Be 
c.  TERRIER,  directeur aux  Charbonnages  de  France,  9,  avenue  Percier,  Paris  Se 
BELGIUM 
L.  BRISON,  professeur a la Facu1te  polytechnique de  Mons,  9,  rue  de  Houdain,  Mons 
ITALY 
Ing.  P.  CERULLI,  ispettore generale delle miniere,  Ministero dell'industria e  commer-
cio,  33,  via Veneto,  Roma 
. NETHERLANDS 
Dr.  w.  DE  BRAAF,  directeur van  het  centraal proefstation der Staatsmijnen,  Treebeek 464 
b)  Sessions of  the  Jury  and its Report  Groups 
1. 
2. 
3. 
4. 
5. 
6. 
7. 
8. 
9. 
10. 
11. 
12. 
13. 
14. 
15. 
16. 
17. 
18. 
27th April  1961 
14th December·l961 
9th February  1962 
8th and  9th October  1964 
4th  and  5th November  1964 
20th November  1964 
18th January  1965 
4th February  1965  (Essen-Kray) 
lOth February  1965  (Bochum) 
lOth March  1965  (PAturages) 
17th March  1965  (Essen-Kray) 
23rd March  1965  (Essen-Kray) 
24th March  1965  (Verneuil) 
29th March  1965 
21st  June  1965  (Verneuil) 
19th  and  20th July  1965  (PAturages) 
lOth September  1965  (Heerlen-Trebeek) 
27th September  1965 465 
D.- WORKING  PARTIES  ON  "HUMAN  FACTORS" 
I.  Working Party on  "Effects of working  time  on safety of work,  especially in 
difficult or unhealthy conditions" 
a)  Composition 
GERMANY 
Berghauptmann Dr.  FUNDER,  Oberbergamt,  4600 Dortmund 
Bergwerksdirektor H.  MIDDENDORF,  Bergassessor a.D.,  Steinkohlenbergwerke  Mathias 
Stinnes  AG,  43  Essen-West 
E.  STEBEL,  Industriegewerkschaft  Bergbau  und  Energie,  4630 Bochum,  Alte Hattinger-
str.  19 
BELGIUM 
VAN  MALDEREN,  ingenieur  en chef,  directeur des. mines  a  la Direction generale des 
mines,  6-8,  rue  de  la Science,  Bruxelles 
M.J.  SAUCEZ,  attache  au Centre de  formation postuniversitaire pour  ingenieurs de 
charbonnages,  141,  rue de  l'Espinette,  Quaregnon 
F.  BIJNENS,  Torenveldstraat  10,  Beringen 
FRANCE 
P.  BOURELIER,  ingenieur des mines,  Cite administrative,  2,  rue de  l'HOpital militaire, 
Strasbourg  (Bas-Rhin) 
C.  TERRIER,  directeur aux  Charbonnages  de France,  9,  avenue  Percier,  Paris  8e 
A.  AUGARD,  secretaire general adjoint  de  la Federation nationale de  la force ouvriere 
des mineurs,  169,  avenue  de  Choisy,  Paris  13e 
ITALY 
Ing.  G.  BULGARELLI,  capo del distretto minerario di Padova,  via Baiamonti  1,  Padova 
Prof.  M.  CARTA,  Istituto arte mineraria,  societa Carbosarda,  Cagliari  (Sardegna) 
L.  BACCI,  Uilmec,  via Sicilia 154,  Roma 466 
NETHERLANDS 
Ir. D.J.  KNUTTEL,  hoofdinspecteur der mijnen,  Staatstoezicht op de  Mijnen,  Heerlen, 
Apollolaan  9 
Ir.  F.W.  FENNELL,  hoofdingenieur  van  de  Staatsmijnen in Limburg,  p/a Staatsmijn 
Wilhelmina;  Terwinselen  (L.) 
H.L.  GROND,  Katholieke Vereniging van  Mijnbeambten,  Schelsberg  202,  Heerlerheide  (L.) 
Drs.  D.C.  VANDERHOOFT  (1),  hoofd  van  de directie mijnwezen,  Ministerie van  Econo-
mische  Zaken,  Bezuidenhouts~weg 30,  's-Gravenhage 
UNITED  KINGDOM 
R.  BELL,  National  Coal  Board,  Production Department,  Hobart  House,  Grosvenor  Place, 
London  s.w.  1 
b)  Sessions of  the Working  Party 
1. 
2. 
3. 
1a)  Sub-Committee 
GERMANY 
29th June  1962 
20th November  1962 
15th March  1963 
Berghauptmann  Dr.  FUNDER,  Oberbergamt,  4600 Dortmund 
. Bergwerksdirektor H.  MIDDENDORF,  Bergassessor a.D.,  Steinkoh1enbergwerke  Mathias 
Stinnes  AG,  43  Essen-West 
BELGIUM 
Frans  BIJNENS,  Torenveldstraat  10,  Beringen 
FRANCE 
Andr~ AUGARD,  secr~taire g~n~ral adjoint  de  1a  F~d~ration nationale de  la force 
ouvriere des mineurs,  169,· avenue  de  Choisy,  Bo!te  post~le 325,  Paris  13e 
(1)  As  representative of  the Restricted Committee. 467 
ITALY 
Prof.  Mario  CARTA,  Istituto arte mineraria,  societa Carbosarda,  Cag1iari  (Sardegna) 
NETHERLANDS 
Drs.  D.C.  VAN  DER  HOOFT,  hoofd  van  de directie mijnwezen,  Ministerie van  Economische 
Zaken,  Bezuidenhoutseweg 30,  's-Gravenhage 
lb)  Sessions of  the Sub-Committee 
1. 
2. 
22nd September  1961 
3rd May  1962 
2a)  Medical  experts 
GERMANY 
Prof.  Dr.  med.  habi1.  H.  BRUENER,  532  Bad  Godesberg,  Kolnerstr.  70 
Prof.  Dr.  med.  G.  LEHMANN,  Max  Planck Institut  fUr  Arbeitsphysiologie,  4600 Dortmund, 
Rheinlanddamm  201 
BELGIUM 
Professeur F.  LAVENNE,  Institut d'hygiene des mines,  Hasselt 
Docteur  LEYH,  Institut d'hygiene des  mines,  Hasselt 
FRANCE 
Docteur  KRAFFT,  m~decin-chef aux  mines  de potasse d'Alsace,  Mu1house 
NETHERLANDS 
Drs.  K.R.  KOOPMANS,  Akerstraat  116  a,  Heer1en 468 
II.  Working  Party  "Medical  problems  of  a  safety policy" 
a)  Composition 
GERMANY 
Regierungsdirektor  W.  SCHNASE,  Bundeswirtschaftsministerium,  Referat  III A I,  53  Bonn 
Dr.  med.  G.  SCHAEPER,  Dortmunder  Bergbau  AG,  4600 Dortmund,  Katharinenstr.  9 
H.  BULLA,  Industriegewerkschaft  Bergbau  und  Energie,  Bochum,  Alte Hattingerstr.  19 
BELGIUM 
A.  VANDENHEUVEL  (1),  directeur general des  mines,  Mi~istere des affaires economiques, 
6-8,  rue  de  la Science,  Bruxelles 
VAN  MALDEREN,  ingenieur  en  chef,  directeur des  mines  a la Direction generale des 
mines,  6-8,  rue  de  la Science,  Bruxelles 
Docteur  VAN  MECHELEN,  medecin-chef  de  l'Institut d'hygiene  des  mines,  24,  Havermarkt~ 
Hasselt 
R.  BALESS,  secretaire national  de  la Centrale syndicale des travailleurs des  mines 
de  Belgique,  8,  rue  Joseph Stevens,  Bruxelles 
FRANCE 
A.  REBIERE,  chef  du  service hygiene et securite miniere a  la Direction des  mines, 
Ministere de.l'industrie,  97,  rue  de Grenelle,  Paris 7e 
Docteur  AUPETIT,  medecin-chef  du  groupe  d'Oignies des houilleres du bassin du  Nord 
et  du  Pas-de-Calais,  20,  rue des  Minimes,  Douai  (Nord) 
L.  CHAUVEAU,  Federation nationale des syndicats chretiens des mineurs,  8,  rue  de 
Navarre,  Paris 5e 
Alternate  :  M.  SAUTY,  Federation  des  Mineurs,  10,  rue Diderot,  Lens  (Nord/ 
Pas-de-Calais) 
ITALY 
Dott.  c.  MICHELAZZI,  ispettore capo del  lavoro addetto alla divisione sicurezza e 
igiene del  lavoro,  Ministero del  lavoro,  Roma 
Prof.  E.  BARTALINI,  direttore dei servizi sanitari della soc.  Montecatini,  18, 
via Turati,  Milano 
A.  GUAITA,  Iglesias  (Cagliari)  (Sardegna) 
(1)  As  representative of  the  Restricted Committee. 469 
NETHERLANDS 
Drs.  D.C.  VAN  DER  HOOFT,  hoofd  van de directie mijnwezen,  Ministerie van  Economische 
Zaken,  Bezuidenhoutseweg 30,  's-Gravenhage 
Dr.  med.  A.V.M.  MEY,  directeur geneeskundige dienst  der Nederlandse Steenkolenmijnen, 
Hor1zonstraat  75,  Treebeek  (L.) 
c.  FEENSTRA,  voorzitter van de Protestant-Christelijke Mijnwerkersbond,  Burg.  de 
Hesselleplein 26,  Heerlen 
UNITED  KINGDOM 
Dr.  med.  J.M.  DAVIDSON,  Safety and Health Division,  Ministry  of  Power,  Thames  House, 
South Milbank,  London  s.w.  1 
b)  Sessions of  the Working  Party 
15th September  1961 
la)  Medical  experts 
GERMANY 
Oberregierungsmedizinalrat  Dr.  med.  R.  WAGNER,  Bundesministerium fUr  Arbeit  und 
Sozialordnung,  53  Bonn. 
Alternate  :  Herr Ministerialrat Dr.  med.  MEYERINGH,  Bundesministerium  fUr  Arbeit 
und Sozialordnung,  53  Bonn 
BELGIUM 
Docteur  P.  KISTERS,  inspecteur general,  chef  de  !'Inspection medicale  du travail, 
128,  avenue  de Broqueville,  Bruxelles  15 
FRANCE 
Docteur J.J. JARRY,  Charbonnages  de  France,  9,  avenue Percier,  Paris  Be 
ITALY 
Prof.  P.  DIDONNA,  ispettore generale del  lavoro,  capo dell'Ispettorato medico del 
lavoro,  libero docente di medicina del  lavoro nell'Universita di Roma,  via 
s. Basilio,  41,  Roma 470 
NETHERLANDS 
H.  ITALIE,  Arts,  inspecteur der  mijnen,  Staatstoezicht  op  de  Mijnen,  Heerlen, 
Apollolaan  9 
I I I.  Working  Party "Psychological  &  sociological factors  in safety" 
a)  Composition 
GERMANY 
Regierungsdirektor  W.  SCHNASE  (1),  Bundeswirtschaftsministerium,  Referat  III A 1, 
53  Bonn 
H.  SANDERS,  Berghauptmann,  Oberbergamt,  4600 Dortmund,  Goebenstr.  25 
Bergwerksdirektor  M.  OBERSCHUIR,  Bergassessor a.D.,  Ewald-Kohle  AG,  4350 Reckling-
hausen,  Lessingstr.  49 
F.  POTT,  Industriegewerkschaft  Bergbau  und  Energie,  4630 Bochum,  Alte Hattingerstr.  19 
BELGIUM 
G.  LOGELAIN,  inspecteur general  a  !'Administration des  mines,  Ministere des  affaires 
economiques,  6-8,  rue  de  la Science,  Bruxelles 
Alternate  :  Monsieur G.J.A.  COOLS,  Directeur divisionnaire  a  !'Administration 
des  Mines,  6-8,  rue  de  la Science,  Bruxelles 
ROYER,  Nieuwstraat  100,  Genk 
E.  VA~~ENDRIESSCHE,  5,  rue  de  Trazegnies,  Courcelles 
FRANCE 
DUVERGER,  ingenieur des  mines  a  !'arrondissement mineralogique  de  Douai 
VERDET,  ingenieur en  chef  du  service central securite des houilleres du  bassin du 
Nord  et  du  Pas-de-Calais,  20,  rue des  Minimes,  Douai  (Nord) 
L.  CHAUVEAU,  Federation nationale des  syndicats chretiens des  mineurs,  8,  rue  de 
Navarre,  Paris 5e 
ITALY 
Dott.  C.  MICHELAZZI,  ispettore generale del Ministero del  lavoro e  della previdenze 
sociale,  via Veneto 33,  Roma 
Avv.  U.  CUTTICA,  dirigente della societa nazionale  Cogne,  via s. Quintina,  Torino 
(1)  As  representative of  the Restricted Committee. 471 
Prof,  N.  DE  PAMPHILLIS,  C,I,S,L.,. via Isonzo 42,  Roma 
LUXEMBOURG 
A.  SCHUSTER,  ingenieur directeur du travail et des  mines,  Inspection du travail et 
des  mines,  19,  avenue Gaston Diderich,  Luxembourg 
A,  RAUS,  directeur a  l'A.R,B,E,D,,  Luxembourg 
Alternate  :  Monsieur  E.  SCHMIT,  Ingenieur  principal  pour  la securite  de  l'A.R.B.E.D. 
Luxembourg 
NETHERLANDS 
Ir.  Chr.  PICKEE,  hoofdinspecteur der mijnen,  Staatstoezicht  op  de  Mijnen,  Apollolaan 9, 
Heerlen 
Ir. G.B.  DEBETS,  directeur Oranje-Nassau  Mijnen,  Heerlen 
F,S,  DOHMEN,  Nederlandse  Kath,  Mijnwerkersbond,  Schinkelstraat  13,  Heerlen 
b)  Sessions of  the Working  Party 
1. 
2, 
3. 
13th March  1964 
lOth  and 11th November  1965 
6th  and 7th January  1966 
la)  Sub-Committee  of  the Working  Party 
GERMANY 
Regierungsdirektor w.  SCHNASE,  Bundeswirtschaftsministerium,  Referat  Ill A 1,  53  Bonn 
H.  SANDERS,  Berghauptmann,  Oberbergamt,  4600 Dortmund,  Goebenstr.  25 
BELGIUM 
E.  VANDENDRIESSCHE,  5,  rue de Trazegnies,  Courcelles 
FRANCE 
L.  CHAUVEAU,  Federation nationale des  syndicats chretiens des mineurs,  8,  rue  de 
Navarre,  Paris 5e 
ITALY 
Dott.  c.  MICHELAZZI,  ispettore generale del Ministero del  lavoro et della providenze 
sociale,  via Veneto 33,  Roma 472 
LUXEMBOURG 
E.  SCHMIT,  ingenieur principal pour  la securite a  l'A.R.B.E.D.,  Luxembourg 
lb)  Sessions of  the  sub-committee 
1. 
2. 
3. 
15th May  1962 
13th July  1962 
18th September  1963 
IV.  Working  Party  on  "Effects of methods  of  payment  on safety" 
a)  Competition 
GERMANY 
Ministerialdirigent Dr.-Ing.  K.  HELLER,  Ministerium fUr  Wirtschaft,  Mittelstand und 
Verkehr,  Land  Nordrhein-Westfalen,  4  Dusseldorf,  Haroldstr.  4 
Dr.-Ing.  H.  SCHRAER,  Assessor des Bergfachs,  Unternehmensverband  Ruhrbergbau, 
4300 Essen,  Postfach 1708/09 
H.  GELHORN,  Industriegewerkschaft  Bergbau  und  Energie,  4630 Bochum,  Alte Hattinger-
str.  19 
BELGIUM 
TONDEUR,  ingenieur principal divisionnaire des  mines  a  la Direction generale des 
mines,  6-8,  rue de  la Science,  Bruxelles 
F.  LELOUP,  ingenieur  en chef,  9,  quai  van  Beneden,  Liege 
L.  THOMAS,  secretaire national de  la centrale syndicale des travailleurs des  mines 
de  Belgique,  impasse  Pirnay  16,  Grace-Berleur 
FRANCE 
J. HAUSER,  ingenieur des mines  a !'arrondissement  des  mines  de  Metz,  1,  rue Eugene 
Schneider,  Metz 
J.  MARSEILLE,  houilleres du bassin de  Lorraine,  2,  rue de  Metz,  Merlebach  (Moselle) 
A.  AUGARD,  secretaire general adjoint,  Federation nationale de  la force ouvriere des 
mineurs,  miniers·et similaires,  169,  avenue  de  Choisy,  Paris 13e 
ITALY 
Dott.  R.  PURPURA  (1),  direttore generale al Ministero del  lavoro,  via Flavia 6,  Roma 
(1)  Chairman,  appointed by  the  Restricted Committee. 473 
Dott.  R.  ROSSANO,  ispettore generale,  Direzione generale  de~le miniere,  Ministero 
dell' industria e  del  commercia,  Roma 
Avv.  L.  PUCCI,  dirigente della societa Montecatini,  via Turati  18,  Milano 
F.  BIAGIOLI,  C.I.S.L~,  via Isonzo 42,  Roma 
LUXEMBOURG 
A.  SCHUSTER,  ingenieur directeur du  travail et  des mines,  Inspection du travail et 
des mines,  19,  avenue Gaston Diderich,  Luxembourg 
A.  RAUS,  directeur  a  l'A.R.B.E.D.,  Luxembourg 
Alternate  :  Monsieur  w.  WAGNER,  Ingenieur  adjoint  au  Chef  du  personnel  A.R.B.E.D., 
avenue  de  la Liberte,  Luxembourg 
NETHERLANDS 
Ir. A.H.W.  MARTENS,  inspecteur generaal der mijnen,  Staatstoezicht  op  de  Mijnen, 
Apollolaan 9,  Heerlen 
Ir. G.B.  DEBETS,  directeur der Oranje-Nassau  Mijnen,  Heerlen 
J.  PALMEN,  secretaris van  de  Ned.  Katholieke  Mijnwerkersbond,  Schinkelstraat  13, 
Heerlen 
UNITED  KINGDOM 
R.  BELL,  National  Coal  Board,  Hobart  House,  Grosvenor  Place,  London  s.w.  1 
b)  Sessions  of  the-Working Party 
1. 
2. 
3. 
23rd  and  24th March  1964 
20th January  1965 
21st March  1966 
la)  Sub-Committee  of the Working  Party 
GERMANY 
Dr.-Ing.  H.  WALTHER,  Leiter der Gedingekommission,  4300 Essen,  Maxstr.  73 
BELGIUM 
TONDEUR,  ingenieur principal divisionnaire des  mines  a  la Direction generale des 
mines,  6-8,  rue  de  la Science,  Bruxelles 474 
FRANCE 
J.  MARSEILLE,  houilleres du bassin de  Lorraine,  Direction generale,  2,  rue  de  Metz, 
Merlebach  (Moselle) 
V.  BRADEFER,  169,  avenue  de  Choisy,  Paris  13e 
ITALY 
Dott.  R.  PURPURA,  direttore generale al Ministero del  lavoro,  via Flavia 6,  Roma 
Dott.  Ing.  G.  CARTA,  direttore generale della Carbonifera sarda con  sede in Carbonia, 
11,  via Napoli,  Carbonia 
LUXEMBOURG 
M.  WAGNER,  ingenieur adjoint  au  chef  du  personnel a  l'A.R.B.E.D.,  avenue  de  la Liberte, 
Luxembourg 
NETHERLANDS 
Ir.  A.H.W.  MARTENS,  inspecteur generaal der mijnen,  Staatstoezicht  op  de  Mijnen, 
Apollolaan 9,  Heerlen 
J.  PALMEN,  secretaris van  de  Nederlandse  Katholieke  Mijnwerkersbond,  Schinkelstraat  13, 
Heerlen 
lb)  Sessions of  the  Sub-Committee 
1. 
2. 
3. 
15th May  1962 
13th July  1962 
18th September  1963 PUBLICATIONS  DEPARTMENT  OF  THE  EUROPEAN  COMMUNITIES 
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